R v Strickland

[2020] NZHC 2314

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CRI-2019-009-007383

[2020] NZHC 2314

THE QUEEN

v

LIAM TEAU ARIKI STRICKLAND

Hearing:

7 September 2020

Appearances:

M N Zarifeh for Crown

R G Glover for Defendant

Judgment:

7 September 2020

SENTENCING REMARKS OF OSBORNE J

This judgment was delivered by me on 7 September 2020 at 10.26 am Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date:

R v STRICKLAND [2020] NZHC 2314 [7 September 2020]

Introduction

[1]Mr Strickland, please stand. You have pleaded guilty to charges of:

·     manslaughter;

·     receiving;

·     driving while disqualified (third or subsequent);

·     reckless driving;

·     burglary;

·     assault with a weapon;

·     dangerous driving; and

·     failing to stop.

[2]    The maximum penalty on the manslaughter charge is life imprisonment with varying maximum periods of imprisonment on the other charges.

[3]    I am shortly going to invite you to sit down again because I need to identify the background to your offending, the facts of your offending, and importantly the reasons for the sentence I will impose on you. That will take some time.

[4]So, please be seated.

[5]    To consider the sentence I should impose on you, I will deal with a number of topics:

(a)First, I will refer to the facts. That will include my consideration of the victim impact statements, three of which have been read by them or the support officer today.

(b)I will turn to examine the period of imprisonment which I should impose on you. That requires me to consider, as you have heard from counsels’ submissions:

(i)first, a starting point, that is a period of imprisonment which I consider reflects the seriousness of your main crime;

(ii)secondly, personal factors about you which make your offending worse; and

(iii)thirdly, the circumstances personal to you which reduce your level of responsibility for the crime and also bring into account your guilty plea.

(c)I must also determine, as you have heard from Mr Zarifeh, whether there should be a minimum period of imprisonment — that is what the lawyers call an MPI.

[6]At this point, I am going to summarise the facts.

Factual background

[7]    In order to establish the factual background, you are aware that there has been two distinct processes. First, between the Crown and you (through Mr Glover) the facts that were agreed were identified. Secondly, in relation to a number of facts which you disputed the Court convened a hearing of evidence last month and I made findings in relation to those disputed facts.

[8]    Relevant to your offending is that you were on 8 August 2018 disqualified from driving for a period of 13 months, expiring on 7 September 2019. Subsequently, and before the offending for which I am sentencing you, you were granted electronically monitored (EM) bail on other charges, including numerous driving charges, and were required to wear an electronic bracelet. Your driving of which I am about to speak occurred after you had cut off that bracelet and absconded from your bail address.

[9]The offences for which you are to be sentenced fall into three time-slots:

20 July 2019

[10]On 20 July 2019, you received a stolen Subaru.

7 August 2019, either side of 2 pm (the Subaru period)

[11]   Some two weeks later, on 7 August 2019, you were observed by police officers who were driving a patrol car on Marlow Road, Aranui. You were driving the Subaru with two passengers.

[12]   The patrol car signalled for your vehicle to stop by flashing its red and blue lights. You instead accelerated and began driving in a reckless, evasive manner through residential areas. You drove at speeds of between 80–90 km/h in residential streets with posted speed limits of 50 km/h. You failed to stop at stop signs. You passed other vehicles at speed against oncoming traffic, causing those vehicles to take evasive action.

[13]   You drove towards the city, making numerous turns through a series of streets. Then, approaching New Brighton, your speed was estimated at 90 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. Your vehicle at that point had smoke coming out of its engine due to the manner of your driving.

[14]   At one point, you lost control of the Subaru while making a sharp left-turn. You mounted the berm, collided with a stop sign and hit some rocks, damaging the Subaru. This Subaru period came to an end shortly after that when you and your associates abandoned the vehicle outside an address in New Brighton.

[15]   In relation to the Subaru period, you have pleaded guilty to disqualified driving (third or subsequent) and reckless driving.

