R v Weston
[2014] NZHC 2351
•25 September 2014
ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE JUDGMENT AND ANY PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS (INCLUDING THE RESULT) IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON THE INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATABASE UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION OF TRIAL. PUBLICATION IN LAW REPORT OR LAW DIGEST PERMITTED. IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
CRI-2013-041-2516 CRI-2013-054-3479
CRI-2013-054-3481 [2014] NZHC 2351
THE QUEEN v
TERRY ANTHONY WESTON KIMBERLEY MEIHANA ZANE MARSH
JEREMIAH SUA
Hearing: 24 September 2014 Counsel:
D R Davies and E M Fitzherbert for Crown E R Fairbrother QC for Weston
A Shaw for Marsh
S N Hewson for SuaJudgment:
25 September 2014
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J
(Pre-trial applications)
[1] On 24 September 2014, I heard a number of pre-trial applications in relation to these matters.
R v WESTON [2014] NZHC 2351 [25 September 2014]
Weston
[2] Mr Weston faces two charges of supplying methamphetamine and one of possession of methamphetamine for supply. On his behalf, Mr Fairbrother QC argued a number of matters.
[3] First, Mr Weston challenged the evidence obtained from a search of the motor vehicle in which he was travelling at the time he was arrested. The ground of the challenge was that both his arrest and the search were made without warrants, and the arrest was unlawful because of the absence of good cause to suspect on the part of the arresting officer. It was argued that if the arrest was unlawful, then any evidence gathered in the course of a search conducted as a consequence of the arrest was not admissible.
[4] Secondly, Mr Weston opposed a Crown application under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961, which sought a ruling that certain evidence in relation to prior methamphetamine dealing, and convictions in respect of that conduct, was admissible as propensity evidence.
[5] Thirdly, the Crown applied for joinder of the charges against Mr Weston with the charges against all other defendants who are going to trial as a result of arrests made in the course of Operation Cargo. Mr Weston made a complementary application for severance of the charges against him and, depending on the outcome of that application, for a change of venue to Napier.
[6]Finally, Mr Weston applied for bail.
Challenge to the lawfulness of Mr Weston’s arrest/admissibility of evidence obtained in the subsequent search
[7] Mr Weston was arrested on the night of 17 December 2013 in suburban Napier by Constable Chantrey, who had limited prior involvement in the investigation leading to Mr Weston’s arrest. Constable Chantrey’s immediate comment to Mr Weston when he was arrested was to the effect that he was being arrested for “drug related matters”. Shortly thereafter, once Mr Weston had got out of the car in which he was a passenger,
and had been handcuffed and placed in the rear of the Police car attending the scene, Constable Chantrey advised Mr Weston that he was being arrested for supplying methamphetamine.
[8] In response to the challenge to the lawfulness of the arrest, the Crown called evidence from five Police witnesses. The first witness was Detective Livingstone, who had been working on the case in Palmerston North and travelled to Hawke’s Bay to supervise the execution of a search warrant on Mr Weston’s then residential property in Georges Drive, Napier. The afternoon before they carried out a search of the premises in reliance on the warrant, Detective Livingstone provided a briefing for additional Police personnel from Napier who were to assist with the search. Those briefed were from the Organised Crime Unit. Shortly before the warrant was executed the following morning, an additional, briefer, outline of the background to the search was given to Constables Chantrey and Townsend, uniformed officers who were to supplement the Police presence, at least in the initial stages of the search.
[9]Mr Weston was not at the property when the warrant was executed.
[10] The second Police officer to give evidence was Detective Baker, who was based in Napier and was asked to participate in executing the search warrant. He was present both at the briefing of Napier Police personnel the day before the search of Mr Weston’s property, and also throughout the search that occurred.
[11] When Mr Weston was not located as a result of executing the search warrant, Detective Livingstone asked another detective in Palmerston North to enter in the Police information database a standard form “wanted to arrest” alert that those involved in a Police inquiry wanted Mr Weston arrested if any other officers came into contact with him. That was duly done. In addition, Detective Livingstone rang the cell phone number that he had been given for Mr Weston and left a message on it, explaining that Police had executed a search warrant at Mr Weston’s residential address, and asking that Mr Weston contact his nearest Police station to discuss the issue.
