Reynolds v Burnard International Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2016-404-227 [2016] NZHC 1292

UNDER the Companies Act 1993

IN THE MATTER OF

the liquidation of PLANHORSE SYSTEMS LIMITED (In Liq)

BETWEEN

GRANT BRUCE REYNOLDS Applicant

AND

BURNARD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

Respondent

Hearing: 13 June 2016

Appearances:

S J Ropati for Burnard International Ltd
B Pamatatau for G B Reynolds

Judgment:

13 June 2016

ORAL JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE R M BELL

Solicitors:

John S Ropati, Auckland, for Burnard International Ltd
Whitlock & Co (M D Whitlock), Auckland, for  G B Reynolds

Counsel:

Bruce Pamatatau, Auckland, for G B Reynolds.

REYNOLDS v BURNARD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED [2016] NZHC 1292 [13 June 2016]

[1]      Mr Reynolds, the liquidator of Planhorse Systems Ltd, applied under ss 294 and 295 of the Companies Act 1993to set aside a voidable transaction, a payment of

$14,225.21 to Burnard International Ltd made on 10 June 2015.  The application was called  on  11  March  2016.    Burnard  International  Ltd  did  not  file  a  notice  of opposition and did not appear on 11 March 2016.  Associate Judge Sargisson made orders under s 295 of the Companies Act requiring Burnard International to pay Mr Reynolds $14,225.21 plus interest and costs.

[2]      Burnard International Ltd has now applied to set aside the orders made on

11 March 2016.  It has applied under r 10.9 of the High Court Rules.  That allows for a  judgment  to  be  set  aside  when  one  party does  not  appear  at  the  trial.    The application ought more properly to be considered under r 15.10, where judgment has been obtained by default.  In this case, Associate Judge Sargisson made the order at the first call in a miscellaneous liquidation list.   Little turns on whether r 10.9 or r 15.10 applies because the test under both rules is the same. The court may set aside if there has or may have been a miscarriage of justice.   Burnard International Ltd does not say that judgment was obtained irregularly.  Instead, it contends that even though judgment was obtained regularly, the judgment ought to be set aside to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

[3]      The approach on applications to set aside judgments obtained regularly by default is well established.  There are clear dicta from the Court of Appeal on the approach to be taken.  A useful starting point is that Court’s decision in Russell v Cox.1   The Court quoted the judgment of McCarthy J in Paterson v Wellington Free Kindergarten Association Inc:2

In approaching an application to set aside a judgment which complies with the rule, the Court is not limited in the considerations to which it may have regard, but three have long been considered of dominant importance.  This was accepted by the Chief Justice in the Court below and by all counsel in this  Court.   They are:  1 that  the  defendant  has  a substantial  ground  of defence; 2. that the delay is reasonably explained; 3. that the plaintiff will

1      Russell v Cox [1983] NZLR 654.

2      Paterson…

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Details
Case
[2016] NZHC 1292
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Reynolds v Burnard International Limited concerns an application by Mr. Grant Bruce Reynolds, the liquidator of Planhorse Systems Ltd, to set aside a voidable transaction under sections 294 and 295 of the Companies Act 1993. The transaction in question involved a payment of $14,225.21 made by Planhorse to Burnard International Ltd on 10 June 2015, which Mr. Reynolds sought to recover. Burnard International Ltd did not oppose the application and subsequently applied to set aside the orders made against it under rule 10.9 of the High Court Rules.

The primary legal issue was whether the court should set aside the orders made by default, given that Burnard International Ltd had not appeared. The court considered the well-established principles for setting aside judgments obtained by default, focusing on whether there was a substantial defence, whether the delay was reasonably explained, and whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the judgment was set aside. Burnard International Ltd argued that it had a substantial defence because it claimed that Planhorse Systems Ltd did not make the payment, and even if it did, it did not come from Planhorse but from an Australian company, Pelikan Artline Pty Ltd.

The court examined the evidence and concluded that Burnard International Ltd did not have a substantial defence. The payment was made within the restricted period, and Planhorse was presumed to be insolvent unless proven otherwise. The court held that the payment was made by Planhorse to Burnard International Ltd, regardless of the source of the funds, as established in previous case law. The court found that Burnard International Ltd had not acted in a manner that would allow it to claim a defence under section 296(3) of the Companies Act. Therefore, the court dismissed the application to set aside the orders and ordered costs on a 1B basis.

This decision underscores the importance of timely responses to legal proceedings and the stringent requirements for setting aside judgments obtained by default. The court's reasoning highlights the relevance of the principles governing such applications and the limited circumstances under which a court may set aside a default judgment.