RJC v JDM
[2013] NZHC 3252
•6 December 2013
NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 139 OF THE CARE OF CHILDREN ACT 2004, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B TO 11D OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE COURT/LEGISLATION/RESTRICTIONS-ON-PUBLICATIONS. IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-4217
[2013] NZHC 3252
UNDER The Care of Children Act 2004 IN THE MATTER
of an appeal against a decision of the Family Court at Auckland
BETWEEN
RJC
Appellant
AND
JDM
Respondent
Hearing: 20 November 2013 Appearances:
D Holbrook and S Medemblik for Appellant Respondent in person
N Schumacher for the Child
Judgment:
6 December 2013
JUDGMENT OF BROWN J
This judgment was delivered by me on 6 December 2013 at 3 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:Holbrook Law, Takapuna, Auckland Galvin Law, Takapuna, Auckland
Copy To: Respondent
RJC v JDM [2013] NZHC 3252 [6 December 2013]
[1] The appellant mother appeals against a decision of his Honour Judge S A Coyle dated 30 August 2013 making a final parenting order on terms which included that C is to be in the day to day care of his father, the respondent, at all times other than those specified in the order.
[2] The grounds of the appeal detailed in the notice of appeal dated 16 September 2013 are:
(a)The Judge erred in fact in determining that the child’s best interests would be served by changing the child’s care arrangements from week about shared care (“shared care arrangement”) to being primarily in the day to day care of the respondent given the evidence that the shared care arrangement saw a marked improvement in the child’s behaviour.
(b)The Judge erred in law and in fact in giving undue and significant weight to the observational evidence of Ms Raethel, a clinical psychologist, despite finding her report relied on inaccurate data.
(c)The Judge erred in fact in relying on Ms Raethel’s evidence that the child continues to run the appellant’s house (her evidence was in the past tense) and continues to have a high level of disrespect for the appellant.
(d)The Judge erred in fact in determining the evidence established the respondent provides a more structured household when it had been observed only by Ms Raethel whom he found had an unwavering view even when she did not have data to support her view.
(e)The Judge erred in law in placing undue weight on the appellant’s past conduct in relation to guardianship decisions regarding the child’s school placements and ADHD assessment.
(f)The Judge erred in law when considering C’s views as reported by the lawyer for child and in failing to give weight to C’s views.
(g)The Judge erred in fact in his assessment of s 5(e) in that the respondent smacked the child a few years ago on only one occasion; the child was smacked after the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act was introduced in June 2007.
(h)The Judge erred in fact in his determination of ss 5(a) and (c) when concluding that the appellant has remained averse to meeting to discuss guardianship issues and in the absence of any evidence regarding the respondent’s position on the same issue as a balance.
[3] The appeal is opposed both by the respondent and by Mrs Schumacher, who was appointed in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to continue to represent C in this matter.1 However it transpired that the parties contended for different permutations of outcome:
(a)The appellant sought the restoration of the shared care arrangement. She did not seek an order that C be in her day to day care;
(b)The respondent supported the order under appeal. However in the event that there was to be a change, he contended that it was in C’s best interests for C to be continuously in the day to day care of one parent and hence considered that the next best alternative to the order under appeal was an order that C be in his mother’s day to day care;
(c)Mrs Schumacher supported the order under appeal. In her submission the next best alternative was the shared care arrangement.
The judgment under appeal
[4]
The events leading to a hearing before Judge Coyle are conveniently summarised in the first part of his judgment under the heading “Background”. C had1 Minute of Ellis J dated 1 October 2013 at [10].
been in the primary day to day care of his mother up until the decision of Judge McHardy on 11 April 2013 when pending a substantive hearing his Honour made an interim parenting order putting in place the shared care arrangement. As Judge Coyle noted that was a decision which neither party expected and one which represented a fundamental shift from C being in the primary care of his mother.2 The issue for determination by Judge Coyle was whether the interim parenting order (the shared care arrangement) should become a final parenting order or whether there should be a change in the care arrangements to those sought by the respondent, namely that C should be primarily in his care.
