IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 89/2010
[2010] NZSC 138
BETWEENRAYLEE PATRICIA HARLEY
Applicant
ANDROBERT JOHN ERWOOD
Respondent
Court:Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ
Counsel:C R Carruthers QC for Applicant
P R W Chisnall for Official Assignee
N Levy as Amicus Curiae
Judgment:16 November 2010
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The applications for leave to appeal by Mrs Harley and Mr Erwood are both dismissed.
REASONS
[1] The High Court[1] and the Court of Appeal[2] are agreed that Mrs Harley’s proof of debt should not have been accepted by the Official Assignee to the extent that it related to a claim which had been compromised by a consent order made by the High Court on 25 November 2003.
[1]Erwood v Official Assignee HC Wellington CIV-2008-442-449, 9 April 2009 per Simon France J.
[2] Official Assignee v Erwood [2010] NZCA 362 per Hammond, O’Regan and Arnold JJ.
[2] We are not persuaded that there is any error of principle in the interpretation given to the consent order by the Courts below. Nor, to address the other test for leave, is the interpretation so obviously wrong that there may have been a substantial miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, it appears to us to be unchallengeable.
[3] Mr Erwood has in his application for leave challenged the decision not to order that the Official Assignee’s costs in the High Court be borne by Mrs Harley. In her very helpful submissions, the amicus, Ms Levy, has pointed out that this puts Mr Erwood in the position of bearing those costs notwithstanding his success. The High Court Judge considered, however, that in all the circumstances, including the extra and unnecessary costs caused by the manner in which Mr Erwood conducted the litigation, the appropriate outcome was that all costs and disbursements in that Court should lie where they fell. We are not disposed to interfere with that assessment which the Judge was well placed to make, noticing that the Court of Appeal also took the view that it was not unreasonable for the Official Assignee to be represented in the High Court.
Solicitors:
Thompson & Morgan, Christchurch for Applicant
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- Case
- [2010] NZSC 138
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to decide included whether the decision not to order that the Official Assignee’s costs in the High Court be borne by Mrs Harley was appropriate. The court found that it was not disposed to interfere with the High Court Judge’s assessment that all costs and disbursements in that Court should lie where they fell, considering the extra and unnecessary costs caused by the manner in which Mr Erwood conducted the litigation. The court also found that it was not unreasonable for the Official Assignee to be represented in the High Court.
The court concluded that the decision of the Courts below was unchallengeable and that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. The court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal by both parties and upheld the decision of the Courts below.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated in the High Court where a consent order was made on 25 November 2003. Following this, Mrs Harley made a claim to the Official Assignee, which was not accepted to the extent that it related to the compromised claim. Mrs Harley appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the High Court's decision. Subsequently, both Mrs Harley and Mr Erwood applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed both applications for leave to appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the High Court and the Court of Appeal erred in their interpretation of the consent order made on 25 November 2003.
2. Whether the interpretation of the consent order was so obviously wrong that it may have resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
3. Whether the decision not to order that the Official Assignee’s costs in the High Court be borne by Mrs Harley was appropriate.
Held
1. The court held that there was no error in the interpretation of the consent order made by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The interpretation given to the consent order was deemed unchallengeable.
2. The court also held that the interpretation of the consent order was not so obviously wrong as to result in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
3. The court held that the decision not to order that the Official Assignee’s costs in the High Court be borne by Mrs Harley was appropriate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the applications for leave to appeal by Mrs Harley and Mr Erwood. The court found that the High Court and the Court of Appeal correctly interpreted the consent order made by the High Court on 25 November 2003, which had compromised a claim made by Mrs Harley. The court was not persuaded that there was any error of principle in the interpretation given by the lower courts and held that the interpretation was unchallengeable. The court also found that the interpretation was not so obviously wrong as to result in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Regarding the second issue, the court noted that Mr Erwood had challenged the decision not to order that the Official Assignee’s costs in the High Court be borne by Mrs Harley. However, the court held that the High Court Judge's decision not to order this was appropriate, given the circumstances, including the extra and unnecessary costs caused by the manner in which Mr Erwood conducted the litigation. The court found that the appropriate outcome was that all costs and disbursements in that Court should lie where they fell. The court was not disposed to interfere with this assessment, as the Judge was well placed to make it. The Court of Appeal also took the view that it was not unreasonable for the Official Assignee to be represented in the High Court. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the interpretation of a consent order by the High Court and the Court of Appeal is binding unless there is a clear error of principle or a substantial miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the court may consider the conduct of the parties in determining the appropriate outcome for costs.