Reiri v Police

[2019] NZHC 3233

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE TIHI-O-MARU ROHE

CRI-2019-476-000027

[2019] NZHC 3233

BETWEEN

LEIGH-MAREE TE AWHINA REIRI

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

AND

DARYL-MAREE REIRI

Respondent

Hearing:	On the papers
Counsel:	A R McRae for Respondent
Judgment:	10 December 2019

JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

Introduction

[1]                 Daryl-Maree Reiri (Ms Reiri) pleaded guilty to one charge of driving whilst disqualified. As part of her sentence, Judge Maze made an order for confiscation of the vehicle she was driving.1 That order is now appealed against by Ms Reiri’s mother, Leigh-Maree Reiri (the appellant). The police do not oppose the appeal and agree it may be dealt with on the papers.

Facts

[2]                 Ms Reiri was disqualified from driving on 2 February 2018  for  a period  of 6 months. At about 12.25 am on 31 March 2018, she was driving a Toyota car on

1      Police v Reiri [2019] NZDC 21415.

REIRI v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2019] NZHC 3233 [10 December 2019]

Dixon Street, Masterton. The police conducted a traffic stop, where roadside checks revealed Ms Reiri was disqualified from driving.

District Court decision

[3]                 Judge Maze noted Ms Reiri had one previous conviction for offending of a different nature. She authorised seizure of the vehicle, ordered Ms Reiri to pay a fine of $200 and court costs of $130, and disqualified her from driving for six months starting from 1 August 2018.

Principles on appeal

[4]Section 129EA Sentencing Act 2002 provides:

129EA Appeal against confiscation by third party

(1)    If the court orders the confiscation of a motor vehicle under section 128, 129, or 129A, a person (other than the offender or, as the case may be, the substitute for the offender) may, within 20 working days after the date of the order, or within any further time that the appropriate court allows, appeal to the appropriate court against the order on the ground that the confiscation is causing, or will cause, undue hardship to the appellant or any other person (other than the offender or, as the case may be, the substitute for the offender).

[5]                 “Undue hardship” requires more than the hardship that would be normally expected to be experienced as a result of confiscation.2 It connotes “serious hardship”, or excessive or greater hardship than the circumstances warrant.3

Submissions

[6]                 Both Ms Reiri and her mother, the appellant, have written letters to the Court outlining the circumstances of the vehicle in question since the offending. Both agree that the appellant took “ownership” of the vehicle on 14 June 2018 when she paid for it to be released from impoundment. The vehicle was legally registered under her name in September 2019. The appellant was unaware of the order for confiscation, and therefore spent a considerable amount of money on the vehicle before receiving a

2      Dalton v Auckland City [1971] NZLR 548 (SC) at 549-550.

3      R v Wallace [2001] 18 CRNZ 577 (CA) at [7]; Komene v Police [2016] NZHC 2120 at [16].

letter regarding confiscation on 1 October 2019. She will be unable to afford another car any time soon.

[7]                 In addition to the wasted money she has spent on the vehicle, the appellant states that she relies on it to get to work, do the school run, get groceries and complete other everyday chores. Ms Reiri now has a baby daughter, whom the appellant takes to appointments using the vehicle. Ms Reiri writes in her letter that confiscation of the vehicle would affect her mother greatly, and that she is ashamed and embarrassed of what she has put her through. She says she is willing to pay a further fine or substitute punishment so the vehicle is not confiscated from her mother.

Analysis

[8]                 The police do not oppose this appeal, and I am satisfied that confiscation would cause undue hardship to the appellant. It is clear that the vehicle has been under her possession rather than her daughter’s for a considerable time, and it would be unduly detrimental to her to lose it after investing so much money in it. I also accept it is appropriate to waive the requirement to comply with the 20 day appeal time frame given the issue only came to the appellant’s attention so recently.

Conclusion

[9]  The appeal is allowed, and the order for confiscation of the Toyota vehicle GUK825 quashed.

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Timaru