R v Taui
[2021] NZHC 594
•22 March 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CRI-2019-085-001094
[2021] NZHC 594
THE QUEEN v
ROBERT JASON TAUI
Hearing: 19 March 2021 Counsel:
G J Burston & T G Bain for the Crown T Harré for Mr Taui
Judgment:
22 March 2021
JUDGMENT OF GWYN J
(Disputed Facts Hearing)
Introduction
[1] Mr Taui has pleaded guilty to seven charges in total: four charges of possession of methamphetamine for supply;1 one charge of possession of cannabis for supply;2 unlawful possession of a pistol;3 and unlawful possession of ammunition.4
[2] When entering his pleas, Mr Taui indicated that he disputes the summary of facts in relation to the four methamphetamine charges, and a disputed facts hearing was therefore scheduled.
1 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(f) and (2)(a); maximum penalty life imprisonment.
2 Section 6(1)(f) and (2)(c); maximum penalty eight years’ imprisonment.
3 Arms Act 1983, s 50(1)(a); maximum penalty three years’ imprisonment or $4,000 fine.
4 Section 45(1); maximum penalty four years’ imprisonment or $5,000 fine.
R v TAUI [2021] NZHC 594 [22 March 2021]
Background
[3] All seven charges result from two police investigations into an operation that supplied methamphetamine in the Auckland and Wellington regions – Operation Superdry in relation to Wellington-based offending, and Operation Maddale in relation to the Auckland-based offending. Mr Taui’s co-offender, Mr McMillan, was the main individual targeted in the Wellington-based offending. Mr Taui was an associate of Mr McMillan, purchasing methamphetamine from him.
[4] All four methamphetamine charges arise from offending that occurred between March and May 2019, when Mr Taui and Mr McMillan exchanged methamphetamine for cash, primarily in a carpark in Wellington. These four charges are detailed as follows:
(a)charge 10, CRN 1632, on 8 April 2019;
(b)charge 11, CRN 1633, on 12 April 2019;
(c)charge 12, CRN 1634, on 14 April 2019; and
(d)charge 13 (representative) CRN 1630, between 1 March-2 May 2019.
[5] Mr Taui accepts that, in respect of all charges, he possessed methamphetamine, which he intended to supply.
[6] Mr McMillan pleaded guilty to some of the charges he faced for his role in the drug business, and was found guilty on the remaining charges following a five week jury trial. The parties agreed that the disputed facts hearing could proceed on the basis of the evidence adduced at Mr McMillan’s trial (the trial).
Law
[7]Section 24 of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides:
24 Proof of facts
(1)In determining a sentence or other disposition of the case, a court—
(a)may accept as proved any fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial and any facts agreed on by the prosecutor and the offender; and
(b)must accept as proved all facts, express or implied, that are essential to a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt.
(2)If a fact that is relevant to the determination of a sentence or other disposition of the case is asserted by one party and disputed by the other,—
(a)the court must indicate to the parties the weight that it would be likely to attach to the disputed fact if it were found to exist, and its significance to the sentence or other disposition of the case:
(b)if a party wishes the court to rely on that fact, the parties may adduce evidence as to its existence unless the court is satisfied that sufficient evidence was adduced at the trial:
(c)the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any disputed aggravating fact, and must negate beyond a reasonable doubt any disputed mitigating fact raised by the defence (other than a mitigating fact referred to in paragraph (d)) that is not wholly implausible or manifestly false:
(d)the offender must prove on the balance of probabilities the existence of any disputed mitigating fact that is not related to the nature of the offence or to the offender’s part in the offence:
…
[8]I adopt the approach to a disputed facts hearing set out by Stevens J in
R v Haarhaus,5 and adopted by Grice J in R v Namana:6
[15] A common sense view is called for in deciding what inferences or conclusions should be drawn from the evidence. The question is whether there is a factual basis and a logical process which leads to a conclusion from other proven facts, thus enabling inferences to be drawn. In this connection, it is appropriate to consider the surrounding evidence that I find to be reliable and ask whether it is safe, logical and rational to draw the conclusion contended for. Finally, it must be logical and rational and must never be speculation or guesswork. I bear in mind that, in relation to any aspect of proof of the alleged aggravating features, where the evidence would support two conclusions of similar weight, to then choose between them would be to guess, which is not permissible …
[16] This is a case where the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence. The Crown pointed to the surrounding context and background emerging from all of the intercepted material and the surveillance … I also remind myself of the standard direction on circumstantial evidence and note that it is the cumulative effect of the evidence that is important. The test must therefore be whether
5 R v Haarhaus HC Auckland CRI-2007-004-18646, 4 June 2009.
6 R v Namana [2019] NZHC 1952 at [9].
there is such a combination of facts and circumstances that enable me to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved the challenged aggravating facts.