[5] After a hearing spanning 19 and 20 August 2013 Judge Coyle issued a Chambers Judgment on 22 August 20133 advising the terms of his order followed by a Reserved Judgment dated 30 August 2013 setting out his reasons for decision.4
[6] The Reserved Judgment recognises the requirements of s 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004 (“the Act’) including the requirement in s 4(5) that the relevant principles in s 5 were to be considered. It records C’s views as conveyed by Mrs Schumacher and then proceeds to consider the relevant s 5 principles. It then addresses the two s 133 reports provided by Ms Raethel, a registered clinical psychologist, whose evidence is the focus of a number of the points on appeal. Finally there is a section headed “The Result”, the first paragraph of which includes the key conclusion:5
Taking into account the views of [C], the relevant s 5 principles I referred to and the evidence, I reached the view that [C] needs to be primarily in the care of his father, and this is why I made the orders issued pursuant to my earlier judgment. The evidence establishes that [C’s] father provides a more structured household which is better meeting his needs in terms of behavioural management.
[7] The significance of a structured household and the issue of behavioural management are developed in [39] as follows:
In reaching this view, I do not want [the appellant] to gain an impression that I think she has failed. She has a child who presents with extreme behaviours
2 At [5].
3 RJC v JDM [2013] NZFC 6886.
4 RJC v JDM [2013] NZFC 6950 [Reserved Judgment].
5 At [38].
that she has done her best to manage. My concern is that if I continue to allow [C] to be raised by her in an environment in which he controls the household, I am then setting [C] up to fail and am potentially putting [the appellant] at risk given that [C] has, in the past, been violent towards her. I am also concerned about the dichotomy in the households – an environment where he can control what happens (his mother’s house) and an environment where he is the child (his father’s house) – and the implications that has for [C’s] development. That inconsistency of parenting is, on Ms Raethel’s evidence, undermining [C’s] ability to learn appropriate behaviours.
Approach on appeal
[8] This is an appeal under s 143 of the Act and accordingly this appeal is by way of rehearing.6 As the Supreme Court stated in Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar7 the appellant bears an onus of satisfying the appeal court that it should differ from the decision under appeal and it is only if the appellate court considers that the appeal decision is wrong that the appellate court is justified in interfering with it. However as the Court further said:8
Those exercising general rights of appeal are entitled to judgment in accordance with the opinion of the appellate court, even where that opinion is an assessment of fact and degree and entails a value judgment. If the appellate court’s opinion is different from the conclusion of the tribunal appealed from, then the decision under appeal is wrong in the only sense that matters, even if it was a conclusion on which minds might reasonably differ. In such circumstances it is an error for the High Court to defer to the lower Court’s assessment of the acceptability and weight to be accorded to the evidence, rather than forming its own opinion.
[9] The Supreme Court subsequently stated in the context of a “relocation” appeal under the Act:9
[35] ... It is trite but perhaps necessary to say that judges are required to exercise judgment. The difficulties which are said to beset the field are not conceptual or legal difficulties; they are inherent in the nature of the assessments which the courts must make. The judge’s task is to determine and evaluate the facts, considering all relevant s 5 principles and other factors, and then to make a judgment as to what course of action will best reflect the welfare and best interests of the children. While that judgment may be difficult to make on the facts of individual cases, its making is not assisted by imposing a gloss on the statutory scheme.
6 Section 143(4), District Courts Act 1947, s 75.
7 Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [4].
8 At [16].
9 Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1.
[10] I first consider each of the eight grounds of appeal. Then as required by Austin, Nichols I proceed to reach my own opinion on the most appropriate parenting order for C.
Changing the shared care arrangement was erroneous given the evidence that the share cared arrangement had seen a marked improvement in C’s behaviour
[11] Leaving to one side the mid-June to mid-July 2013 period when there was an unexplained regression in C’s behaviour,10 generally speaking there was a discernible improvement in C’s behaviour in the duration of the shared care arrangement.11 Indeed the significant improvement in C’s behaviour was not of a nature that the Principal of his school would have predicted. At the August 2013 review meeting at the School12 it was recorded that:
[C’s] behaviour has moved to the point where he is at the very challenging end of the ‘normal student behaviour’ spectrum whereas previously he was well outside this spectrum.
