Ruwhiu v Police HC Rotorua CRI-2007-463-61

[2007] NZHC 1761

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

CRI-2007-463-61

CHARLIE HENRY RUWHIU

Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:         18 May 2007

Appearances: Mr M Ward-Johnson for appellant

Ms L Davis for respondent

Judgment:      28 May 2007 at 2.30 pm

JUDGMENT OF LANG J [on appeal against sentence]

This judgment was delivered by me on 28 May 2007 at 2.30 pm pursuant to Rule

540(4) of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

Solicitors:
Mr M P Ward-Johnson, Tauranga

Crown Solicitor, Rotorua

RUWHIU V NZ POLICE HC ROT CRI-2007-463-61  28 May 2007

[1]      Mr Ruwhiu was sentenced by His Honour Judge Ingram in the District Court at Tauranga to an effective sentence of three years and nine months imprisonment on one charge of burglary, two charges of receiving and one charge of blackmail.    He now appeals to this Court on the basis that the sentencing Judge applied erroneous principles when sentencing him and that the overall sentence that he received is manifestly excessive.

The sentences

Burglary

[2]      The Judge took the lead charge as being the charge of burglary.   This charge resulted  from an  incident  on 17  October  2006  in which Mr  Ruwhiu  went  to  a residential address in Mt Manganui in the middle of the day.     He forced open a window and entered the house.     Once inside the house he removed a stereo, sunglasses and money having a total value of approximately $800.

[3]      The sentencing Judge adopted a starting point of three years imprisonment on this charge.   He increased that sentence by six months to reflect Mr Ruwhiu’s long list of previous convictions for offences involving dishonesty and burglary.   He then increased it by a further three months to reflect  the fact  that the offending was brought  about  by  Mr  Ruwhiu’s  addiction  to  methamphetamine.      Allowing  a discount of one-third for an early guilty plea, the Judge imposed a final sentence of two years and nine months imprisonment on this charge.

Receiving (bass guitar)

[4]      Between 8 and 10 October 2006 burglars entered a residential address in Mt Maunganui and stole a bass guitar valued at  $3,500.     The  police  subsequently received footage from video  security films taken by two  local businesses in Mt Maunganui.   These clearly showed Mr Ruwhiu endeavouring to sell the stolen bass guitar.   Judge Ingram adopted a starting point of 18 months imprisonment in relation to this charge and reduced that term by six months to reflect the appellant’s early guilty plea.    He imposed an end sentence of one year’s imprisonment to be served

cumulatively upon the sentence of two years nine months imprisonment imposed in relation to the burglary charge.

Blackmail and receiving (cellphones and passport)

[5]      On 25 October 2006 a Korean National had his bag stolen from his place of work in Mt Maunganui.     The bag contained his passport, two cellphones, an electronic diary and other personal items.

[6]      An associate of the complainant subsequently received a text message to the effect that the stolen property would be returned to the complainant provided a cash payment was made.    Arrangements were then made for an exchange of money for the stolen items to take place.      Although $800 was initially demanded, the complainant eventually agreed to pay the sum of $185 in order to have his goods returned to  him.      The complainant  subsequently contacted the police and  they established an observation point at which they were able to carry out surveillance of the agreed drop-off point for the cash.   They then observed Mr Ruwhiu uplifting an envelope containing the sum of $185 cash from the agreed drop-off point.   When the police spoke to him regarding this offending, he admitted his part in it.

[7]      The Judge adopted a starting point of 18 months imprisonment in relation to the charge of blackmail.    After allowing six months for the guilty plea the Judge imposed a final sentence of one year’s imprisonment.     He also ordered that that sentence be served cumulatively upon the sentence imposed in respect of the charge of burglary.

[8]      On the charge of receiving the cellphones and passport the Judge adopted a starting point of 18 months imprisonment and again allowed a six-month discount to reflect the early guilty plea.    The Judge ordered the final sentence of one year’s imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in relation to the charge of blackmail.

Summary

[9]     In summary, the Judge imposed a sentence of two years nine months imprisonment  on  the  burglary charge,  with  an  effective  cumulative  sentence  of

12 months imprisonment to reflect the offending in relation to all other charges.

