R v Smith Ca232/02
[2003] NZCA 313
•11 February 2003
| PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S139 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE DATABASE UNTIL COMPLETION OF RE-TRIAL |
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND | CA232/02 |
THE QUEEN
V
[ ] SMITH
| Hearing: | 19 September 2002 |
| Coram: | Glazebrook J Chisholm J Chambers J |
| Appearances: | S W Hughes for Appellant S P France for Crown |
| Judgment: | 11 February 2003 |
| JUDGMENT OF THE COURT |
Following a defended trial in the High Court at New Plymouth, Mr Smith was convicted on 19 June 2002 on one representative charge of rape and two charges of indecent assault on a girl aged between 12 and 16 years. These charges span a period from December 1973 to December 1977.
Mr Smith submits that there was a misdirection on one of the indecent assault counts and further misdirections on the rape charge as regards consent and honest belief in consent. Mr Smith did not challenge his conviction on the other indecent assault charge. In view of the way in which the representative rape charge had been laid, the Court also raised the issue as to whether there was a misdirection on the representative rape charge through a failure to direct as to the necessity for unanimity in respect of one or more specific incidents.
Relevant facts
The charges of indecent assault both related to alleged digital penetration of the complainant’s vagina by Mr Smith – once at her house and once in his car. Mr Smith did not give evidence at trial but in a videotape interview he admitted at least one digital penetration – that in the car. He also admitted touching the complainant’s breasts during a berry picking outing on an earlier occasion. The berry picking incident was not the subject of charges. Mr Smith was a married man, a friend of the complainant’s family and a member of the same church.
At trial the complainant also gave evidence of what she said was non-consensual sexual intercourse occurring on possibly 30 or 40 occasions starting from when she was about 12. She was unable to give details in respect of most of these occasions – she spoke of her body being there but her head not. She did, however, give evidence of two specific occasions – one at Mr Smith’s house and one at the band rotunda in Naumai Park, Hawera.
The complainant’s evidence was that the intercourse at Mr Smith’s house took place when Mrs Smith was out taking food to a fellow church member. The complainant thought the incident happened before the Smiths had children and, although not entirely sure, that she had not begun menstruating (she began menstruating at about 13½ years old). By contrast the defence evidence was that Mrs Smith had taken food to the fellow church member in 1978 which would rather have made the complainant 16 years old at the time of the alleged intercourse.
In relation to the Naumai Park incident the complainant gave evidence that this occurred when she was attending Rangers which would indicate that she was between 14 and 16 years old at the time. She said that Mr Smith used to park about 50 metres down the road and leave his car lights on so she would not miss his vehicle and she would stop and talk and sometimes he would ask her to get into the car. It was on one of those occasions that the park incident happened.
The complainant said that she had never consented to any of the sexual activity but had not protested because she was a compliant child and had been taught to respect adults. She spoke too of dissociating her mind from her body during the offending. Under cross-examination the complainant accepted that she had never offered physical resistance or made her alleged absence of consent to any of the sexual activity known to Mr Smith by means of express words or conduct. She also accepted that she had not considered the intercourse to be rape until her doctor suggested it to her relatively recently.
Mr Smith admitted in his video interview penetrating the complainant’s vagina with his penis somewhere in Naumai Park (he was unsure if it was by the band rotunda). He said that he did not remember if she said yes or no to that activity. He said, however, that full sexual intercourse had happened only once. He specifically denied the allegation that sexual intercourse with the complainant had taken place at his house. We note too that Mr Smith made a similar comment in respect of consent to the digital penetration saying “I can’t tell you that okay. I don’t know”, although of course consent was irrelevant with regard to those charges.
Counsel’s submissions
Ms Hughes advanced three submissions on Mr Smith’s behalf. Her first was that the Judge had wrongly told the jury that Mr Smith had admitted in his video interview that he had penetrated the complainant’s vagina digitally at her family’s home. Ms Hughes submits that Mr Smith only admitted one instance of digital penetration, that which occurred in the car, and that the Judge thus misdirected the jury. She further submits that the Judge failed to remedy the matter when he (at Ms Hughes’ request) recalled the jury and gave supplementary directions.
