Rangi v The King

[2025] NZHC 2209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE

CRI-2025-488-000087

[2025] NZHC 2209

BETWEEN

DJ RANGI

Appellant

AND

THE KING

Respondent

Hearing:	5 August 2025
Appearances:	M Creamer (on behalf of S Thode) for Appellant P Hamber for Respondent
Judgment:	7 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF LANG J

[on appeal against sentence]

This judgment was delivered by Justice Lang On 7 August 2025 at 10.00 am

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:…………………………

Solicitors/counsel:

Thode Utting, Auckland

Marsden Woods Inskip Smith, Crown Solicitor, Whangarei

RANGI v R [2025] NZHC 2209 [7 August 2025]

[1]    Mr Rangi pleaded guilty in the District Court to a representative charge of kidnapping1 and a charge with injuring with intent to injure.2 Those charges were laid by the Crown.

[2]    In addition, Mr Rangi pleaded guilty to two charges laid by the police. These were charges of driving whilst disqualified in its aggravated form3 and failing to stop for police.4

[3]    On 29 May 2025, Judge D J McDonald sentenced Mr Rangi to five years’ imprisonment on the kidnapping charge.5 He imposed concurrent sentences on the remaining charges.

[4]    Mr Rangi appeals against sentence. He contends the Judge adopted a starting point for the kidnapping charge that was too high and then failed to give him adequate discounts to reflect mitigating factors. He says this resulted in an end sentence that is manifestly excessive.

The offending

The charges of kidnapping and injuring with intent to injure

[5]    The charges of kidnapping and injuring with intent to injure were laid as a result of an incident that occurred on 5 September 2024. On that day, Mr Rangi was travelling in his vehicle with his partner of five years duration. During the journey, he asked her questions relating to a two-hour time period in which she had failed to respond to his calls and texts. He believed that she was being unfaithful to him.

[6]    Mr Rangi was not satisfied with the answers his partner gave to his questions. He turned off the main highway onto a gravelled side road. As he did so, he told his partner that he was doing this so that no-one would see the two of them. He then began to strike her without warning.

1      Crimes Act 1961, s 209(b).

2      Section 189(2).

3      Land Transport Act 1998, s 32(1)(a).

4      Section 52A.

5      New Zealand Police v Rangi [2025] NZDC 12512.

[7]    When Mr Rangi’s partner tried to get out of the vehicle, he grabbed her in a headlock and pulled her back into it. Every time she attempted to get out of the vehicle, he prevented her from doing so. He struck her numerous times on her legs, arms, body, head and face. He also spat on her face on several occasions. In doing  so, he told her that she deserved to be spat on because that is how she made him feel. He also laughed at his partner when she began crying as he struck her.

[8]    After approximately an hour and a half Mr Rangi allowed his partner to get out of the vehicle to have a cigarette. Whilst she was outside, he searched her cellphone seeking evidence confirming she had been unfaithful to him. He then began to hit her again even though he had been unable to find any evidence to suggest that his suspicions about his partner were correct.

[9]    At one stage Mr Rangi struck his partner forcefully on the nose on several occasions. She had suffered an earlier head injury and asked him to stop. He refused to do so and continued to hit her in the face. When she was able to get out of the vehicle again he apprehended her, placed her in a head lock and then forced her back in.. He then locked the door so she could not get out.

[10]   At this stage another vehicle came down the road. Mr Rangi responded by forcing his partner’s head down between the driver’s seat and rear passenger’s seat so that the persons in the passing vehicle could not see what was happening. He punched her in the legs when she attempted to get the attention of the passengers of the passing vehicle by kicking the window of the vehicle.

[11]   Mr Rangi detained his partner in this way for approximately three hours before turning the vehicle around and driving back onto the main highway. As a result of the incident his partner suffered bruising to her arms, her leg, her body, face and both arms.

The charges of driving whilst disqualified and failing to stop

[12]   These charges were laid as  a  result  of  a  separate  incident  that  occurred on 16 December 2023. On that date officers in a police patrol vehicle attempted to stop a vehicle being driven by Mr Rangi in order to conduct a routine check. They did

so by activating the vehicle’s flashing lights and siren. He failed to stop and instead accelerated away from the police vehicle.

[13]   The summary of facts records that Mr Rangi continued to drive the vehicle at speed. He also endeavoured to evade the police by overtaking multiple vehicles. On one occasion an oncoming vehicle had to take evasive action to avoid a head-on collision with Mr Rangi’s vehicle. The police ultimately abandoned the chase due to their concerns for the safety of other motorists.

[14]   Subsequent enquiries revealed that Mr Rangi had been disqualified from driving for a period of six months on 21 July 2023. The present conviction is the eighth occasion on which Mr Rangi has been convicted of driving whilst disqualified.