[17] This is a case where the prisoner put the Crown to proof in respect of the aggravated facts relied upon. In his submissions for the prisoner, [counsel] put forward a number of propositions which he contended showed reasonable doubt regarding the aggravating facts in question. From time to time both in cross-examination and in submissions, counsel for the prisoner put forward possible alternative inferences, for example, contending that the prisoner was dealing in grams rather than ounces and contending that the tablets were BZP rather than MDMA.
[18] In this context I remind myself of the approach to be taken by the Judge as described by the Court of Appeal in R v Seekamut CA82/03 10 July 2003. There, Anderson J in hearing an appeal in relation to the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable stated at [21]:
Counsel has raised many possible alternative inferences consistent with innocence, and has argued that those inferences must be preferred. If on an objective basis that has regard to all the circumstances, a rational alternative to guilt is not excluded, there must for that reason be a reasonable doubt. But the mere fact that some of the circumstances might arguably permit an inference inconsistent with guilt is not enough. The jury's function is to assess the whole of the evidence and in so doing may conclude that a suggested alternative is not reasonably tenable. In light of this reality Counsel's submissions are unpersuasive. The circumstantial evidence in this case was entirely adequate to support a verdict of guilty.
Submissions
[9] Mr Harré, counsel for Mr Taui, submitted that, in relation to all four of the methamphetamine charges, the Crown has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt the weight and purity of the methamphetamine that Mr Taui has been convicted of possessing. He submitted the Crown cannot prove Mr Taui was in possession for supply of more than 421.8 grams of methamphetamine.
[10] The case for the Crown is that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of methamphetamine weighing at least 1.5 kilograms, and there is no evidence suggesting that the purity of the methamphetamine involved was low enough to mitigate the seriousness of Mr Taui’s offending.
Analysis
[11] Although I have not heard submissions on s 24(2)(a), I confirm the Court will attach significant weight to the disputed facts; in particular, the quantity of methamphetamine is a key factor affecting sentencing in methamphetamine cases.
[12] For completeness, I also confirm the disputed facts as to weight are aggravating facts. Mr Harré conceded that the disputed facts as to purity are mitigating facts, but the Crown acknowledges that the burden rests on the Crown to prove both the weight and purity of the methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.
The purity of the methamphetamine
[13] The Court of Appeal in Zhang v R commented on the purity of methamphetamine in New Zealand generally:7
[76] Purity levels of methamphetamine seized by law enforcement agencies in New Zealand are comparatively high relative to other countries at an average of 73 per cent. Methamphetamine in a “base” state takes liquid form. The maximum purity of methamphetamine in solid form is 80 per cent. Typically methamphetamine in solid form is achieved by mixing 80 per cent methamphetamine with 20 per cent hydrochloride. It is common for methamphetamine to be “cut” or adulterated with other products, however, such as isopropylbenzylamine, the dietary supplement dimethylsulphone, or caffeine.
[14] The Court of Appeal also confirmed that purity should not be taken into account as a mitigating factor in assessing culpability, unless the evidence establishes that purity is below 60 per cent.8
[15] Detective Senior Sergeant Pritchard gave expert evidence in the trial about methamphetamine in New Zealand. Relevant to this disputed facts hearing, in relation to purity, he said:
(a)the colour of methamphetamine can vary, from white crystalline, to off-white, yellow, brown or pink, depending on the manufacturing process or cutting agents;
7 Zhang v R [2019] NZCA 507, [2019] 3 NZLR 648.
8 At [129].
(b)methamphetamine is normally in excess of 60 per cent pure when manufactured;
(c)purity of up to 80 per cent is common; and
(d)methamphetamine being damp is an indicator of recent manufacture.
