Ravelich v Manning

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2017-404-2590

[2018] NZHC 255

UNDER Section 119(2) of the Insolvency Act 2006

IN THE MATTER

of an originating application that disclaimed property vest in the applicant

BETWEEN

BRETT RAVELICH

Applicant

AND

JAMES WILLIAM OWEN MANNING

Respondent

Hearing: 27 February 2018

Appearances:

Applicant in person

M Lloyd for Respondent

Judgment:

27 February 2018


JUDGMENT OF LANG J

[on application for order that disclaimed property vest in the applicant]


This judgment was delivered by me on 27 February 2018 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date……………

RAVELICH v MANNING [2018] NZHC 255 [27 February 2018]

[1]                  The applicant, Mr Ravelich, was involved in a business relationship with the respondent, Mr Manning, during 2010 and 2011. Their business involved the operation of a bar on Karangahape Road. The two men formed a company, The Eagle Bar Limited (the company), to operate the bar. They each held shares in the company.

[2]                  In January 2010 Mr Ravelich transferred his shares to Mr Manning and resigned as a director. There is now a dispute between the two regarding the reasons for the transfer but that is not material for present purposes. Mr Ravelich has always contended, however, that Mr Manning continued to hold the shares on trust for him.

[3]                  The relationship between the two men went sour in 2011 and Mr Manning issued proceedings in this Court after Mr Ravelich assumed sole control of the bar.1 This led to a counterclaim by Mr Ravelich in which he formally claimed that Mr Manning held the shares transferred to him in January 2011 in trust for Mr Ravelich.

[4]                  On 22 April 2012  Mr  Ravelich  was  adjudicated  bankrupt.  This  halted  Mr Manning’s claim against Mr Ravelich, and Mr Ravelich’s interest in the counterclaim became vested in the Official Assignee.2 The claim and counterclaim were subsequently discontinued with the consent of all parties on 20 June 2012.

[5]                  Mr Ravelich was discharged from bankruptcy in April 2015. He then instituted a fresh proceeding against the Official Assignee and Mr Manning on 11 August 2016.3 This was struck out by Associate Judge Sargisson on 3 March 2017 because the rights asserted by Mr Ravelich in the proceeding remained vested in the Official Assignee.4

[6]                  On 22 September 2017, however, the Official Assignee disclaimed his interest in any rights arising out of Mr Ravelich’s business association with Mr Manning. In this proceeding Mr Ravelich seeks an order under s 119 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (the Act) that the disclaimed rights now be vested in him.


1      Manning v Ravelich HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-2189.

2      Insolvency Act 2006, s 101.

3      Ravelich v Official Assignee HC Auckland CIV-2016-404-1871.

4      Ravelich v Manning [2017] NZHC 332.

[7]                  Mr Manning opposes the application. He says that it would now be unfair on him for the order to be made, and that any claim has no…

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Details
Case
[2018] NZHC 255
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The dispute in this case involved Brett Ravelich and James William Owen Manning. Mr Ravelich sought an order that disclaimed property vest in him, pursuant to s 119 of the Insolvency Act 2006. The dispute arose from a business relationship between the parties that involved the operation of a bar. Mr Ravelich and Mr Manning formed a company to operate the bar, each holding shares in the company. In January 2010, Mr Ravelich transferred his shares to Mr Manning and resigned as a director. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the reasons for the transfer, but it is not material for present purposes. Mr Ravelich has always contended that Mr Manning continued to hold the shares on trust for him. In April 2012, Mr Ravelich was adjudicated bankrupt. The Official Assignee disclaimed his interest in any rights arising from Mr Ravelich’s business association with Mr Manning in September 2017. Mr Ravelich then instituted a proceeding against the Official Assignee and Mr Manning to seek an order vesting the disclaimed rights in him. Mr Manning opposes the application, arguing that it would be unfair on him for the order to be made and that any claim has no prospects of success.

The primary legal issue was whether the Court should make an order vesting the disclaimed rights in Mr Ravelich. The Court considered whether it was fair for Mr Ravelich to be vested with the disclaimed rights and whether the claim had any prospect of success. The Court also considered whether there was any prejudice to Mr Manning in the proceeding being commenced by way of originating application rather than statement of claim. The Court found that the application was not one that could be brought by way of originating application as of right, but granted leave to commence the proceeding by way of originating application due to the straightforward nature of the issues.

The Court found that it would be futile for the Court to make an order vesting the rights in Mr Ravelich as any claim he might file based on the transfer of shares would inevitably be the subject of a successful application by Mr Manning for summary judgment on the basis that he has an unanswerable defence to the claim. The Court also found that Mr Manning could not now file any counterclaim against Mr Ravelich as he would have been entitled to do if Mr Ravelich had not been declared bankrupt, which would result in unfairness to Mr Manning. The Court therefore dismissed the application and ordered that Mr Manning was entitled to costs on a Category 2B basis together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar.

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