In addition Ms Hughes complains that the Judge in his supplementary directions went on to direct that the jury were entitled to accept the complainant’s evidence that digital penetration occurred at the house if they could not remember (as he could not) any specific challenge by Ms Hughes to the complainant’s evidence that this occurred in the house. In her submission the Judge should have balanced this part of the supplementary direction by informing the jury that Mr Smith’s statements during the video interview were an implicit challenge to the complainant’s version of events in the house.
Mr France for the Crown submitted that the Judge’s supplementary directions made it obvious to the jury that the defence position was that Mr Smith did not admit digital penetration in the house. He also submitted that Mr Smith’s statements during the video interview were ambiguous and that, if he wished to challenge the prosecution with respect to whether digital penetration occurred in the house, Ms Hughes should have done so when cross-examining the complainant.
Ms Hughes’ second submission was that the Judge’s direction to the jury on the rape charge was not an appropriate one, given that the offending was historical and fell to be considered under s128 of the Crimes Act 1961 as it was prior to its amendment in 1985. In oral argument, however, it became clear that her focus was with particular aspects of the summing up by the Judge in relation to the question of consent and the concerns would have been similar even under the law as it is now. We therefore do not need to consider the extent to which the 1985 amendments changed the law.
The main concern expressed by Ms Hughes was with a direction by the Judge in his oral summing up that both the lack of physical threat and the fact that a victim does not resist are “irrelevant”. Ms Hughes, however, took no issue with the Issues Sheet given to the jury where it was stated that a failure to protest or physically resist is not to be taken of itself as consent.
Ms Hughes submitted that the fact that a victim does not protest can be highly relevant both to the issue of consent and more importantly perhaps to honest belief in consent. She also submits that the Judge in his summing up should have, particularly given the thrust of the defence case, directed that consent can be given reluctantly, hesitantly or tearfully and may be regretted afterwards. She pointed to the decision of this Court in R v C [1995] 2 NZLR 330 where such a direction was approved by this Court even after the change to the legislation. She also submits that other conduct that could have been taken as signifying consent should have been referred to, for example, the complainant’s conduct in meeting Mr Smith after Rangers. Finally it was submitted for Mr Smith that the Judge’s summing up was not balanced and failed sufficiently to alert the jury to the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, particularly with respect to the fact that the complainant referred to an “affair” or “relationship” between herself and Mr Smith and the fact that the complainant had said that she had not wanted to share Mr Smith’s attentions with her sister.
In Mr France’s submission an accused person is entitled to have the offence applied as it existed at the time of the offence but there is no entitlement to an old style of address, except perhaps in cases where the change of emphasis in the legislation (and that is all in his submission that occurred in 1985) is directly in issue. He further submitted that the directions on consent were wholly adequate. In this case there was no suggestion by the defence of a reluctant, hesitant or tearful consent. The defence suggestion was of a young girl swept away by the attentions of an older man and positively consenting. Mr France accepted that the remarks as to lack of protest being irrelevant were unfortunate but submitted that, read in context, they would not have led to a misunderstanding by the jury.
Ms Hughes’ third submission was that the Judge’s directions on honest belief were inadequate in that the complainant’s lack of protest by words or conduct was not sufficiently stressed and that her actions which could be seen as signifying compliance (such as meeting Mr Smith after Rangers) were inadequately addressed. She also submits that the direction on honest belief in consent became intermingled with the directions on consent and thus that the jury were not given the opportunity to consider the two questions separately.
Mr France argued that, as the trial was short and the issues relatively simple, there was no need for a detailed summary of the defence case. In his submission, however, even though clearly not particularly supportive of the defence case, the Judge nevertheless outlined the essence of the defence case to the jury. In Mr France’s submission the Judge was not obliged to attempt to bolster what was in his submission an incredible defence theory of a 12 year old entering into a relationship with a married man involving repeated consensual intercourse prior to her having even reached puberty, a defence that was in any event inconsistent with Mr Smith’s admissions and denials in his video interview.
