Rubbish Farming Limited v Remediation (NZ) Limited
[2025] NZHC 2510
•29 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE
CIV-2025-419-107
[2025] NZHC 2510
BETWEEN RUBBISH FARMING LIMITED
Applicant
AND
REMEDIATION (NZ) LIMITED
Respondent
Hearing: 23 June 2025
Telephone conference on 14 August 2025
Further submissions and evidence received 13, 14, 19 and
25 August 2025Appearances:
D M Fraundorfer and H Lewis for Applicant J D Cameron and M Black for Respondent
Judgment:
29 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF McHERRON J
[1] Rubbish Farming Limited (RFL) applies for injunctive orders against Remediation (NZ) Limited (RNZ). RFL seeks to restrain RNZ from continuing sand quarrying operations in a designated portion of a property in Cambridge, defined in a lease agreement dated 11 October 2023.
[2] RFL’s application arises from a dispute concerning the interpretation and scope of this lease agreement, in particular whether RNZ is entitled to quarry for sand in the areas defined in the lease as “the common areas” or “Common Zone”.
[3]The precise order RFL seeks is:
The respondent, its directors, servants, related bodies corporate, subcontractors, officers, employees, personnel, agents or other persons authorised to act on their behalf are to cease all mining operations within the
RUBBISH FARMING LIMITED v REMEDIATION (NZ) LIMITED [2025] NZHC 2510 [29 August 2025]
area referred to as the “common zone” in the Deed of Lease dated 11 October 2023 (Common Area) and are to remove all personnel and equipment from the Common Area.
[4] RNZ opposes RFL’s application. It contends that the lease allows it to quarry across the entire property, apart from an area specifically used by RFL, and that the matter should be referred to arbitration pursuant to cl 43.2 of the lease.
Procedural history
[5] Directions were made for the filing of opposition documents by 6 May 2025. RNZ filed its notice of opposition and supporting affidavit a month late, one business day before RFL’s submissions were due. RFL objected to the late filing of both these documents and to an unsworn affidavit by Peter Rabbidge, RNZ’s Chair.
[6] Mr Rabbidge’s sworn affidavit was provided before the hearing and RFL filed supplementary submissions addressing points raised in RNZ’s submissions. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the delay in provision of RNZ’s documents has not caused any prejudice to RFL in terms of its ability to respond.
Factual background
[7] RNZ extracts high-grade Waikato river sand. It sells washed and sieved sand and aggregates to golf courses, councils, playing fields and the building industry.
[8] RNZ had previously owned the property itself, from around 2008, and has been quarrying it for many years.
[9] RFL purchased the property from RNZ in October 2023. It leased part of it back to RNZ for it to continue its quarrying operations. A detailed lease was signed on 11 October 2023. The lease describes the “premises” as:
That part of the Landlord’s property at Cambridge Road, Cambridge (being the land in Record of Title 646080) outlined on the attached plan.
[10] The business use is defined in the lease as “Sand Quarry and Dried Sand Plant”. All necessary land use consents are in place for the quarry operation. These were obtained by RNZ before it sold the property to RFL. Mr Rabbidge deposed that the sand resource has a limited lifespan prior to exhaustion, which is why the lease has a three-year term and a three-year renewal through to the end of 2029.
[11] Mr Rabbidge deposed that he understands RNZ and RFL’s respective operations have synergies in the way in which they use the property. RFL’s business involves recycling building and construction waste. The material that is non- recyclable can be used to fill voids created by RNZ’s activities. RNZ’s business is quarrying. Its goal is to make the volume of sand extracted as large as possible, consistent with its consent conditions. Mr Rabbidge referred to discussions he had with RFL about the synergies between the two businesses, and possible collaboration concerning administration, transport, and machinery. He understood the larger the void RNZ created with its quarry, the better the potential for acceptance of RFL waste.
[12] RFL says that RNZ promptly disregarded the lease by continuing to quarry sand from common areas where quarrying is not permitted, as if RNZ was still the owner of the land and without regard to the terms of the lease. RFL says it never agreed that the whole property would be available for RNZ to quarry sand.