7 August 2019, after 2 pm (the van period)

[16]   This period began with you climbing over a fence from where you had dumped the Subaru and taking a white van parked in a neighbouring driveway. You entered

the neighbouring property in order to find another vehicle to take — hence the burglary charge.

[17]   As you drove backwards out of that driveway in which the van had been parked, a police dog-handler pulled his car up at a 45 degree angle across the road, with lights activated, in order to have you stop. I have found that as you completed your reversing manoeuvre out of that driveway, you then drove forward into the police car, striking it down the right-hand side, the side on which the constable was seated. Hence the charge of assault with a weapon.

[18]   You then accelerated, with the white van fishtailing, towards the roundabout on Shaw Avenue and Hawke Street. I found that the police car, with activated red and blue flashing lights and siren, was following you at a distance of 35–60 m.

[19]   As you approached the Hawke Street roundabout (some 200 m from where you had taken the van) you were driving at approximately 60 km/h and accelerating.

[20]   There were people walking on the footpath, frequenting neighbouring shops and businesses.

[21]   As you approached the roundabout, Dean Amies was in front of you. He had moved out from the pavement to the pedestrian haven in the middle of the road as you approached the roundabout. He had then taken a step or two back into the roadway and was standing facing your vehicle as it approached. He appeared to be watching you and waving his arms.

[22]   You entered the roundabout still accelerating. Your right-hand wheels rode up over the raised roundabout as you went through. You struck Mr Amies with the middle of the front of your van. He was then pulled underneath the van and dragged approximately 20 m before coming free from under the van. At no point did you brake or deviate away from Mr Amies to avoid a collision. You did not hesitate, let alone stop. You continued accelerating a short way south until you turned sharp right into another street. A police vehicle coming in the opposite direction narrowly avoided a collision with you as you cut across the corner on its side of the road.

[23]   Further on, you nearly caused an accident with a truck when you drove onto the wrong side of the road towards oncoming traffic. You also caused an oncoming car to take evasive action at a later point. A pedestrian in your path also had to take evasive action to avoid being hit as you drove your van across the road towards oncoming traffic and onto a footpath directly toward the pedestrian. At a subsequent intersection, you failed to take the corner and ended up going straight through the t- intersection onto the footpath on the opposite side of the road.

[24]   You eventually abandoned the van up a driveway. When the police located the van, you had disappeared. You subsequently evaded the police for nine days while appeals were made through the media and searches were conducted to locate you.

Mr Amies’ death

[25]   Mr Amies died at the scene of the injuries you caused. He had been thrown in the air for a distance of 9.3 to 11.1 m, from which the Serious Crash Unit Investigator estimated that your speed at the point of impact was 54.3 km/h +/– 6 km/h.

[26]Mr Amies was 48 years old on the day you killed him.

[27]   As you have heard and read in the victim impact statements which I have received, he was a much-loved son, brother and uncle. I acknowledge the grief expressed by his family, who to a person recognise the “lovely chap” that Mr Amies was. His father, in the written statement which you have heard read, touched upon matters directly relevant to sentencing when he addressed the words directly to you, and I trust that when you get a written copy of the family statements, you will read them carefully. The loss his family has suffered is beyond measure. There is no sentence that I can impose which will remedy their suffering.

[28]As it is, Mr Amies and his family that day were not your only victims.

[29]   The police officer following you towards the roundabout had to witness first- hand what happened to Mr Amies. He had to attend to Mr Amies on the road as you fled. He has provided me with a short but compelling statement of the impact of the events upon him. Tragically, he lives with the feeling that he failed in the basic

principles of preserving life. He, of course, bears no responsibility whatsoever for the death of Mr Amies. That is your responsibility alone. But he lives with the suffering you caused.