Grounds of appeal

[10]     Mr Ward-Johnson advanced the appeal on three separate bases.     First, he argued that the Judge had taken a starting point that was too high in respect of the charge of burglary.    Secondly, he contended that it was not open to the Judge to increase that  starting point to reflect  Mr Ruwhiu’s previous convictions because these were already adequately reflected  in the starting  point  that  the Judge had adopted.   Third, Mr Ward-Johnson submitted that the Judge erred in principle when he increased the starting point by a further three months to reflect the fact that the offending was carried out in order to feed Mr Ruwhiu’s addiction to methamphetamine.

Was the starting point in respect of the burglary charge too high?

[11]     The Judge’s reasoning in relation to the starting point that  he adopted in respect  of the  burglary  charge  is  captured  in  the  following  paragraph  from  his sentencing remarks:

[14]     As far as the burglary is concerned, the relevant authorities are the well known cases of Senior v Police (2000) 18 CRNZ 340 (High Court, Christchurch, 19 December 2000, John Hansen and Young JJ), R v Southon (2003) 20 CRNZ 104, CA314-02 and R v Nguyen (CA 110/01, 2 July 2001). It is clear in your case that you fall well into category 3, which is that of a recidivist burglar, who even on a single burglary can expect to receive a sentence of around three years.   Deterrence and denunciation are significant sentencing factors and in my view you fall squarely within that category.   It is fair to say the burglary concerned was not sophisticated but bearing in mind that it was a private home, burgled in the course of the day, this is a serious matter.

[12]     Mr Ward-Johnson did not take issue with the Judge’s conclusion that Mr Ruwhiu is a recidivist burglar who can now expect to receive a significant sentence of imprisonment upon conviction for even a single charge of burglary.    This flows

from the fact that Mr Ruwhiu now has 39 previous convictions for burglary or other offences involving dishonesty.     Mr Ward-Johnson contended, however, that the Judge  had  failed  to  properly  analyse  the  nature  of  Mr  Ruwhiu’s  previous convictions.   He submitted that, when that exercise is undertaken, it can be seen that Mr Ruwhiu’s previous criminal history is not as serious as the sheer number of his convictions might suggest.   He also submitted that the sentencing Judge had failed to undertake such an analysis, and that, if he had undertaken that process, he would have adopted a significantly lower starting point.

[13]     For this aspect of the appeal Mr Ward-Johnson relied principally upon the conclusions reached by Keane J when he considered an appeal that  Mr Ruwhiu lodged against the sentences that he received when he was last before the Court: Ruwhiu v Police HC ROT CRI 2005-470-23 29 April 2005.    On that occasion the sentencing Judge in the District Court had also adopted a starting point of three years imprisonment on a charge of burglary to which Mr Ruwhiu had pleaded guilty.

[14]     After reviewing Mr Ruwhiu’s previous convictions in some detail, Keane J

reached the following conclusion:

[27]     Mr Ruwhiu’s 36 convictions are unquestionably aggravating but are not to be seen as an absolute. 29 are attributable to a spate of offending in the period 1982-1988, when Mr Ruwhiu was aged between 16 and 22 years. In the 17 years since he has acquired nine further convictions. Two were in

1993 for which he was sentenced to six months imprisonment, three in 1998,

when  he  was  imprisoned  for  20  months,  one  in  2000  when  he  was imprisoned for nine months and one in 2002 for which he was sentenced to

200 hours community work and supervision, but given a final warning. He has continued to offend but at a reducing rate and on a decreasing scale. He is not a rampant recidivist.

[15]     Keane J concluded that the starting point of three years imprisonment was too high and that, even taking into account Mr Ruwhiu’s previous criminal history, the burglary charge warranted a starting point of no more than 20 months imprisonment.

[16]     There is nothing in the Judge’s sentencing notes in the present case to suggest that counsel referred him to the judgment of Keane J.    That is not surprising given the fact that Mr Ruwhiu was no doubt sentenced during the course of a busy list day in the District Court.   Nevertheless I consider that that judgment provides valuable

assistance regarding the approach to be taken in relation to the starting point on the burglary charge.

[17]     There is nothing particularly remarkable about the circumstances giving rise to the present conviction for burglary.   It involved the burglary of a dwelling house that occurred during the day and presumable at a time when the occupants were absent.   Property having a relatively modest value was stolen.    I accept Mr Ward- Johnson’s  submission  that  it  bears  all the  hallmarks  of opportunistic  offending. Although I accept that any such offending is by its very nature serious, there is nothing about the circumstances of the offending that  would,  of itself,  attract  a sentence in the order of three years imprisonment.