Issue raised by the Court
There was a supplementary issue raised by the Court. Counsel made oral submissions on this at the hearing and were given the opportunity to make further written submissions. The issue raised relates to the representative charge of rape. As can be seen from the facts set out above the complainant gave evidence of two specific incidents of alleged rape. It seems likely that her statement to the Police also identified those incidents as Mr Smith was asked about them in his video interview and denied the incident in his house but admitted intercourse had taken place at Naumai Park. Specific charges should have been laid in respect of those two incidents.
In R v P [1998] 3 NZLR 587 this Court criticised the framing of an indictment as a single representative count where six separately identifiable alleged incidents of rape were identified and where, in respect of those incidents there was no uncertainty as to time, place or the nature of the particular offending. By framing the charges as a representative charge this Court held that the appellant had been deprived of the right to have each specific allegation separately tested under the criminal process. Because of this the verdict of the jury did not necessarily reflect a unanimous view that one particular incident took place and that all the elements of the offence were proved in respect of that incident. This had resulted in a miscarriage of justice in the Court’s view.
We also note the decision in R v P (CA184/99, 2 September 1999, unreported) where this Court held that the risk of injustice could be averted by an appropriate direction to the jury that they could not convict on the general representative charge of rape in reliance on any of the specific admitted incidents unless they were unanimously satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all the elements of rape coincided in respect of any particular incident they found occurred. Specific reference by the Judge may be necessary to the incidents which have been particularly identified.
Ms Hughes adopted the issue raised by the Court and submitted that in this case too the failure to lay specific charges and properly to direct in relation to the representative charge resulted in a miscarriage of justice as it could not be known that the jury were unanimous in their verdict in respect of any one incident, particularly because the trial focused to a large degree on two distinct and detailed allegations of rape. She submits that the lack of an appropriate direction as to unanimity on a particular charge combined with the misdirections on consent and honest belief made the verdict on the rape charge unsafe.
Mr France for the Crown conceded that it would have been better to have had separate charges in relation to the two specific incidents identified or a clearer direction in respect of unanimity in relation to those incidents. However, he submitted that, given the nature of the evidence in the case and Mr Smith’s admissions, no miscarriage of justice resulted. He submitted that there were only ever two live issues in the trial – the complainant’s consent and Mr Smith’s belief in consent. Given the admission by the accused of intercourse and his statement that he could not remember whether she consented or not, the Naumai Park incident inevitably became the focus of the jury’s attention. In addition there was no suggestion at trial that consent or honest belief differed as between incidents.
Admission in the video interview
We turn now to the alleged misdirection about Mr Smith’s admissions during the video interview as to digital penetration. In summing up, the Judge said to the jury that Mr Smith “has admitted that he penetrated [the complainant] with his fingers in a bed at the [complainant’s family home]”. The Judge then went on to read the relevant passages from the video interview transcript (slightly paraphrased) as follows:
Q.There was one instance where your wife [M] had been sick, or was sick, and had gone to hospital and you stayed with the [complainant’s family] in your family home with one of your sons. [That should be “their family home with one of your sons”]. Okay. They took you in and you stayed there for a little while [M] was in hospital. Can you remember that at all?
A.Mmm hmm.
Q.On one of these particular nights, [the complainant] stated that you went into her room, you woke her up, you took her through to your room which was like the sunporch on the other side of the house.
A.[The transcript records him as frowning as if can’t remember and then shaking his head – no].
Q.Okay. You placed her into your bed. All right.
A.Carry on.
Q.And during that time that she was in your bed you inserted your fingers into her vagina.
A.[Shakes head – no.] I done it once, yes.
Q.You did it once?
A.Mmm mmm.
Q.In that house?
A.Well, can’t remember that one, I know. I remember doing it once though.
We agree that this passage from the video interview is ambiguous. Thus the judge’s categorical direction to the jury that Mr Smith had admitted the house incident, while a possible view, was not the only (and perhaps was not even the most likely) view.
In his supplementary directions however the Judge not only re-read the above passage dealing with the alleged admission of digital penetration in the house, but also continued reading a passage which included Mr Smith’s admission about digital penetration in his car. The Judge explained to the jury that “Ms Hughes submits that the admission that is made in answer to the questions about digital penetration at the house is open to interpretation from the interview as being related only to what happened in the motor vehicle.” He told the jury that this was entirely a matter for them to construe based on what was said in the interview.
