Rewa v Police
[2015] NZHC 2459
•8 October 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CRI-2015-409-000085 [2015] NZHC 2459
BETWEEN CAMERON LEE REWA
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
Hearing: 7 October 2015 Appearances:
C A Morgan for Appellant
K B Bell for CrownJudgment:
8 October 2015
JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J
[1] Mr Cameron Rewa appeals his sentence of one year, nine months’ imprisonment imposed by Judge MacAskill for one charge of injuring with intent to injure,1 on the basis that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Background facts
[2] The facts which gave rise to this charge occurred in the early morning hours of 13 December 2014. Mr Rewa was drinking with associates at the time and was heavily intoxicated.
[3] At about 2.30 am, the 50 year old victim was walking on the opposite side of the road. He yelled out to Mr Rewa, inquiring as to what bars were open. Mr Rewa responded abusively, crossed the road, and punched the victim once in the face without warning. The force of the blow rendered him unconscious and caused him
to fall to the ground and strike his head.
1 New Zealand Police v Rewa [2015] NZDC 15414.
[4] The victim was admitted to hospital, where he received treatment for concussion, a fractured eye socket and a large laceration to the back of his head. The laceration required around 12 stitches. Surgery was ultimately required for the fractured eye socket, involving the insertion of a titanium mesh.
Principles applying to appeal
[5] Mr Rewa may appeal his sentence as of right. Pursuant to s 250 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 2011, he must show that:
(a) there was an error in the sentence (for any reason); and
(b) a different sentence should be imposed.
[6] The Court of Appeal has confirmed that an accepted ground of error is where the sentence is “manifestly excessive”, notwithstanding that there is no express reference to this in s 250.2
The District Court sentencing
[7] In adopting a starting point of two years, six months’ imprisonment, Judge MacAskill considered the aggravating factors to be that it was an attack which took a vulnerable victim by surprise and the attack was completely unprovoked. He noted that the fact that there was only one hit did not reduce culpability substantially, because he saw the objective of such street assaults was to “win” by incapacitating the victim by knocking him down.
[8] No uplift for previous convictions was applied, but equally, despite a letter of apology to the victim, he did not consider that the remorse justified any reduction of sentence beyond that given for Mr Rewa’s guilty plea. There was however an uplift of two months to account for the fact the offending occurring while Mr Rewa was already subject to a sentence. From the adjusted figure of two years, eight months, a
discount of four months was applied to recognise Mr Rewa’s attempts at
2 Tutakangahou v R [2014] NZCA 279.
rehabilitation, and then a further full 25 per cent discount was applied for the guilty plea reducing the sentence to imprisonment of one year and nine months.
[9] Judge MacAskill did not consider any sentence less than imprisonment to be appropriate given the primacy of deterrence and denunciation. As such, leave to convert to home detention was declined.
Pre sentence report
[10] The report prepared by the Department of Corrections discloses that Mr Rewa was then demonstrating good compliance with standard and special conditions, and no barriers to compliance with a community-based sentence had been identified. He had also attended programmes to address the base causes of his offending, and had demonstrated motivation to change. A sentence of home detention was recommended.
Discussion
[11] In the defendant’s written submissions, counsel made two key points. The first was that the starting point was excessive having regard to analogous cases. Second, the Judge erred in declining to sentence Mr Rewa to home detention, when such a sentence was open to him in light of s 16(1) of the Sentencing Act.
Starting point
[12] In assessing the appropriateness of the starting point, counsel have referred to several cases. The first, in Hall v R, involved an appeal against a sentence imposed on one charge each of injuring with intent to injure and assault with intent to injure.3
In that case the events took place at a bar. Mr Hall, who was intoxicated, approached the victim and asked him if he wanted a “rumble”, which the victim declined. Mr Hall nonetheless punched the victim in the face, knocking off his glasses, and then proceeded to grab him by the shirt and punch him multiple times in the face. He and his associates also tackled the victim to the ground and began kicking him
about the body and head, even when the victim was unconscious.
3 Hall v R [2015] NZCA 249.
[13] The District Court took a starting point of two years, six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeal stated the starting point was open to the Judge and that a higher starting point could have been taken.
[14] Elizalde v Police also involved an appeal against sentence in relation to a charge of injuring with intent to injure.4 Mr Elizalde was drinking at a bar in the early hours of one morning, when he took umbrage with the victim talking to a woman with whom Mr Elizalde “had a connection”.5 When the victim was not looking he punched him once in the side of the face with a closed fist. This caused the victim to stumble back in shock. When the victim was transferred to hospital, it was discovered his jaw was broken in two places and required surgery which involved numerous stitches and the insertion of three metal plates.
[15] After assessing the features of the case, Asher J was of the view that the only seriously aggravating feature was the hard and unexpected punch, which inflicted “moderate injury”. The starting point of two years, six months’ imprisonment taken in the District Court was substituted with a starting point of two years, one month’s imprisonment. Asher J seems to have been influenced by the fact that there was no weapon and no repeat blows.