[18]     The issue in the present  case is therefore whether  a starting  point  of 36 months  can  be  viewed  as  being  manifestly  excessive  taking  into  account  Mr Ruwhiu’s previous criminal history.

[19]     Mr Ruwhiu must now accept that if he continues to commit offences such as these the sentences that he receives will become increasingly more severe.   For that reason there can be no  doubt that the sentencing Judge was entitled to select  a starting point in excess of the 20 months imprisonment that Keane J viewed as being appropriate in relation to Mr Ruwhiu’s last conviction for burglary.

[20]     A starting point of three years imprisonment is, however, an increase of more than 90 per cent from the starting point that this Court viewed as being appropriate when Mr  Ruwhiu  was  last  sentenced  on  a  similar  charge.      In  the  absence  of aggravating features about the offending itself, I do not consider that an uplift of that magnitude was warranted.   For that reason I take the view that the starting point that the Judge adopted on the charge of burglary was manifestly excessive having regard to Mr Ruwhiu’s previous convictions.

[21]     During  argument  Mr  Ward-Johnson  accepted that  an  appropriate  starting point  in  the  present  case  would  have  been  one  of  two  years  six  months imprisonment.     I agree with that assessment but would add that, if Mr Ruwhiu

continues to offend in a similar way in the future, a starting point of three years imprisonment or more is likely to be appropriate.

[22]     I therefore consider that the appropriate starting point in the present case was a sentence of imprisonment of no more than two years six months.    That sentence should be reduced by the one-third to give due recognition to the early guilty plea, leaving an end sentence of one year eight months imprisonment on the burglary charge.

Should  the  starting  point  have  been  increased  by  six  months  to  reflect  Mr

Ruwhiu’s previous convictions?

[23]     In giving his reasons for increasing the starting point by six months to take account of Mr Ruwhiu’s previous criminal convictions the Judge said no more than that he was adding six months “to count [sic] for your appalling prior record”.

[24]     There is no doubt that previous convictions can amount to an aggravating factor that may legitimately be taken into account for sentencing purposes.   They are specifically prescribed by s9(1)(j) of the Sentencing Act 2002 as an aggravating factor that must be taken into account by a sentencing court.    I also accept that previous convictions are personal to the offender, and  for that  reason they may operate to increase the starting point that has been selected in respect of a particular offence.

[25]     In  the  present  case,  however,  the  starting  point  that  the  Judge  selected reflected the fact that Mr Ruwhiu had a large number of previous convictions for like offending.    The existence of the previous convictions was the very reason that the Judge selected a starting point of three years imprisonment.

[26]     In those circumstances I consider that Mr Ruwhiu’s previous criminal record, correctly described by the Judge as being “appalling”, was already adequately reflected in the starting point that the Judge adopted.   It is also adequately reflected in the starting point that this Court deems to be appropriate on appeal.     For this

reason I do not consider that there is any justification for increasing the starting point to take account of Mr Ruwhiu’s previous convictions.

Was the Judge entitled to increase the starting point by three months to reflect the fact  that  the  offending  was  related  to  Mr  Ruwhiu’s  addiction  to methamphetamine?

[27]     The Judge expressed his reasons in relation to this aspect of the sentence as follows:

[7]       The Crown have emphasised in submissions to me the nature of the offending, the relatively short period over which it was carried out and the background  of  your  addiction  to  methamphetamine  as  being  significant factors for me to consider.

[8]       Your counsel has urged me to regard these matters as falling at the lower end of the scale and it is his submission that your methamphetamine addiction explains the offending and his argument is that certainly nothing should be held against you because methamphetamine is involved.     As I indicated to him, and I now propose to indicate to you, I have a straightforward view that people who indulge in illegal drugs and offend because of their involvement with the illegal drugs, not only can they not expect  the  Courts  to  regard  that  as  a  mitigating  factor,  because  the Sentencing Act says that we may not take it into account, but I for myself regard that as being an aggravating factor.    People who take illegal drugs and put the lives or property of others at risk can expect, from me at least, the response that the behaviour should not have been indulged in in the first place and I regard it as adding to the seriousness of the crime.

