R v v
[2025] NZHC 1904
•11 July 2025
SUPPRESSION ORDERS EXIST: SEE PARAGRAPH [11] IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CRI-2024-004-006962
[2025] NZHC 1904
THE KING v
V
Hearing: 11 July 2025 Appearances:
K Li for Crown
S N B Wimsett KC as Standby Counsel
Judgment:
11 July 2025
ORAL JUDGMENT OF LANG J
[Disposition]
Solicitors/counsel:
Meredith Connell, Office of the Crown Solicitor, Auckland S N B Wimsett KC, Auckland
R v V [2025] NZHC 1904 [11 July 2025]
[1] V is charged with murdering Mr Stephen Thorpe on 24 August 2024. On 14 May 2025, I found that V was suffering from a mental impairment, namely a treatment resistant psychotic illness, that rendered him incapable of instructing counsel and standing trial.1
[2] In a further judgment delivered on 12 June 2025, I held that V had committed the acts underpinning the charge.2
[3] It is now necessary for me to determine what orders I should make by way of disposition. The options available to the Court are set out in ss 24 and 25 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2009 (the Act), which relevantly provide as follows:
24 Detention of defendant found unfit to stand trial or insane as special patient or special care recipient
(1)When the court has sufficient information on the condition of a defendant found unfit to stand trial or acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court must—
(a)consider all the circumstances of the case; and
(b)consider the evidence of 1 or more health assessors as to whether the detention of the defendant in accordance with one of the orders specified in subsection (2) is necessary; and
(c)make one of the orders referred to in paragraph (b) if it is satisfied that the making of the order is necessary in the interests of the public or any person or class of person who may be affected by the court’s decision.
(2)The orders referred to in subsection (1) are that the defendant be detained—
(a)in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992; or
(b)in a secure facility as a special care recipient under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.
(3)Before the court makes an order specified in subsection (2)(a), the court must have received evidence, under subsection (1)(b), about the defendant from at least 1 health assessor who is a psychiatrist.
1 R v V [2025] NZHC 1148.
2 R v V [2025] NZHC 1533.
25 Alternative decisions in respect of defendant unfit to stand trial or insane
(1) If, after considering the matters specified in section 24(1)(a) and
(b) concerning a defendant found unfit to stand trial or acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court is not satisfied that an order under section 24(2) is necessary, the court must deal with the defendant—
(a)by ordering that the defendant be treated as a patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment)
Act 1992; or
(b)by ordering that the defendant be cared for as a care recipient under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003; or
(c)if the person is liable to be detained under a sentence of imprisonment, by deciding not to make an order; or
(d)by ordering the immediate release of the defendant.
(2) …
[4] I have already considered the circumstances of the case in my earlier judgments and it is not necessary for present purposes to repeat my earlier conclusions. To assist me in reaching my decision as to disposition I have now received reports from two psychiatrists, Dr Pillai and Dr Duggal, who have been involved in V’s care and treatment whilst he has been remanded to the Mason Clinic in Auckland.
[5] Both psychiatrists confirm that V remains severely affected by his disorder. Dr Pillai’s conclusion is as follows:
Further V’s response to treatment so far has been minimal and he continues to have a wide set of delusions. V has been unable to engage in any assessment of his behaviour at the time of the index offence and so his risk remains unmodified. The prospects for risk reduction in the short to medium term are limited. In this case special patient status would ensure that V continues to receive high intensity specialist mental health support over the medium to long term to assist with his rehabilitation and recovery. Under special patient status V could not be discharged from specialist care without the highest level of oversight (the Minister of Health).
[6] To similar effect, Dr Duggal concludes:
The index offence can be considered to be of the gravest severity. It is my opinion that such offending would normally be considered by the Court to be of a severity warranting detention as a Special Patient.
Further, analysis of V’s future dangerousness to the community suggests that, without compulsory treatment and extended forensic care and rehabilitation, he poses a chronically elevated risk of similar violent offending. Such a risk profile would, in my opinion, typically lead to the restrictions of special patient status under section 24(2)(a) of the Act.
[7] Neither psychiatrist considers the less restrictive orders that are available under s 25 of the Act would adequately recognise the seriousness of the present offence and the risk that V will continue to pose to the safety of the community.
[8] I am left in no doubt regarding this issue. V continues to pose a significant risk to the community as the present offence demonstrates. He will need many years of treatment and close supervision before this risk will abate to the point where he may be considered for release into the community.
[9] I therefore make an order under 24(2)(a) of the Act that V is to be detained in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.
[10] Given that this order disposes of the proceeding, I would normally make a final decision as to whether the interim suppression orders should be lifted or made permanent. I am unable to do that in this case for two reasons. First, V’s mother has recently filed an application seeking an order that suppression shall continue. This will need to be determined and that cannot be done today. Secondly, I consider it appropriate for input on this issue to be provided by V’s treating physicians. They may be able to advise the Court as to the likely effect on V’s rehabilitative prospects if his name was to be published at this point. I will give directions on these issues in a separate minute.
[11] The interim order for suppression of V’s name and identifying particulars will accordingly remain in existence until such time as the application for continued suppression has been determined.
Lang J
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