R v Spittal

[2015] NZHC 2915

NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS, OF COMPLAINANTS PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE JUDGMENT AND ANY PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS (INCLUDING THE RESULT) IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON THE INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATABASE UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION OF TRIAL. PUBLICATION IN LAW REPORT OR LAW DIGEST PERMITTED.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY

CRI 2014-083-1033

[2015] NZHC 2915

THE QUEEN

v

MARK SPITTAL

Hearing:	22 October 2015
Appearances:	H C Mallalieu for the Crown S Ross for Mr Spittal
Judgment:	20 November 2015

JUDGMENT OF MALLON J

Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ [1]

Propensity............................................................................................................................................................ [3]

W’s evidence as propensity evidence in relation to C.............................................................................. [3]

The charges involving C as propensity evidence in relation to S........................................................ [14]

W’s evidence as propensity evidence in relation to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman........................... [16]

Charges 10 and 11 as propensity evidence in relation to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman................ [18]

Severance.......................................................................................................................................................... [19]

Mode of evidence............................................................................................................................................. [27]

Amendment of charges 15 to 20.................................................................................................................. [37]

R v SPITTAL [2015] NZHC 2915 [20 November 2015]

Result.................................................................................................................................................................. [38]

Other matters................................................................................................................................................... [43]

Introduction

[1]                 Mr Spittal is to stand trial on 30 sexual and physical violence charges involving four complainants as follows:

(a)Charges 1 to 14 allege that he committed sexual violations, physical violence and made threats against his then partner (C) between 1995 and 1998.

(b)Charges 15 to 22 allege that he supplied cannabis to, stupefied, raped, threatened and assaulted another person (S) on one occasion, and that he supplied cannabis to and indecently assaulted her on another occasion, on dates between 2011 and 2013.

(c)Charges 23 and 24 allege that he attempted to pervert the course of justice in relation to the charges involving S, with the help of two associates (Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman) between 26 August 2014 and 22 January 2015.

(d)Charges 25 to 30 allege that he committed theft, assaults and threats against two complainants (Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman) on 22 January 2015.

[2]                 The Crown has made pre-trial applications seeking to lead propensity evidence, various modes of evidence orders, and the amendment of specified charges. There is also a defence application for severance.

Propensity

W’s evidence as propensity evidence in relation to C

[3]                 The Crown seeks to lead propensity evidence from a former partner of Mr Spittal (W) that he was physically violent towards her.1 The Crown seeks to lead that evidence in relation to the charges involving physical violence against C. The Crown also submits that one of the charges involving C (alleging that Mr Spittal used his hands to grab C around the throat) is relevant propensity evidence in relation to one of the charges involving S (also alleging that he used his hands to grab S around the throat). The Crown does not allege that the sexual violation charges in relation to C are relevant propensity evidence in relation to the charges involving S. That is because the nature and circumstances of the allegations are quite different and have no real connection with each other.

[4]                 W lived with Mr Spittal as his partner between March and May 1999. Her four year old daughter and Mr Spittal’s two year old daughter also lived with them. C is the mother of the latter child. Mr Spittal pleaded guilty to and was convicted of an assault with a weapon (a knife) against W. He also pleaded guilty to and was convicted of wounding with intent to injure W’s daughter and kidnapping her. The Crown seeks to lead as propensity evidence the assault with a weapon incident and other assaults on W that are referred to in her formal written statement taken in relation to the above three charges.

[5]                 These assaults on W, as referred to in that statement, can be summarised as follows:

(a)On one occasion, W went to town and her car broke down. She had to walk home. When she got home Mr Spittal “went right off” and punched her in the right eye and pulled her hair.

(b)On 28 April 1999 W decided she wanted to leave Mr Spittal. She threw her belongings out onto the front lawn. He threw her over the verandah.

1      Evidence Act 2006, ss 40 and 43.

When she tried to walk up the stairs to the front door Mr Spittal pushed her back down the steps a few times. When he allowed her back inside he put her down on his bed, punched her three times on her jaw, and kicked her about three times in her ribs. He would not let her leave the house and she had to bring all her belongings back inside.