[9]       I accept unreservedly that your drink and drug habits over the years have caused you a great deal of trouble but the blame for that lies fairly and squarely with you.    I accept it has been the cause of your downfall and I accept it is likely the cause of your offending here, but I do not accept that any reduction in sentence is warranted and in fact I consider that an increase in the sentence is justifiable.

…

[19]      As I say I have a strong view of the prevalence of offending based on the consumption of methamphetamine and the need and craving to feed the habit that arises from those who use methamphetamine.   In my view that is an aggravating factor which should add to the sentence and I propose in your case to deal directly with that.

[20]      Balancing all those matters as best I can, and dealing firstly with the burglary, as I say I regard you as a repeat offender and I take as a starting point a sentence of three years.    I add to that six months to count for your appalling prior record and I add a further three months to account for the fact that you were using the burglary to fund your illegal consumption of methamphetamine.     Accordingly that brings  me to three years and nine

months.   I give you credit of 12 months for your guilty plea and accordingly on the burglary you are sentenced to two years and nine months imprisonment.

[28]     It is clear from the Judge’s observations that, in his view, offending that is motivated by the need to obtain funds to feed an addiction to methamphetamine is an aggravating factor that operates to increase the starting point adopted in respect of a sentence.   That view is expressed in terms that can fairly be described as absolute.

[29]     Counsel advised me that they were unable to find any direct authority in which this particular issue has been directly considered.   They both referred me to R v Finau (2003) 20 CRNZ 333, in which the Court of Appeal said (at 337):

[16]      There is also difficulty with a reference by the Judge to alcohol and illicit substances being an aggravating factor.   Certainly these matters were not mitigating but it is not conventional to regard them as justifying an uplift from a properly determined starting point …

[30]     Taken literally, this passage supports the submissions made on behalf of Mr Ruwhiu.      I accept Ms Davis’ submission, however, that Finau is readily distinguishable from the present case.     The Court in Finau was concerned with offending that had occurred under the influence of alcohol or drugs.   That is not the position in relation to Mr Ruwhiu’s offending.    Rather, the relevance attributed by the Judge to this aspect of his offending is in relation to the factor that motivated Mr Ruwhiu to commit the offences.    That is a different issue to that with which the Court of Appeal was dealing in Finau.

[31]     A case that may be more closely in point is R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170, in which the Court of Appeal said at [63]:

For the same reasons as are fully reviewed in the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales  in Henry,  generally the fact  that robbery is committed to feed  drug addiction should not  be treated as  a mitigating factor.

[32]     These cases demonstrate that the consumption of, or need to acquire, drugs has not traditionally been regarded as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes. That approach has now been codified to some extent by s 9(3) of the Sentencing Act

2002, which prohibits the Court from taking into account by way of mitigation the

fact that the offender was, at the time of committing the offence, affected by the voluntary consumption or use of alcohol or any drug or other substance.

[33]     In considering whether the sentence to be imposed in respect of offending driven by a need to acquire drugs can properly be increased to reflect that fact, the other principles and purposes of sentencing set out in the Sentencing Act 2002 are of obvious relevance.

[34]     Section 9(1) of the Act  specifies factors that may amount to aggravating factors that must be taken into account.    Those factors do not include offending motivated by a need to obtain drugs or money to acquire drugs.   The Act is in fact silent in relation to the issue of motivation other than in relation to s 9(1)(h), which relates to offending motivated by hostility towards any group of persons having an enduring common characteristic such as race, colour, nationality or religion.

[35]     Section 9(4) of the Act, however, provides that  nothing  in s 9(1)  or  (2) prevents the Court from taking into account “any other aggravating or mitigating factor that the Court thinks fit”.   In the present case Ms Davis relied on this section as providing justification for the Judge regarding this particular factor as an aggravating factor warranting an increase in the starting point that he had selected.

[36]     I  accept  that  there  may  be  circumstances  in  which  the  motivation  for offending may properly be taken into account as an aggravating or mitigating factor. In some cases this  factor  may merge with the  issue of premeditation,  which  is specified by s 9(1)(i) as being an aggravating factor that must be taken into account.

[37]     I accept also that the fact that offending may be drug-related may also operate in some circumstances as an aggravating factor.   A possible example may be the fact that the offender has burgled a chemist shop in order to obtain drugs or precursor materials for use in the manufacture of drugs.    Another example might be a case involving persistent drug-related offending, coupled with continued failure by the offender to deal with an obvious addiction.    In each of these examples, however, motivation might merge with other aggravating features.     Addiction in the first example might merge with the existence of pre-meditation.   In the latter example the

aggravating factor might be more explicable in terms of the offender’s previous criminal history and the need to protect the community from offending in the future.