[12] However the thrust of this point of appeal appears to be that, because there was improvement in C’s behaviour in the period of the shared care arrangement, it was an error on the part of the Judge to change C’s shared care arrangement (the status quo at the hearing in August 2013) to that the subject of the Judge’s order. In support of that contention it was argued by Ms Holbrook that there was no evidence before the Court that the shared care arrangement was not working for C. It was also submitted that there was no evidence that C’s improved behaviour was attributable solely to the respondent.
[13] However neither of those contentions were in issue. As Mrs Schumacher observed in her submissions:
It is agreed that there was no evidence that [C’s] improved behaviour was attributable solely to the defendant father. Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that [C’s] difficult behaviour was attributed solely to the appellant mother. [C’s] behaviour has been challenging throughout, regardless of what care arrangements are in place and whose care he is in.
10 Reserved Judgment, above n 5, at [30].
11 Ibid at [28] and [37](a) and (b).
12 A meeting which takes place each school term as part of the process for supporting C.
The latter observation was expressly noted by Judge Coyle.13
[14] The reason why Judge Coyle preferred the order which he made was because he considered that the evidence established that C’s behaviour was more easily able to be managed in his father’s care, a state of affairs which was attributable to the fact that C’s father provided a more structured household. That state of affairs was better calculated to meet C’s needs in terms of behavioural management.14
[15] Had the shared care arrangement (which involved a change from the original care arrangement pursuant to which C was in the day to day primary care of his mother to spending approximately half of his time in the primary care of his father) disclosed a regression in his behaviour, then there might well have been reason to doubt the wisdom of an order which placed C in the primary day to day care of his father. However, as already noted, generally speaking the shared care arrangement resulted in an improvement.
[16] Nevertheless, as Mrs Schumacher submitted, that is not to say that the shared care arrangement was the most optimal care arrangement which could be achieved. As s 4(5) recognises, what the Court was required to do was to determine what “best” serves C’s welfare and best interests. The Court having concluded that that objective was best achieved by C being in the primary day to day care of his father, no sound basis for attacking that conclusion is to be found in the circumstance that C’s behaviour had already improved under the shared care arrangement.
Undue and significant weight was given to the observational evidence of Ms Raethel despite a finding that her report relied on inaccurate date
[17] Judge Coyle was clearly alive to unsatisfactory aspects of the evidence of Ms Raethel. He addresses this explicitly at [32] and [33] noting that he could place little weight on her report to the extent that it maintained that C’s behaviour deteriorated more markedly when in his mother’s care.
13 Ibid at [29].
14 Ibid at [37] and [38].
[18] However Judge Coyle clearly distinguished between that part of Ms Raethel’s evidence, which he found unreliable, and other parts of her evidence which he considered were of assistance to him, evidence which he noted was supported by other evidence from Mr Tony Ross, a special education psychologist.15
[19] Judge Coyle had received evidence from the school principal about C’s ability to perceive a weakness and exploit it to his advantage. The Judge explored that issue with Ms Raethel16 and considered that it was appropriate to give significant weight to that evidence of Ms Raethel.17
[20] As the Judge records at [34] where Ms Raethel’s evidence was useful to him was in relation to the risks for C if things did not improve and as to the type of parenting style and structure that C requires. Having read the Judge’s discussion of those issues, having noted also the observations of Mr Ross and the position of Mrs Schumacher I do not consider that either undue or significant weight was given to that part of Ms Raethel’s evidence described as observational evidence.
There was factual error in the reliance on Ms Raethel’s evidence that C continues to run the mother’s house and to have a high level of disrespect for her
[21] The appellant’s argument on this point focused upon the differences between Ms Raethel’s first and second reports. It was emphasised that Ms Raethel’s testimony which was relied on by the Judge was that C “did” (i.e. past tense) run the appellant’s household. The point was made that that perception reflected the observations in Ms Raethel’s first report. The submission was advanced that there was no observational evidence whatsoever in the second report to support Ms Raethel’s evidence that C currently maintains a high level of disrespect for the appellant or currently runs her household.
[22]It is true that the passage from Ms Raethel’s evidence quoted by the Judge at
[35] refers to both the present and the past tense whereas there was no observation to that effect recorded in Ms Raethel’s second report. However the passage quoted is
15 Ibid at [40].
16 Ibid at [35]-[36].
17 Ibid at [37]-[41].
an excerpt from rather than a full record of Ms Raethel’s evidence as to the difference between the two houses which was:
C does run the house, or did run the house, except for the last observation it was a little less obvious but he did run the house and do what he wanted to at his mother’s house and she did not intervene for fear of the consequences.