[13] At the heart of the dispute between the parties is the document RFL alleges is the “attached plan” in the lease’s premises description. RFL submits this document sets out the different areas the parties would operate in. The document takes the form of an aerial photograph of the property superimposed with three cross-hatched “zones” coloured red, blue and yellow respectively (plus roading coloured green on the perimeter):
[14] RFL says that this plan demarcates the parts of the property each party could use for its business activities. In particular, these zones were:
(a)a red RNZ zone, in which RFL says RNZ could operate its sand quarry and dried sand plant business (labelled “Revital Zone” on the above plan);
(b)a blue “WasteWorx Zone” on which RFL says WasteWorx Ltd (now called ResourceCo Ltd) is building a construction and demolition waste recycling plant; and
(c)a yellow “Common Zone”.
[15] Neither the plan itself nor any other part of the lease provides an express description or definition of what the “Common Zone” represents. By reference to the
definition of “the common areas” in the lease, RFL says it is “those parts of the property the use of which is necessary for the enjoyment of the premises and which is shared with other tenants and occupiers”.1
[16] There are also disputes between RNZ and RFL as to whether all relevant parties initialled the plan set out above. Mr Rabbidge denies seeing the plan before signing the lease and does not accept that it forms part of the lease or the parties’ negotiations in general. I do not need to resolve this aspect of the dispute. However, I record that RNZ argues RFL’s interpretation of the disputed document is inconsistent with other provisions of the lease and would make the need for those provisions redundant. In particular:
(a)RNZ notes that the definition of “the common areas” is not the same as the term “Common Zone” that is used on the plan; and
(b)the lease permits RNZ to mine the whole property.
[17] RNZ also relies on a term sheet which the parties used as a guide for documenting their agreement concerning the lease. The term sheet provides for RNZ to have mining rights in relation to all the sand in the “designated operations area” for the term of the lease. The “designated operations area” is defined by reference to a map attached as schedule 1 to the term sheet, which includes the whole of the property including what was described as the:
(a)mining area;
(b)processing plant & stock piling area; and
(c)access road & weigh bridge area.
[18]The term sheet also provided that:
The parties acknowledge and agree to grant each other both internal and external access through their respective properties for the purpose of normal business activities, in relation to their respective businesses.
1 Reflecting the definition of “the common areas” in cl 47.1(l) of the lease.
[19] In the face of clear and repeated demands to stop mining in the common areas, RFL alleges that RNZ has continued to remove sand at an alarming rate and in a dangerous manner for its financial benefit, damaging the land, causing prejudice to RFL’s business operations and causing serious health and safety issues.
[20] In particular, RFL alleges that RNZ has been operating in the yellow zone (the “Common Zone”) next to the road that ResourceCo is building. On 4 March 2025, RFL’s engineer witnessed an RNZ digger conducting earthworks under the fill embankment for RFL’s road. These earthworks were undermining the embankment, endangering the digger driver and anyone else on the road because it could have caused the embankment to collapse. As the engineer’s report states, the excavation activity ceased after these safety concerns were pointed out.2
[21] As a result of its concerns, RFL took steps to cancel the lease. On 24 March 2025, it served a notice of intention to cancel the lease under the Property Law Act 2007, requiring RNZ to cease all mining activities in the common area by 31 March 2025. This notice expired without RNZ having complied. RFL seeks to formalise these steps under its originating application, in which it seeks orders cancelling the lease, and for possession of the land in RFL’s favour.3 RFL also seeks compensation for remedying breaches of the lease, in particular the costs of sand removed from the common area under the lease.
[22] RNZ has filed a notice of opposition to the originating application. It denies breaching the lease and says the parties had agreed RNZ would take sand from the whole property, as reflected in the term sheet which had been prepared by RFL and was relied on by RNZ. RNZ argues the term sheet can be used to interpret the lease, although RFL says it should not be used in this way and is not binding.
2 Mr Fullerton-Smith filed an updating affidavit referring to a slip on 12 June 2025 in the area “where [RNZ]’s mining had undermined [RFL’s] roading”. The affidavit also annexed an email dated 12 June 2025 from Mr Fullerton-Smith to Mr Rabbidge asking him not to pump water into the “old pond”, and forwarding him an email from Tom Sutcliffe of MS Civil stating “the old point on the out-road cannot be used as a pond anymore because the embankment fill is not cohesive fill so will become saturated, and over time will likely lead to failure of the road.”