(c)On the night of 7 May 1999 things were “pretty tense” between Mr Spittal and W because W had broken a lamp that C had given to C’s two year old daughter. The next morning Mr Spittal told W to do the dishes and he followed her into the kitchen. He held a boning knife to her throat and said “Do you want me to stick you?” He then left the address.

[6]The last of these three incidents was the subject of the conviction in relation to

W. These assaults occurred in the context of violence by Mr Spittal against W’s three year old daughter, which was described by the District Court Judge in sentencing Mr Spittal as “gratuitous if not sadistic violence on a defenceless child”.2 W’s statement describes further violent incidents against her daughter and provides more details on the two incidents giving rise to the wounding and kidnapping convictions described above.3 After the assault on W with the knife,4 W left the relationship and her daughter received treatment for the injuries caused by Mr Spittal.

[7]                 The Crown submits that Mr Spittal’s assaults on W show a propensity to assault his female partners in circumstances which have similarities to the physical violence that is the subject of the charges in relation to C.

[8]                 C was in a relationship with Mr Spittal from late 1995 to around mid-1998. The alleged physical violence against C as set out in the summary of facts is as follows:

(a)Charge 1 (injuring with intent to injure): On an occasion between November 1995 and March 1996 Mr Spittal accused C of flirting with another man, grabbed her by the hair, pulled her into a bedroom, threw

2      Police v Spittal DC Wanganui CRN-908-300-817-678, 6 August 1999.

3 See [4] above.

4 See [5](c) above.

her on a bed, punched her around the head, kicked her in the back and told her he would kill her.

(b)Charge 2 (assault with a weapon): On an occasion between 23 April 1996 and 19 September 1996 Mr Spittal became angry with C for smoking because she was pregnant. He used a crutch (that he had because of an injury from a motor vehicle accident) to strike C across her shoulder and on her kneecap.

(c)Charge 3 (assault with a weapon): After using the crutch, Mr Spittal threw a chair at C.

(d)Charge 4 (injuring with intent to injure): On an occasion between January 1997 and October 1997, when C was pregnant, Mr Spittal became angry with her for refusing to make a drink for him and an uncle. He dragged her by the hair along the floor, and kicked her in the head and stomach several times.

(e)Charge 5 (disabling): In or around June 1997, as a result of a dispute, Mr Spittal put his hands around C’s throat and held her against the wall with her feet off the ground. She was unable to breath and lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness she was on the ground with the defendant standing over her.

(f)Charge 6 (injuring with intent to injure): On an occasion between January  1997  and  October  1997,  following  an   argument   over Mr Spittal’s infidelity, Mr Spittal punched C twice in the face.

(g)Charges 10 and 11 (assault with a weapon and threatening to kill): On an occasion in 1998, after Mr Spittal and C had split up, Mr Spittal walked into C’s kitchen, grabbed her by her hair, picked up a large knife and held it against her throat. He told her that he would slit her throat if she was seeing anyone else.

(h)Charge 12 (male assaults female): On an occasion in 1998, when C was at her mother’s address, Mr Spittal arrived early in the morning demanding money. C said no. Mr Spittal became angry and punched her in the head.

(i)Charge 13 (male assaults female):  On an occasion  in 1998, when   Mr Spittal was angry with C for not leaving her friend’s house, he punched her in the head.

[9]                 C suffered injuries as a result of these assaults. She did not seek medical treatment because she was fearful of Mr Spittal. Nor did she disclose the offending to the police until February 2014. By this time S had disclosed to the police the alleged offending against her.

[10]             The Crown submits that the alleged violence against W has similarities to the alleged violence against C. Both involve domestic violence from a controlling, dominating and jealous male; explosive anger; hair-pulling; punches to the head; kicks; and intimidation with threats and a knife to the throat. Counsel for Mr Spittal submits that, although there are some general similarities in the allegations, they are general features of offending of this kind and the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative effect.

[11]             I consider that the evidence of the three assaults against W, as described in her statement, are evidence of Mr Spittal’s propensity to assault his female partners in order to control them. The second and third assaults were committed in the context of W wanting to leave him. It is evidence of a propensity to assault her in the manner referred to by the Crown. That propensity is relevant to the allegations of violence against C. That violence is alleged to have occurred in a similar context, involving a domestic relationship and an intention to control her (for example, when he thought she was flirting with other men, when she would not do what he wanted, or when she left him). The manner of the assaults is also similar. I consider that the proposed propensity evidence, if accepted as reliable by a jury, has high probative value to the charges of physical violence against C.

