Ryan v Sensational Views Limited

[2025] NZHC 2877

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-000042

[2025] NZHC 2877

UNDER

the Land Transfer Act 2017 and the High Court Rules 2016

BETWEEN

MATTHEW PETER RYAN

First Applicant

LIFESTYLE RENTAL PROPERTIES LIMITED
Second Applicant

LIFESTYLE LOANS LIMITED
Third Applicant

AND

SENSATIONAL VIEWS LIMITED

Respondent

cont. over

Hearing:	On the papers
Appearances:	P Brinsley / S Dalgleish for the Applicants R McNaughton for the Respondent
Judgment:	2 October 2025

COSTS JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE COGSWELL

This judgment was delivered by me on 2 October 2025 at 3.00 p.m. pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date.......................................

Solicitors:

MBC Law Ltd, Auckland P Brinsley, Wellington

S Dalgleish, Auckland

RYAN v SENSATIONAL VIEWS LTD [2025] NZHC 2877 [2 October 2025]

CIV-2025-404-000601

UNDERthe Land Transfer Act 2017 and High Court Rules 2016

IN THE MATTER                of an originating application for an order

that a caveat not lapse

BETWEEN  MATTHEW PETER RYAN

Applicant

SENSATIONAL VIEWS LIMITED
Respondent

Introduction

[1]    This judgment deals with the respondent’s claims for costs in two related proceedings, CIV-2025-404-000042 and CIV-2025-404-000601.

[2]    Whilst the parties to both applications differ, both proceedings relate to at one level to the falling out between two friends, Matthew Peter Ryan and Laurence Pope. The other applicants are entities owned by or related to Mr Ryan. Sensational Views Ltd is related to Mr Pope.

Proceeding CIV-2025-404-000042

[3]    This originating application was to prevent the lapsing of caveat number 12213166.1. The originating application was filed within the prescribed statutory timeframe in response to a notice of lapse.

[4]The respondent filed a notice of opposition and an affidavit in support.

[5]    The Court adjourned the application to a fixture, which order operates as an interim order sustaining the caveat pending determination.1

1      Section 143(4) Land Transfer Act 2017

[6]    The applicants, however, did not notify the District Land Registrar of the interim orders within the prescribed statutory timeframe2, and the caveat lapsed.

[7]    By Minute dated 25 February 2025, Associate Judge Brittain noted that as a result, the proceeding was defunct, the only outstanding issue being the question of costs.

[8]    The  proceeding  was   then   called   before  Associate   Judge   Brittain   on 8 April 2025. The applicants advised the Court that they intended to file an application for leave to file a second caveat.

[9]    Later, by memorandum dated 6 May 2025, the applicants confirmed that they did not intend to proceed to seek the leave of the Court to lodge a second caveat.

[10]   Accordingly, for this originating application the issue remains the respondent’s claim to costs.

Proceeding CIV-2025-404-000601

[11]   This proceeding relates to caveat 1322177.1. The caveat was filed by Mr Ryan alone.

[12]   The originating application to prevent the lapsing of this caveat was filed within the prescribed statutory timeframe in response to a notice of lapse.

[13]The respondent filed a notice of opposition and an affidavit in support.

[14]   Timetabling was put in place on 8 April 2025 to dispose of the applicant’s application to prevent the lapse of caveat 1322177.1.

[15]   By memorandum dated 6 May 2025, the applicant confirmed that that application was to be discontinued, and the caveat withdrawn.

2      Section 143(3) Land Transfer Act 2017

[16]   Accordingly, for this originating application, the issue remains the respondent’s claim to costs.

Present position

[17]   The present position, therefore, is that in relation to both the proceedings, the applicant to those proceedings has withdrawn them.

[18]   The respondent has been required to respond to both applications, with notices of opposition and evidence filed in both and Court appearances required in the Caveat Lists.

[19]   No agreement about the costs consequences of the discontinuances was reached with the respondent, who seeks costs on both applications. The respondent seeks costs on an indemnity basis.

Approach to costs

[20]   The starting point on costs is that generally in relation to the determination of costs3:

(a)the party who fails with respect to a proceeding or an interlocutory application should pay costs to the party who succeeds;

(b)an award of costs should reflect the complexity and significance of the proceeding;

(c)costs should be assessed by applying the appropriate daily recovery rate to the time considered reasonable for each step reasonably required, in relation to the proceeding or interlocutory application;

(d)an award of costs should not exceed the costs incurred by the party claiming the costs, and

3      Rule 14.2 High Court Rules 2016

(e)so far as possible, the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

[21]   At the end of the day, the determination of costs is an exercise of the Court’s discretion. That said, the discretion is not unfettered and has to be exercised judicially.

The parties’ position on costs

[22]   The respondent’s position on costs is that both sets of proceedings had no merit and were a collateral part of the ongoing dispute between Messrs Ryan and Pope. The respondent contends that there was no sustainable caveatable interest for the lodging of either caveat.

[23]   The respondent says that it is clear that there was no basis to support the caveatable interest claimed on either application and that the respondent’s opposition was so compelling that the applicants had no choice but to discontinue both applications. The respondent adds that no substantive claim has ever been served on it in relation to the alleged claims to the properties sought to be caveated.

[24]   The respondent seeks an order for indemnity costs under r 14.6. It says that the applicants’ applications had no hope of success. It says that the allegations of fraud were never appropriately pleaded nor supported by evidence.

[25]   For the applicant parties, they say that this is an appropriate case where the general presumption that a discontinuing party pays costs should be displaced.4

[26]   They say that that is warranted having regard to the serious and credible allegations of fraud and dishonesty that initiated this dispute, the direct benefit that the respondent received from its fraudulent acts. They argue that the fact that Mr Ryan discontinued was not due to any concession that there was merit in the respondent’s opposition, but to avoid further wasteful litigation costs.

4      Rule 14.7 High Court Rules 2016

[27]   Many of the matters set out by the applicants as grounds to resist the order for costs are matters which were hotly contested in the opposition papers filed in both applications.

[28]   The applicants argue for the legitimacy of the rights on which the caveats were lodged. With respect to counsel, those arguments would have more weight in the context of a full hearing, but in the case of matters discontinued without full hearing, it is difficult to see how the Court could make findings as to disputed evidence.

[29]   The applicants say that the proceedings were discontinued to avoid the burden and escalating costs of continued litigation rather than as an acknowledgement of the merits of the case.

[30]   It is difficult to see why the long-standing prevailing position should be disturbed. The costs regime exists to provide recompense to a successful party where the opposing party discontinues without an agreement as to costs.

Discussion

[31]   I am not able to conclude on the basis of what has been put before the Court that the applications were so utterly hopeless that they should never have been filed and that as a result the applicants should be visited with indemnity costs.

[32]   Standing back and considering this matter in the round, I consider that the respondent is entitled to scale costs. I am not prepared to grant indemnity costs nor an uplift.

[33]   The applications, whilst defended, were discontinued before the need for submissions or the hearings themselves.

[34]   The respondent has set out in a schedule the scale costs applicable to the     2B category. 2B is the appropriate category for costs.

[35]   Costs total $17,016, which includes $286 in disbursements for filing fees on two notices of opposition.

[36]   I grant costs and disbursements to the respondents in both proceedings in a total amount of $16,730.00 and disbursements in a total sum of $286.00.

Associate Judge Cogswell