3 Property Law Act 2007, s 244.
[23] Mr Rabbidge deposes that RFL was well aware that RNZ was quarrying sand within the “Common Zone”, including on occasions where, Mr Rabbidge says, Mr Fullerton-Smith watched the extraction, and transport of sand from areas outside the “Revital Zone”, including sand that Mr Fullerton-Smith purchased for RFL’s crushing plant for which RFL paid without questioning its origin or RNZ’s ownership of it.
[24] RNZ also argues that the rent payable under the lease, $150,000 per annum, reflects that there will be ongoing sand mining in the Common Zone, as has continued since RFL purchased the property in 2023.
[25] Despite the existence of the underlying Property Law Act proceeding seeking to cancel the lease, the present judgment solely relates to RFL’s application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent RNZ from continuing to mine sand from the Common Zone.
Agreement to arbitrate dispute
[26]Also relevant is cl 43.2 of the second schedule to the lease, which provides:
Unless any dispute or difference is resolved by mediation or other agreement within 30 days of the dispute or different arising, the same shall be submitted to the arbitration of one arbitrator who shall conduct the arbitral proceedings in accordance with the Arbitration Act 1996 or any other statutory provision then relating to arbitration.
[27] However, RFL submits the Court has jurisdiction even in respect of the Property Law Act dispute. It says there is no “dispute or difference” in terms of cl 43.2, because RFL has exercised its right to cancel the lease.
[28] For its part, RNZ submits this overlooks the fact that the crux of the issue is an interpretation of the lease. It says the parties are obliged to submit their dispute to arbitration rather than the Court.
[29] In response to this argument, RFL says that the Court retains jurisdiction to grant the injunction as an “interim measure”, restoring the status quo pending the
determination of the dispute and/or preventing actions by RNZ likely to cause current or imminent harm.4
Legal framework for injunctions
[30]The test for granting an interlocutory injunction is well established:5
(a)there are three stages to the consideration of an application for an interlocutory or interim injunction;
(b)the applicant must establish there is a serious question to be tried, or put another way, that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious;
(c)next, the balance of convenience must be considered, which requires consideration of the impact on the parties of the granting of, and the refusal to grant, an order;
(d)finally, an assessment of the overall justice of the position is required as a check.
[31]RFL submits:6
(a)harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages is likely to result if an injunction is not granted; and
(b)that harm substantially outweighs the harm that is likely to result to RNZ if the injunction is granted; and
(c)there is a reasonable possibility that RFL will succeed on the merits of its claim; and
4 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1, arts 9(1) and 17, definition of “interim measure”.
5 NZ Tax Refunds Ltd v Brooks Homes Ltd [2013] NZCA 90, [2013] 13 TCLR 531 at [12]; Intellihub v Genesis Energy Ltd [2020] NZCA 344 at [23].
6 Arbitration Act 1996, sch 1, art 17B.
(d)it is impractical and/or impossible for RFL to seek these orders from the arbitral tribunal because it has not yet been constituted.
My assessment
[32]I will now analyse each of the elements of the test for an interim injunction.
Serious question to be tried
[33] In relation to the first element of the test for an interlocutory injunction, serious question to be tried, RFL relies on its substantive application under the Property Law Act seeking orders cancelling the lease, failure to comply with its terms and orders for possession of the leased land in RFL’s favour. In that proceeding, RFL also seeks orders that RNZ pay compensation and costs.
[34]RFL says it has a real prospect of succeeding at trial because:
(a)The disputed works are in the Common Zone, which on a plain reading of the term “the common areas” in the lease may only be used by RNZ to the extent “necessary for the enjoyment of the premises”. RFL says that quarrying sand in the common areas is not necessary for RNZ to utilise its exclusive use area, the “Revital Zone”, and is therefore not permitted.
(b)RFL’s director, Mr Fullerton-Smith, deposes it was never the parties’ intention for RNZ to mine the whole area. A valid Property Law Act notice has been served and has expired without being complied with.
(c)No proceedings for relief against cancellation of the lease have been filed by RNZ.
[35] RFL argues its claim could support a perpetual injunction. It says it has a proprietary right or interest in the leased land which it is trying to protect from RNZ’s continued interference.