[30]   There is a further victim of your offending from whom I have received a statement, namely the pedestrian who you came close to driving into. He has told me that he thought he was a goner. He was reduced, as he describes it, to a “right mess”. Such was the further human cost of your recklessness.

Other factual matters

Methamphetamine

[31]   You are described by the probation officer who provided the report to me as having a “chronic methamphetamine habit”. You referred to a daily use of methamphetamine around the time of the offending and afterwards. You informed the probation officer that the level to which you were affected at the time of your offending was “10 out of 10”. In the affidavit you provided to me for the disputed facts hearing you said that you had used methamphetamine at that time and were not thinking rationally about surrender.

Reasons for flight

[32]   To the probation officer, you asserted that at your last arrest, you had been beaten so badly that you were admitted to hospital with broken ribs and internal injuries. You explained that as a reason for fleeing from the police.

[33]   In your affidavit for the disputed facts hearing, you again explained that you had accelerated away after hitting Mr Amies because you feared what the police would do to you if you stopped.

[34]   As you know, I heard the evidence from both you and the officer who took your previous arrest at the disputed facts hearing. I found that, on your arrest earlier in the year, you had probably suffered your injuries either in the course of your own driving or in the course of being tackled to the ground when you had to be unwillingly

arrested. I found that your suffering those injuries on your prior arrest was not the reason you failed to stop for the police in August.

Your desire not to be caught

[35]   You explained to the probation officer that fleeing from the police with your two passengers had been “pure impulse”. You said that there was a warrant for your arrest after having cut off your electronic bracelet.

[36]   At your disputed facts hearing, you also explained that you drove up to the speeds you drove deliberately in order to have the police call off their pursuit.

[37]   In short, Mr Strickland, the reason you drove as you did was to avoid being caught and taken back into custody. It was all about you.

Your conduct at the roundabout

[38]   You have given numerous explanations for your conduct at the roundabout. To the probation officer, you stated that you had been unable to veer away from the victim as police cars were blocking the only possible escape route. You explained to me at the disputed facts hearing that the police cars were on either side of the roundabout in the cross-road. To some extent, you must therefore have been looking in both of those sideways directions as you came to the roundabout.

[39]   To the probation officer, you also stated that Mr Amies had moved into the path of your van with his hands out, as if trying to stop you, and that he then appeared to trip, perhaps while trying to jump clear. It was clear on the video evidence which I saw that there was no such tripping and that Mr Amies was, for a distinct period before you drove into him, standing in one spot on the road facing you.

[40]   In your affidavit for the disputed facts hearing, you variously described Mr Amies as “having stepped out in front of me waving his arms” and as “running in front of me”. You stated that there was no way that you could avoid him.

[41]   Furthermore, at the disputed facts hearing in cross-examination, you stated that you had swerved left to try to avoid Mr Amies. But in further cross-examination and in answer to me also, you agreed that even though Mr Amies must have been clearly in front of you, you did not see him. You explained that you were not focused on anything in front of you. You were just focused on coming off the roundabout.

[42]   In other words, you made no attempt whatsoever to avoid Mr Amies. You simply did not see him although he was clearly standing there. In your various explanations, you were clearly trying to point a finger at Mr Amies for acting impetuously so as to make it impossible for you to avoid him. That is not how it happened — you drove straight into him without seeing him because your mind was so taken up on escaping that you were not aware of Mr Amies until the point you hit him.

Remorse

[43]   You stated to the probation officer that you accepted full responsibility for Mr Amies’ death and Mr Glover has explained to me this morning and spoken to Mr Amies’ family of your remorse.

[44]   Those statements have to be weighed against your unsuccessful attempts through the disputed facts hearing still to downplay aspects of your offending and even to move responsibility for Mr Amies’ death either wholly or partly to him through assertions as to how he came to be directly in front of you on the road.

