Rodney Paul Taniwha v The Queen - [2010] NZSC 50

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 16/2010
[2010] NZSC 50
RODNEY PAUL TANIWHA
v
THE QUEEN
Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard and Tipping JJ
Counsel:W C Pyke for Applicant

N P Chisnall for Crown

Judgment:12 May 2010

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]        The applicant’s appeal against conviction for sexual violation by rape was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.[1] His defence at trial was that he believed on reasonable grounds that the complainant was consenting. He has sought leave to appeal to this Court on the ground that the Judge misdirected the jury in relation to this defence. The Judge in fact gave a direction which followed the Court of Appeal’s specimen direction in R v Guatama.[2] The jury was told that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have a reasonable belief that the complaint was consenting and that one way that the Crown could do that would be to satisfy the jury “that no reasonable person in the accused’s shoes could have thought that the complainant was consenting”.
[1]      R v Taniwha [2010] NZCA 15.
[2]      R v Guatama CA 275/01, 13 December 2001 at [39].
[2]        It is said for the applicant that this way of putting the issue departs impermissibly from the wording of s 128 of the Crimes Act 1961. The argument appears to be that it excludes consideration of reasonable grounds based on the facts as the accused believed them to be, thereby distracting the jury from an evaluation of the applicant’s account of the relevant events.
[3]        This Court has previously concluded, in refusing leave in R v Can,[3] that the issue sought to be raised is moot where there is no evidence upon which the proposed interpretation of the section might make a difference. So it is in this case. There is nothing suggested about the circumstances, or put forward concerning the characteristics of the applicant himself, which the jury might have omitted to take into account as a result of being directed as they were. There were no circumstances or characteristics of which it could be said that they might have peculiarly affected the perceptions of the applicant. A test of what a reasonable person “in his shoes”, that is, in the applicant’s circumstances, might believe on reasonable grounds therefore could not be said to have inappropriately diverged from the statutory test in this case.
[3]      R v Can [2007] NZSC 93 at [7].
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2010] NZSC 50
Decision Date: 12 May 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand considered an appeal by Rodney Paul Taniwha against his conviction for sexual violation by rape. Taniwha argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury on his defence, which was that he reasonably believed the complainant was consenting. The appeal focused on whether the trial judge's direction to the jury, which followed a precedent set in R v Guatama, was appropriate. The trial judge instructed the jury that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that Taniwha did not have a reasonable belief that the complainant was consenting, and one way to do that was by showing that no reasonable person in Taniwha's position could have thought the complainant was consenting. Taniwha's argument was that this direction departed from the wording of section 128 of the Crimes Act 1961 and excluded consideration of his reasonable grounds based on his perception of the facts.

The Supreme Court found that the issue raised by Taniwha was moot as there was no evidence suggesting that the jury might have omitted to consider any circumstances or characteristics peculiar to Taniwha's case that could have affected his perception. The court concluded that the direction given by the trial judge did not diverge inappropriately from the statutory test, as there were no unique circumstances or characteristics of Taniwha that would have required the jury to consider a different perspective. The court relied on its previous decision in R v Can, where it was held that the issue of misdirection is moot if there is no evidence that the jury's consideration was affected by the direction given.

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, affirming Taniwha's conviction. The court did not find merit in the argument that the trial judge's direction was inappropriate or prejudicial to Taniwha's defence. Consequently, Taniwha's appeal was unsuccessful, and the original conviction stood.

Orders