[36] RNZ submits there is no serious question to be tried. It says the lease is silent on what areas it can carry out quarrying in. Rather, RNZ argues the lease contemplates it has mining rights over the whole property (though it concedes it will not mine in the blue “WasteWorx Area” designated for RFL). RNZ submits the agreement for sale and purchase, the lease, the term sheet and the parties’ subsequent conduct are all consistent with an intention by the parties that RNZ would continue its quarry operations over the property, with RFL filling voids created by RNZ through its clean- fill operations.
[37] RNZ argues that it could not continue its quarrying operation at all if confined to the red “Revital Zone”, making the lease redundant and removing the synergy between the parties’ respective operations.
[38] In my view, RFL has established that there is a serious question to be tried. The dispute centres on the interpretation of the lease and whether RNZ’s mining activities breach its terms. The parties offer conflicting evidence regarding the inclusion and significance of the disputed pages of the lease and who signed them, but more importantly it is the interpretation of the attached plan that is currently unresolved.
[39] However, for the following reasons I assess the strength of RFL’s interpretation, on a preliminary basis, as only moderate.
[40] First, I observe that for a matter that now occupies such significance in the arguments of RFL, the lease is notably silent on the precise area in which RNZ is permitted to quarry sand, or more particularly any limits on that area.
[41] Second, the lease’s definition of “premises” does not refer to the Red “Revital Zone”. Rather it refers to “that part of the Landlord’s property … outlined on the attached plan”. Arguably the “premises” for the purposes of the lease includes all of the property except the “WasteWorx Zone” and the roading.
[42] Third, if the term sheet is allowed to influence interpretation of the lease, as I consider it should be, it suggests a more limited reason for the identification of a
common area/Common Zone than that currently advanced by RFL. Rather than an area in which no mining may occur (an interpretation which doesn’t follow through into any express terms of the lease), the term sheet suggests that the primary reason for the provision of a common area was to enable access rather than to prevent particular activities.
[43] It is also consistent with the synergistic operation of both businesses, as described above, that the Common Zone is the area the parties intended would be the area where RFL would fill voids created by RNZ’s mining with unrecyclable building waste. Such an interpretation of the lease, involving shared use of the Common Zone area, would arguably accord with the definition of “the common areas” in the lease.
[44] However, I am not in a position to resolve the lease interpretation dispute and note that it is not the role of the Court on an interim injunction to resolve conflicts of evidence.7
[45] Moreover, it is generally recognised that there is a “low threshold” for a finding of a serious question to be tried.8
[46] Accordingly, while on the material I have reviewed for the purposes of the present application, RFL’s case does not appear to be strong, it is a bona fide interpretation dispute relating to the lease which is not frivolous or vexatious. The matter is suitable for further consideration and determination, whether by the Court or in an arbitration. I return to the issue of the appropriate forum for further consideration and determination below.
Balance of convenience
[47] RFL submits that the relevant question is whether refusing an injunction would be harder on it if successful at trial than on RNZ, considering the following four factors:9
7 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL) at 407.
8 Nirvana Farms Ltd v Makakaho Land Co Ltd [2020] NZHC 3268 at [18]
9 Roman Catholic Bishop of Diocese of Auckland v Boynton [2018] NZHC 2636 at [14].
(a)The adequacy of damages. RFL says damages will be inadequate if it is successful at trial due to:
(i)RNZ having already removed large amounts of sand (and continuing to do so);
(ii)the serious health and safety issues with RNZ’s disputed works and potential liability for that including that the disputed works may cause roading embankments to collapse;
(iii)losses will be difficult to quantify and would require additional discovery;
(iv)concerns that RNZ is unlikely to be able to meet the likely significant damages award.
(b)Preservation of the status quo. RFL says granting the injunction would give effect to the status quo as it does not stop RNZ from operating within its zone.
(c)The uncompensable disadvantages to either party. RFL submits the only uncompensable disadvantage is to itself.
(d)Relative strengths of the parties’ cases. RFL submits that its case is strong and the harm caused to it substantially outweighs any harm to RNZ should the injunction be granted.
[48] I am not persuaded that damages would be either inadequate or difficult to calculate. According to RNZ, all of its current mining operations take place within the so-called “common area”. Therefore, calculating the value of the sand extracted from that area would be a relatively simple task. Moreover, any damage to roadways (no evidence that any such damage has actually occurred was presented) could also be addressed in a damages award. Nor am I satisfied that it is appropriate to infer from the limited material I have been provided that RNZ has liquidity issues or that a damages award could not be met.
