| NOTE: HIGH COURT ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE WITNESS IDENTIFIED IN [13], [64] AND [65] OF THE JUDGMENT IN [2018] NZHC 2330 REMAINS IN FORCE. |
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 16/2022 [2023] NZSC 79 |
| BETWEEN | ROBERT ROPER |
| AND | MARIYA ANN TAYLOR |
| ATTORNEY-GENERAL Second Respondent |
| SC 23/2022 | ||
| BETWEEN | ATTORNEY-GENERAL | |
| AND | MARIYA ANN TAYLOR | |
| ROBERT ROPER Second Respondent | ||
| Court: | Winkelmann CJ, Glazebrook, O’Regan, Williams and William Young JJ |
Counsel: | J F Mather for Appellant (SC 16/2022) and Second Respondent (SC 23/2022) |
Judgment: | 3 July 2023 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A There are no costs orders in this Court.
BCosts in the Courts below are to be dealt with by those Courts.
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REASONS
Introduction
Ms Taylor sought compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder caused by Mr Roper sexually assaulting and falsely imprisoning her in the late 1980s while both were employed by the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF).
The Court of Appeal, by majority, held that Ms Taylor’s claim for compensation for false imprisonment could proceed.[1] The Court of Appeal also held that the false imprisonment claim was not covered by s 21B of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (the Act).[2]
[1]Taylor v Roper [2020] NZCA 268, [2021] 3 NZLR 37 (French, Brown and Clifford JJ) [First CA judgment] at [198]–[209].
[2]Taylor v Roper [2021] NZCA 691, [2022] 2 NZLR 671 (French, Brown and Clifford JJ) containing the addendum to the First CA judgment addressing s 21B of the Act: at [5]–[51].
Mr Roper and the Attorney-General, on behalf of the RNZAF, appealed to this Court against the Court of Appeal decision. Ms Taylor cross-appealed.[3]
[3]Roper v Taylor [2022] NZSC 62 (Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ).
This Court allowed the appeal and held that Ms Taylor could not sue for compensatory damages for false imprisonment and (tentatively) that s 21B would, in any event, be engaged.[4]
[4]Roper v Taylor [2023] NZSC 49 (Winkelmann CJ, Glazebrook, O’Regan, Williams and William Young JJ) at [103].
In her cross-appeal Ms Taylor argued that the accident compensation regime did not apply to bar her claim for compensatory damages. This Court dismissed the cross-appeal, holding that the ban in s 317(1)(a) and (b) of the Act applies.[5]
Submissions on costs
[5]At [51].
Mr Roper submits that costs should follow the event in the normal manner. He is legally aided and seeks costs equal to his full legal aid costs.
The Attorney-General does not seek costs in this Court.
Ms Taylor submits that any entitlement Mr Roper may have to costs as a result of succeeding on appeal should be offset against exemplary damages awarded against him. Ms Taylor submits further that she should be entitled to costs on a 3B basis in the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
Our assessment
We make no order for costs. While compensatory damages are not available, the claim for exemplary damages is still to be decided.[6] The matter is therefore ongoing and there have been findings by the High Court of serious misconduct by Mr Roper.[7]
Result
[6]We are not to be taken as making any comment on the claim for exemplary damages.
[7]M v Roper [2018] NZHC 2330 (Edwards J) at [74]–[77].
There are no costs orders in this Court.
Costs in the Courts below are to be dealt with by those Courts.
Solicitors:
Albany Legal Ltd, Auckland for Appellant (SC 16/2022) and Second Respondent (SC 23/2022)
Chambers Craig Jarvis, Auckland for First Respondent
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Second Respondent (SC 16/2022) and Appellant (SC 23/2022)
- AGLC
- Roper v Taylor [2023] NZSC 79
- Case
- [2023] NZSC 79
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory framework provided by the Accident Compensation Act 2001. The Court found that the statutory provisions precluded Ms Taylor from suing for compensatory damages for false imprisonment. In particular, section 21B of the Act was held to exclude claims for damages for personal injury, including false imprisonment, that arise out of employment. The Court's decision was based on a careful analysis of the legislative intent behind the accident compensation regime and its interaction with common law claims for damages. Additionally, the Court held that section 317(1)(a) and (b) of the Act barred Ms Taylor's claim for compensatory damages, as they explicitly excluded claims for damages for personal injury. The Court's ruling was thus a clear affirmation of the statutory scheme's primacy over common law claims in the context of employment-related injuries.
The Supreme Court's decision effectively reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier ruling, which had allowed Ms Taylor's claim for compensation for false imprisonment to proceed. The Court's judgment emphasised the importance of adhering to the statutory framework designed to provide a no-fault compensation system for work-related injuries. By holding that Ms Taylor could not sue for compensatory damages for false imprisonment and that section 21B of the Act applied, the Court reinforced the limitations on common law claims in the context of the accident compensation regime. The dismissal of Ms Taylor's cross-appeal further underscored the comprehensive nature of the statutory provisions, which preclude claims for compensatory damages for personal injury arising out of employment. The Court's decision clarified the legal landscape regarding the interplay between statutory compensation schemes and common law claims for damages.
The Supreme Court's judgment concluded that no costs orders would be made in the Supreme Court, while costs in the lower courts were to be dealt with by those courts. This decision reflects the ongoing nature of the litigation, with the claim for exemplary damages still to be decided. The Court refrained from commenting on the potential claim for exemplary damages, focusing instead on the specific issues of compensatory damages and the applicability of section 21B of the Act. The costs ruling ensures that the financial implications of the litigation are managed appropriately within the existing judicial framework, allowing the lower courts to address the costs incurred during the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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