The pre-sentence report

[45]   The pre-sentence report explains that you were raised in a family that enjoyed periods of plenty but between periods of deprivation. Your father was a drug dealer, so drug use and illegal activities became normalised for you. You are now yourself a father to two young sons. Your current partner takes your infant to see you in prison, while your sister brings your other son to see you. The writer notes that you clearly dote on your sons, but that your commitment to offending-related factors means that you have been unable to support your family as your first priority. You have that enduring methamphetamine addiction to which I have referred, and you describe

yourself as having lived off the proceeds of selling that drug since your last release from prison. You state that you now wish to address that addiction and your other offending-related factors.

[46]   It is stated that your trajectory from childhood misbehaviour and youthful offending through to gang affiliation, substance abuse, and eventually this conviction for manslaughter, had an “air of inevitability”. The behaviours and attitudes behind your offending have been reflected in the assessments made by your probation officer. It is noted that despite engaging well with past sentences and interventions, you have retained a “sense of entitlement” when it comes to driving. That is reflected in your many convictions for serious driving offences. You are described as lacking consequential thinking, thinking about the consequences, which is reflected in your explanation of your present offending as having been “pure impulse”. It may have been impulse when you were first spotted by the police. But in the extended period after that, you made a number of very deliberate decisions, including taking the van, crashing into the dog handlers’ vehicle, and so on.

[47]   In regard to Mr Amies’ death, you told the report writer that Mr Amies moved into the path of the van and then appeared to trip. You said that at that point, you felt “hollow” and unable to react beyond continuing your driving. While you knew Mr Amies had been badly injured at least, you said you were sure that you would be killed if you stopped. You said you were unaware Mr Amies was being dragged beneath your vehicle. You said you accepted full responsibility for his death and “wished there were words to assist his family with his grief”.

Purposes and principles of sentencing

[48]   I have to have regard to the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing. They are laid out in ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act 2002. I must impose on you a sentence that will hold you accountable for the harm done to your victim, to his family and to the community, to denounce your conduct, but to promote a sense of responsibility for and acknowledgment for the harm you have caused, and to deter you and others from committing the same or similar offences in the future. In doing so, I must also must consider your need for rehabilitation. I must take into account the

gravity of your offending and the need for sentences across criminal offending to be consistent.

Sentencing for manslaughter

[49]   The lead charge in this case is manslaughter. Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, pursuant to ss 171 and 177 of the Crimes Act 1961. There is no tariff for manslaughter as it has been said to “cover a myriad of situations which are all but impossible to categorise”.1

Starting point

[50]   Counsel are in agreement that a global starting point should be adopted for the charges of manslaughter, driving while disqualified, failing to stop, reckless driving, assault with a weapon and dangerous driving. They agree that an uplift should then be applied for the charges of receiving and burglary. That is also my view.

Aggravating and mitigating factors

[51]The aggravating features in your offending are as follows:

(a)excessive speed;

(b)a persistent and deliberate course of bad driving;

(c)impaired driving (on your own assessment, “10 out of 10”);

(d)failure to stop for police;

(e)failure to give assistance;

(f)your disqualification from driving; and

(g)the extent of the harm you caused.

1      R v Thomas [2018] NZHC 819 at [49].

[52]   In relation to the harm caused, the death of Mr Amies is of course part of the charge of manslaughter but there is, as Mr Zarifeh has indicated, the additional impact on other people affected by your driving to be taken into account.

[53]   The fact that a police officer was a target of your assault charge could also be taken into account as a further aggravating factor but as it does not relate specifically to the manslaughter conviction, I attach marginal weight to it in this case.

[54]There are no mitigating features of your offending.

Crown submissions

[55]   Mr Zarifeh referred me to several cases in which the courts have considered the starting point for manslaughter. In arriving at the starting point, I have had particular regard to the facts of those four cases, being: Whiu v R (nine years);2 R v Hawthorn (10 years);3 R v Popo (12 years);4 and R v Bannan (12 years), the last of those to which Mr Zarifeh made specific reference this morning.5

[56]   Mr Zarifeh submitted that your offending was more serious than in all those four cases. He submitted that the starting point for your sentence should be something greater than 12 years’ imprisonment.