[12]             The reliability of W’s evidence is supported by the conviction in respect of the third assault she described in her statement. Nothing has been advanced to suggest that the first and second assaults she described did not occur. There is no suggestion of collusion between W and C. There is a potential for unfair prejudice if the jury hear that the violence on W occurred in the context of gratuitous and sadistic violence on a very young girl in his care. However the prosecutor can lead the evidence from W in a way that does not include this context. Without that context, the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial and can be the subject of appropriate judicial direction to the jury.

[13] I therefore rule that W’s evidence of the three alleged assaults referred to at [5] above is admissible at the trial involving C.

The charges involving C as propensity evidence in relation to S

[14]             The Crown submits that one of the charges involving C (charge 5: using his hands to grab C around the throat) is relevant propensity evidence in relation to one of the charges involving S (charge 19: using his hands to grab S around the throat). However the charge involving S did not arise in the context of a domestic relationship. Rather the allegation is that the morning after allegedly drugging and raping S, he strangled her while threatening to kill her if she told anyone.

[15]             While the manner of the assault is very similar to the alleged assault in  charge 5, the context is very different. The Crown does not allege that the sexual violation charges in relation to C are relevant propensity evidence in relation to those involving S. That is because the nature and circumstances of the allegations are quite different and have no real connection with each other. As discussed below in relation to the severance application, there is a risk of unfair prejudice if the charges in relation to C are heard in relation to S. At this stage I would not rule the charge 5 incident as admissible propensity evidence in relation to the charge 19 incident, or vice versa. However this could be revisited if there is a conviction on charge 5 in relation to a later trial of charge 19, or vice versa (after the first trial and before the second trial).

W’s evidence as propensity evidence in relation to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman

[16]             The Crown submits that the use of a knife to threaten and intimidate W shows a propensity for violence that is relevant to one of the assault charges in relation to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman. As discussed below in relation to the severance application, these charges arise in the context of a dispute when they were intoxicated. Mr Spittal demanded money from them and is alleged to have punched Ms Takiari in the face while holding a knife and threatening to cut her throat.

[17]             Because of the different context in which it arises, I consider that the probative value of the evidence is low. There is a high risk of unfair prejudice in relation to the charges involving Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman if the jury learn of the context in which this offending occurred in relation to W. I therefore consider that W’s evidence is inadmissible as propensity evidence in relation to the charges involving Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman.

Charges 10 and 11 as propensity evidence in relation to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman

[18]             The same submission is made in relation to the alleged use of a knife to threaten and intimidate C. For the same reason I consider that the alleged offending in this way in relation to C (charges 10 and 11) is inadmissible as propensity evidence in relation to the charges involving Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman.

Severance

[19]             The physical violence charges involving C are described above. The charges of sexual offending involving C are as follows:

(a)Charge 7 (sexual violation (by anal penetration)): On an occasion between January 1997 and October 1997 Mr Spittal began trying to have anal intercourse with C. She told him she did not want to do it. Mr Spittal proceeded to have anal intercourse with her despite her protestations.

(b)Charge 8 (sexual violation by rape):  On an occasion in 1998 when  Mr Spittal and C were no longer living together, C took their youngest

daughter to visit Mr Spittal at his house. When C lay down on the bed Mr Spittal considered that she wanted to have sex. C told him that she did not want to have sex. Mr Spittal struggled with her and then raped her.

(c)Charge 9 (representative rape): On a number of occasions between 1996 to mid-1998 Mr Spittal forced himself on C, and despite her resistance, he raped her.

