Riddiford v Attorney-General - [2012] NZCA 112

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA48/2010
[2012] NZCA 112

BETWEEN DANIEL THOMAS SPENCER RIDDIFORD
First Appellant

AND YVONNE ADA RIDDIFORD
Second Appellant

AND THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Respondent

Hearing: 2 November 2011

Court: Arnold, Randerson and Stevens JJ

Counsel: Appellant in Person
R Birdsall as McKenzie Friend
M T Parker and J S Andrew for Respondent

Judgment: 28 March 2012 at 10 a.m.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The appeal is allowed.
BThe decision of the Land Valuation Tribunal as to costs is quashed, as is the High Court’s order for costs.
CThe respondent is to pay the appellants usual disbursements.

REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Arnold J)

An award of costs is challenged

In this appeal the appellants, Mr Daniel Riddiford and his mother Mrs Yvonne Riddiford, challenge an order for costs made against them in the Land Valuation Tribunal (the Tribunal).[1] The Tribunal awarded costs of $100,000 in favour of the Crown, comprising $30,000 by way of legal costs (against actual legal costs of $41,459.10) and $70,000 for witness expenses (against actual costs of $82,108.21).
[1] Riddiford v Attorney-General LVT Wellington LVP1/00, 18 May 2007.
The background is that in September 1991 the Riddifords obtained subdivision consent under the Local Government Act 1974 in relation to 1402 square metres of land containing a farm cottage on their 6500 hectare sheep station on the Wairarapa coast. As a condition they were required to set aside an esplanade reserve. This comprises a 20 metre wide strip running along 9.45 kilometres of coastline. Its total area is a little over 19 hectares.
After the subdivision was approved, Mr Riddiford entered into negotiations with the Department of Conservation and the South Wairarapa District Council about the management rights for the reserve. (The Council would normally have managed it.) By an agreement dated 7 March 1995, Mr Riddiford obtained the right to manage the reserve and to relocate it should he wish to utilise the reserve land for aquaculture.
Mr Riddiford then entered into discussions with Valuation New Zealand about compensation. He indicated that he was seeking compensation of many millions of dollars. Because Valuation New Zealand was disestablished shortly after, the Department of Conservation took over the negotiations. The Department instructed a valuer, Mr Bulman, to undertake a valuation for the purposes of assessing compensation. He assessed reasonable compensation at $120,000.
This was unacceptable to the Riddifords. As there was no agreement, the matter was referred to the Land Valuation Tribunal for determination under s 290 of the Local Government Act. The hearing before the Tribunal, at which the Riddifords were represented by counsel, took six days. The Riddifords’ valuation evidence came from Mr Calderwood, a retired valuer who had worked for Valuation New Zealand. It appears that he gave a valuation of around $11.3 million, although the Riddifords’ claim was for approximately $13.3 million. Mr Calderwood based his valuation on the unique features of the land including what he considered to be its realistic potential for development in the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2012] NZCA 112
Decision Date: 28 March 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Riddiford v Attorney-General was an appeal against a costs order made by the Land Valuation Tribunal. The Riddifords had sought a significant sum of money as compensation for the taking of a coastal strip by the Crown. The Tribunal awarded them a much smaller sum and ordered them to pay costs to the Crown. The Riddifords appealed to the High Court against the valuation and costs decisions. They were unsuccessful on both grounds. The High Court also ordered costs against them on their appeal. They then applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the High Court’s costs decision. The Court granted leave on two grounds, namely whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to award costs in excess of $600 and whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to award costs against the Crown. On the first of these issues, the Court concluded that there was no jurisdiction to award costs in excess of $600. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to award costs derived from the Land Valuation Proceedings Act and the Commissions of Inquiry Act. The latter Act authorised the making of a scale of costs in respect of any inquiry. The scale was set at £300 (now $600) by the Supreme Court in 1903. Although the Tribunal was not a commission of inquiry, it was deemed to be one under the Land Valuation Proceedings Act. It followed that the Tribunal was bound by the 1903 scale. The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal’s costs order was quashed. The High Court’s order for costs against the Riddifords was also quashed. The Crown was ordered to pay the Riddifords’ usual disbursements.

Orders