Rush v Police
[2025] NZHC 2576
•5 September 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE TIHI-O-MARU ROHE
CRI-2025-476-000011
[2025] NZHC 2576
BETWEEN STEVEN CHRISTOPHER RUSH
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 28 August 2025 Appearances:
C A Lilley for Appellant
C J Mitchelmore for Respondent
Judgment:
5 September 2025
JUDGMENT OF PRESTON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 5 September 2025 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
RUSH v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 2576 [5 September 2025]
Introduction
[1] Steven Rush, aged 34 and with no previous convictions, appeals the decision of Judge Dravitzki on 26 June 20251 declining to discharge him without conviction on a charge of dangerous driving.2
The driving
[2] The following facts are taken from the police summary of facts, to which Mr Rush pleaded guilty.
[3] At midday on Wednesday 20 November 2024, Mr Rush was the driver of a heavy motor vehicle which was carrying a road roller. Mr Rush was driving north through Timaru.
[4] Mr Rush was driving in the outside of two lanes of SH1 which pass Pak’n Save in Timaru, travelling at approximately 40 kph. A driver of a Mini (referred to in this judgment as Mr M) was driving his car in the inside lane and passed Mr Rush towards the end of the passing lane. Mr M stayed adjacent to the gap between Mr Rush’s vehicle and the vehicle in front of him in preparation to merge at the end. As the lanes merged, Mr M drove into the shoulder but managed to move right into the gap. Mr Rush then followed behind Mr M extremely closely. Mr M sped up to create distance between him and Mr Rush while keeping a sufficient distance from the vehicle in front of him. Mr Rush closed the gap again to a distance considerably less than the required 16 meters required in that speed zone.
[5] As I discuss below, what happened next was subject of some contest before the Judge at sentencing.
[6] As the summary of facts recorded, Mr M slowed and braked as a precaution after seeing a dog running loose on the side of the road, and due to traffic braking ahead of him. Mr Rush crashed into the back of the Mr M’s car, shunting it forward,
1 Police v Rush [2025] NZDC 15109.
2 Land Transport Act 1998, s 35(1)(b); maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or $4,500 fine. The court must order the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for six months or more unless the s 81 exception applies.
and then continued before hitting the car a second time. Mr Rush called the police and stated the driver of the Mini (Mr M) was being a hoon.
District Court decision
[7] Prior to sentencing, Mr Rush filed affidavit evidence in support of the application for discharge.
[8] The Judge undertook a detailed review of the facts. He traversed the police summary as well as Mr Rush’s affidavit containing his account of events. The Judge noted “there are two quite at least contrasting and some would say different versions of what happened”.3 By agreement of counsel, the Judge took the opportunity to view dashcam footage from the vehicle following Mr Rush. This had been provided to Mr Rush by a following driver, immediately after the incident. Mr Rush provided it to police for their investigation.
[9]The Judge’s findings on the video were:
[11] … It is dashcam footage taken from a vehicle that was travelling behind yours at a safe travelling distance, so some way behind, but it is of very good quality and the images are clear. There are two x one minute segments of recording which I viewed which essentially cover all of the incident which I have referred to. In it, it is obvious initially to see the mini motor vehicle passing to the left of your truck. There is nothing wrong with that manoeuvre.
…
[12] As the roadway comes towards the point where it narrows, the driver endeavours to merge in in front of your vehicle. Your vehicle does not slow at all and it appears the mini does speed up slightly to move into what was a narrow gap in front of your vehicle and behind the vehicle in front of you. You then clearly maintain your speed. You do not slow down at all to provide a safe following distance behind the mini. In fact you drive extremely closely behind him.
[13] There is no way there is sufficient room left as a safer following distance and Mr Ellis has just said, the onus is on the following vehicle to ensure that a safe following distance was maintained. It would have been perfectly possible for you to allow that distance, just as the vehicle that … had the dashcam, maintained a safe following distance behind your vehicle.
[14] You did not do so and it is evident why you did not do so, because you were angry and frustrated at what you saw was the mini’s inappropriate driving manoeuvre. And it may have been that it was a very tight gap that it
3 At [10].
was aiming to get into, but it was quite easy for you to de-escalate the situation then and there, initially by slowing to allow him to merge in, and then once he was merged in, to slow to allow that safe travelling distance. You did not do so and you continued to follow right behind him.