[16] In addition to Detective Pritchard’s general evidence, purity assessments were carried out on three samples of methamphetamine in this case:
(a)On 15 March 2019, Police discovered two bags of methamphetamine (totalling two kilograms) concealed in a Nissan Tiida, which Mr McMillan had purchased from Mr James in Auckland. Each bag was sampled; one was 69 per cent pure, and one was 71 per cent pure. Mr Burston, counsel for the Crown, submitted Mr James was likely the origin of the methamphetamine Mr McMillan sold to Mr Taui in March 2019.
(b)On 26 April 2019, Police found a one-ounce bag of methamphetamine in Mr McMillan’s personal hiding spot at the Gilmer Terrace car park, which Mr McMillan likely purchased from Mr Owen.9 This was sampled and was 74 per cent pure. Mr Burston submitted Mr Owen was likely the origin of the methamphetamine Mr McMillan sold to Mr Taui in April 2019.
[17] The Crown alleges that the methamphetamine in Mr Taui’s possession was approximately 70 per cent pure. Mr Burston relied on the evidence showing that methamphetamine sold is usually more than 60 per cent pure when manufactured, and submitted the Court can draw an inference from the three samples taken (showing the methamphetamine Mr McMillan was selling was between 69-74 per cent pure) that the remaining methamphetamine purchased by Mr Taui was of similar purity. He submitted there is no evidence suggesting the purity of the methamphetamine was low
9 The evidence in the trial was that Mr James ceased operating in Auckland on 25 March 2019, and thereafter Mr McMillan sourced methamphetamine from Mr Owen.
enough to mitigate the seriousness of Mr Taui’s offending. The Crown said it has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of methamphetamine that was approximately 70 per cent pure.
[18] Mr Harré argued that Mr Burston’s submission that there is no evidence suggesting the purity of the methamphetamine was low enough to mitigate the seriousness of Mr Taui’s offending inverts the onus; in his submission, the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt the aggravating feature of purity. There is, Mr Harré said, no evidence of the ratios of cutting agent to methamphetamine, and the Crown has not proved the purity of the methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.
[19] Based on the evidence of Detective Pritchard and the evidence of the three purity assessments carried out in this case (where all methamphetamine sampled was 69-74 per cent pure), it is reasonable to infer that the methamphetamine in Mr Taui’s possession was approximately 70 per cent pure. I am satisfied of that beyond reasonable doubt.
The weight of the methamphetamine
[20]In his expert evidence at the trial, relevant to weight, Detective Pritchard said:
(a)methamphetamine is generally sold in “ounces”, “grams”, “quarters”, “halves” and “point” amounts;
(b)small dealing quantities are generally packaged in small plastic snap lock bags, which often have designs imprinted on them;
(c)a gram of methamphetamine will sell for between $300 and $1,000, with round $400 being common;
(d)a street level “ounce” of methamphetamine normally weighs around 28 grams, including the plastic bag which may weigh up to about four grams;
(e)the cost of an “ounce” of methamphetamine commonly ranges between
$3,000-$14,000, with around $6,000 being common; and
(f)profit from the sale of drugs is derived by purchasing larger amounts at reduced cost for the purpose of dividing up or “making up” into a higher number of smaller amounts for on-selling at an increased collective cost.
Charge 10
[21] On 8 April 2019, Mr Taui entered the Gilmer Terrace car park and placed a package in a grey camouflage cap on top of an air conditioning duct. Detectives Mounsey and Philpott subsequently retrieved that package, and located six sealed white bags containing a crystalline substance. Four of the six bags were weighed; they weighed 21 grams, 28.4 grams, 29 grams, and 29.4 grams (totalling 107.8 grams). The two bags that were not weighed were of a similar size to the larger bags that were weighed. A small sample was also taken, and both the spectrometer and ESR confirmed the substance was methamphetamine.