Defence submissions

[57]   When Mr Glover, on your behalf, initially filed submissions in mitigation, it became evident that you were disputing facts alleged by the Crown. Those related to matters such as your speed, you asserting that your speed was no more than 70 km/h and that you had not stopped because of a fear of being beaten up by the police.

[58]   Since I determined the disputed facts, Mr Glover filed amended submissions and he has spoken to those this morning.

2      R v Whiu [2007] NZCA 591.

3      R v Hawthorn HC Wellington CRI-2003-035-3840, 28 May 2004.

4      R v Popo [2009] NZCA 447.

5      R v Bannan HC Christchurch CRI-2010-009-14017, 15 December 2010.

[59]   Perhaps the major point of Mr Glover’s submissions to me, in the light of the facts as they have now been determined, is that the decisions you made in relation to your driving on 7 August 2019 cannot be viewed as rational decisions. Mr Glover invites me to find that, having regard to your comparatively young age and your methamphetamine intoxication, your failure to stop was not a cynical decision but rather an irrational one made in what must be seen as extreme circumstances. He asked me to take into account the thoughtful manner in which you had answered questions of Mr Zarifeh and my questions at the disputed facts hearing and the proper concessions which I recognise that you did make in your cross-examination.

[60]   Mr Glover submitted that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Gacitua v R is of assistance in relation to the starting point.6 The Court of Appeal in Gacitua recognised the highly fact-specific nature of sentencing where death has been caused by dangerous or reckless driving or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.7 In the High Court in Gacitua, the sentencing Judge had adopted a starting point of five years’ imprisonment, which the Court of Appeal found appropriate.8 As Mr Zarifeh has emphasised, that was in relation to cases of dangerous or reckless driving or driving under the influence and causing death.

[61]   Mr Glover submitted that the driving in Gacitua might be seen as worse in some respects than in your case as it involved what he termed a “great deal higher speed” (over 100 km/h albeit in an 80 km/h zone). He also referred to a longer period of driving involved in Gacitua. There was driving in that case for approximately 10 minutes.9 Mr Glover was contrasting that situation with this where your speed of approximately 57 km/h or 60 km/h was involved when you reached the roundabout and you had gone a couple of hundred metres from where you had taken the van.

[62]   Mr Glover submitted that the approach in Gacitua suggests a starting point of about half the 12 years suggested by Mr Zarifeh. As against the seven aggravating features identified by Mr Zarifeh, Mr Glover listed for me some six aggravating features.

6      Gacitua v R [2013] NZCA 234.

7 At [22].

8 At [43].

9      At [5] and [11].

Assessment

[63]   This Court has very recently noted, in the case R v Makoare, that a starting point of six to nine years’ imprisonment is usually adopted in manslaughter cases where death results from reckless driving under the influence of alcohol.10 I have considered the sentencing remarks of Cooke J in Makoare as well as each of the cases to which his Honour referred last week.

[64]   As judges always observe in relation to such cases, each case turns ultimately on its own facts and the other cases are only a general guide.

[65]   Your case is removed from the level of seriousness of most by reason of the number and significance of your aggravating features. All of the seven aggravating features identified by the Crown were serious. While, at the point you drove into and killed Mr Amies, your speed was not greatly above the 50 km/h speed limit, it would be incorrect to consider your speed at that point of time alone. You were in the course of deliberately building up to a much greater speed of the same order as you had been travelling at before having to swap vehicles.

[66]   In the circumstances of your case, I adopt a 10 year starting point collectively for all charges other than receiving and burglary.

Uplift for receiving and burglary

[67]   Mr Zarifeh submitted that the starting point should have a further uplift of one to two years to reflect the charges of receiving (that is, on 20 July 2019) and burglary (that is, on 7 August 2019). I agree that there should be an uplift. Each of those were distinct offences. The receiving was committed well before the 7 August 2019 incidents and I take into account the close linkage in time of the burglary to your driving offending and the element of spontaneity involved in that burglary.