Because the Judge in his supplementary direction re-read the whole of the relevant part of the transcript to the jury and made it very clear that the interpretation of Mr Smith’s statement was in dispute, the jury was clearly alerted to the need for it to decide whether there had been any admission about digital penetration in the house. In addition, we note that it was not put specifically to the complainant that digital penetration did not occur at the house and we accept that the Judge accurately directed the jury that in that situation the jury was entitled to accept the complainant’s unchallenged evidence.
Direction on the rape charge
We now turn to the rape charge and examine first the alleged misdirection on consent. It is worth setting out the Judge’s directions in his summing up on consent in full so that the alleged misdirection can be seen in context:
[61] If you are satisfied that the accused had sexual intercourse with [the complainant] by penetrating her with his penis, then the next question for you to consider is whether or not she consented. Consent means an agreement given freely and voluntarily by a woman who is able to understand the significance of what is to happen, i.e. sexual penetration, and who is able to make an informed and rational decision about whether or not she will consent.
[62] If a woman in [the complainant’s] position submitted to what was happening, not because she welcomed it, but because she felt powerless or trapped, she [Ms Mann for the Crown] said, that is not consent in legal terms. The fact that a man does not physically threaten a woman is irrelevant. So, too, is the fact that the complainant does not protest verbally or resist physically. She does not consent if she submits because she regards what is to happen as unavoidable.
[63] Here [the complainant’s] evidence was that she did not consent; that she did not participate freely or voluntarily in the 30 or 40 acts of sexual intercourse. She told you about her defence mechanism of disassociating her mind from her body to shut out what was occurring. If you accept that that occurred, you may well accept that she was not consenting at all to sexual intercourse with Mr Smith.
[64] [The complainant] specifically said that she never wanted the sexual intercourse with Mr Smith to happen. She did not give any evidence that she encouraged him or signified her approval. The fact that she may have submitted to Mr Smith’s demands, because she had been taught that adults were to be obeyed, respected and trusted, does not signify consent. Her evidence was that her only control over him was to avoid him. Again, if you accept [the complainant’s] evidence, you may have no difficulty in concluding that she did not consent.
Before embarking on the discussion as to consent the Judge summarised the Crown and defence cases on that issue. He said as to Mr Smith’s case:
[59] On the other hand, for Mr Smith, Ms Hughes says that this is a classic case of seduction by an older man of a younger woman; that [the complainant] is driven by her guilt arising from her religious faith about what was in reality an affair between consenting parties; and, in Ms Hughes’ submission, she has only decided to complain after her doctor suggested that what occurred was rape.
There is also a further paragraph in the summing up which, although in the section dealing with honest belief, is relevant also to consent:
[70] Also Ms Hughes suggested to you that [the complainant] was reconstructing events with the benefit of hindsight, based on guilt arising from her religious faith, and that she made a conscious decision as a teenager to end what in reality was no more than an affair. You will take into account all of the circumstances again. You will decide whether or not this was what people understand to be an affair. But you may well consider that [the complainant] did suffer guilt, right from the time that Mr Smith first penetrated her digitally. You may well consider that this reaction was entirely understandable. You may consider that she felt violated and abused but powerless. And you may consider that it was only as she grew into teenage years that she felt strong enough to confront Mr Smith, and demand that he cease.
There is no doubt that a failure to protest verbally or resist physically can be highly relevant as the jury would have been entitled to infer consent from that (particularly when placed alongside the other evidence Ms Hughes pointed to such as the complainant’s willingness to get into Mr Smith’s car). Taken by itself therefore the direction that the failure to protest or resist is irrelevant is not a correct statement of the law. In context, however, it is clear that the remark referred back to the first part of the paragraph – that is the direction that submission because of feeling powerless or trapped is not consent. If the jury accepted that the complainant submitted in that sense, then indeed the failure to protest or resist is irrelevant. In other words the Judge was saying that, if the jury accepted the complainant’s evidence that she did not in fact consent, then lack of protest or physical resistance did not convert absence of consent into consent. While it certainly could have been more happily expressed (as indeed it was in the Issues Sheet given to the jury), taken in context we do not consider the jury would have misunderstood it.