[38]     In the absence of legislative or appellate authority on the point, however, I do not consider that a general or absolute approach can be justified.    People commit offences for all kinds of reasons.     Generally speaking, they fall to be punished according  to  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  offending  rather  than  their motivation in committing it.

[39]     A general or absolute approach is also, in my view, at odds with the current approach to addiction and its treatment as a purpose and principle of sentencing relevant to the offender.    Section 7(1)(h) permits, and ss 8(h) and (i) require, the Court to take into account the rehabilitation of the offender as part of the purposes of and principles applicable to sentencing.   Drug addiction as a cause of offending has frequently been taken into account by sentencing courts when considering whether to impose a rehabilitative or deterrent sentence.

[40]     I consider that it would be dangerous, and potentially counterproductive, to recognise a principle that predicates in general or absolute terms an outcome based solely on the motivation of the offender.     That type of approach may prevent a sentencing court from imposing a sentence that would be in the long term interests of both the offender and the community.     It may also cause offenders who  might benefit from a rehabilitative sentence to be reluctant to reveal the motivation for their offending for fear that their sentence will automatically be increased if they do so.

[41]     For these reasons I do not consider that it would be appropriate for the courts to develop a general principle to the effect that all offending motivated by the need to acquire drugs should be treated more seriously than offending motivated by other factors.   Moreover, the legislature is clearly aware of the fact that the use of drugs and alcohol may be closely related to criminal offending.    That much is obvious from the fact that the Sentencing Act 2002 specifically prohibits the Court from viewing the consumption of alcohol or drugs as being a mitigating factor.     The legislature did not, however, go further and declare that offending motivated by a desire to obtain drugs should be viewed  in a  more serious  light  than offending

motivated by other reasons. I do not consider that sentencing courts should take a general or absolute approach in relation to this issue when Parliament has not seen fit to do so.

[42]     I consider that, if it is to be treated as an aggravating factor at all, it must be taken into account pursuant to s 9(4) of the Act, which provides the Court with a discretion to treat other matters, not specified earlier in the section, as being aggravating or mitigating factors in appropriate cases.

[43]     Each case should, therefore, be determined according to its facts and merits. In appropriate cases the court may invoke s 9(4) to treat the part that drugs have played  in  criminal offending  as  an  aggravating  factor.      The  court  should  not, however, increase a sentence that is otherwise appropriate unless it has undertaken a proper analysis of factors relevant to this particular issue.

[44]     The starting point in any such analysis will usually be the extent to which, if at all, the offender’s involvement with drugs played a part in the offending for which he or she is being sentenced.   In the present case that is clear.   All of the offending for which Mr Ruwhiu was being sentenced was motivated by his need to obtain money to buy methamphetamine.

[45]     Next,  the  court  must  consider  whether  the  offender  has  previously  been involved  with  drugs,  coupled  with  the  extent  to  which,  if  at  all,  any  such involvement has led to previous offending.  In the case of Mr Ruwhiu, that analysis is instructive.    His only previous drug-related convictions were in 1986, when he was convicted of being in possession of cannabis and utensils, and in 1987 when he was convicted of being in possession of cannabis.    He has no previous convictions for any offences involving Class A or Class B drugs.

[46]     The pre-sentence report  also  provides  valuable  insight  into  Mr Ruwhiu’s current involvement with methamphetamine.   It makes no mention of any previous involvement with drugs.   The report says that Mr Ruwhiu had been doing well after his most recent release from prison, but that he began taking methamphetamine in June or July 2006 and “everything went down hill after that”.   He explained to the

probation officer that he was unable to stop taking methamphetamine and reverted back to his criminal ways.

[47]     The nature of Mr Ruwhiu’s previous convictions, coupled with the comments contained in the probation report, suggest that Mr Ruwhiu’s involvement with methamphetamine has been a relatively recent phenomenon, and that it is unlikely to have been a factor in any of his previous offending.   .