[12] The two uniformed constables who were present when Mr Weston was subsequently arrested also gave evidence. Constable Chantrey was driving the Police patrol vehicle that received an instruction to go to a different Napier residential address where it was believed Mr Weston could be located. Mr Weston was in fact located in a vehicle with two others near that address. The vehicle was stopped and the arrest was effected with the co-operation of Mr Weston and the other occupants.
[13] Constable Chantrey was one of those who had accompanied the detectives when they executed the search warrant. He was aware from a limited briefing before the execution of the warrant that Mr Weston was wanted on drug related matters, involving the supply of methamphetamine. At some point in his involvement, Constable Chantrey familiarised himself with a photograph of Mr Weston, so that he would know him on sight. In the four day period between the search of the residential property and the night of the arrest, Constable Chantrey was reminded of the fact that Mr Weston was wanted by a regular process of briefing officers as they began their shifts as to current matters of concern in the area. That information reminded the constable that Mr Weston was wanted on drug related matters, given alleged involvement in methamphetamine dealing.
[14] I also heard evidence from Constable Townsend who accompanied Constable Chantrey at the time of the arrest. His evidence was to similar effect, although he may have had a somewhat looser appreciation of what it was intended that Mr Weston would be charged with.
[15] There was also brief evidence from Constable Marshall, who received the information about the location of Mr Weston on the night of his arrest, and issued the instruction for Constables Chantrey and Townsend to attempt to locate him. Constable Marshall was unsure as to whether he was explicit in his instructions that Mr Weston was to be arrested, or whether that would just have been implicit from the terms of prior briefings, and the tenor of what he conveyed to Constable Chantrey.1
[16] Mr Fairbrother argued that the arrest, which was made without a warrant, did not come within s 315(2)(b) of the Crimes Act because, at the time of the arrest,
1 Notes of evidence at 14/13, cf 14/26.
Constable Chantrey did not have good cause to suspect that Mr Weston had committed any offence punishable by imprisonment. Mr Fairbrother argued that the presence of good cause to suspect involved an objective assessment that the Court was to review in light of the state of the constable’s knowledge at the time. Mr Fairbrother argued that there had to be a reasonable degree of specificity in the knowledge relied on by the officer to come to the view that there was good cause to suspect, because of the accompanying duty on the arresting officer under s 316(1) of the Crimes Act which provides as follows:
316 Duty of persons arresting
(1) It is the duty of every one arresting any other person to inform the person he is arresting, at the time of the arrest, of the act or omission for which the person is being arrested, unless it is impracticable to do so, or unless the reason for the arrest is obvious in the circumstances. The act or omission need not be stated in technical or precise language, and may be stated in any words sufficient to give that person notice of the true reason for his arrest.
[17] Mr Fairbrother suggested that s 316(1) reflects a recognition of the entitlement of a person arrested to know from that point in time the charge that he or she faces, so as to enable the arrested person to make an adequately informed decision as to his or her response to being arrested.
[18] Mr Fairbrother did not challenge existing case law to the effect that the knowledge attributed to an arresting officer need not all result from personal inquiries. It is legitimate for information to be pooled, so that an arresting officer may rely on a summary or synopsis of the nature of the case against the arrested person, as compiled by others.2
[19] Mr Fairbrother accepted that Detective Livingstone would have had good cause to suspect, had he been the arresting officer. However, because Constable Chantrey denied that he had arrested Mr Weston merely because he was following instructions, Mr Fairbrother argued that the constable was not entitled to rely on the more extensive, institutional, knowledge held by the Police overall, and had to justify an adequate basis for his individual decision that good cause to suspect existed.
2 For example, R v Briggs [2009] NZCA 244 at [55].
[20] With respect, I do not consider that the assessment of whether the arresting officer had good cause to suspect can be approached in that way. Constable Chantrey appreciated when he assisted in the search of Mr Weston’s residential premises that the search was being executed in relation to suspicions that Mr Weston was involved in drug dealing, and in particular dealing in methamphetamine. When Mr Weston was not apprehended in the course of that search, Constable Chantrey was aware of the on- going concern for Mr Weston to be located for the purposes of arresting him in relation to charges involving dealing in methamphetamine. Constable Chantrey was entitled to rely on the more detailed analysis of grounds for charges against Mr Weston that Detective Livingstone had summarised for the other personnel involved in the search. Accordingly, he was able to conclude he had good cause to suspect by relying on the knowledge that others within the Police had more detailed grounds for relevant charges against Mr Weston.