10 R v Makoare [2020] NZHC 2289 at [17], citing R v Thomas [2018] NZHC 819; R v Pora [2015] NZHC 1104; R v Whiu, above n 2; Ormsby v R [2013] NZCA 578; R v McGrath [2014] NZHC 1583; R v Mika [2013] NZHC 2357; and R v Murcott [2014] NZHC 971.

[68]   I find it appropriate to uplift the starting point by one year on account of those two charges. That brings the starting point to 11 years.

Personal factors

Previous convictions and offending on bail

[69]   You have a number of relevant previous convictions. They include, since 2015, driving while disqualified (three times), dangerous driving, failing to stop, careless driving, escaping lawful custody, injuring with intent to injure, unlawfully getting into a vehicle and driving with breath alcohol over 150 mcg (being a person under the age of 20). You were also subject to EM bail at the time of your offending and you had absconded from your bail address.

[70]   Mr Zarifeh submitted on account of your criminal history and offending while on bail an uplift of between 18 months and two years should be applied. Mr Glover recognised that there needed to be an uplift but submitted that it should be no more than one year.

[71]   The Court is entitled to count driving history as a personal aggravating factor despite the Court having already taken it into account in dealing with the defendant as a disqualified driver.11

[72]   I consider that an uplift of one year’s imprisonment is appropriate to take into account your previous convictions and your offending on bail.

Youth and the disadvantage of your upbringing

[73]   Mr Strickland, you were 21 years’ old at the time of these offences. You are now 22.

[74]   I find it appropriate, in the context of this serious offending, to have regard to your youth, but balanced by the observation that this type of offending is often carried

11     R v Popo, above n 4, at [26]–[28].

out by young male drivers who either do not appreciate or choose to ignore the risks they create, both to themselves and others, by driving in such a dangerous manner.12

[75]   It is appropriate that credit for youth in this type of situation be limited by the need to give effect to other purposes of sentencing, including deterrence and denunciation.

[76]   I also recognise that your upbringing and, in particular, your introduction to a drug habit at a very early age set up the circumstances in which, at 22 years of age, you are here to be sentenced for manslaughter. While I have little information as to your prospects of rehabilitation, it is right that your sentence be at least modified to promote the prospect of rehabilitation sooner rather than later.

[77]   I will allow a discount of one year’s imprisonment on account of your age at the time of the offending and the disadvantage of your upbringing.

Guilty plea

[78]   You are entitled to a discount for your guilty plea. You pleaded guilty to the manslaughter (and other charges) after the Crown reduced the primary charge from murder.

[79]   The Supreme Court has noted that the courts give credit for a guilty plea principally to promote the effective operation of the criminal justice system.13 At the same time, the Supreme Court recognised that the reduction of a charge (such as from murder to manslaughter) is a significant benefit to the defendant often reached as a result of understandings between the prosecutor and defence counsel and often involving a concession. If the full credit for an early guilty plea is then also given, the sentence may not properly reflect the offending.14

[80]   In normal circumstances, I would have allowed a 20 per cent discount for your guilty plea.

12     Millar v R [2019] NZCA 570 at [25].

13     Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [45].

14 At [62].

[81]   In this case, a 20 per cent discount would not be appropriate. The Court of Appeal has recognised that if, after the resolution of disputed facts, it becomes apparent that a defendant was not fully prepared to acknowledge his or her guilt, that can be factored into the discount that is finally given.15 Here, the one day disputed facts hearing required the attendance of six police witnesses and their preparation for cross-examination. Having regard to the findings I made in relation to the disputed facts, it detracts heavily from your acceptance of responsibility for your offending. You were prepared to concede only as much as you thought the evidence necessitated.