[22] The Crown alleges Mr Taui was in possession of a total of 160 grams on this occasion. Mr Burston relied on the usual units of methamphetamine that people deal in, in order to infer the weight of the two bags that were not weighed. Mr Burston noted the purpose of the disputed facts hearing is to enable the Court to appropriately sentence Mr Taui, and he emphasised the key principle of achieving consistency in sentencing, and imposing similar sentences on offenders who commit similar offences. He submitted that in commercial-scale operations such as Mr McMillan’s, methamphetamine is commonly sold in ounces. As noted above at [20], one ounce of methamphetamine sold in a drug deal typically weighs 28 grams. Based on that, Mr Burston submitted the Court can infer five of the six bags contained approximately 28 grams, and the one smaller bag contained 21 grams; he submitted the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of 160 grams of methamphetamine.
[23] Mr Harré did not take issue with the Crown’s evidence that methamphetamine is commonly sold in ounces, or the weight of the bags in which it is commonly sold.
Mr Harré accepted that there is evidence establishing that the four bags of methamphetamine that were weighed amounted to 107.8 grams in total. However, he submitted there is no evidence establishing the weight of the other two bags, beyond reasonable doubt. In his submission, at a minimum, the weight of the packaging should be deducted (calculated on the basis of each bag weighing 4 grams). He submitted Mr Taui was in possession of a total weight of 83.8 grams on this occasion.
[24] I accept Mr Burston’s submission that to attempt to ascertain the weight of the packaging, and then to deduct that amount from the total weight, would be inconsistent with other similar cases. In methamphetamine dealing cases, the Court is frequently asked to infer both the act of supply and the amount supplied, without the benefit of inspected and weighed amounts. For example, in R v Namana Grice J proceeded on the basis that she could infer weight and purity of the methamphetamine based on intercepted communications.10
[25] I also accept that, as Mr Burston emphasised, the assessment of weight is not an exact science. In order to achieve consistency with other cases, the Court can approach this case as a situation where Mr McMillan was selling “ounces” and Mr Taui was buying “ounces”, and can assess the starting point for sentence on that basis.
[26] Based on the specific evidence on this charge about the weighing of the packages (including the fact the bags that were not weighed looked similar in size to the bags that were weighed), Detective Pritchard’s general evidence, and the Crown’s evidence about the likelihood of Mr Taui and Mr McMillan dealing in ounces, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of 160 grams (the equivalent of five ounces and one smaller package) of methamphetamine on 8 April 2019.
Charge 11
[27] On 12 April 2019, Mr McMillan entered the Gilmer Terrace car park and placed a package in a black and blue sock on top of an air conditioning duct. Mr Taui
10 R v Namana [2019] NZHC 1952.
later collected that package. Before it was collected, Detectives Mounsey and Philpott retrieved the package, and located a heat-sealed package containing a number of individual sealable bags. These bags were similar to the bags located on 8 April. The package weighed 306 grams. As it was heat-sealed, the package could not be opened. However, a spectrographic analysis confirmed the presence of methamphetamine.
[28] The Crown alleges Mr Taui was in possession of a total of 280 grams on this occasion. Together with the confirmed weight of the package, Mr Burston again relied on the usual units of methamphetamine that people deal in. He submitted the package contained 10 individually sealed ounces of methamphetamine, and the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of 280 grams of methamphetamine.
[29] Mr Harré again relied on the weight of an individual bag being 4 grams, and on that basis the maximum methamphetamine contained in the 10 individually sealed bags could not be more than 266 grams in total. He highlighted that figure does not account for the weight of the large heat-sealed bag containing the smaller individual bags.
[30] For the reasons set out above at [24]-[25], the general evidence of Detective Pritchard, and the specific evidence about the weighing of the package, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of 280 grams (the equivalent of 10 ounces) of methamphetamine on 12 April 2019.
Charge 12
[31] On 14 April 2019, Mr McMillan entered the Gilmer Terrace car park and placed a package in a black sock on top of an air conditioning duct. Mr Taui later collected that package. Before it was collected, Detectives Mounsey and Philpott retrieved the package, and located three sealed bags containing a crystalline substance. All three bags were weighed; they weighed 28.6 grams, 28.9 grams, and 28.9 grams (totalling 86.4 grams). A small sample was taken, and both the spectrometer and ESR confirmed the substance was methamphetamine.
[32] The Crown alleges Mr Taui was in possession of a total of 84 grams on this occasion. Together with the confirmed weight of the packages, Mr Burston again relied on the usual units of methamphetamine that people deal in. He submitted each package contained one ounce of methamphetamine, and the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of 84 grams of methamphetamine.