[20]The alleged offending involving S relates to two occasions as follows:

(a)Charges 15 to 20: The first occasion was between January and July 2011 when S was 13 years old. S was at Mr Spittal’s house. Mr Spittal gave her cannabis joints to smoke. S asked for a drink. She saw some pills on the bench which were mushed up. The juice she was given had a white substance at the bottom of the glass. She felt dizzy and tired and lay down on a bed. When she woke up Mr Spittal was in bed with her. She began to cry. Mr Spittal jammed the bedroom door shut with a knife. He then raped her. In the morning Mr Spittal grabbed her around the throat with both hands for about seven seconds. She struggled to breathe. While strangling her, he said that if she told anyone he would kill her. This incident is the basis for charge 15 (supplying cannabis to a person under 18), charge 16 (disabling), charge 17 (sexual violation by rape), charge 18 (injuring with reckless disregard), charge 19 (an alternative charge of male assaults female), and charge 20 (threatening to kill).

(b)Charges 21 and 22: The second occasion took place during a period of school holidays between January and June 2013 when S was 15 years old. Mr Spittal took her out shopping and bought her clothing and lunch. He gave her a joint of cannabis to smoke. He drove her to the outskirts of town and told her that he wanted to teach her to drive. He told her to sit on his knee. While she was on his knee, he put his hand on her vagina on the outside of her clothing. He told her to put her seat

back and she refused. She told him she wanted to go home. Mr Spittal drove her home. He asked her to kiss him on the tongue. She refused and got out of the car. The charges arising from this occasion are charge 21 (supplying cannabis to a person under 18) and charge 22 (indecent act on a young person).

[21]             On 10 July 2014 Mr Spittal was arrested and charged with the alleged offending against C and S. The first incident involving S was initially thought to have occurred in 2012 at an address where Mr Spittal lived with another male who required a caregiver. Ms Takiari was that man’s caregiver and at some point she was in a relationship with Mr Spittal. The police wanted to contact Ms Takiari as a potential witness. It is alleged that in or around August 2014 Mr Spittal offered Ms Takiari and her partner, Mr Deadman, money to assist him in his defence of the charges involving

S. Ms Takiari was to say that S never stayed the night at the address. Mr Deadman was also to coach Ms Takiari in how to give evidence. These matters are the basis for charges 23 and 24 (both charges of attempting to pervert the course of justice).

[22]             The last set of charges relate to alleged offending on the evening of 22 January 2015. Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman visited Mr Spittal as they understood that Ms Takiari would be assisting Mr Spittal the next day in relation to his court case. They all became intoxicated. A dispute arose and the following is alleged to have occurred:

(a)Charge 25 (common assault on Mr Deadman): Mr Spittal became angry and punched Mr Deadman about the head.

(b)Charge 26 (assault with a weapon): Mr Spittal pulled out a knife and pointed it towards Mr Deadman in a threatening manner. Mr Spittal demanded car keys from Mr Deadman and lunged towards him with the knife.

(c)Charge 27 (unlawfully taking a motor vehicle): Mr Spittal took the car keys and drove off in the vehicle. He later returned with the vehicle but refused to give the keys back until Mr Deadman paid him money.

(d)Charge 28 (assault on female): Mr Spittal pushed Ms Takiari on her chest.

(e)Charges 29 and 30 (assault with a weapon/threatening to kill): While holding the knife in his right hand, Mr Spittal punched Ms Takiari in the face and threatened to cut her throat.

[23]Mr Spittal applies for severance of the following three sets of charges:

(a)charges 1 to 14 (relating to C);

(b)charges 15 to 22 (relating to S), together with charges 23 and 24 (perverting the course of justice); and

(c)charges 25 to 30 (relating to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman).

[24]             I consider that the application should be granted.5 The three sets of offending are unrelated in time and circumstances. The first set relate to Mr Spittal’s partner at the time. They took place approximately 13 years before the second set of charges that relate to S. The third set of charges have no connection with the other charges, other than that Mr Deadman and Ms Takiari were in Whanganui because (or partly because) they understood they were needed to assist Mr Spittal in relation to the charges involving S. That, however, is the background to why they were present. It  is not alleged that the assistance they were to provide Mr Spittal was relevant to the dispute that gave rise to the alleged assaults against them.

[25]             The evidence in relation to each set of charges is not relevant to the other sets to an extent that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect:

(a)The allegations in relation to C and S each involve serious sexual offending. Because they are unrelated in time and circumstances, it is not suggested that the alleged sexual offending in relation to one is

5      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 138(4); as considered in Churchis v R [2014] NZCA 281, (2014) 27 CRNZ 257 at [28](a) to (e).

relevant propensity evidence in relation to the other. If the allegations in relation to C and S are tried together there is a real risk of unfair prejudice even with appropriate judicial directions. The jury may unfairly conclude that if Mr Spittal would do what is alleged in relation to S, he must also have done what is alleged in relation to C, or vice versa.