More generally we consider that the Judge adequately summarised the defence case in para [59] set out above. A trial Judge is not obliged to repeat every point defence counsel has made, particularly if the trial is short as it was here. We note too that the evidence of the complainant meeting Mr Smith after Rangers (which Ms Hughes says should have been mentioned) is not necessarily helpful to the defence as the complainant also gave evidence of trying to avoid him at that time and that would presumably also have been mentioned. She stated in her evidence that she would try and avoid having sexual intercourse during this period as much as possible. She would bike past his car very fast or on other occasions give excuses for not getting in the car such as she was menstruating or that she had too much homework.
While clearly not sympathetic to the defence case we consider that the summing up as a whole left the jury in no doubt that they had to make a finding on all the available evidence as to whether the Crown had proved that the complainant had not consented. In addition, we accept Mr France’s submission that there was no necessity to give a direction on tearful or reluctant consent as that was not part of the defence case as put to the jury.
We now move on to the honest belief issue. The Judge in his summing up summarised in some detail what the Crown prosecutor said in her closing address on this issue. Having mentioned that the first sexual contact between Mr Smith and the complainant occurred during the berry picking outings, Mr Smith’s position of power and trust, and the complaint’s youth and vulnerability, the Judge continued:
[69] [The complainant’s] evidence was that Mr Smith never asked her whether she consented to having sexual intercourse. Ms Hughes countered this by asking you rhetorically: how often has anybody asked – would you consent to sexual intercourse at 4 p.m. today? It is a matter for you, but you may consider that this suggestion is rather artificial and unrealistic when applied to the circumstances of this case. Again it is a matter for you, but you may consider the force of Ms Mann’s submission that Mr Smith took advantage of his age, his knowledge of [the complainant’s] trust and faith in adults, and her vulnerable personality. You may be satisfied that he never cared whether she consented or not to sexual intercourse – he just had his way with her within the context of a dominating and controlling relationship. If you are satisfied that that was the case, as Ms Mann suggests, then whenever he had sexual intercourse with her Mr Smith cannot have had a real or genuine belief that [the complainant] was consenting, and the Crown will have proved that element of the charge….
[71] It is for you to determine what really happened. I must emphasise, though, that Mr Smith does not have to prove that he honestly believed [the complainant] was consenting. The opposite applies: the Crown must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Smith did not honestly believe in her consent.
The Judge then returned to the transcript of Mr Smith’s video interview with the police and read the following portion:
Q.When you mean, when you’re talking about sex, okay, do you, you’re talking about full penetrational sex?
A.Well I’ve had an operation myself and I couldn’t have kids or anything, so, yeah.
Q.So you’re talking about penetration of her vagina with your penis, is that correct?
A.Mmm. Mmm.
Q.Okay. Did she consent to that?
A.Can’t remember. [Inaudible] say yes or no, don’t know.
Q.So you don’t remember if she said yes or no?
A.No. No.
He asked the jury to consider whether Mr Smith’s inability to recall during the interview whether the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse in Naumai Park was a matter of significance.
There was also a supplementary direction given at Ms Hughes’ request (at the same time as the supplementary direction on the digital penetration admission) in the following terms:
[81] The other issue that Ms Hughes has raised is that before she put the 4 o’clock question to you in her address yesterday afternoon, she said to you this: an honest belief in consent – that’s on the rape charge – can be a mistaken belief. She said to you that [the complainant] was never dragged or forced. She admitted that. And she said that there was nothing in the evidence that would suggest that Mr Smith would not have accepted a rebuff if it was given. Now, of course, if you are not satisfied that the Crown has proven that Mr Smith did not have an honest belief, then you dismiss the charge against him.
[82] Ms Hughes’ submission to you is that an honest belief can be a mistaken one, and she says it is open to you to infer from all the circumstances that Mr Smith may reasonably have believed that [the complainant] was consenting, even though she said she was not, and she says that you can reach that conclusion or draw that inference from the fact that [the complainant] did not physically resist or verbally remonstrate with him. Indeed, you can if you wish, look at all the evidence and draw inferences. What I am saying to you is that there is no evidence before you that Mr Smith in fact reached that conclusion, and what I am directing you to do is to look to all the other evidence that I mentioned to you before; in particular the history of the relationship; in particular the evidence given by [the complainant] that Mr Smith never asked whether she consented to this. This is an issue for you to decide on the facts.