[33] Mr Harré again submitted the weight of the plastic bags, at 4 grams each, should be deducted, leading, in his submission, to a total weight of 72 grams.
[34] For the reasons set out above at [24]-[25], the general evidence of Detective Pritchard, and the specific evidence relating to the weighing of the package, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Taui was in possession of 84 grams (the equivalent of three ounces) of methamphetamine on 14 April 2019.
Charge 13
[35] Charge 13 is a representative charge covering the period from 2 March to 2 May 2019. This charge covers 12 separate occasions, which can be grouped into three separate categories.
[36] First, there are four dates covered by covert CCTV within the car parks (the CCTV dates), where Police were unable to intercept the relevant packages. On 2 April 2019, Mr McMillan left a package for Mr Taui at the Gilmer Terrace car park, and Mr Taui left a package for Mr McMillan. On 5 April 2019, Mr McMillan and Mr Taui met in person at the Gilmer Terrace car park and exchanged packages. On 21 April 2019, Mr McMillan and Mr Taui met in person at the Kumutoto Lane car park and Mr McMillan gave Mr Taui a package. On 29 April 2019, Mr McMillan left a package at the Gilmer Terrace car park, and Mr Taui collected it.
[37] Second, there are seven dates prior to the installation of CCTV (the pre-CCTV dates). On these dates, Police observed vehicles associated with Mr Taui and vehicles associated with Mr McMillan, or Mr McMillan on foot, entering the Gilmer Terrace car park. Mr Burston submitted there was no reason for Mr Taui to visit the car park except to purchase methamphetamine from Mr McMillan, and the pattern fits the
activity in April that was captured on CCTV, where Police were able to intercept packages.
[38] Third, on 18 April, Police intercepted a package of cash (totalling approximately $22,000-$27,000) left by Mr Taui for Mr McMillan. Mr Burston submitted that amount of money would purchase approximately four ounces of methamphetamine. Later that day, Police observed Mr Taui visiting Mr McMillan at his Lambton Quay apartment (the Lambton Quay date). Later that night, Mr McMillan was also observed walking on foot in Kumutoto Lane, and Mr Taui was also known to be in the area at that time.
[39] As none of the packages on these 12 occasions were intercepted by Police, the Crown asks the Court to infer both that methamphetamine was purchased by Mr Taui on each occasion, and the amount of methamphetamine that was supplied. In terms of the weight, the Crown alleges between one and two kilograms was supplied in total.
[40] Mr Burston submitted the evidence proves these transactions would have been multiple ounces. He pointed to the fact that the methamphetamine supplied over the three occasions that were intercepted (detailed at [21]-[34] above) were all multiple ounces (between three and 10 ounces); Mr McMillan was a commercial-level drug dealer, convicted of possessing two kilograms of methamphetamine purchased in one transaction, who did not deal in grams; the payment of $22,000-$27,000 is consistent with Mr Taui purchasing multiple ounces of methamphetamine; and the packages that were able to be observed (though not weighed) were large enough to hold multiple ounces of methamphetamine. Mr Burston submitted Mr Taui purchasing multiple ounces on each occasion fits the pattern of his transactions with Mr McMillan, and the scale of Mr McMillan’s overall operation.
[41] Mr Burston submitted that the average weight supplied over the three occasions that were intercepted (detailed at [21]-[34] above) was 175 grams; on that basis, he submitted it is likely two kilograms was supplied to Mr Taui over the 12 occasions which make up charge 13. Alternatively, Mr Burston submitted the smallest quantity supplied (on 14 April, detailed at [31]-[34] above) was 84 grams; on
that basis, he submitted the lowest plausible quantity purchased by Mr Taui during the period of the representative charge was one kilogram.
[42] In response, Mr Harré said the Crown’s allegations of weight on charge 13 rely on guesswork and speculation. In relation to the CCTV dates, Mr Harré submitted there is no corroborating evidence (for example, text messages or evidence of on-supply) to justify a finding that Mr Taui purchased methamphetamine on these occasions. In relation to the pre-CCTV dates, Mr Harré submitted the Crown relied on the summary of facts, which is not evidence, and again submitted there is no corroborating evidence. He noted Mr Taui also pleaded guilty to being in possession of a commercial quantity of cannabis, and the Crown has not excluded the possibility that these transactions may have in fact related to cannabis. In relation to the Lambton Quay date, Mr Harré submitted that the Crown is asking this Court to “reverse engineer the factual position” based on the amount of cash intercepted, to arrive at a hypothetical quantity of methamphetamine purchased, which cannot be achieved on a principled basis. He submitted the Crown’s reliance on Mr Taui visiting Mr McMillan’s apartment is speculative.