The sentence

[15]   The Judge took the kidnapping charge as the lead, or most serious, charge given that it carried a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. He considered that, viewed overall, the offending contained several aggravating factors.6 The first was that it was prolonged and involved repetitive acts of violence and threats of violence. Although the offending was not premeditated, it took three hours for Mr Rangi to cease detaining his partner. During this period, he attacked her on multiple occasions by punching her head and face in circumstances where he knew she had a pre-existing head injury. The fact that he had laughed at her and spat in her face meant there was also a degree of cruelty and degradation involved. The offending resulted in both physical and psychological harm to his partner. In addition, there was an element of breach of trust given the fact that Mr Rangi had attacked a person who was entitled to trust him with her safety. These factors led the Judge to select a starting point of five years six months’ imprisonment for the kidnapping and the violence.7

[16]   Turning to the charge of driving whilst disqualified, the Judge noted that, on a stand-alone basis, the starting point would have been eight to ten months’ imprisonment. However, he elected not to apply any uplift to reflect that charge.8

6 At [11].

7 At [13].

8 At [14].

[17]   The Judge accepted that, although Mr Rangi’s guilty pleas came late, they saved his partner from giving evidence. He therefore applied a discount of 15 per cent to reflect guilty pleas.9 However, he declined to apply any further discounts to reflect remorse, rehabilitative efforts undertaken before sentencing and factors identified in a s 27 report.10

[18]   Finally, the Judge applied an uplift of four months to reflect the fact that     Mr Rangi has numerous previous convictions for offending in a family violence context.11 This produced the end sentence of five years’ imprisonment.

Was the starting point too high?

[19]   On Mr Rangi’s behalf, Mr Creamer accepts the offending contained the aggravating factors the Judge identified. However, he contends that the starting point the Judge selected was too high when compared with those adopted in similar cases. In this context, Mr Creamer relies on Ratahi v Police, Cassidy-Gugich v R, Anguna v R and Wilson v R.12 He submits that, when the approach taken in these cases is considered, a starting point of around three years four months’ imprisonment would have been appropriate for the charges relating to the kidnapping incident. He contends that an uplift of no more than seven months should have been applied to reflect the charge of driving whilst disqualified.

[20]   There is no guideline appellate judgment for the crime of kidnapping. This is no doubt because it can be committed in a wide variety of ways. And, for the same reason, direct comparisons with the approaches taken in other cases is of limited assistance. As Mr Hamber points out for the Crown, the facts in each of the cases relied upon by Mr Creamer differ from those in the present case in one way or another. The most that can be said is that, as Downs J observed in Cassidy-Gugich, a starting point of two and a half years’ imprisonment is likely to be appropriate in cases where the offender detains a former partner briefly and there is associated violence or threats

9 At [16].

10     At [17]–[19].

11 At [21].

12     Ratahi v Police [2021] NZHC 3586; Cassidy-Gugich v R [2016] NZHC 3027; Anguna v R [2020] NZCA 127; and Wilson v R [2015] NZHC 2653.

of violence.13 However, the starting point will be correspondingly greater in cases where the period of detention is longer and significant violence is used.

[21]   In Nuku v R, the Court of Appeal identified three bands within which offending involving the infliction of injury with intent to do so will fall.14 The starting point for sentencing purposes will depend on where the offending falls within a particular band. At sentencing in the present case both counsel agreed that, on a standalone basis, the charge of injuring with intent to injure would fall within band two in Nuku. This applies to cases involving  three or fewer of the aggravating  factors identified  in     R v Taueki.15 In the present case the aggravating factors were the fact that the offending involved a prolonged assault on the offender’s partner and that involved repeated blows to the head and face of the victim. Offending in band two will attract a starting point of up to three years’ imprisonment.16

[22]   Taking into consideration the prolonged and calculated nature of Mr Rangi’s offending I consider a starting point of close to three years’ imprisonment would have been justified on the charge of injuring with intent to injure. However, this does not take into account the fact that Mr Rangi drove the victim to an isolated area for the express purpose of assaulting her with little risk of being observed. He then kept her captive in the vehicle for approximately three hours whilst he assaulted her. He also thwarted the attempts she made to escape from the vehicle. I consider these factors easily justified an increase of at least two years’ imprisonment. This means that I consider a starting point of around five years’ imprisonment would have been appropriate on the two charges laid as a result of the kidnapping incident.