[21] Nor was there a material deficiency in the manner in which the arrest was carried out, by virtue of the initial advice to Mr Weston being in relatively general terms to the effect that he was being arrested for drug related offences. As Ms Davies emphasised, the imperative at the point of arrest is to detain the charged person. Here, an immediate priority for Constable Chantrey was to ensure that the driver of the vehicle did not try to leave the scene. He therefore indicated the arrest somewhat cursorily, and returned to it as soon as the position was stabilised. No material prejudice to an arrested person’s rights arises if there is a short delay between the act of arrest and communicating to him or her a more precise outline of the acts or omissions for which the person is being arrested. That is implicit in the qualification to the obligation in s 316, when it is impracticable to do so. In this case, that further detail of the charges was provided once Mr Weston was secure in the back of the patrol car.
[22] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the arrest was a lawful one in terms of s 315 of the Crimes Act. As Mr Fairbrother conceded, it follows from that finding that the evidence obtained as a result of the search of the vehicle that occurred at the time of arrest can also not be challenged.
Crown application to admit propensity evidence of prior methamphetamine offending
[23] Mr Weston has prior convictions for supplying methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for supply. The conduct giving rise to those convictions occurred in July and August 2004, some nine and a half years before the conduct involved in the current charges. The application was opposed, essentially on the basis that the limited probative value of evidence of those prior convictions was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice that would arise from the jury knowing of them. The argument was conducted on the basis that Mr Weston will deny all aspects of the Crown case on the present charges, with no concessions. In particular, the charge of possession for supply relates to numerous small quantities of methamphetamine, in total amounting to 29.27 grams, that were found in the motor vehicle in which Mr Weston was travelling at the time of his arrest. The two other people in the vehicle at the time have not been charged, and Mr Weston intends denying that he was in possession of those quantities of methamphetamine.
[24] Ms Davies conceded that the modus operandi adopted by Mr Weston in both 2004 and in 2013 reflected a common practice of mid-level methamphetamine dealers. However, she cited numerous features of the conduct as constituting similarities between Mr Weston’s relevant activities in 2004, and those in 2013. These included Mr Weston’s ability to source methamphetamine, his preparedness to both possess and supply the drug, the extent of his resort to text messaging and telephone calls in coded language to arrange his dealing in the drug, and his practice of using hotel and motel premises to carry out drug deals. Those make up a meaningful list of similarities for the purposes of considering the level of coincidence that the current offending did not occur as the Crown alleges, and Mr Weston’s involvement as otherwise being capable of an innocent explanation. However, they are hardly distinctive.
[25] A further similarity lies in the scale of dealing involved in both 2004 and 2013. The Crown case will be that Mr Weston dealt in ounce lots of methamphetamine, as well as smaller amounts, so that it is possible to suggest he was a mid-level dealer in 2004, and participated as a mid-level dealer in 2013.
[26] The feature of his conduct that is distinctive to Mr Weston is that the drug dealing activities in 2004 involve one of the present co-defendants, Mr Sua. It appears that conduct giving rise to 2004 charges against both Messrs Weston and Sua involved them in activities at an address in Esk Street, Napier. One of the current supply charges alleges that Mr Weston supplied Mr Sua and his partner, Ms Meihana, with an ounce of methamphetamine in Hawke’s Bay. After that supply, the Crown case is that Mr Sua phoned Mr Weston to warn him of Police monitoring. A further detail is that Mr Weston made a deposit of money into Mr Sua’s bank account. That is inarguably a coincidence consideration where a subsequent course of alleged offending involves a co-offender who was involved in the earlier convictions.
[27] Mr Fairbrother realistically accepted that the settled approach to the analysis of proposed propensity evidence assumes the ability of juries to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate reliance on such evidence. Naturally, the assessment has to be fact-specific in each particular case. One recent Court of Appeal review cited six decisions where propensity evidence of previous convictions for drug dealing offences had been admitted on subsequent trials for similar offending, contrasted with two decisions where proposed propensity evidence of that type had been excluded.3
[28] The analysis required is to evaluate the probative value of the proposed evidence in light of the circumstances of the current charges and the anticipated nature of the defence to be offered, and to weigh that value against the risk of an unfairly prejudicial effect on the defendant.4
[29] Mr Fairbrother argued that if the Crown has the courage of its convictions in its reliance on the meanings attributed to the intercepted communications and other aspects of its case, then propensity evidence of similar offending in the past by Mr Weston could not add a lot to an already purportedly strong Crown case. That is an unrealistically narrow approach to the assessment of probative value. Particularly in relation to the onus on the Crown to prove that the methamphetamine found in the car was in Mr Weston’s possession, the proposed propensity evidence would have relatively high probative value.