[49] My primary concern in relation to balance of convenience, however, is that on my assessment, the injunctive relief sought by RFL goes significantly beyond maintaining the status quo pending resolution of the disputed issues at trial. Rather, it would have the effect of bringing RNZ’s quarrying operations to a halt, requiring it to effectively terminate those operations, and causing it irreputable financial harm. RNZ’s operations are long-standing, pre-dating the lease agreement, and have continued since the lease agreement was entered into. The operations are integral to its business and I am satisfied for the purposes of this preliminary argument that RNZ has established concerns that, if an injunction is granted, it could spell the end of RNZ’s quarrying operations on the property, causing it uncompensable harm. This would include the need to decommission its equipment and make its employees redundant, with the effect that it may not be able to resume operations if ultimately successful at trial.
[50] On balance therefore, I conclude that the harm to RNZ from granting the injunction would outweigh the harm to RFL from its refusal. The status quo favours RNZ, particularly given lack of confidence that RFL will ultimately succeed. Accordingly, on present information before the Court, my preliminary assessment of the relative strengths of the parties’ respective cases favours RNZ.
Overall justice
[51] In light of my conclusion in relation to the balance of convenience, it is not necessary to separately address this element, but I will do so as a final check. In my assessment, the conduct of both parties is relevant. According to its evidence, RFL acted promptly upon discovering the alleged breach, but the evidence that its position changed following its due diligence on RNZ for the purposes of considering a possible purchase, raises questions about its motivations.
[52] RNZ has continued to pay its rent and, as far as the information indicates, is complying with its consents. My assessment of the overall justice of the application is that there is insufficient evidence of imminent or irreparable harm to justify injunctive relief.
Arbitration
[53] As discussed, cl 43.2 of the lease provides for disputes to be referred to arbitration. RFL argues that as the lease has been cancelled, this clause no longer applies. I consider that the resolution of the dispute between the parties remains a question of interpretation of the lease and is therefore subject to arbitration.
[54] I accept that the Court retains jurisdiction in relation to interim relief under art 9 of sch 1 of the Arbitration Act. However, it follows from my decision that I do not consider the threshold for interim relief under art 17B is met. I do not consider that there is compelling evidence of imminent harm or any impracticability in seeking relief from an arbitral tribunal.
Conclusion
[55]The application for interlocutory injunction is declined.
Costs
[56] My provisional view is that RNZ is entitled to costs according to category 2B. The parties are directed to attempt to agree costs. If they cannot agree, memoranda not exceeding three pages may be filed.
Events post hearing
[57] After the hearing, but before I gave this judgment, counsel for RFL filed an urgent memorandum on 13 August 2025. The memorandum stated that as of that date, “new and serious health and safety risks have arisen at the Cambridge Quarry site, arising from the actions of [RNZ]”. Counsel described these risks as follows:
The applicant has advised that the respondents are excavating sand in a manner that is highly likely to result in collapse. The sand at risk of slippage is estimated to weigh approximately 17 tonnes, creating a significant and imminent risk of injury or death.
[58] Pictures “depicting the dangerous activity occurring on site” were included. Counsel advised that WorkSafe New Zealand has been notified. “Given the
seriousness”, counsel for RFL sought “interim interim” orders requiring RNZ to cease all mining operations within the “common zone” pending delivery of my judgment.
[59] It was not clear from the material provided where the “dangerous activity” about which RFL is concerned is occurring. The memorandum did not specify the alleged “dangerous activity” was near or compromising any road.
[60] I convened a telephone conference on 14 August 2025 to try to find out more about RFL’s concerns. I asked Mr Fraundorfer to confirm where the activity he reported was taking place and whether it was near or compromising any road.
[61]At the conference:
(a)Mr Fraundorfer clarified on behalf of RFL that the activity was occurring in the “Common Zone” into a bank underneath a road that is in frequent use by both parties. Mr Fraundorfer said the activity was highly likely to result in the collapse of the road. He said that WorkSafe was on its way to the quarry site.
(b)Mr Cameron said was unable to confirm on behalf of RNZ whether this was correct, but he would obtain instructions and inform the Court.
