RPW Judgment Creditor AND H Judgment Debtor

[2022] NZHC 2344

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE PARTIES.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CIV-2022-419-14

[2022] NZHC 2344

BETWEEN

RPW

Judgment Creditor

AND

H

Judgment Debtor

Hearing:	3 August 2022
Appearances:	Jesse Savage for the Judgment Creditor Judgment Debtor is self-represented
Judgment:	14 September 2022

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE C B TAYLOR

This judgment was delivered by me on 14 September 2022 at 3:00pm

pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

………………………….

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Norris Ward McKinnon (Jesse Savage), Hamilton, for the Judgment Creditor

Copy for:
H (the Judgment Debtor)

RPW v H [2022] NZHC 2344 [14 September 2022]

Introduction

[1]        RPW applied on 29 April 2022 for orders adjudicating H bankrupt, and as to costs.1

[2]        H seeks a stay of the adjudication proceeding on the grounds that he currently has judicial review proceedings on foot in the Employment Court in respect of several Employment Relations Authority (ERA) determinations, which he says will render RPW’s bankruptcy application nugatory.

[3]        RPW has applied to strike out H’s judicial review application. That issue is before the Employment Court, which has yet to issue its decision.

Background

[4]        RPW’s application is based on a bankruptcy notice for $67,035.78. The debt arises from various penalty and costs awards imposed on, or made against, H in the ERA and Employment Court.

[5]        H is an employment advocate. He represented a former employee of RPW during a mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement dated 5 March 2018. The agreement imposed an obligation on the parties not to make derogatory or disparaging comments about the other. H signed the record of settlement to indicate his agreement to being bound by that term. However, he went on to make disparaging comments about RPW on a public Facebook page. This led to seven determinations of the ERA, culminating in orders requiring H and his company to comply with the settlement terms and to remove the offending comments from social media.2

1 Creditor’s application for adjudication order dated 29 April 2022 at [1].

2      H v Employment Relations Authority [2021] NZSC 188 [SC decision] at [5], citing R v H [2018] NZERA Auckland 253.

[6]        H challenged the ERA’s final two determinations, dealing with penalties. The Employment Court refused applications for leave to extend time to challenge the first five determinations and dismissed the challenges against the last two determinations. That being so, the penalties order by the ERA stood and costs were awarded to RPW.3 The Court of Appeal struck out H’s subsequent application for judicial review of the directions and orders of the ERA and decision of the Employment Court.4 The Supreme Court declined H leave to appeal from that decision.5

[7]        As stated above, H has now brought judicial review proceedings in the Employment Court, which RPW has sought to strike out. The Employment Court’s decision is pending.

[8]        In the time since RPW  applied  for  the  adjudication  order,  the  Employment Court issued a judgment ordering H to pay RPW further costs of $6,800. This additional debt relates to an unsuccessful interlocutory application H made for an order preventing counsel from acting for RPW in the proceedings in that court.  RPW has issued a demand for payment; H has refused.

Application for stay of proceedings

[9]H applies for a stay of proceedings on the following grounds:6

a.The alleged debt is based on a claim by [RPW] to enforce an illegal contract against me as a third party, using orders from the Employment Relations Authority.

b.Member Rachel Larmer in proceedings in the Employment Relations Authority purported to make orders which she had no power to make because they had no statutory foundation in the Employment Relations Act 2000. Further orders were made by Judge Mark Perkins of the Employment Court based on Member Larmer’s orders, which were not orders he was legally able to make.

c.The employment institutions can only make orders that are founded in the powers given to them by statute, namely the Employment Relations Act 2000. No statutory foundation has ever been put forward by the Authority, the Employment Court or [RPW].

3      At [6], citing H v RPW [2020] NZEmpC 141.

4      H v Employment Relations Authority [2021] NZCA 507.

5      SC decision, above n 2, at [12].

6 Application of [H] for stay of proceedings dated 16 May 2022 at [2].

d.The orders against me breach New Zealand’s international obligations in respect of corruption and money laundering.

e.The making of the orders against me by Member Larmer of the Employment Relations Authority is being judicially reviewed in the Employment Court in EMPC 394/2021.

f.These bankruptcy proceedings will be rendered nugatory if those orders are reviewed.

g.The review is of public interest and public importance. The making of the bankruptcy orders consequent of such baseless orders would bring into question the functioning the New Zealand legal system and the safety of the jurisdiction as a place to do business.