[15] The gap then did widen, I think as he sped up to try and put some distance between you and his vehicle, but once again it narrowed to a very short following distance so that again, you were right behind his vehicle. What is then seen is that as the two of your vehicles travelling very closely passed a certain point in the road. Behind the two of you but before the vehicle that has got the dashcam in it, a dog is seen on the side of the road and it is at or about that point that the mini brakes.
[16] Now I accept that both the mini and your vehicle are well past where the dog can be seen in the video, and it is a clear inference, in fact Ms Lilley has been express about it now, that you do not think his braking had anything to do with the dog and in fact was deliberate behaviour by him to touch on his brakes to try and get you to back off essentially, but of course you were following so closely by that stage that you were not able to and you ran into the back of him. Then what happened is the two of you immediately got out of your vehicles and engaged in a heated altercation in the middle of the road, and that was because the two of you were already agitated, frustrated and angry as a result of this interchange far before you ran into each other.
[10]The Judge concluded on the facts that:4
… neither of you covered yourselves in glory and both may well have been acting inappropriately. It may have been quite a narrow gap for the mini driver to get himself into but as I have said, there was every opportunity for you to de-escalate the situation, to move back, to not follow so closely, but you chose not to. You were angry and frustrated, you were having a bad day and you let it get the better of you on that occasion. I do not know whether he braked in response to the dog or not, I do not discount that explanation entirely, but I also take into account what you say about that and I do not discount that entirely either. The reality is though that if you had not been following him so closely, you would not have run into him either.
[11] At [18] of his sentencing remarks the Judge assessed the gravity of the offending as low to moderate, although as is discussed below, he later observed the offending to be at the “lower end very much” of dangerous driving charges he had seen.5 He considered it was not a serious incident, noting no one was hurt and the damage was minor to moderate and had been dealt with through insurance.
[12] The Judge turned to the potential consequences of conviction. Counsel for Mr Rush argued a conviction would make it more difficult for him to obtain a Bridge
4 At [17].
5 At [23].
Engineering Self Supervision (BESS) licence and that NZTA may revoke Mr Rush’s heavy driving licence which is subject to a fit and proper person test. The Judge understood those consequences may come into effect whether or not a conviction was entered. The Judge accepted a conviction may suggest the offending was more serious than Mr Rush would characterise it. The Judge determined there was not an established risk that a conviction (as distinct from the driving incident in itself) would prevent Mr Rush obtaining and keeping his licences.
[13] The Judge also considered the financial consequences for Mr Rush in that he runs his own business, has significant financial outgoings and is the main provider for his family. He accepted the police’s submission that, if disqualified, Mr Rush would be eligible to apply for a limited licence to enable him to drive for work purposes. Further, he determined the closure of Mr Rush’s business (which had the potential to occur if Mr Rush was disqualified) would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending, but noted back-dating the 28-day stand down period would allay this consequence.6
[14] The Judge did not consider there was a real risk a conviction itself would prevent Mr Rush obtaining his licences or result in financial loss given he would be eligible to apply for a limited licence. The Judge therefore was not satisfied the consequences of a conviction were out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending even though the offending was “at the lower end very much of dangerous driving charges which I have previously seen”.7
[15] Having dismissed the application for a discharge, the Judge was not satisfied there were special reasons for not imposing disqualification under s 81 of the Land Transport Act 1998. The Judge was uncertain what the special reasons were for consideration but was inclined to consider that it was Mr M’s driving. While the Judge accepted Mr M’s driving mitigated Mr Rush’s culpability, the Judge considered it did “not … by a long way constitute special reasons under s 81 so as to not impose disqualification”.8
6 At [21].
7 At [23].
8 At [24].
[16] The Judge determined Mr Rush was entitled to be dealt with as any other first offender by reason of his “very good character” and no previous convictions.9
[17] The Judge dismissed Mr Rush’s s 106 application and entered a conviction. The Judge imposed a fine of $500 and court costs of $143. He dismissed the s 81 Land Transport Act application and imposed the minimum six months disqualification period. However, the Judge backdated the disqualification to 25 May 2025 so that Mr Rush would be immediately eligible to apply for a limited licence to drive for work purposes and directed such an application be granted priority.