(b)To the extent that some similarities exist in the kind of physical violence involved, there are also significant differences in context. The context of the alleged sexual offending in relation to S risks giving rise to unfair prejudice in relation to the allegations involving C, and vice versa

(c)The allegations in relation to C and S give rise to a risk of unfair prejudice in relation to the allegations of violence involving Mr Deadman and Ms Takiari.

[26]             Further, in this case, trial practicalities and the efficient use of the Court’s resources do not warrant a single trial notwithstanding the risk of unfair prejudice. For example, there are few witnesses who will need to give evidence at more than one trial. Two witnesses will give evidence in relation to the charges involving C as well as S, and Ms Takiari will give evidence in relation to the charges involving S as well as those relating to herself. Arrangements can be made for witnesses who are fearful of Mr Spittal and his family. No other practicalities have been advanced by the Crown as being relevant to the severance application. I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to grant it.

Mode of evidence

[27]             The Crown applies for mode of evidence orders in relation to a number of witnesses.6

6      Evidence Act 2006, ss 103 and 105.

[28]             Mr Spittal consents to the applications in relation to Chenara Clare (evidence in chief by DVD and remainder of evidence by CCTV), J7 (CCTV) and T8 (CCTV). I accordingly make those orders by consent.

[29]             Mr Spittal does not consent to, but does not advance any submissions against, the applications made for D9 and V10 (both behind a screen out of the view of Mr Spittal and the public gallery). In the absence of any grounds advanced in opposition, I accordingly make these orders.

[30]             The Crown applies for C to give her evidence in chief by way of DVD and for all her evidence to be given behind a screen and out of public view. The latter will be the case in any event in relation to the charges of sexual offending in which she is the complainant.11 Mr Spittal opposes the application insofar as C seeks to give her evidence in chief by way of DVD. His position is that C has had no contact with him for 20 years and there is no evidence that she is particularly vulnerable. He says that any risk of intimidation can be adequately mitigated if C gives her evidence behind a screen and out of public view.

[31]             The application for C is supported by a statement from her. She has never given evidence in Court before and is nervous thinking about it. Seeing Mr Spittal will make her “feel sick”. She is concerned that she will cry if she has to talk about what Mr Spittal did to her, she has tried to forget about it, and it will be hard for her to remember everything he did to her when he is in the same room listening to her.

[32]             The Crown applies for S to give her evidence in chief by DVD and the remainder of her evidence by CCTV. Mr Spittal opposes this application. His position is that S will be 18 by the time of the trial, her credibility will be the key trial issue, and she is not particularly vulnerable and has had very little contact with Mr Spittal. Mr Spittal says that she will be adequately protected by giving evidence and being cross examined from behind a screen. He says that his defence counsel should be able

7      Witness 15, list of witnesses and exhibits, 23 September 2015.

8      Witness 17, list of witnesses and exhibits, 23 September 2015.

9      Witness 11, list of witnesses and exhibits, 23 September 2015.

10     Witness 4, list of witnesses and exhibits, 23 September 2015.

11     Section 103(4(b)(ii).

to cross examine S on the basis of a comparison between her evidence in chief and her evidential DVD interview.

[33]             The application is supported by a statement from S. She feels nervous about giving evidence. She last saw Mr Spittal when he assaulted her in his car. She is scared of him and does not want to see him. Seeing him would make her feel “physically sick, unsafe and uncomfortable.” She thinks he will intimidate her. She wants to be in a different room where she cannot see him. She wants to have her DVD interview played as her evidence in chief. She thinks it will be hard to talk about these personal things that happened to her in front of strangers. It will make her feel “really stressed” and she will cry. What happened “haunts” her and she thinks about it every day.

[34]             The Crown applies for W to give her evidence by CCTV from Wellington. Mr Spittal’s position is that, as W has had nothing to do with him for many years, her application seems motivated by convenience rather than the interests of justice. He says that any risk of intimidation and undue stress can be met by W giving evidence from behind a screen and out of public view.