H’s affidavit in support dated 16 May 2022

[10]      H has made an affidavit in support of his application for a stay of proceedings. He deposes he does not believe the alleged debt has any legal validity. He says the claimed debt has its origins in “bogus” claims made by RPW in the ERA to be able to enforce illegal and void contracts against third parties if signed off by a government official. He says the employment institutions have no powers except those under the Employment Relations Act, and that the employment institutions therefore had no power to make the orders against him.7

[11]      H deposes that he is contesting the orders in judicial review proceedings in the Employment Court. He says he believes the review proceedings are of public interest and public importance because, if the actions by RPW against him are allowed to stand, New Zealand will no longer be a safe place to do business. He says he believes this would also apply if a bankruptcy order were to be made against him on the basis of layered orders that have no legal foundation. He says continuation of the proceedings while the underlying review continues would send the message that, if you do business in New Zealand, you are at risk of “bogus claims” being enforced against you, even while you contest them.8

[12]      H deposes he believes that RPW’s method not only has no legal basis, but it is also in breach of New Zealand’s obligations under the United Nations Convention against Corruption. He says he does not believe this Court should support RPW’s

7      Affidavit of [H] in support of application for stay of proceedings dated 16 May 2022 at [1]–[8].

8      At [9]–[15].

claim to bankrupt him using orders the entire basis of which is disputed on judicial review. He says further that if the ERA is empowered to make valid anonymised orders suppressing evidence of wrongdoing and the identity of wrongdoers, this would provide a means for corruption and money laundering.9

[13]      Finally, H deposes that he has issued proceedings against RPW, the law firm that represents it, and two employees of that law firm. He says he believes those parties will eventually be found liable for the consequences of the “bogus proceedings” against him. He asks this Court to stay the proceedings pending the review of the underlying actions.10

H’s submissions

[14]      H, representing himself, submits that the proceeding should be stayed in the interests of justice and the interests of the reputation of the New Zealand judicial system. He alleges that RPW has used public funds to cover up wrongdoing and to attack anyone who tries to conduct business honestly. He submits the proceeding is founded on a “bogus” debt arising out of an ERA determination. He says the order in that determination, however, was founded on a series of similarly “bogus” claims about law advanced by RPW’s solicitors. He says there was never any jurisdiction for the orders to be made against him.11

[15]      H alleges that the original project of RPW appears to have been to cover up an internal payroll fraud by attacking the person who reported it. He says RPW has claimed to have established powers to validate and enforce illegal contracts to suppress evidence of wrongdoing and offences, and to attack anyone who reports on such wrongdoing and offences. He says the project lacks any legal foundation and appears to have two aims: to silence him and to illegally bring down his business.12

[16]      H submits the ERA had no power to grant “illegal” and “unenforceable” non- identification orders against him, or to fine him for speaking about RPW’s wrongdoing

9      At [16]–[19].

10     At [20]–[21].

11 Submissions of [H] in support of application for stay of these proceedings dated 15 July 2022 at [7].

12     At [8]–[15].

in March 2019. He submits there is no step in RPW’s “operation” that is not unlawful

— “[i]t is bogus from start to finish”. He submits similarly that the Employment Court had no power to hear the case against him or to fine him. Accordingly, he says, it is obvious to all parties and the world that these proceedings are baseless.13

[17]      H says the Employment Court is currently seized of his judicial review proceeding and has reserved its decision. Should that review be unsuccessful, the next step is for the United Nations Human Rights Committee to consider breaches of the free speech provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.14

[18]      Next, H submits it would be in the interests of justice, this Court, and its officers to stay the proceeding. If the judicial review is successful and the Employment Court finds the ERA determinations were ultra vires, “this case can begin to unwind”. He submits it would be unseemly for the Court to bankrupt him before that happened. If the judicial review is unsuccessful, however, the matter will have to be dealt with at the international level — to the nation’s embarrassment.15

[19]      Concluding, H submits that the tribunal determinations and court orders show “illegal agreements, including agreements to commit predicate offences and launder money, being created in the employment institutions and used by other courts”. He says the Court should stay the proceeding in the interests of justice and to preserve the reputation of New Zealand and its judiciary.16

Other information provided to the Court by H

[20]      Although not formally filed in the Court, I have given leave to H to put before me additional information he considers important for me to consider in coming to my decision. This comprises the information attached to his memorandum dated 8 August 2022, comprising:

(a)A letter dated 5 August 2022 from Dr Gary Namie; and

13     At [17]–[34].

14     At [35]–[37].

15     At [38]–[42].

16     At [43]–[45].

(b)MBIE briefing — Summary of Submissions on Bullying and Harassment Issues Paper dated 16 December 2021, which has annexed to it an MBIE paper “Bullying and Harassment at Work: Consultation Submission Analysis”.