[23]   This is six months less than the starting point the Judge adopted for those charges. However, the Judge applied no uplift for the offending encompassed in the charge of driving whilst disqualified even though it was entirely separate from the kidnapping incident. As I have already noted, this was the eighth occasion on which Mr Rangi has been convicted of driving whilst disqualified. It also involved a deliberate attempt to avoid apprehension by the police. Further, the manner in which

13     Cassidy-Gugich v R, above n 12, at [16].

14     Nuku v R [2012] NZCA 584, [2013] 2 NZLR 39.

15     R v Taueki [2005] NZCA 174, [2005] 3 NZLR 372.

16     Nuku v R, above n 14, at [38(b)].

Mr Rangi drove his vehicle placed other road users at significant risk of injury or death. An increase of at least six months was required to reflect the seriousness of this offending. It follows that the starting point of five years six months’ imprisonment was not outside the available range. This ground of appeal fails as a result.

Were the discounts for guilty pleas, remorse and rehabilitative efforts inadequate?

Guilty pleas

[24]   Mr Creamer says that Mr Rangi entered his guilty pleas shortly after his counsel initiated resolution discussions with the Crown. He contends that a discount of 20 per cent ought to have been applied to reflect this factor.

[25]   Mr Hamber reminds me that Mr Rangi did not enter his guilty pleas until seven months after his first appearance. Resolution discussions began approximately three months earlier. Mr Hamber also points out that, although several charges were withdrawn as part of the resolution process, the summary of facts has never been altered.

[26]   I accept the Crown’s submission that the guilty pleas cannot be regarded as having been entered at an early stage. Further, the Crown has never altered its stance in relation to the overall gravity of the offending or the factual basis on which sentencing should proceed. I am therefore not prepared to say that the Judge erred by applying a discount of 15 per cent.

Rehabilitation and remorse

[27]The Judge dealt with these issues as follows:

[18]      Rehabilitation. Let it be commended for doing rehabilitation, however, you have been given numerous opportunities in your previous appearances in this court. You are now 44. It is really too little, too late.

[19]      There is remorse. The pre-sentence report writer says there is very little of that but your letter, and like Mr Moroney [says], is one of the more unusual ones that we get. You really ask me to sentence you to jail for the maximum term which is 14 years for kidnapping. Well I am not going to do that. One has to sentence in accordance with a certain way of doing things.

[28]   Mr Creamer contends the Judge ought to have provided Mr Rangi with a discount of five to ten per cent to reflect both the remorse he expressed in the letter to the Judge and the fact that he took advantage of the limited opportunities available to him to undertake rehabilitative courses whilst in custody.

[29]   The credit to be given to an offender for rehabilitative steps undertaken whilst on remand must be viewed in light of all relevant circumstances. In the present case these include the duration and nature of Mr  Rangi’s  criminal  history.  It  now  spans 26 years and encompasses virtually all forms of criminal activity. He has several convictions for offences committed in a family violence context as well as for drug- related offending, driving offences, burglary and dishonesty offending and breaching Court orders and sentences. Notably, the kidnapping incident occurred just four months after Mr Rangi was sentenced to nine months’ supervision on two charges of breaching his prison release conditions and one charge of failing to answer District Court bail. Given that background, and his obvious lack of response to the sentence of supervision, I do not consider the Judge erred in failing to provide Mr Rangi with a discount to reflect the rehabilitative steps he had undertaken whilst on remand.

[30]   It is for a sentencing Judge to determine whether an expression of remorse is genuine. Further, an offender may express remorse in many different ways. One of the most common of these is through comments made to the writer of a pre-sentence report. As the Judge noted, the pre-sentence report does not attribute to Mr Rangi any comments that might be regarded as remorseful.

[31]   Another way in which remorse may be expressed is through the restorative justice process. Mr Rangi sought to engage in this process but it did not eventuate. However, care needs to be taken before giving credit for this factor. Many victims, particularly in a family violence context, are understandably very reluctant to participate in a process that brings them face to face with an abuser. This creates the risk that an offender will offer to participate in such a process in the certain knowledge that the victim will not take up the offer. Credit may therefore be sought for an offer that was not genuinely advanced.

[32]   In the present case the only method by which Mr Rangi expressly made his remorse known was through the letter he provided to the Judge on the day of sentencing. Judges frequently receive letters of this type. The weight to be given to them, particularly when they are not corroborated in any other way, is very much a matter for the sentencing Judge’s discretion. In the present case the Judge was entitled to weigh the comments Mr Rangi made in his letter against the manner in which he has responded over many years to the sentences imposed by the courts. It is never too late for an offender to express remorse. However, expressions of remorse made by an offender who has been before the courts repeatedly over many years are likely to face a higher level of scrutiny before they are accepted as genuine. In the present case I do not consider the Judge erred in failing to provide a discount to reflect the remorse expressed by Mr Rangi in his letter.

Result

[33]The appeal against sentence is dismissed.

Lang J