Principles on appeal
[18] The Court may grant a discharge without conviction under s 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002 only if it is satisfied, under s 107, that the direct and indirect consequences of a conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending.10
[19] The decision under s 107 involves a matter of fact, requiring judicial assessment. Appeals against the proportionality test under s 107 are by way of rehearing, with the appellate court making its own assessment of whether the criteria are established.11 If a discharge without conviction should have been granted, then there will have been a material error by the sentencing Judge, or a miscarriage of justice will have occurred for any other reason, and so the appeal against conviction must be allowed.12
Discussion
Gravity of offending
[20] For Mr Rush, Ms Lilley argues the Judge’s assessment of the gravity of the offending as low to moderate over-estimated Mr Rush’s culpability and failed to place sufficient weight on Mr M’s contribution.
9 At [25].
10 Sentencing Act 2002, s 107.
11 H (CA680/11) v R [2012] NZCA 198 at [35]–[36].
12 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 232(2)(b) or (c); and Jackson v R [2016] NZCA 627 at [12].
[21] Ms Lilley contends the conduct of the victim in contributing to the incident (as found by the Judge), is a key mitigating factor.13 Counsel submits the actions of Mr M merging into a tight gap, deliberately accelerating and then braking are relevant to Mr Rush’s culpability. She submits Mr Rush has acknowledged his fault in the incident, has accepted responsibility and plead guilty, and argues the Judge did not properly account for Mr Rush’s previous good character as a first-time offender with favourable letters of support.14 Ms Lilley characterises Mr Rush’s offending as an error of judgement and emphasises that he is a hardworking man, attempting to run his own business to support his family.
[22] Further, it is submitted the Judge gave insufficient weight to Mr Rush’s state of mind on the day of offending. Specifically, Mr Rush’s sole employee had resigned in the weeks leading up to the incident. This caused Mr Rush significant stress as he needed to bring in enough income each month to meet loan requirements and had a number of contracts to complete in the lead up to Christmas.
[23] Mr Mitchelmore responds that Ms Lilley’s articulation of the incident is at odds with the factual findings of the Judge, emphasising the Judge found Mr M was not at fault in merging and that Mr Rush could have slowed down to create a safe following distance, but chose not to. As the Judge found, and was accepted by Mr Rush’s guilty plea, the operative cause of the collision was Mr Rush’s following distance. Accordingly, Mr Mitchelmore submits the conduct of Mr M is not a mitigating factor.
[24] Mr Mitchelmore also notes as a special licence holder Mr Rush must be held to a higher standard of driving than the average road user. That he engaged in dangerous driving due to personal frustration elevates its gravity and engages public safety considerations. For all these reasons, Mr Mitchelmore submits the Judge correctly characterised the gravity of the offending as low to moderate.
[25] I have not found this aspect of the appeal straightforward. Although I have not had the benefit of viewing the dashcam footage I am assisted by the Judge’s observations on that evidence.
13 Sentencing Act, s 9(2)(c).
14 Section 9(2)(g).
[26] As the Judge found, and Mr Rush accepted by his plea, the operative cause of the collision was Mr Rush’s following distance during the incident after Mr M merged in front of him. It is correct, also, as Mr Mitchelmore points out that even if Mr M had “cut off” Mr Rush, this does not justify his driving response. However, I do not agree as the prosecutor submits that therefore the conduct of Mr M was not a mitigating factor.
[27] Indeed, reading the Judge’s remarks in the passage cited above at [9] it is clear the Judge found Mr M’s behaviour contributed to the incident, notwithstanding that Mr Rush’s failure to put some distance between the Mini and his vehicle ultimately caused him to run into the Mini when it braked suddenly. Thus, the Judge noted that in the dashcam footage after the passing manoeuvre (with which there was nothing wrong) the Mini “does speed up slightly to move into what was a narrow gap”. He found—regarding the appellant’s anger and frustration at what he saw as an inappropriate driving manoeuvre—that “it may have been… a very tight gap that [Mr M] was aiming to get into”, and further that Mr Rush failed to “de-escalate” the situation. Additionally, the Judge accepted that both vehicles were “well past” the dog on the roadside when the Mini braked and that it was a “clear inference” Mr M deliberately touched his brakes prior to the collision.