RPW’s submissions

[21]      Mr Jesse Savage, for RPW, submits that s 42(2) of the Insolvency Act 2006 cannot avail H because he has not appealed against the judgment or order underlying the bankruptcy notice. Mr Savage points out that a judicial review is not an appeal, and all H has done is apply for judicial review of the ERA determinations underlying the Employment Court decisions on which the bankruptcy notice is based. H is out of time to appeal the Employment Court’s cost order and he therefore does not meet the threshold criteria for this Court to exercise its discretion to halt the proceeding under s 42. And, even if H had met the criteria, the Court should not in any event exercise the discretion.17

[22]      Mr Savage submits further that the Court should not exercise its general discretion to stay a bankruptcy application under s 38. He points out that, subject to the Official Assignee’s approval, a bankrupt has no statutory bar to bringing or continuing proceedings. He submits that third-party oversight of H’s litigation is desirable because H continues to bring unmeritorious and costly applications. Further, Mr Savage submits, there is a need for accountability in litigation. H has continually refused to pay his debt, instead seeking the Court’s sanction to run endless appeals and reviews.18

[23]      In Mr Savage’s submission, H’s proceedings in the Employment Court and the High Court are unlikely to succeed. He has repeatedly failed in his contention that the ERA does not have jurisdiction over a non-party to an employment relationship or to regulate the conduct of an advocate appearing before it. The Employment Court has considered such the argument in detail and has conclusively rejected it. In any event,

17     Judgment creditor’s consolidated submissions in opposition to application for stay of proceedings dated 27 July 2022 at [6]–[10], citing SC decision, above n 2.

18     At [11]–[25].

Mr Savage says, if H were to succeed in his judicial review applications, the costs and penalties awarded against him would not simply fall away.19

[24]      Next, Mr Savage submits that H has produced no evidence to prove he is solvent or that he has a realistic prospect of paying his debts. H has repeatedly said he does not have the money to pay, and there is evidence that other creditors are being kept out of their money. Mr Savage submits further that H, in applying to stay the bankruptcy proceeding, has not come to the Court with clean hands. He continues to intimidate witnesses, counsel and judges, and fails to follow reasonable legal process.20

[25]      Concluding, Mr Savage submits H is seeking an indulgence from the Court and has provided no authority or cogent reason for it to do so. Even if H’s judicial review is successful, the debt will not be overturned. H continues to cause loss to RPW and other parties. In the circumstances, the Court should decline to stay the bankruptcy proceeding. It should adjudicate H bankrupt.21

Updating information for the Court

[26]Mr Savage updated the Court as follows:

(a)the Employment Court is yet to issue its decision regarding RPW’s application to strike out H’s application to judicially review the ERA determinations; and

(b)On 5 July 2022, the Employment Court issued a judgment ordering H to pay RPW costs of $6,800 (Additional Debt). The costs relate to a failed standalone interlocutory application  by  H  in  the  Employment Court for an order preventing counsel from acting for RPW in the Employment Court proceedings. Demand has been made on H, but he refused to pay the additional costs.22

19     At [26]–[39], citing Re Chesterfields Preschools Ltd (in liq), ex parte Sisson [2017] NZHC 1410.

20     At [40]–[58].

21     At [59]–[63].

22     Affidavit of Soroya Elizabeth McGall dated 19 July 2022.

Legal principles

[27]Section 38 of the Insolvency Act provides:

38       Court may halt application

(1)The court may at any time halt the creditor’s application for adjudication.

(2)The court may halt the application on the terms and conditions (if any), and for the period, that the court thinks appropriate.

