Robinson v The Queen - [2020] NZHC 1711

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE

CRI-2020-488-000025

[2020] NZHC 1711

BETWEEN
JOHN CLIFFORD WALTER ROBINSON

Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Hearing: 15 July 2020

Appearances:

Appellant in person

G R Anson for Respondent

Judgment:

17 July 2020

JUDGMENT OF LANG J

[on appeal against sentence]

This judgment was delivered by me on 17 July 2020 at 3.30 pm.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date……………

Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington Copy to: Appellant

ROBINSON v R [2020] NZHC 1711 [16 July 2020]

[1] Mr Robinson stood trial in the District Court on charges of trespass, causing intentional damage and assaulting a female. The jury found him guilty of trespass, but not guilty of the other two charges.

[2] On 6 May 2020, Judge K B de Ridder made an order under s 110 of the Sentencing Act 2002 (the Act) requiring Mr Robinson to come up for sentence if called upon to do so within six months.1 He also directed Mr Robinson to pay reparation to the complainants’ insurer in the sum of $7,757.90.

[3]Mr Robinson appeals against both aspects of the sentence.

Background

[4] The charges were laid as a result of a longstanding dispute between Mr Robinson and his neighbours, Mr and Mrs Woest. The dispute appears to be wide ranging in scope but the charges arose from a dispute relating to Mr Robinson’s driveway, part of which encroached on Mr and Mrs Woest’s land. Some years ago Mr Robinson paved the driveway in concrete. One edge of the paving followed what Mr Robinson considered to be the boundary between his property and that belonging to Mr and Mrs Woest.

[5] Mr and Mrs Woest subsequently discovered the paved edge of the driveway encroached on their land. During a period when Mr Robinson was overseas they installed a fence along their side of the correct boundary. This reduced the width of Mr Robinson’s driveway considerably. He became concerned that the driveway was not sufficiently wide to enable an ambulance or other first responders to obtain access to his house should that be necessary. On 21 May 2018 Mr Robinson took matters into his own hands. He used a chainsaw to cut through the posts of the fence at ground level. He then used a small digger to push the fence off the driveway and further onto Mr and Mrs Woest’s property. This resulted in the charges of intentional damage and wilful trespass.

1 R v Robinson [2020] NZDC 10060.

[6] Mr Robinson defended the intentional damage charge on the basis that he believed he had the right to remove the fence from what he understood to be his property back onto Mr and Mrs Woest’s property. The jury’s verdict on that charge suggests they accepted Mr Robinson’s explanation or, alternatively, were left in a state of reasonable doubt by it. The verdict on the charge of wilful trespass confirms the jury considered Mr Robinson knew he was trespassing on Mr and Mrs…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Robinson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Robinson v The Queen [2020] NZHC 1711
Case: [2020] NZHC 1711
Decision Date: 17 July 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Robinson v The Queen involved an appeal against the sentence imposed by the District Court. Mr. Robinson, the appellant, was convicted of trespass but acquitted of the other charges brought against him. The District Court had deferred sentencing and ordered Mr. Robinson to pay reparation to the complainants' insurer. Mr. Robinson appealed both the requirement to appear for sentencing within six months and the reparation order. The appeal was heard by Lang J, who had to determine whether the District Court's sentencing order was appropriate.

The central legal issues were whether the District Court was correct in ordering a deferred sentence and if the reparation order was justified and correctly quantified. Regarding the deferred sentence, Mr. Robinson argued that a conviction and discharge would have been more appropriate, considering the circumstances and his compliance with bail conditions. Concerning the reparation order, Mr. Robinson contested the amount ordered, suggesting that he should only be required to pay a lesser amount based on his own estimate of the repair costs.

Lang J found that a conviction and discharge was a suitable sentence given the circumstances and the history of the case. The Court noted that Mr. Robinson had already faced significant consequences, including time in custody and restrictive bail conditions. However, the Court also determined that the reparation order was not correctly quantified. Mr. Robinson was required to pay reparation, but the amount should be based on a more realistic estimate of the repair costs, which he had provided. The Court set aside the reparation order and substituted it with an order for Mr. Robinson to pay $1,759.28 to the complainants' insurer without affecting the insurer's right to pursue further recovery if necessary.

The final orders of the Court were to set aside the requirement for Mr. Robinson to appear for sentencing within six months and replace it with a conviction and discharge. The reparation order was also set aside and replaced with an order for Mr. Robinson to pay $1,759.28 to the complainants' insurer.

Orders