[82]   On my assessment, a discount of 15 per cent — that is 20 months — is what is appropriate for your guilty plea.

Remorse

[83]   You have expressed remorse at various times and in various ways but the report writer has noted the sense of entitlement which has repeatedly led you into your offending. Robust assessment is required when defendants express remorse.16

[84]   I accept Mr Zarifeh’s submission that all the objective evidence in relation to your case demonstrates that you have placed self-preservation above the interests of all others. Your willingness to engage in a dispute over the level of your speed, when the prosecution evidence was overwhelming, indicates to me that your statements of remorse are not in fact grounded in a true willingness to accept your full responsibility. I will not allow a separate discount (that is, separate from the guilty plea discount) for remorse.

End sentence

[85]   From the adjusted starting point of 11 years, I therefore must make adjustments to take account of one year added for your record and bail offending and of two reductions — one year for your youth and background and 20 months for your guilty plea.  That brings your end sentence to nine years and four months’ imprisonment.   I

15     Hessell v R  [2009] NZCA 450, [2010] 2 NZLR 298 at [46]–[48]. See also Nathan v R  [2011]

NZCA 284.

16     Robertson v R [2020] NZCA 218 at [12].

will be imposing lesser sentences on all the other charges, that is, other than manslaughter. You will serve all those sentences concurrently — that is to say, at the same time — so that your total sentence will be one of nine years and four months.

MPI

[86]   I am required to consider whether you should serve a minimum period of imprisonment. That is done where the date on which you would otherwise be eligible for parole is not sufficient to meet the relevant purposes and principles of sentencing.17

[87]   While Mr Zarifeh has correctly identified facts which tend to favour an MPI, I have come to the view, by a narrow margin, that an MPI is not necessary to meet sentencing needs in your case. The sentence I am imposing will lead to by far the longest period of imprisonment that you will have served. Given your relative youth, there needs to be the prospect of your rehabilitation to which I have already referred.

Disqualification

[88]   You must be disqualified from driving. It is appropriate that your disqualification be for three years, to start on your release date from prison on these offences.18

Sentence

[89]Would you please stand, Mr Strickland.

[90]   On all the following charges, your prison sentences will be served concurrently:

(a)on the charge of manslaughter, you are sentenced to nine years and four months’ imprisonment;

(b)on the charge of driving while disqualified (third or subsequent), you are sentenced to three months’ imprisonment;

17     Sentencing Act 2002, s 86.

18     Sentencing Act, s 124.

(c)on the charge of reckless driving, you are sentenced to two months’ imprisonment;

(d)on the charge of assault with a weapon, you are sentenced to two years’ imprisonment;

(e)on the charge of dangerous driving, you are sentenced to two months’ imprisonment;

(f)on the charge of receiving, you are sentenced to one year’s imprisonment; and

(g)on the charge of burglary, you are sentenced to one year’s imprisonment.

[91]   In addition, on the charge of manslaughter, you are disqualified from driving or from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of three years, to commence on the date of your discharge from prison on the charges on which you have been sentenced today.

[92]Would you please be seated again for a moment before I get you to stand down.

Strikes warning

[93]   Given your conviction for manslaughter, you are now subject to the three strikes law. I am going to give you a warning of the consequences of another serious violence conviction. You will also be given a written notice which contains a list of these ‘serious violent offences’ and Mr Glover will no doubt take you through that.

(a)If you are convicted of any one or more serious violent offences other than murder committed after this warning and if a Judge imposes a sentence of imprisonment then you will serve that sentence without parole or early release.

(b)If you are convicted of murder committed after this warning then you must be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole unless it would be manifestly unjust to do so. In that event the Judge must sentence you to a minimum term of imprisonment.

[94]Mr Strickland, please stand down.

Osborne J

ADDENDUM

[95]   On the failing to stop charge, Mr Strickland, having been convicted, is discharged.

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Christchurch

R G Glover, Barrister, Christchurch