[23] It is also important to bear in mind that the passages highlighted by the Judge are only some of the evidence which he heard. Indeed the passage quoted above was followed immediately by the following exchange:
Q:And [the school Principal] also described [C] as a child who innately could sense a weakness in someone or something and then exploit it.
A: Yes.
Q:And I take it from the answer you gave a short time to Ms Schumacher you’d agree with that?
A: I would, he definitely does, ...
[24] Then on the next page of the transcript there is the following exchange between the Judge and Ms Raethel:
Q:It has occurred to me as I have listened to your evidence for [C] is it a possibility that he is raised by his mum, he’s got these character traits we have talked about, and in a sense familiarity has bred contempt and that he has over time learnt how to actively subvert and get around the best endeavours of his mother –
A: Yes, I –
Q: - to correct his behaviour?
A:I agree. He has, he actually has a high level of disrespect of her. And I’m not blaming her for that entirely, I’m saying that the ongoing, I’m saying by that the ongoing efforts to keep up with his behaviour and to manage it have led to him realising that he can push the boundaries, he can get away with it, and like anybody else she gets tired, and you can’t let up with [C], you just can’t. He has exploited it and will continue to do so, and my concern, the reason I was looking at the split still not working, is that he’s with her for seven days and that’s a long time to be able to again and again manipulate and change the rules. Why he changes back when he goes to his father’s place, in my opinion, is that he has had consistent and very tight boundaries and he knows he can’t push them.
Q: It’s almost chameleon-like, isn’t it – A: Mmm, it is.
Q: - back to the situation you’re in? A: Absolutely, but then children do. ...
[25] I consider that the Judge’s consideration of C’s behaviour at the different parents’ houses was more nuanced than this point in appeal would suggest. I consider that the Judge’s conclusion that C continues to act disrespectfully towards his mother reflects the evidence, and what I infer was the Judge’s view, concerning C’s capacity to actively subvert his mother’s undoubted genuine efforts to address C’s behaviour. That sort of conduct is to be contrasted with more explicit confrontational behaviour which occurred at an earlier point in time such as when C gave his mother a black eye.
[26] However behaviour of both kinds involves disrespect. I do not consider that the judgment was erroneous in the manner contended in the third point on appeal.
There was error in the determination that the father provides a more structured household when this relied only on the observations of Ms Raethel
[27] I have already noted the Judge’s expression of concern about aspects of Ms Raethel’s evidence. I infer that the assertion as to the Judge’s finding as to Ms Raethel’s unwavering view is based on his observations at [33].
[28] However the Judge proceeds immediately to recognise evidence from Ms Raethel which was useful to him, in particular the type of parenting style and structure which C required. There is no doubt that Ms Raethel’s evidence pointed to the respondent’s household being the more structured. Nor was that the only evidence. I note in that regard the observations in the memorandum of Mrs Schumacher dated 30 May 2013 updating the Court after the shared care arrangement had been put in place. I do not consider that there was any error of the nature alleged.
Undue weight was placed on the mother’s past conduct in relation to guardianship decisions regarding C’s school placements and the ADHD assessment.
There was erroneous determination of ss 5(a) and (c) in the conclusion, inter alia, that the mother remained averse to meeting to discuss guardianship issues in the
absence of any evidence regarding the father’s position on the same issue as a balance.
[29] I address the fifth and eighth points on appeal together because they both relate to that part of the judgment where Judge Coyle addressed the s 5(a) and (c) principles. The appellant criticises what is described as the Judge’s significant focus on historical guardianship issues which it was contended were not relevant to the care arrangements for C. Section 4(3) of the Act was invoked which provides:
A parent’s conduct may be considered only to the extent (if any) that it is relevant to the child’s welfare and best interests.