[62] In the meantime I asked whether, at least in the meantime, the parties could agree that no operations threatening the roadways would take place.
[63] After the telephone conference, Mr Cameron filed a memorandum dated 14 August 2025, stating:
(a)He had requested clarification of the report made to WorkSafe, along with the location, but this had not been provided by RFL.
(b)He had made preliminary enquiries with RNZ, noting the uncertainty of what is alleged, and has been advised by RFL that:
(i)WorkSafe will attend the property on 15 August 2025;
(ii)no excavation will be undertaken prior to WorkSafe attending the property on 15 August 2025;
(iii)RNZ will comply with all WorkSafe directions following the visit.
(c)Mr Cameron offered to file an affidavit on behalf of RNZ once RFL clarified its allegations. In the meantime, to shed light on the situation, Mr Cameron annexed a map showing where sand has recently been extracted from, a photo showing the distance from the excavation point, and finally, a photo of the road. The yellow line on the map shows the location of the road. According to the material provided by Mr Cameron, the recent excavation point is a significant distance from the road.
[64]Mr Cameron filed a further memorandum dated 19 August 2025 advising:
(a)No further information about the WorkSafe complaint had been provided by counsel for RFL. RNZ has sought this information directly from WorkSafe under the Official Information Act 1982, but does not expect a response for several weeks.
(b)Issues regarding health and safety matters are appropriately dealt with by WorkSafe and do not warrant an injunction.
[65] With counsel’s memorandum was an affidavit from RNZ’s quarry manager Mr van Veen. He deposes that the excavation site about which RFL has expressed concerns is far from the road. Annexed to his affidavit are photographs confirming this.
[66] Mr van Veen also describes a WorkSafe inspection on 15 August 2025 which he attended along with Mr Rabbidge. Mr van Veen deposes that following the review of the site, the WorkSafe inspectors advised:
(a)RNZ is not (and will not be) required to immediately cease operations as a result of the inspection.
(b)It is likely an improvement notice of sustained compliance notice will be provided to RNZ in a few days.
(c)The suggestions in the notice will include some improvements in training quarry face loader operations and minor changes to RNZ’s standard operating procedures.
[67] Mr van Veen deposed that one of the WorkSafe inspectors advised that the reason for the site visit was a reported incident which included a video of an RNZ loader scraping up materials from the base of a quarry face, and some of the face giving way and jolting the loader. The issue was the RNZ driver’s operation of the loader. The inspector did not raise any concerns about RNZ’s operations impacting, undermining or compromising the roads on the site.
[68] Mr van Veen also annexed to his affidavit the three WorkSafe improvement notices. They require:
(a)training on standard operating procedures;
(b)pre-start checks for brake systems;
(c)edge protection for mobile plant.
[69] Mr Fraundorfer’s claim that the excavation activity was highly likely to result in the collapse of the road is not substantiated by this material.
[70] On 25 August 2025, Mr Fraundorfer filed a report prepared by Maven Engineering, who attended the quarry on 22 August 2025 to carry out a slope safety assessment of part of the access road. Counsel sought my “direction in light of the urgent safety risks identified” in Maven’s report. This memorandum and report had not been invited by the Court.
[71] It was unclear exactly what part of the property Maven’s report relates to. Nor was it clear what relationship the issues raised in the report have to the issues covered in the previous evidence or submissions at the hearing, or the subsequent excavations leading to the WorkSafe inspection. RNZ advised it did not intend to respond.
[72] Maven’s report records a “major concern” of “potential slope stability issues”, among other medium and minor concerns relating to a “dammed water reservoir” Maven considers may compromise the roadway. Maven states “there is evidence … that toe/slope failure MAY have already occurred” and recommends that “the Revital DAM and associated WATER RESERVIOR [sic] be removed ASAP to prevent any further slope failures”.
[73]Mr Fraundorfer seeks a direction in light of these “urgent safety risks”.
[74] I decline to make such a direction. It seems unlikely that the construction of the “dammed water reservoir” has occurred since the hearing. It is unclear why, if it was relevant to the issues raised, the information in Maven’s report was not provided before the hearing. Most importantly, however, Maven’s recommended action is outside the scope of the relief sought by RFL in its injunction application.
McHerron J
Solicitors:
Fraundorfer Ltd, Tauranga for Applicant Willis Legal, Napier for Respondent
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