3 Luang-Saysy v R [2014] NZCA 3013 at [4].
4 Evidence Act 2006, s 43(1).
[30] There is a legitimate form of support for various components of the Crown case, provided by the fact of prior offending where there were similar, relatively common, features, and on a comparable scale. The propensity evidence can legitimately be called in aid, for instance, in making out the Crown case on the meaning and effect of the intercepted communications, and on the important issue of whose methamphetamine it was located in the vehicle Mr Weston was travelling in when arrested.
[31] The legitimate scope of the Crown’s resort to the propensity evidence can be controlled by appropriate directions, and a clear warning to the jury that they are not to allow the propensity evidence to influence impermissible reasoning. There are no features here that make such a warning any more difficult to convey, or for a jury to understand, than has been the case in numerous other trials where similar propensity evidence has been allowed.
[32] There was a lapse of some nine and a half years between the offending to which the 2004 convictions related, and the present charges. Ms Davies submitted that for a substantial portion of that period, Mr Weston would have been serving the sentence imposed for the earlier convictions, so that the lapse should be viewed as a shorter period, and not sufficient to materially dilute the probative value of the proposed propensity evidence.
[33] The period when Mr Weston was unable to offend in this way is not a complete answer to what is otherwise a relatively lengthy lapse in time. However, I do accept that, in assessing the overall context of the probative value of the propensity evidence, the lapse in time, making a reasonable allowance for the period in which Mr Weston could not offend because he was in jail, is not so great as to materially dilute its value for propensity purposes.
[34] The prejudice to Mr Weston is conventional in the sense that it strengthens the Crown case against him and makes it more likely, when a legitimate propensity analysis is applied by a jury, that they will be satisfied that the Crown has established relevant elements of the charges. I do not consider that unfair prejudice will arise to
any extent that could possibly outweigh the probative value that the evidence will have.
[35] Accordingly, I grant the Crown’s application for the admissibility of this propensity evidence.
[36] Although the point was not covered whilst Mr Fairbrother was in Court, later in the course of pre-trial arguments I raised with Ms Davies my predictable concern that the form in which the propensity evidence is placed before the jury should be the subject of careful consideration prior to trial. Hopefully it can be contained in a s 9 admission of facts that confines the matters adduced on this topic to those that are genuinely of probative value.
Joinder/severance
[37] The Crown has notified its intention to apply under s 138 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 to have the charges against Mr Weston and all the other defendants still involved in the proceedings heard together. It is for the Court to assess whether it is in the interests of justice for charges to be heard together.
[38] Ms Davies’ current projection was that of a total of 47 witnesses, 27 of them will contribute to the evidence against Mr Weston. She described the charges against all defendants as a form of “wheel conspiracy” with Mr Sua at the centre and others at the periphery. Because of the coincidence of association between Messrs Weston and Sua, both in their 2004 offending and in the present charges, Ms Davies submitted that it was a compelling case for the charges against Mr Weston to be heard together with those against the other defendants. None of the other defendants have taken issue with the charges against them being heard together.
[39] Mr Fairbrother characterised the Crown’s case against Mr Weston as involving three discrete charges, none of them having elements of a conspiracy with any of the other defendants. He had also contended for geographical separation, in that Mr Weston’s offending was alleged to have occurred in Hawke’s Bay, whereas the charges against the remaining defendants involve offending alleged to have occurred in and around Palmerston North. That geographical distinction was the basis for a
separate application on behalf of Mr Weston for a change of venue, the basis for which depended on his first successfully opposing joinder.
[40] As the argument developed, Mr Fairbrother was realistic in acknowledging that if the propensity evidence which linked Messrs Weston and Sua by virtue of their 2004 convictions was admissible, then Mr Weston’s case for separate trial was substantially weakened.