[28]      Section 38 is couched in general terms and is nonprescriptive as to the matters the Court is to consider when determining a halt application. The discretion is intended to be flexible, by which the courts may consider varying circumstances and give those circumstances different weight according to each case.23

[29]      Exercise of the general power in s 38 might arise in circumstances where the debtor pursues separate proceedings by which he or she may recover enough to satisfy creditors. The Court will not want to thwart a creditor’s application simply because of a long-term hope that the debtor can eventually pay creditors. The Court will consider whether to give the debtor time to prosecute the separate action.24

[30]      Despite the inherent flexibility of the s 38 discretion, certain considerations are invariably brought to account, including:25

(a)    the history of the litigation and the conduct of the parties in the same;

(b)    the impression that the court can gain of the merits of the appeal;

(c)    the stage reached in the appeal and any information to hand as to when it may be disposed of;

(d)    the relative consequences for both parties of making or refusing the order sought;

(e)    any known consequences for third parties.

23 Re Koroniadis ex parte Bank of New Zealand [2013] NZHC 2865 at [11]. See also Sharrock v Kipping [2018] NZHC 3421.

24 Paul Heath and Michael Whale (eds) Heath and Whale on Insolvency (online ed, LexisNexis) at [3.10.6]. See Re Twidle [1916] NZLR 748 (SC); and Ellis v NZI Finance Ltd CA 253/89, 24 July 1990.

25 Michael Wilson and Partners Ltd v Sinclair [2020] NZHC 2546 at [9].

[31]Section 42 of the Insolvency Act provides:

42       Halt or refusal of application when judgment under appeal

(1)This section applies if the creditor’s application for adjudication relies on one of the following acts of bankruptcy:

(a)the debtor failed to comply with a bankruptcy notice (see section 17);

(b)a judgment against the debtor for non-payment of trust money is not satisfied within 5 working days after the date of the judgment (see section 28)

(2)If the debtor has appealed against the judgment or order underlying the bankruptcy notice or the judgment for non-payment of trust money, as the case may be, and the appeal is still to be decided, then the Court may—

(a)halt the creditor’s application for adjudication; or

(b)refuse the application.

Analysis

[32]The questions which must be determined in this judgment are:

(a)Is s 42(2) of the Insolvency Act applicable, and should the application be halted pending the outcome of an appeal?

(b)If the answer to the question at [32](a) is “No”, should the application be halted under s 38 of the Insolvency Act? This question in turn involves consideration of the criteria established by the Court when exercising its discretion under s 38, as set out at [30] above.

[33]I consider each of these questions in turn.

Is s 42(2) of the Insolvency Act applicable, and should the application be halted pending the outcome of an appeal?

[34]      Section 42(2) provides to the Court discretion to halt an application if the debtor has appealed against a judgment or order underlying the bankruptcy notice. In this case, Mr Savage submits that:

(a)the debtor has not appealed against the judgment or order underlying the bankruptcy notice because:

(i)a judicial review is not an appeal; and

(ii)H has applied to judicially review the ERA determinations underlying the Employment Court decisions on which the bankruptcy notice was based, not the Employment Court decision itself;

(b)even if the judicial review was successful, then the Employment Court decision will remain, and in particular the Employment Court’s decision for payment of costs on which the bankruptcy notice is based will remain. H has not appealed the Employment Court’s decision on costs and the Supreme Court has noted he is now out of time to do so.26

[35]      Mr Savage also submits that even if s 42(2) was engaged, the Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of halting the application for the following reasons:

(a)H has delayed bringing the judicial review proceedings. The proceedings were not commenced until nearly 14 months after the Employment Court decision of Judge Perkins, dated 4 September 2020, and not until after H was served with the bankruptcy notice.

(b)H will not be unduly prejudiced by an order. The Court has heard the argument on the judicial review and the parties are now awaiting the decision.

(c)The Employment Court Judge is aware of the bankruptcy proceedings and has declined to intervene.

(d)H’s fraud claim is vexatious and in contempt of Court, and it is in the interests of justice for H to have responsible third party oversight into

26     SC decision, above n 2.

how any future applications are brought. The Official Assignee would be able to provide this oversight.

(e)There are third party creditors who have provided affidavits in support of the adjudication.

(f)The interests of justice therefore favour a bankruptcy order.

[36]      My conclusion in relation to s 42(2) is that Mr Savage is correct that the application for a judicial review of the underlying ERA determinations is not an appeal of the Employment Court’s costs decision on which the bankruptcy notice is based. Also, as Mr Savage has pointed out, even if the judicial review application was entirely successful, the Employment Court costs decisions remain, which are the judgments underlying the bankruptcy notice. Consequently, RPW’s application should not be halted under s 42(2) of the Act.