[30] In relation to the eighth point on appeal attention was drawn to the extensive cross examination of the appellant by the respondent over historical guardianship issues whereas in her evidence the appellant indicated that she was not averse to meeting to discuss guardianship issues in the future on a face to face basis. It is important to recognise the context of the Judge’s review of the historical conduct. It was necessary for him to consider the issues of on-going consultation and cooperation recognised in the principle in s 5(c). The Judge reached the clear conclusion that the appellant, on the evidence, had adopted a view that she would engage in consultation with the respondent but that if he disagreed with what she wanted then she would do what she wanted in any event.18
[31] The conclusion that the appellant had remained averse to attend meetings needs to be read in the context of the Judge’s full analysis. He noted that since the shared care arrangements there had been weekly communication by email and that, while that initiative had come from the respondent, it was to the appellant’s credit that she had willingly engaged in that email communication.19 It was then that the Judge noted that the appellant remained averse to meeting face to face to talk about guardianship issues concerning C and the fact that the appellant refuses to have any communication with the respondent’s wife. The Judge then recognised that in the course of evidence the appellant had expressed a willingness to meet with the respondent and his wife and he expressed the hope that she would do so but on the
18 At [14].
19 At [19].
basis of the evidence which he had reviewed he remained sceptical as to the prospects.
[32] In taking issue with the appellant’s submission Mrs Schumacher submitted that the Judge had focused significantly on the ability of C’s parents to facilitate the other’s relationship with him and to co-parent and communicate. She considered that the matters to which the Judge referred were of significant relevance to C’s future having regard to the need for the parents to jointly discuss and resolve matters relating to his care. Mrs Schumacher recognised the appellant had stated that she would be willing to discuss guardianship issues in the future on a face to face basis but made the point that the evidence established that up until the time of the hearing the appellant had chosen not to do so. Indeed the respondent submitted that the appellant continues to refuse to meet and to discuss guardianship issues despite several requests by the respondent.
[33] I consider that Mrs Schumacher’s analysis is correct and I do not find that there is any error in the judgment of the kind contended for in points on appeal 5 and 8.
The Judge erred in law when considering C’s views as reported by the lawyer for the child and in failing to give sufficient weight to C’s views20
[34] The appellant first drew attention to ss 6(2)(a) and (b) of the Act which requires that a child be given reasonable opportunities to express views on matters affecting the child and further requires that any view the child expresses (either directly or through a representative) must be taken into account.
[35] The role of communicating C’s view to the Court was undertaken by Mrs Schumacher whose contribution was remarked upon very favourably by the Judge in the course of his consideration of the subject of C’s views.21 The Judge then noted the different views which C had expressed together with the fact of Mrs Schumacher’s submission that C had become wary of expressing views as he knew that his views would be considered by the Court.
20 The word sufficient was added by Ms Holbrook in her oral submissions.
21 At [11].
[36] I apprehend that there are two different complaints within the sixth point on appeal. The first is directed to the discharge by Mrs Schumacher of her functions whereas the second focuses upon the sufficiency of weight given to C’s views by the Judge.
[37] So far as the former is concerned, it is clear from [10] that Ms Schumacher accurately conveyed to the Court C’s various expressions of his desire to spend time with either parent including, in particular, the view after the shared care arrangement commenced that he would like to spend some more time with his mother. Indeed I consider that the account of her discussion with C in her memorandum of 5 August 2013 was meticulous in endeavouring to convey C’s views. In my view, she having done so, Mrs Schumacher was not required to refrain from submitting what she considered was the best course for C’s welfare and best interests. Nor was the Judge in error in taking her views into account.
[38] The nature of the Court’s obligation to consider a child’s views was helpfully analysed by Randerson J in C v S (an authority cited by the appellant):22
[31] ...
(h) By s 6(2)(b), where a child expresses views, they may be conveyed to the Court either directly or through a representative (usually the lawyer appointed to act for the child). Any views expressed “must be taken into account”. The expression “take into account” is stronger than the common statutory formula “have regard to” but it does not go so far as to oblige the decision maker to act in accordance with any view expressed by the child. That would run counter to the Court’s wider obligation to assess what the child’s welfare and best interests require: s 3. The obligation to take any such views into account is mandatory but the section (in contrast to s 23(2) Guardianship Act and article 12 of the Convention) is silent as to the weight to be given to the views expressed. It is implicit that the Court retains a discretion to give such weight to the child’s views as it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case. Despite the omission in the new section to the age and maturity of the child (in contrast to s 23(2) of the 1968 Act) the Legislature cannot have intended that a Court should not have regard to those factors along with such other considerations as may be relevant to an assessment of the weight to be given to the child’s views.