[41] I am not satisfied that the circumstances relevant to the charges against Mr Weston are as discrete from the circumstances involved in charges against other defendants as Mr Fairbrother contended. For instance, one of the charges of supplying methamphetamine brought against Mr Weston involved a supply to Mr Sua and Ms Meihana. Their conduct after they allegedly received that methamphetamine from Mr Weston is relevant to the case against them.
[42] Assessing the context of the factual narrative overall, and the extent of overlap in evidentiary terms, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for the charges against Mr Weston to be heard together with the charges against the remaining defendants.
Application for bail
[43] On Mr Weston’s behalf, Mr Fairbrother has recently made application for bail. Bail was originally refused when Mr Weston was arrested in December 2013. The principal concern motivating the application was the impediment to Mr Fairbrother taking adequate instructions to prepare for trial, with Mr Weston in Manawatu Prison and Mr Fairbrother having to travel from Hawke’s Bay to confer with him.
[44] The application was made on the basis that Mr Weston would be subject to a 24 hour curfew at the home of his former wife at 253 Georges Drive, Napier. His former wife completed an affidavit acknowledging the obligations she would be assuming if bail was granted on the terms proposed, and indicating her agreement to having him at the property.
[45] Given Mr Weston’s criminal record, there is an onus on him under s 12 of the Bail Act 2000 to satisfy the Court that he would not offend on bail. He has a deplorable record of offending on bail on previous occasions, and Mr Fairbrother did not attempt to rationalise that. Indeed, he did not address argument as to how the s 12 onus could be discharged.
[46] Instead, he was implicitly arguing that the current impediment to taking adequate instructions could compromise Mr Weston’s rights to a fair trial.
[47] The Crown continue to oppose bail. However, Ms Davies raised the prospect that Mr Weston could be transferred from Manawatu Prison to Hawke’s Bay Prison, where it was anticipated that adequate arrangements could be made for Mr Fairbrother to conduct the lengthy interviews that will no doubt be necessary to prepare Mr Weston’s defence.
[48] At my suggestion, Mr Fairbrother asked that the application for bail be adjourned, on the basis that the reason motivating the application might well be addressed by transferring Mr Weston to Hawke’s Bay Prison.
[49] I accordingly directed that Corrections be requested as a matter of priority to facilitate a transfer of Mr Weston to Hawke’s Bay Prison. Assuming that can be facilitated, I do not anticipate the application being brought on again.
Marsh
Opposition to Crown notices under ss 130 and 135, Evidence Act 2006
[50] The Crown has previously given notice under ss 130 and 135 of the Evidence Act 2006 of its intention to offer documents in evidence without calling a witness (that is, the transcribed content of intercepted communications), and to offer documents which purport to be transcripts of recorded conversations under s 135(3) of the Evidence Act.
[51] On Mr Marsh’s behalf, Mr Shaw objected to that course. He wants the opportunity to cross-examine the officer responsible for transcribing the recorded
content of intercepted communications, and is instructed to challenge the accuracy of substantial portions of the transcripts, as prepared thus far.
[52] Ms Fitzherbert, who appeared for the Crown on this aspect of the pre-trial applications, agreed that discussions between counsel thus far have been productive in narrowing the areas of dispute.
[53] I was advised that the notice under s 130 will not be relied on, and the Crown agree that they will call the officer, Detective Deegan, at trial.
[54] After clarifying that any transcript offered in evidence only has status as an aid to the jury’s interpretation of the content of recorded communications that will be played to them, Mr Shaw modified the extent of his remaining objections. In this regard, the Crown accepts that the jury will be told that it is for them to make what they will of the recorded conversations, and that they are not obliged to treat the transcript prepared by the Police as determinative of what was said.
[55] A residual issue is the prospect of a challenge to Detective Deegan claiming an ability to identify whose voices appear in the recorded conversations.
[56] If that issue is to be taken any further, then Mr Shaw, on Mr Marsh’s behalf, is to particularise the challenge to the proposed voice recognition opinion evidence to be offered by Detective Deegan, and to file the terms of that challenge and serve it on the Crown by 1 October 2014.
[57] If such a challenge ensues, then by 8 October 2014 the Crown is to file and serve its response by way of an outline of argument in support of the admissibility of the Deegan voice recognition evidence.
[58] I will direct the Registry to refer any such documents to me. Depending on the scope of what appears to be involved, I will endeavour to make arrangements enabling it to be resolved prior to trial.