[28] In sum, I accept that Mr M’s driving, particularly in braking suddenly, was causative of Mr Rush crashing into Mr M’s car. However, as his plea acknowledges, if Mr Rush had been following a safe distance, he would have had ample time to stop safely as the vehicle behind Mr Rush did. The very reason for safe following distances is to allow for safe responses to unexpected manoeuvres from vehicles in front. Although it was Mr M’s braking and the subsequent crash which precipitated the charges, Mr Rush’s driving was dangerous regardless of whether Mr M braked. Still, although the primary culpability lies squarely with Mr Rush, I accept the Judge found the conduct of Mr M was contributory. This is clear from the Judge’s comment: “Mr Rush, you have to take at least a good chunk of the responsibility for what occurred on this occasion”.15 Further, from his conclusion as noted, that:16
15 At [18].
16 At [17] (emphasis added).
…neither of you covered yourself in glory and both may well have been acting inappropriately …
[29] In my view, these aspects of the Judge’s reasons are also consistent with his later finding: that the offending was “at the lower end very much” of dangerous driving charges he had seen.
[30] The non-injury collision occurred when Mr Rush was driving at 40kph. I accept it is an aggravating factor of the offence that he was driving a heavy vehicle at the time; this increased the danger in following too closely as large vehicles take longer to stop once the brakes are applied. Mr Rush would have been familiar with the heightened safety issues associated with driving heavy vehicles due to being a special licence holder. On the other hand, the offence is mitigated by the steps Mr Rush has taken to address his actions, including face to face driver training and which has cost him not an insignificant amount of time and money.17 He appears to have taken the dangerous driving charge extremely seriously. As his counsel emphasises, he has conducted his business as a professional driver for nine years and driven many thousands of driving kilometres without incident and with a clean record save for this isolated incident. I have no doubt he will be very mindful of his driving in the future to avoid any similar charges arising against him.
[31] Weighing all these matters, I have found some of the Judge’s findings on their face hard to reconcile with his conclusion the gravity of the offence was low to moderate. However, I acknowledge his first instance advantage—particularly in view of the dashcam footage—and I do not find he erred in that assessment. Rather, I consider it is plain the Judge considered the offending to lie towards the low end of that spectrum which, as a range of decisions indicates, inevitably turns very much on the particular facts.18
17 Voluntarily Mr Rush has undertaken an E-drive course and an advanced driving course. The advanced driving course involved four-night sessions and a drive test with an instructor and cost Mr Rush $600. During the course, Mr Rush was able to assess the 20 November offending with the instructor and discuss how he would drive differently if a similar situation arose again.
18 See for example Gibson v Police [2019] NZHC 1920; Police v Herbert DC Christchurch CRI-2010-009-6714, 22 October 2010 at [33]; Jeon v Police [2014] NZHC 66; and Patterson v Police [2024] NZHC 2758.
Consequences of conviction
[32] Both counsel canvassed the consequences of conviction fulsomely. I record there has been a significant impact on Mr Rush’s family including young children as a result of the conviction and notwithstanding the Judge’s appropriate accommodation by backdating Mr Rush’s suspension. This is inevitable, if regrettable. However, I focus on the impact of conviction (and the limited licence) upon Mr Rush’s business and ability to gain or hold special licences and therefore his ability to support his family as, in my view, the significant issue on appeal.
[33] Regarding the terms of the limited licence, I agree with Mr Mitchelmore that the terms are not heavily restrictive. Mr Rush may drive for work purposes or to pick up his children from school (if they fall sick) and pick his daughter up from an after-school activity twice a week. He is able to drive for work between 5.00 am and
7.30 pm, Monday to Friday and 7.00 am to 2.00 pm on Saturdays. Further, if undertaking night work for NZTA, his work hours can be from 6.00 pm to 6.00 am. Mr Rush can drive a maximum of 70 hours in one week. There are nine vehicles Mr Rush is authorised to drive, and the area he can drive for work stretches from Invercargill to Marlborough and west to Mt Cook region.