[43] There is a sound evidential basis from which I can infer that on all 12 of the dates encompassed by charge 13 Mr Taui did purchase methamphetamine from Mr McMillan:
(a)In relation to the CCTV dates, the covert nature and the location of the meetings is consistent with the details of the transactions covered by charges 10, 11 and 12.
(b)In relation to the pre-CCTV dates, Mr Taui accessed the Gilmer Terrace carpark, using a remote fob, stayed only for a short time on each occasion, and did so without any obvious purpose for being there other than to purchase methamphetamine. Mr McMillan also accessed the carpark at proximate times on these dates. These are the same characteristics evident in the CCTV dates.
(c)On 18 April 2019 Mr Taui is observed visiting Mr McMillan at the latter’s Lambton Quay apartment. Although this is the only occasion when Mr Taui is seen visiting Mr McMillan’s apartment, rather than the Gilmer Terrace or Kumutoto Lane car parks, he had deposited cash ($22,000-$27,000) in the hiding place used by him and Mr McMillan at the Gilmer Terrace car park, earlier that day. I accept that the amount of cash is consistent with the scale of previous dealing between Mr McMillan and Mr Taui.
(d)There is no plausible basis to conclude that Mr Taui may have been buying cannabis, rather than methamphetamine, from Mr McMillan. Although Mr Taui has pleaded guilty to being in possession of a commercial quantity of cannabis, none of the charges laid against Mr McMillan relate to cannabis, and no cannabis was located in the Police searches when they arrested Mr McMillan;
(e)The lack of corroborative evidence, such as text messages, is not surprising given the evidence at trial that Mr McMillan communicated largely by way of encrypted applications or other covert means and expected his associates to do likewise.
[44] Overall, I am satisfied by the evidence, in particular the scale of Mr McMillan’s dealing, and the typical circumstances of Mr McMillan and Mr Taui’s observed and intercepted transactions, that their 12 interactions in the period covered by charge 13 were for the purpose of selling and buying methamphetamine. The cumulative evidence provides a sound basis on which I can reach that conclusion without the need for speculation or guesswork.
[45] As to the weight of the methamphetamine purchased by Mr Taui on each of the 12 occasions, I infer that each transaction involved multiple ounces. That conclusion is consistent with:
(a)The scale of Mr McMillan’s operation: he was purchasing kilograms and selling ounces. There is no evidence that he dealt in smaller amounts.
(b)While there was some small variation in the weight of the packages that were intercepted and weighed, they were consistently multiple ounces in total in each transaction.
(c)The payment of $22,000-$27,000 on 18 April is consistent with Mr Taui’s transactions with Mr McMillan being for multiple ounces of methamphetamine.
[46] The Crown’s allegation is that Mr Taui purchased in the region of two kilograms from Mr McMillan in the period from 2 March to 2 May 2019, based on the average weight involved in the three intercepted transactions. I accept that is an available inference from the totality of the evidence set out above. However, I prefer to take a conservative approach, favourable to Mr Taui, and base the calculation of the total amount covered by charge 13 on the smallest quantity weighed on the three intercepted occasions. That was 84 grams on 14 April 2019. On that basis, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Taui purchased one kilogram of methamphetamine (the equivalent of three ounces on 12 occasions) from Mr McMillan in the transactions covered by the representative charge.
Result
[47] I find beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Taui purchased the following amounts of methamphetamine from Mr McMillan:
(a)charge 10: 160 grams;
(b)charge 11: 280 grams;
(c)charge 12: 84 grams; and
(d)charge 13: one kilogram;
totalling 1.524 kilograms.
[48] The case is adjourned to 13 May 2021 for sentencing. At sentencing, the Crown will be entitled to rely on the aggravating facts found as proved beyond reasonable doubt in this judgment.
Gwyn J
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