PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S139 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1985
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA 401/02
CA 404/02THE QUEEN
v
T (CA 401/02) (CA 404/02)
Hearing:26 March 2003
Coram:Anderson J
Baragwanath J
Gendall JAppearances: P L Borich for Appellant
G C De Graaff for Crown
Judgment:3 April 2003
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY BARAGWANATH J
[1] The appellant appeals against his conviction by a jury in the High Court at Auckland on 9 October 2002 of two representative counts of rape, three representative counts of sexual violation involving fellatio and one of attempted rape of his step-daughter between 1 February 1986 and 31 July 1994. The Solicitor-General seeks leave to appeal against the sentence of concurrent terms of four years imprisonment imposed on 1 November 2002. A feature of the case is that the appellant had previously been convicted and sentenced for like offending committed on the complainant on 28 August 1994.
Conviction
[2] In support of the appeal against conviction the appellant advances three grounds:
a)A pre-trial ruling of 2 July 2002 admitting evidence of recent complaint was wrong in principle.
b)The learned trial Judge erred in refusing the defence leave to cross‑examine the complainant’s mother on her statement.
c)The jury’s verdicts were inconsistent and unsupportable.
Recent complaint
[3] The complainant said that she was aged five at the commencement of the alleged offending which continued until 28 August 1994 when the complainant’s mother caught the accused committing an act of attempted sexual violation by rape. On the night of that offence the complainant underwent interview by a specialist interviewer of which a videotape record was taken. She was also medically examined at the Starship Hospital. It is common ground that the complainant was not a willing participant in the interview, during which the interviewer asked her “Is this the first time your father has done anything to you?” Her response was a nod and noise, which appeared to indicate that the offence of 28 August was the only one. The medical examination took place at 3.50 am on 29 August 1994 about four hours after the offence had occurred. The medical notes contain no record of complaint of previous offending. A statement of 31 August 1994 by a house surgeon at Auckland Hospital records that the complainant was asked if such offending had happened before and she answered “No”.
[4] The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted sexual violation by rape and on 5 February 1995 was sentenced to three years imprisonment.
[5] In late September or early October 1994, some four to five weeks after the offending of 28 August 1994, the complainant went to live with an aunt and told her that the appellant had abused her on four occasions, saying that he had made her have oral sex once and that the other three occasions involved non-consensual intercourse.
The pre-trial ruling
[6] In a ruling of 2 July 2002 O’Regan J…
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- Case
- [2003] NZCA 332
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the Court of Appeal of New Zealand as an appeal against the appellant's conviction and sentence. The appeal against conviction was based on three grounds: the admissibility of evidence of a recent complaint, the refusal to allow cross-examination of the complainant’s mother on her statement, and the inconsistency of the jury’s verdicts. The appeal against sentence challenged the adequacy of the four-year term imposed for the multiple counts of sexual offending. The matter was heard on 26 March 2003 and judgment was delivered on 3 April 2003.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the pre-trial ruling admitting evidence of a recent complaint correct in principle?
2. Did the trial Judge err in refusing the defence leave to cross-examine the complainant’s mother on her statement?
3. Were the jury’s verdicts inconsistent and unsupportable?
4. Was the sentence imposed manifestly inadequate?
Held
1. The court held that the pre-trial ruling admitting evidence of a recent complaint was correct in principle.
2. The court held that the trial Judge did not err in refusing the defence leave to cross-examine the complainant’s mother on her statement.
3. The court held that the jury’s verdicts were not inconsistent and were supportable.
4. The court held that the sentence imposed was not manifestly inadequate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal considered three main issues in the appeal. Firstly, regarding the pre-trial ruling admitting evidence of a recent complaint, the court held that the complainant's difficulty in complaining to her mother, who was the partner of the accused, justified the admission of the complaint as it was made at the first reasonable opportunity. The court found no error in the trial Judge's decision and applied the principle that a complaint must be made at the first reasonable opportunity, in line with common law and statutory provisions.
Secondly, concerning the refusal of the defence leave to cross-examine the complainant’s mother on her statement, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial Judge was within his discretion to refuse such leave. The court noted that the appellant had already pleaded guilty to charges relating to the period in question, and the evidence did not establish a miscarriage of justice. The court emphasized that the jury's decision-making is characterized by conscientiousness in following instructions.
Thirdly, the court examined the consistency of the jury's verdicts. It found that the acquittals on specific counts and both Avondale counts were not inconsistent with the guilty verdicts, as there were factual considerations that explained the acquittals. The court applied the principle that the jury's sense of fairness and justice could properly be applied in reaching the verdicts.
Lastly, regarding the sentence imposed, the Court of Appeal held that the sentence was not manifestly inadequate. The court applied the totality principle, considering the full extent of the offending, and found that the sentencing Judge's sentence was within the permissible range considering the standards of the time of the offending. The court dismissed the appeal against the sentence, finding that the Judge's ultimate sentence was open to him.