Raukawa v The Queen

[2015] NZHC 2877

BY ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT, THE NAMES OF MR RAUKAWA'S DANCE STUDIO BUSINESS,

AND OF ITS CO-OWNER ARE SUPPRESSED.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND BLENHEIM REGISTRY

CRI 2015-406-0012 [2015] NZHC 2877

BETWEEN

STAYZ TE ATAMIRA RAUKAWA

Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN Respondent

Hearing:	17 November 2015 (via AVL)
Counsel:	R Harrison for Appellant A L Mills for Respondent
Judgment:	18 November 2015

JUDGMENT OF SIMON FRANCE J

[1]      Mr Raukawa appeals the refusal of the District Court to grant him permanent name suppression.1

[2]      Mr Raukawa pleaded guilty to four counts of unlawful sexual connection with a young person and eight charges of indecency with a girl between the ages of

12 and 16.  The victim was a student at the dance school where Mr Raukawa was working.   He befriended her when she was aged 15, and over a period of time engaged in progressively more intimate sexual activity, culminating in intercourse.

He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years and six months.

1      R v Raukawa DC Blenheim CRI-2015-006-000725, 20 October 2015.

RAUKAWA v THE QUEEN [2015] NZHC 2877 [18 November 2015]

[3]      Mr Raukawa initially advanced the case for name suppression on the basis of the impact publicity would have on his wife and children, and his business.   His concern in the business context was for the plight of his business partner and the long term survival of what he considers to be a publicly beneficial programme. Evidence was filed from persons who have been through the programme, or their children have. They attest to its value.

[4]      On appeal it is accepted that the test of extreme hardship cannot be met in relation to his family, but the appeal is pursued in relation to the business.   As I understand it, although the evidence is unclear, the dance business operates through a parent company and franchises.  The affected “persons” are therefore the company and the other shareholder.

[5]      When  Mr Raukawa  was  charged,  he  admitted  the  activity.    Further,  he advised existing and past students of the situation.   This means that the publicity surrounding his sentencing, even though his name was suppressed, was easily referable by clients of the business to him.

[6]      The  evidence  before  the  Court  is  that  there  has  subsequently  been  a significant decline in business.   Two franchises have shut, discussions with other potential  franchisees  have  failed,  and  the  remaining  businesses  are  suffering  a decline.

[7]      Against that background the case for name suppression assumes a narrow focus.  It is said that the ability in the future to rebuild the business will be greatly impaired by the publicity of Mr Raukawa’s name.   This is because the business operates a dance system developed by him and unique to this chain of businesses.

[8]      The application fails to establish extreme hardship by a wide margin.  First, it is apparent that Mr Raukawa’s own publication of his name to existing and past clients has already caused huge damage to the business.  It is entirely speculative as to what impact publication to the rest of the public will have on the prospects of rebuilding the  business  sometime in  the future.   The material  does  not  suggest extreme hardship will ensue.

[9]      Second, the application was premised on the proposition that this beneficial dance  system  that  the  business  operates  will  be  lost  if  the  business  fails. Mr Harrison says this is because the system is unique to the business.  That may be presently so, but there is no evidence as to whether the system is somehow protected, and why it is not transferable to another business.

[10]     The  statutory  test  is  extreme  hardship.     Even  with  the  formal  name suppression  that  has  existed  until  now,  any  significant  incidental  harm  to  the business has happened.   The evidence fails to establish that further hardship that could be caused by publication of Mr Raukawa’s name to the world at large would be extreme.

[11]     For the record I note that even if extreme hardship had existed, I would consider name suppression inappropriate.  This was serious sexual offending and the interests of publicity, both now and for the future, clearly outweigh the hardship that might  be  caused  to  businesses  associated  with  Mr Raukawa.     It  would  be inappropriate to suppress the identity of Mr Raukawa who may seek in the future to teach dance, something he is obviously very good at.  The public is entitled to make an informed choice as to whether to send their children to him.

[12]     The appeal is declined, and name suppression in relation to Mr Raukawa is lifted.

Solicitors:

R Harrison, Barrister, Blenheim

O’Donoghue Webber, Crown Solicitors, Nelson

Simon France J