IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2016-404-227 [2016] NZHC 1292
UNDER the Companies Act 1993 IN THE MATTER OF
the liquidation of PLANHORSE SYSTEMS LIMITED (In Liq)
BETWEEN
GRANT BRUCE REYNOLDS Applicant
AND
BURNARD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Respondent
Hearing: 13 June 2016 Appearances:
S J Ropati for Burnard International Ltd
B Pamatatau for G B ReynoldsJudgment:
13 June 2016
ORAL JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE R M BELL
Solicitors:
John S Ropati, Auckland, for Burnard International Ltd
Whitlock & Co (M D Whitlock), Auckland, for G B Reynolds
Counsel:
Bruce Pamatatau, Auckland, for G B Reynolds.
REYNOLDS v BURNARD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED [2016] NZHC 1292 [13 June 2016]
[1] Mr Reynolds, the liquidator of Planhorse Systems Ltd, applied under ss 294 and 295 of the Companies Act 1993to set aside a voidable transaction, a payment of
$14,225.21 to Burnard International Ltd made on 10 June 2015. The application was called on 11 March 2016. Burnard International Ltd did not file a notice of opposition and did not appear on 11 March 2016. Associate Judge Sargisson made orders under s 295 of the Companies Act requiring Burnard International to pay Mr Reynolds $14,225.21 plus interest and costs.
[2] Burnard International Ltd has now applied to set aside the orders made on
11 March 2016. It has applied under r 10.9 of the High Court Rules. That allows for a judgment to be set aside when one party does not appear at the trial. The application ought more properly to be considered under r 15.10, where judgment has been obtained by default. In this case, Associate Judge Sargisson made the order at the first call in a miscellaneous liquidation list. Little turns on whether r 10.9 or r 15.10 applies because the test under both rules is the same. The court may set aside if there has or may have been a miscarriage of justice. Burnard International Ltd does not say that judgment was obtained irregularly. Instead, it contends that even though judgment was obtained regularly, the judgment ought to be set aside to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
[3] The approach on applications to set aside judgments obtained regularly by default is well established. There are clear dicta from the Court of Appeal on the approach to be taken. A useful starting point is that Court’s decision in Russell v Cox.1 The Court quoted the judgment of McCarthy J in Paterson v Wellington Free Kindergarten Association Inc:2
In approaching an application to set aside a judgment which complies with the rule, the Court is not limited in the considerations to which it may have regard, but three have long been considered of dominant importance. This was accepted by the Chief Justice in the Court below and by all counsel in this Court. They are: 1 that the defendant has a substantial ground of defence; 2. that the delay is reasonably explained; 3. that the plaintiff will
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- Case
- [2016] NZHC 1292
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the court should set aside the orders made by default, given that Burnard International Ltd had not appeared. The court considered the well-established principles for setting aside judgments obtained by default, focusing on whether there was a substantial defence, whether the delay was reasonably explained, and whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the judgment was set aside. Burnard International Ltd argued that it had a substantial defence because it claimed that Planhorse Systems Ltd did not make the payment, and even if it did, it did not come from Planhorse but from an Australian company, Pelikan Artline Pty Ltd.
The court examined the evidence and concluded that Burnard International Ltd did not have a substantial defence. The payment was made within the restricted period, and Planhorse was presumed to be insolvent unless proven otherwise. The court held that the payment was made by Planhorse to Burnard International Ltd, regardless of the source of the funds, as established in previous case law. The court found that Burnard International Ltd had not acted in a manner that would allow it to claim a defence under section 296(3) of the Companies Act. Therefore, the court dismissed the application to set aside the orders and ordered costs on a 1B basis.
This decision underscores the importance of timely responses to legal proceedings and the stringent requirements for setting aside judgments obtained by default. The court's reasoning highlights the relevance of the principles governing such applications and the limited circumstances under which a court may set aside a default judgment.