[48]     The next, and final, aspect of the analysis involves consideration of the extent to which the offender has been prepared to deal with drug-related problems in the past and the steps that he or she is now prepared to take to deal with such issues.   In the present case there is no suggestion in the probation report that Mr Ruwhiu has had significant problems with drugs in the past or that he has failed to adequately address those problems.    The report noted, in fact, that Mr Ruwhiu has complied with the requirements of  his  previous  sentences  and  court  orders,  and that  this indicates that he does have some ability to respond to intervention.   Mr Ruwhiu also told the probation officer that he would like to be considered for a substance abuse rehabilitative programme that he could commence whilst in custody.

[49]     Taking these matters into account, I do not consider that the part that Mr Ruwhiu’s addiction to methamphetamine played in the present offending ought to have been treated as an aggravating factor that justified the starting point  being increased by a further three months.   Rather, it was a neutral factor that could not be viewed as either aggravating or mitigating the present offending.    It goes without saying, however, that Mr Ruwhiu needs to address his methamphetamine addiction. If he does not do so, and if he continues to commit offences to feed his habit, he runs the very real risk that sentences imposed upon him in the future will be increased.

The other sentences

[50]     Although  Mr  Ward-Johnson  suggested  that the  Judge  may  have  taken  a starting point that was too high in relation to the charge of receiving the bass guitar, he did not quarrel with the overall manner in which the Judge imposed sentences on the remaining charges.      That  is not  surprising  given  the  fact  that  Mr  Ruwhiu

received an effective cumulative sentence of just 12 months imprisonment in relation to all his other offending.

[51]     It  would  have  been  open  to  the  Judge  to  impose  a  separate  cumulative sentence in relation to both the blackmail charge and the charge relating to receiving the bass guitar.    They both represented serious offending, and they were clearly distinct in nature, circumstance and time.

[52]     I consider that the Judge must have elected to impose concurrent sentences on those charges having regard to totality principles.   He must have taken the view that  a  single  cumulative  sentence  of 12  months  imprisonment  on  all  remaining charges was appropriate having regard to the length of the sentence that he had imposed on the burglary charge.

[53]     Given my earlier findings it follows that, if the sentences imposed on the remaining charges are not disturbed, Mr Ruwhiu will serve an effective sentence of two years eight months imprisonment on all charges.    The issue therefore arises as to whether, viewed in totality, a single effective cumulative sentence of 12 months imprisonment  on all remaining  charges  is  still  appropriate  having  regard  to  the sentence that is now to be imposed on the burglary charge.

[54]     Viewing the matter overall, I do not consider that a sentence of two years eight months imprisonment would adequately reflect the totality of Mr Ruwhiu’s offending.    It would, in my view, pay insufficient regard to the seriousness of the offending on the remaining charges of blackmail and receiving.

[55]     The  blackmail  charge,  although  not  the  most  serious  of  its  type,  was nevertheless serious and deserved a deterrent sentence.    It involved extortion using valuable personal assets as a form of leverage in circumstances where the victim would have felt extremely vulnerable.    The charge of receiving the cellphones and passport forms part of the overall criminality of the blackmail charge, and does not require separate recognition.      On its own I  consider  that this offending  would ordinarily attract a cumulative sentence of 12 months imprisonment.

[56]     The charge of receiving the bass guitar was also a reasonably serious matter given Mr Ruwhiu’s previous convictions and the value of the property concerned.   I consider  that  that  charge  warranted  a  starting  point  of  at  least  12  months imprisonment  and  that  it  also  warranted  a  sentence  that  was  to  be  served cumulatively to both the other sentences.   Having regard to the principles of totality, a reduction of two-thirds, or eight months, is justified on this charge.   This produces a sentence of four months imprisonment to be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed in respect of the blackmail charge.

Result

[57]     The appeal is allowed.     The sentences imposed in the District Court are quashed.

[58]     In their place I impose the following sentences:

a)       On the charge of burglary Mr Ruwhiu  is sentenced to  20 months imprisonment.

b)       On the charge of blackmail Mr Ruwhiu is sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with that term to be cumulative upon the sentence imposed in relation to the charge of burglary.

c)       On the charge of receiving the passport and cellphones Mr Ruwhiu is sentenced  to  nine  months  imprisonment  to  be  served  concurrently with the sentence imposed on the charge of blackmail.

d)On the charge of receiving the bass guitar Mr Ruwhiu is sentenced to four months imprisonment.      That sentence is to be served cumulatively upon the sentence of imprisonment imposed in relation to the charge of blackmail.

Lang J