[16] In Elizalde v Police, Asher J referred to two other cases, describing them in these terms:6
… I note that in Tiplady-Koroheke v R a two year starting point was accepted by the Court of Appeal where the appellant had punched the victim in the head at a party, and where four associates had joined in the assault, and when the victim was on the ground there was repeated kicking to the head and stomach. The victim suffered a broken eye socket and severe bruising. The culpability of that offending was higher than the present.
In Dean v Police, there was an unprovoked attack, pushing a victim in the back, punching him in the face and causing him to fall to the ground, and then a further five punches to the victim's face and a stomping on the victim's head. The victim lost consciousness for a period during the assault and suffered contusions to the eye, abrasions to the lips, face and head and a partial tear of the mouth. The starting point there was fixed at two years'
4 Elizalde v Police [2015] NZHC 959.
5 At [1].
6 At [19]–[20], citing Tiplady-Koroheke v R [2012] NZCA 477; Dean v Police [2014] NZHC
1542.
imprisonment. That offending was also more serious than that of
Mr Elizalde.
[17] Having regard to these cases, and the tariff decisions Nuku v R and R v Taukei, I consider that the starting point adopted is out of step with analogous authorities.7 In my view, the offending is less serious than that in the Court of Appeal decision in Hall v R and comparable with that in the decision in Elizalde v Police. While counsel for the respondent emphasised that, in Elizalde, the victim did not in fact fall to the ground, whereas in the present case, Mr Rewa knocked the victim unconscious, it seems to me that the injuries inflicted were similar, as was the manner in which the blow was struck. I also note that in Elizalde, an attempt was
made to strike the victim again which was only stopped by a member of the public which was not the case here.
[18] I therefore consider that the appropriate starting point, should be two years, one month’s imprisonment, which is consistent with the parties submissions in the District Court.
[19] In light of this adjustment, I then follow the District Court Judge’s sentencing process. The starting point of 25 months is adjusted by an uplift of two months to account for offending whilst subject to a sentence, and discounted by four months to account for Mr Rewa’s attempts at rehabilitation to reach an adjusted starting point of 23 months’ imprisonment. With a full 25 per cent discount for his guilty plea, this would lead to a final sentence of 17 months’ imprisonment.
Home detention
[20] As the sentence is reduced from 21 months to 17 months, I consider this is a sufficient difference to be satisfied that the original sentence was manifestly excessive and a different sentence should be imposed. This means the question of
home detention is once more live.
7 Nuku v R [2012] NZCA 584, [2013] 2 NZLR 39; Taueki v R [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA).
[21] While I accept the respondent’s submission that the introduction of home detention has not removed a short term of imprisonment as a sentencing option,8 equally, as was said in Iosefa,9 I accept that home detention is a punitive and serious sentence in its own right. Furthermore, there is a clear legislative policy to keep offenders in the community to the extent possible and to assist in their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
[22] Mr Rewa’s offending is clearly very serious and cannot be condoned. Any sentence imposed must reflect this and recognise the harm to the victim. But telling against imprisonment, in my view, are the following features:
(a) Mr Rewa’s comparably youth at 25 years of age;
(b)the fact he has never before been convicted of a violence offence. The offending is clearly out of character;
(c) his undoubted genuine rehabilitative efforts and motivation to change; (d) the family support he has;
(e) the fact he is regarded highly by his employer who considers him “a reliable team player with high work standards and a real asset to our company”;
(f) the fact there appear to be no issues with compliance generally and that Mr Rewa has never before been sentenced to home detention.
[23] Accordingly, this is a case where I consider that the least restrictive sentence that is possible to be imposed in all the circumstances, while still addressing the purposes of the Sentencing Act 2002, is a sentence of home detention.
[24] However, I am advised from the bar that the address for home detention which was vetted in the pre-sentence report is no longer available. An alternative
8 R v Stanton [2008] NZCA 370.
9 R v Iosefa [2008] NZCA 453.
address will need to be proposed before a sentence of home detention can be considered.
[25] I therefore have decided to allow the appeal. The sentence of imprisonment of one year, nine months is quashed and a sentence of imprisonment of one year, five months is substituted. I also grant leave to apply to substitute the sentence with home detention once a suitable alternative address has been proposed.
[26] If home detention is applied for, then it should be subject to the following special conditions under s 80C:
(a) Mr Rewa is to attend and complete a programme to target alcohol abuse to the satisfaction of a probation officer;
(b)Mr Rewa is to work with a probation officer to address violence propensity to the satisfaction of a probation officer; and
(c) Mr Rewa is not to consume or use any alcohol or illicit drugs
[27] For the avoidance of doubt, the reparation aspect of the sentence remains intact.
Solicitors:
C A Morgan, Barrister, Christchurch
Raymond Donnelly & Co., Christchurch
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