If the answer to the question at [32](a) is “No”, should the application be halted under s 38 of the Act?

[37]      At [12] of his submissions, Mr Savage sets out the reasons why he considers the Court should not exercise its discretion under s 38 to the application for adjudication. These are:

(a)subject to the Official Assignee’s agreement, H would not be prevented from continuing his judicial review application;

(b)it is desirable for H to have oversight in litigation;

(c)H has no realistic chance to overturn the debt or the Additional Debt;

(d)H is actually insolvent;

(e)H has not come to the Court with clean hands.

H’s extant proceedings

[38]I deal first with the proceedings H has on foot. These are:

(a)a judicial review application in the Employment Court which has been heard but no decision issued as at the date of the hearing; and

(b)a fraud claim in the High Court.

[39]      In relation to the fraud claim, Mr Savage submits it reveals no factual basis and submits that there is no possibility that the fraud claims will succeed, given the proceedings have now been the subject of seven ERA determinations and six Employment Court judgments. There is no evidence before the Court indicating that if the fraud claim were to succeed, it would result in overturning the debt on which the bankruptcy notice is based. The fraud proceedings are therefore not a reason to halt the bankruptcy proceedings.

[40]      In relation to the judicial review application in the Employment Court, H has repeatedly advanced the same argument regarding the lack of the ERA’s jurisdiction, and he advanced the argument again at the hearing on 3 August 2022. Mr Savage has submitted that in all cases H has failed in his contention that the ERA does not have jurisdiction over a non-party to an employment relationship or to regulate the conduct of an advocate appearing before it.

[41]      This argument has been dealt with by the Employment Court in the following manner in another proceeding in which H was involved: Bay of Plenty District Health Board v Culturesafe New Zealand Ltd.27 In this instance the Employment Court held:

[52]       The Authority possesses significant court-like powers for the enforcement of its processes.

[53]      For example the Authority may award a penalty for obstructing or delaying an investigation. This is to ensure that the Authority’s ability to conduct a just and fair investigation, as it is required to do, is not undermined or impeded. The provision does not state that the qualifying event must occur at an investigation meeting.

27     Bay of Plenty District Health Board v Culturesafe New Zealand Ltd [2020] NZEmpC 149 at [52]–

[55](citations omitted).

[54]      It may issue compliance orders against parties and non-parties requiring those persons to do any specified thing, or to cease a specified activity, where there has been non-compliance with any order, determination, direction or requirement made or given under the Act. The use of that broad power may be considered where any person has not observed or complied with an order, determination, direction, or requirement is given by the Authority, or a Member or Officer of the Authority.

[55]      It also has the ability to deal with contempts in the face of the Authority as committed by any person. Such contempts include the wilful insulting of a Member or Officer of the Authority, the wilful interrupting or obstructing of proceedings of the Authority, or where a person misbehaves, or wilfully and without lawful excuse disobeys an order or direction of the Authority in the course of an investigation meeting.

[42]      Mr Savage submits that the law on the matters raised in H’s judicial review application is settled and clear. The Employment Court has already considered this argument in detail and issued reasons for rejecting it.

[43]      I accept Mr Savage’s submission that it is unlikely that the judicial review proceedings will be successful, given the clear statement of the law on this issue already made by the Employment Court. Accordingly, in my view, the judicial review proceedings are not sufficient reason to halt RPW’s application for adjudication.

Cannot overturn the debt

[44]      Mr Savage submits that even if H is completely successful in his judicial review application, this will not overturn the debt on which the bankruptcy notice is based. H has put forward no evidence as to why the Court decisions regarding the debt would be quashed if the judicial review of the underlying ERA determinations were successful (which I have found is highly unlikely).

[45]      Mr Savage points to the decision in Re Chesterfields Preschools Ltd (in liq), ex parte Sisson.28 In that case, the debtor pursued interlocutory applications that could not succeed. Costs were imposed against the debtor because he pursued applications without merit. The Court considered it sufficient to dispose of the application that:29

28     Re Chesterfields Preschools Ltd (in liq), ex parte Sisson, above n 19.

29 At [36].

Regardless of any success which might occur in later substantive proceedings against the Commissioner, there would be no basis upon which to reverse the interlocutory costs orders so incurred.