[34] However, as can be seen, the work obligations are onerous and Mr Rush is the sole driver in the business he has developed, after losing his employee just prior to this incident. The police submit that he could ameliorate his position (and therefore the financial strain on the business) by meeting clients remotely, arranging alternative transport or employing a driver for the remainder of the period of disqualification. I am not persuaded by that submission in context of the nature of this business. Further, the terms of the finalised limited licence were reduced from the initial draft order. Relevantly, the hours Mr Rush is able to work on Saturdays was reduced from the initial hours of 5.00 am to 7.30 pm, and he had the flexibility to pick up his children from school (for any reason) and transport any child for any sporting activity.
[35] As Judge Dravitzki accepted, the risk Mr Rush’s business would fail due to the conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending.
[36] Mr Rush seeks to adduce fresh evidence on appeal by affidavits explaining the impact of the limited licence on Mr Rush’s work since sentencing, including the profit and loss position of his business, and its immediate financial forecast. This information, including the impacts on his business notwithstanding the limited licence terms his evidence is fresh and cogent. It is admitted in the interests of justice. The evidence shows the slim margins on which Mr Rush’s business operates, including significant committed outgoings and a projected revenue significantly lower than what is required to ensure the business remains viable over the next several months. Further, he has lost out on at least one contract since the granting of the limited licence due to an inability to accept an urgent job on a Sunday. Another job required an extension from the client due to Mr Rush not being able to drive through the night. Although the client allowed the extension in this case, Mr Rush deposes future clients may well choose to contract a competitor.
[37] Ms Lilley also observes Mr Rush’s conviction directly relates to his profession and means of earning income. She argues it is therefore of far greater significance than if Mr Rush was facing a different charge. This conviction will be given more weight when applying for a BESS licence than any other conviction. It is argued the reputational damage and impact on potential contracts is out of all proportion to the offending. In response, Mr Mitchelmore submits it is entirely appropriate for the conviction to be taken into account in the context of the “fit and proper person” test undertaken in respect of heavy vehicle licences. Mr Mitchelmore notes the conviction will not act as an automatic bar to satisfaction of that test.
[38] The Judge found that the entry of a conviction may add to the perceived severity of the incident when NZTA is determining Mr Rush’s special licence applications.
[39] There is another dimension, as became clear in argument before me. Ms Lilley confirmed the NZTA “review” of Mr Rush’s licence (which occurred in or around December 2024 well before a conviction was entered) was, rather, a written warning that any further traffic or driving offences could jeopardise Mr Rush’s licence. It is thus a response which was generated by the offending conduct itself rather than conviction, as Mr Mitchelmore identifies. However, it is also in itself an (appropriate)
consequence of the offending which operates as a protective factor, independent of a conviction.
[40] Further, NZTA is the appropriate specialist body to determine whether Mr Rush is fit and proper to be holding special licences in light of his offending.19 But as noted, the regulator is already aware of the underlying offending. There is force, accordingly, in Ms Lilley’s submission that the conviction will carry greater weight in the assessment of Mr Rush’s skills and bear on his professional reputation. While NZTA is the appropriate body to determine the outcome of Mr Rush’s licences, it would appear it is already apprised of the fact of charge, at least, and I agree with the Judge’s assessment that entry of a conviction would likely add to the perceived severity of the incident.
[41] I accept that disqualification is not an inevitable consequence of a conviction as submitted by Mr Mitchelmore. However, it is mandated by the Land Transport Act under s 35(2)(b) unless the s 81 exception applies. The “special reasons” in s 81 for not imposing disqualification must relate to the offence, not the offender.20 Given the Judge’s factual findings, I do not consider Mr M’s conduct exculpates Mr Rush to the point required by s 81. Accordingly, I find the Judge did not err in declining to apply s 81. Mr Rush may be able to apply for a new limited licence with broader terms,21 however this could become redundant given the flexibility required by Mr Rush’s work. Resultingly, the only reasonable way to mitigate the consequences of the offending would be to grant Mr Rush a discharge without conviction.
[42] Taking all these factors into account and with the benefit of the fresh evidence on appeal, I assess the consequences of the conviction as moderate to severe. This is due to the impact of the limited licence on Mr Rush’s business which, notwithstanding the terms of the limited licence, creates a real risk that Mr Rush’s business will have to close.
