R v X (No 2)

Case [2015] NZHC 1245


NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS, OF DEFENDANT PROHIBITED BY ORDER MADE UNDER S 200 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS, OF DEFENDANT'S HUSBAND OR CHILD PROHIBITED BY ORDER MADE UNDER S 202 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WANGANUI REGISTRY

CRI 2015-083-529 [2015] NZHC 1245

THE QUEEN

v

X

Hearing: 5 June 2015

Counsel:

L C Rowe for Crown
D Goodlet for Defendant

Ruling:

5 June 2015

RULING (2) OF SIMON FRANCE J (Applications for name suppression)

[1]      This Ruling responds to an application by X and her husband (who has a different name) for permanent name suppression following her discharge without conviction on a charge of manslaughter.1   The deceased was the couple’s only child, a young boy aged 16 months at the time.  The circumstances leading to his death are

covered in the ruling granting a discharge and will not be repeated here.

1      The application for suppression of the husband’s name is made by the Crown.  It is separately advanced by the defendant as a reason to suppress her name (Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 200(d)).

R v X [2015] NZHC 1245 [5 June 2015]

[2]      The  applications  are  made  pursuant  to  ss 200  and  202  of  the  Criminal Procedure Act 2011.  The primary ground relied upon by the mother is s 200(2)(a) which is that publication will cause extreme hardship.  The equivalent ground for the father is found in s 202(2)(a) where the test is undue hardship.

[3]      It is convenient to deal immediately with the father’s application which is not opposed.  The father is plainly a victim in this matter, and has suffered a tragic loss. He is, both by reason of his work situation and by disposition, a person who has taken significant steps to protect his privacy.  I have been provided with material that makes it plain that his on-going ability to continue in his current employment will be compromised if his name is published.  The reasons why publicity would affect his present employment are clearly explained and legitimate.  The material provided to the Court is compelling and comfortably satisfies the test of undue hardship.  The Crown’s application for suppression of his name is granted.

[4]      A complication  of  this  decision  is  that  the  deceased  shared  his  father’s surname.  There have been mixed messages to date from the Court as to whether, despite interim suppression for the father, the media were permitted to publish the child’s name.  In a Minute dated 6 May 2015 Dobson J clarified that to do so would breach the then interim order.  However I am aware that some publication had occurred prior to this time. Although formal suppression of the young boy’s name is not necessary because it is an inevitable by-product of the order in relation to the father, I consider it will remove any uncertainty if I formally do so.  I do not consider the fact of…

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R v X (No 2) [2015] NZHC 1245
Case
[2015] NZHC 1245
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v X (No 2), the court dealt with applications for permanent name suppression made by X and her husband following X's discharge without conviction on a charge of manslaughter. The deceased was the couple's only child, aged 16 months, who died under tragic circumstances. The primary legal issues before the court were whether publication of the names of X, her husband, and their deceased child would cause extreme or undue hardship, thereby justifying suppression under sections 200 and 202 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.

Simon France J found that the father's application for name suppression was not opposed and granted the application based on the compelling evidence of undue hardship. The court also formally suppressed the deceased child's name, clarifying that any further publication would breach the order. Regarding X's application, the court considered the statutory test of extreme hardship, which was satisfied based on expert evidence about the significant impact on her mental health and ability to work. The court balanced this against the public interest in open justice, ultimately concluding that suppression was warranted to avoid extreme hardship to X. The court also allowed certain non-identifying information to be published, such as X's occupation as a health professional, while suppressing specific identifying details.

The final orders of the court suppressed the identities of X, her husband, and their deceased child, allowing only certain non-identifying information to be published. This decision was made to protect the privacy and well-being of the family while considering the legitimate public interest in the case.

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