22 C v S [2006] 3 NZLR 420.
[39] It is apparent from the judgment that the Judge both received C’s views and took those views into account.23 It was for the Judge to consider how much weight he gave to C’s views in all the circumstances, it being one factor amongst several which needed to be considered and weighed by the Judge. I do not consider that there is any reasonable basis for contending that the Judge failed to give “sufficient weight” to C’s views. Nor do I consider that the Judge was in error in taking into account the views conveyed by Mrs Schumacher even if they could be said to be inconsistent with views expressed by C on one particular occasion.
There was error in the assessment of s 5(e) concerning the incident of the father having smacked C on one occasion
[40] The Judge noted that the respondent had admitted to smacking C some years ago on one occasion but the Judge accepted the respondent’s evidence that he had not done so since and will not do so in the future.24 It is only fair to acknowledge that Ms Holbrook described this ground of appeal as being just part of the overall picture. However she made the point that, while in and of itself it would not provide a case for returning to a shared care arrangement, the fact of the incident highlighted the lack of focus on what happens at the respondent’s house. She argued that Ms Raethel’s focus was entirely on the appellant.
[41] Certainly smacking a child has become a criminal offence and it is a mandatory requirement for the Court to consider the protection of a child’s safety from all forms of violence under the principle in s 5(e). However the solitary incident referred to occurred some years ago and there was no suggestion on the part of the appellant that C would not be safe in his father’s care. I have earlier noted the point that the order which the appellant sought was a return to the shared care arrangement, not an order for C to be primarily in her day to day care. In the circumstances I do not consider that the allegation of error on the part of the Judge contained in the seventh point on appeal is established.
23 At [38].
24 At [13].
My own assessment
[42] Even though I have not found any of the grounds of appeal made out, as the passage from Austin, Nichols to which I earlier referred notes, the appellant is entitled to judgment in accordance with this Court’s opinion even where the issue involves an assessment of fact and degree and entails a value judgment.
[43] The issue for determination is what parenting order would best serve C’s welfare and best interests. I have considered the evidence mindful of the requirement to address the s 5 principles relevant to the welfare and best interests of C in his particular circumstances.
[44] Ms Holbrook submitted that the s 5 principles primarily relevant for this appeal are s 5(b), (d) and (e). I agree and I include (e) because of the need for a care arrangement that ensures C’s safety, in particular from his own behaviour. I agree with the Judge that there is no basis for concern about C’s physical safety in respect of either parent. In addition, and like the Judge, I also consider that the s 5(a) and (c) principles are of significant relevance in this case.
[45] My impression from the totality of the evidence leads me to the same view as that expressed by Judge Coyle at [40] that the best chance C has to meet the current projection of an on-going improvement in his behaviour is if he has a home environment which is consistent with the discipline imposed by his school, namely where there are home and school environments that are both structured and tightly controlled.
[46] This also was Mrs Schumacher’s submission. Indeed I have had the additional advantage of hearing from Mrs Schumacher about her meeting with C on 5 November 2013 at his school. She relayed C’s comments at that meeting concerning the differences between his mother’s and father’s homes as follows:
If I am naughty at mum’s house she doesn’t get angry and I don’t get in trouble ... I get in trouble more at dad’s house than I do at mum’s ... I don’t know why ... mum plays a lot with me, dad does too, but mum plays games like play fighting which is fun ... If I’m naughty at dad’s I get into trouble and I don’t get to play ... If I’m naughty at mum’s not much happens.
[47] That most recent description by C of the differences in the households appears to me to be consistent with the view that the respondent’s home provides a more structured environment.
[48] My own conclusion is that the parenting order which is more likely to best serve C’s welfare and best interests is one in which C is primarily in the day to day care of his father.
Disposition
[49] I do not find that any of the points on appeal are made out. On my own assessment of the case I have reached the same conclusion as Judge Coyle that the best parenting order for C’s particular circumstances is that he be primarily in the day to day care of his father. The appeal is dismissed.
Brown J
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