19 See for example, Peruman v R [2025] NZCA 226 at [39]–[42], citing C v R [2020] NZCA 443 at [26].
20 Anderson v Police [2016] NZHC 942 at [15].
21 The Land Transport Act is silent on the jurisdiction to vary the conditions of a limited licence, however there is no express prohibition of such an application under s 105 or the associated provisions.
Out of all proportion
[43] I turn then to the third stage assessment: whether the consequences of conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending.
[44] In this I bear in mind that, as I have found, the Judge’s reasons indicate he found the offending to be at the very lower end of the “low to moderate” spectrum of such offending. Again, I focus on the submissions regarding the impact upon Mr Rush’s business and professional obligations above all other consequences, albeit I recognise that there has been a considerable impact upon the appellant and his family, and associated costs through what has been a protracted process.22
[45] Ms Lilley refers to the urgency with which the limited licence was sought, to protect the business position. She says this led to Mr Rush agreeing to reduced conditions in order to obtain police consent. Although as I have noted the terms of the licence on their face provide generous ability to drive for work purposes, counsel advises Mr Rush’s business has slowed in the winter months due to weather and reduced daylight hours. It is vital for Mr Rush to work long hours when weather permits and meet potential clients on weekends. This is compromised by the limited licence.
[46] Applications under s 106 rely heavily on the specific facts of the offending. That said, I find it useful to consider this Court’s decision in Gibson v Police.23 Mr Gibson had a verbal altercation with the victim who was parked on the road outside his driveway. Mr Gibson told the victim to move but the victim refused and told Mr Gibson to park in front of him. Mr Gibson reversed swiftly, resulting in contact between the towbar on Mr Gibson’s ute and the number plate on the victim’s car. No significant damage was caused, and the victim and his partner were not injured. The District Court Judge had assessed the offending as:24
… deliberate and selfish, high risk and to prove a point … I accept that no damage resulted but that was luck. When you deal with other people’s cars in a dangerous manner, you put their lives and their cars at risk.
22 I put to one side the submission that suggests the conviction “rewards” Mr M for his irresponsibility in the collision, which is unsupported on the facts the Judge found.
23 Gibson v Police [2019] NZHC 1920.
24 At [15], citing Police v Gibson [2019] NZDC 5613 at [32].
[47]I consider this bears some similarity to Mr Rush’s offending.
[48] The gravity of the offending in Gibson was accepted to be low level.25 In this assessment, the Judge accounted for the fact that Mr Gibson was remorseful; he had undertaken an anger management course; his offer to meet with the victim and apologise; and his offer for reparation. Counsel argued the consequences would be disproportionate in that it had negatively impacted Mr Gibson’s ability to gain a Transport (Goods) Service Licence for a tip truck he had recently purchased. The Judge determined however that the dangerous driving conviction was likely not the reason for NZTA rejecting Mr Gibson’s application given Mr Gibson’s previous traffic infringements and the fact he lied about the pending charge on his application form.26 The appeal was therefore dismissed as the consequences were not out of all proportion with the offending.27
[49] In contrast to the facts in Gibson, Mr Rush’s business faces slim margins and the significant need for flexibility in his work renders the potential consequences here out of all proportion with the seriousness of the offending. Furthermore, unlike in Gibson a discharge without conviction would ameliorate the impact on Mr Rush’s work.
[50] The threshold under the proportionality requirement is high. I do not consider the Judge erred on the facts before him. That said, the fresh evidence on appeal satisfies me there is a real risk that Mr Rush’s business will be put under unsustainable financial pressure, including due to inability to service contracts. As the Judge identified, the closure of Mr Rush’s business is a consequence out of all proportion to the offending.28 While the other consequences relied on by Ms Lilley do not meet that high threshold, this case turns on the financial consequences to Mr Rush’s business.
[51] Resultingly, I am satisfied the real risk that Mr Rush’s business will close is out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending and the appeal will therefore be
25 At [48].
26 At [53]–[54].
27 At [56].
28 Police v Rush, above n 1, at [21].
allowed. Given the Court’s discretion to make an order for payment under s 106(3), I do not disturb the orders for a fine and costs made by the Judge.
Result
[52]The appeal is allowed.
[53]Mr Rush’s conviction is quashed.
………………………………………
Preston J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Timaru
Counsel:
RSM Law Limited, Timaru
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