[35]             The application is supported by a statement from W. W has not seen Mr Spittal since 1999 which was her “worst year ever.” She does not want to see him and would “freak out” if she did. She has in the back of her mind that Mr Spittal will “try and get [her] back” for what happened. She does not visit Whanganui because she does not want to see Mr Spittal or his family. She does not want to give evidence in the same town where the trial takes place. She says she would probably have an anxiety attack. Talking about Mr Spittal “after all these years has made [her] feel anxious again.” It is “too daunting.” Giving evidence “would bring up all that trauma again.”

[36]             I grant the orders sought in relation to C, S and W. There is no presumption against evidence being given in alternative ways.12 The nature of the allegations is such that each of the witnesses are vulnerable. Their statements confirm that. There is no prejudice to a defendant if a vulnerable witness is permitted to give their evidence by pre-recorded video when they remain available for cross examination. Their

12     R v Stone [2008] NZCA 313 at [28].

recollections, and any inconsistencies arising from imperfect recollections, can be explored through cross examination. Nor does prejudice arise if W gives her evidence by CCTV from an out of town venue. Her statement sets out why this is in the interests of justice in her case.

Amendment of charges 15 to 20

[37]             Charges 15 to 20 currently allege that the offending took place "[b]etween the 11th day of January and the 30th day of June 2012." As a result of further enquiries the relevant timeframe is now believed to be "between the 11th day of January and the 7th day of July 2011." This is based on information that the adult male who required care by Ms Takiari, and who lived at the address where the offending allegedly took place with Mr Spittal, died on 11 July 2011. Mr Spittal opposed the amendment but was unable to advance any basis for that opposition, and in particular could refer to no prejudice if the amendment was to be permitted. As advised orally at the hearing, leave is granted to amend charges 15 to 20 so that the alleged timeframe is now "between the 11th day of January and the 7th day of July 2011."13

Result

[38]On the propensity evidence applications, I make the following orders:

(a)W’s evidence of the three alleged assaults referred to at [5] above is admissible at the trial involving C.

(b)Charge 5 (involving C) is at this stage ruled inadmissible as propensity evidence in relation to charge 19 (involving S). The admissibility of any future conviction on charge 5 as propensity evidence at a separate trial on charge 19, or vice versa, is better considered later (between the two trials) and can be reconsidered at that time.

(c)W’s evidence is inadmissible as propensity evidence in relation to the charges involving Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman.

13     Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 133.

(d)Charges 10 and 11 (involving C) are inadmissible as propensity evidence in relation to the charges involving Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman.

[39]             On the severance application, I order severance of the following three sets of charges:

(a)Charges 1 to 14 (relating to C).

(b)Charges 15 to 22 (relating to S), together with charges 23 and 24.

(c)Charges 25 to 30 (relating to Ms Takiari and Mr Deadman).

[40]I direct that charges 25 to 30 be transferred back to the District Court.

[41]On the mode of evidence applications, I make the following orders:

(a)Ms Clare is to give her evidence in chief by DVD and the remainder of her evidence by CCTV. J and T are to give their evidence by CCTV.

(b)D and V are to give their evidence behind a screen, out of the view of Mr Spittal and the public gallery.

(c)C is to give her evidence in chief by way of DVD, and her evidence is to be given behind a screen and out of public view.

(d)S is to give her evidence in chief by way of DVD, and the remainder of her evidence is to be given by CCTV.

(e)W is to give her evidence by CCTV from Wellington.

[42]             Leave is granted to amend charges 15 to 20 so that the alleged timeframe is now between “the 11th day of January and the 7th day of July 2011.”

Other matters

[43]             No oral submissions were made about the admissibility of the evidence of Constable Karin Ann Wakefield, the expert interviewer. I anticipate that, as the evidence is routine, it is unopposed. Subject to receiving and considering any further submissions by Mr Spittal, Constable Wakefield’s evidence is admissible.14

[44]             I make an order prohibiting publication of the judgment and any part of the proceedings (including the result) in news media or on the internet or other publicly available database until final disposition of the trial. Publication in a law report or law digest permitted.

Mallon J

14     Evidence Act 2006, s 22.