[46]      Mr Savage submits that is exactly the  situation  in  relation  to  the Additional Debt. That was a stand-alone application brought by H. It failed, and increased costs were ordered. The decision was not premised on any fact at issue in the substantive judicial review application, and it is unchallengeable in that respect.

[47]      In conclusion on this issue, I am of the view that it is highly unlikely that any of H’s actions will be able to overturn the Employment Court decision on which the bankruptcy notice is based or the Additional Debt owing to RPW based on the interlocutory costs order made.

[48]      Accordingly, this position weighs heavily in favour of granting the adjudication order.

Bar to proceeding

[49]      Mr Savage submits that a bankrupt does not have a statutory bar to bringing or continuing any proceedings. Section 76 of the Insolvency Act halts all proceedings to recover any debt that is proven in the bankruptcy but the judicial review application does not fall into this category. Consequently, H may continue his judicial review application with the consent of the Official Assignee.

Oversight of litigation

[50]      Mr Savage submits that oversight of H’s litigation is required because he continues to bring applications that have no chance of success. He is increasing his debt to RPW and third parties, and also consuming resources of various courts and impeding the efficient administration of justice

[51]      Mr Savage points to the recent example of H’s application to have opposing counsel in the judicial review application recused. The application failed and the Judge found that it was apparent that the proceedings were without merit and based on H’s affidavit evidence of his opinions and beliefs, which the Employment Court

found did not provide any material assistance in deciding that counsel should be disqualified.30 Mr Savage point out this litigation was particularly unmeritorious, as H brought a similar application in the previous Employment Court proceedings. H was not successful and incurred a costs award that was uplifted by 20 per cent because:31

The applications were so clearly without merit that their purpose could only be assessed as an attempt to create difficulties and obfuscate the issues raised in the challenges, which dealt only with issues of quantification of penalties and costs in the Authority. Increased costs are appropriate in this case.

[52]      On this issue, my view is that H’s previous actions and the Employment Court’s comments on his various applications weigh in favour of there being oversight of the litigation initiated by H, which would be provided by the Official Assignee. This factor weighs in favour of granting the adjudication order.

Is H insolvent?

[53]      Mr Savage has submitted that H has produced no evidence to prove he is solvent, nor provided any comfort to the Court that he has a realistic prospect of paying the debt. He submits that there is also evidence before the Court that there are other third party creditors with significant debts.32

[54]      I am of the view that the lack of information regarding H’s financial situation being put before the Court to indicate he may have a prospect of paying the debt weighs in favour of making the adjudication order.

Clean hands?

[55]Mr Savage’s submissions set out a description of H’s conduct in relation to:33

(a)intimidating witnesses;

30     H v Employment Relations Authority [2022] NZEmpC 87.

31     H v RPW [2020] NZEmpC 192 at [7].

32     Affidavit of Te Puea Winiata in support of the adjudication of [H] dated 2 June 2022.

33     Judgment creditor’s consolidated submissions in opposition to application for stay of proceedings, above n 17, at [43]–[48].

(b)intimidating counsel;

(c)intimidating judicial decision-makers;

(d)committing contempt of Court; and

(e)failure to follow reasonable legal process.

[56]      I will not reiterate in this judgment the various pronouncements made by the ERA and the Employment Court in relation to H’s conduct. Examples Mr Savage directed me to are statements in the judgment of Judge Perkins.34 It is sufficient, for the purposes of this judgment, to conclude that H’s conduct in the litigation to date weighs in favour of the Official Assignee having oversight of the litigation and therefore weighs against halting the application for adjudication.

Conclusion

[57]      Due to the conclusions I have reached at [36], [43], [47], [52], [54] and [56], I am of the view that the application by H to halt the bankruptcy proceedings should be declined.

[58]      I have considered both H’s submissions at the hearing and the additional material he has put before the Court regarding the work both he and Culturesafe New Zealand Ltd (now in liquidation) have done in terms of protecting the position of employees who may be the subject of workplace bullying or harassment. I have no doubt this is valuable work. However, it does not provide justification in the context of this application for halting the bankruptcy proceedings which, for the reasons set out at [57] above, should proceed.

34     H v RPW, above n 3, at [41]–[46].

Result

[59]I make the following orders:

(a)The application by H to halt RPW’s application for adjudication is dismissed.

(b)Costs are awarded in favour of RPW on a 2B basis.

…………………………….. Associate Judge Taylor