Sua
[59] On behalf of Mr Sua, Mr Hewson had previously objected to the proposed propensity evidence in relation to Mr Sua’s relevant previous convictions, but that objection was not maintained. Admissibility of propensity evidence of a similar type that was the subject of argument in relation to Mr Weston is admissible.
Admissibility of hearsay statements
[60] Mr Sua maintained an objection to the admissibility of notes of an interview with Mr Scott Fraser, a former co-defendant who has pleaded guilty and been sentenced. The Crown proposed to offer evidence from a detective who interviewed Mr Fraser, in which the detective would give evidence of Mr Fraser’s recollection of factual matters bearing on the involvement in methamphetamine dealing by Mr Sua and Ms Meihana.
[61] Predictably, Mr Hewson objected to evidence in that form on the basis that it would be hearsay unless Mr Fraser was called. If he was called, there was no need for the recitation from the detective, and the evidence would be given from Mr Fraser.
[62] That position is accepted by the Crown and the present proposal is that Mr Fraser will give evidence.
[63] An additional objection was taken to the admissibility of the transcript of a recorded conversation between Messrs Fraser and Marsh on 3 December 2013. In that, Mr Fraser purportedly describes Ms Meihana’s version of events when she and Mr Sua were stopped, in the course of a journey returning from Hawke’s Bay, with an ounce of methamphetamine. Mr Fraser’s narrative has Ms Meihana successfully concealing an ounce of methamphetamine from the Police, despite being strip searched by them.
[64] Mr Hewson characterised this as objectionable hearsay, and inarguably inadmissible unless Mr Fraser gives evidence. In that event, there may be circumstances in which the terms of his statement about the events in issue at that time could become admissible, but not as a component of the original Crown evidence.
[65] Ms Fitzherbert contended that the narrative recorded in the conversation between Messrs Marsh and Fraser would be admissible if Mr Fraser did not give evidence, because it came within the common law exception for statements against a co-conspirator, as provided for in s 12A of the Evidence Act 2006.
[66] Mr Hewson opposed this prospect. Mr Fraser was not a co-conspirator of Mr Sua and Ms Meihana in terms of any of the charges currently before the Court. Further, the events described were all in the past and did not have relevance to any on- going arrangements to advance a criminal conspiracy between Mr Fraser and Ms Meihana and Mr Sua. It would follow that the conversation could not be characterised as one in furtherance of any relevant conspiracy, so it fell outside the exception for co-conspirator communications.
[67] Ms Fitzherbert submitted, without being able to cite particular authority, that the concept of conspirators for the purposes of the co-conspirator rule was not confined to a specific conspiracy that had become the subject of charges against the co- defendants. Rather, the Court could recognise that they were co-conspirators in relation to an on-going course of conduct or mutual criminal venture. She urged that that more liberal scope of a “conspiracy” would apply here because at the time of the conversation, Mr Fraser shared with others of the defendants the intention of continuing a course of conduct in acquiring and supplying methamphetamine.
[68] In the absence of authority justifying that wider approach to co-conspirator communications, I am inclined to uphold Mr Hewson’s objection. If Mr Fraser did not give his own evidence as to his understanding of the conduct of Mr Sua and Ms Meihana, then the recorded conversation of Mr Fraser telling Mr Marsh about that at the time would not be admissible.
[69] However, I adjourned the argument to allow the Crown to file a memorandum with authority that such a wider conspiracy as Ms Fitzherbert described is sufficient to bring the co-conspirator rule into play. I will revisit my provisional view in light of any additional argument she (and then Mr Hewson in reply) may present.
Timetable directions
[70] Counsel are hopeful of reducing the evidence required at trial by settling the terms of statements of fact to be admitted by agreement under s 9 of the Evidence Act. The terms of propensity evidence in relation to prior convictions of Messrs Sua and Weston are an obvious topic for inclusion. I have directed that the Crown is to serve on defence counsel all requests for agreement to amended terms of s 9 notices by 1 October 2014.
[71] I direct that defence counsel are to respond, identifying the extent of agreement, and with proposals for amendments where disagreement exists, by 13 October 2014.
Dobson J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Palmerston North L P Lafferty, Napier for Weston Ord Legal, Wellington for Sua
Counsel:
E R Fairbrother QC A Shaw
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