[83] Ms Hughes says that in his statement to the police Mr Smith started by denying that he had raped anybody. But you will weigh that against the answers that I read to you before about him not remembering whether consent was given to the event in Naumai Park.
We consider these directions taken together adequately put the issues before the jury. They make it clear that the Crown needs to prove a lack of honest belief and in the supplementary directions refer specifically to the complainant’s lack of physical or verbal protest. We note again that there is no necessity for a trial Judge to repeat every point defence counsel has made. We agree that the directions on consent and honest belief were intermingled in the summing up but that is largely because in this case those two issues were inextricably linked. The very matters put forward by the defence as signifying consent (e.g. lack of protest) were also highly relevant to the question of honest belief.
Representative charge direction
As indicated above the complainant, as well as giving evidence that she was raped on possibly 30-40 occasions, also gave evidence of two specific incidents – the Naumai Park incident and the incident at Mr Smith’s house. The Police knew that the complainant was able to give particulars of two of the alleged acts of rape. They specifically asked Mr Smith about those incidents in his evidential video. There can be no doubt that the two specific incidents should have been the subject of separate charges. The representative charge should have dealt only with the occasions about which the complainant could not be specific: see s329(6) and R v P [1998] 3 NZLR 587. Had that course been taken, then the jury would have correctly focused on the Naumai Park incident and the Smith house incident separately and then on the balance occasions separately. That would have ensured unanimity with respect to the three charges.
As the Crown had not charged three separate offences, the risk of injustice could have been averted by a direction to the jury that they could not convict on the representative rape charge in reliance on any of the specific incidents unless they were unanimously satisfied that all the elements of rape coincided in respect of that particular incident – see R v P (CA184/00, 2 September 1999) at para 21, referred to at para [20] of this judgment. That direction was not given in this case.
We note the Crown submission that the Naumai Park incident would have been the focus of the jury’s attention. Although the Judge concentrated in his summing up on the Naumai Park incident, (in respect of which Mr Smith had conceded sexual intercourse took place between him and the complainant and also made comments which the jury would have been entitled to conclude negatived honest belief in consent), the summing up is not restricted to that incident. When the Judge was dealing with the issue of consent he did not deal only with the Naumai Park incident. He referred to the complainant’s evidence with respect to “the 30 or 40 acts of sexual intercourse”. He told the jury that, if they accepted the complainant’s evidence, they might “well accept that she was not consenting at all to sexual intercourse with Mr Smith”. Later in the summing up, he referred to the sexual activity having allegedly begun when she was only 11 years of age. That was much earlier than the alleged Naumai Park incident. In any event, the trial cannot be recast as if it were a trial on the Naumai Park incident alone. For example, much of the evidence that was admitted may have been irrelevant (and hence inadmissible) if the Naumai Park incident had been the sole focus of the trial.
There is nothing in the summing up which required the jury to reach unanimity as to the three elements that needed to be proved with respect to any one alleged incident. Even though, as the Crown points out, there was no suggestion at trial that consent or honest belief differed as between incidents, the representative charge spans a long period and the jury would have been entitled to take a different view as to consent or honest belief in consent, depending on the complainant’s age. We cannot therefore exclude the possibility that some members of the jury may have concluded that, while they were not satisfied about lack of consent with respect to Naumai Park, for example, they were satisfied about lack of consent with respect to earlier incidents, while others may have thought that only the Naumai Park incident was proved, with respect to which they were satisfied as to lack of consent and lack of honest belief in consent. On the Judge’s direction, the jury could have brought in a verdict of guilty, notwithstanding a lack of unanimity with respect to any one incident.
This, on the authority of the cases discussed above in paras [18] to [20], leads to a miscarriage of justice. We have considered whether this is a case where the proviso to s385(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 applies but the Court was not able to conclude, for the reasons already set out, that the jury would inevitably have convicted had there been a proper direction on unanimity.
Decision
For the reasons given above the appeal is dismissed in relation to the indecent assault charge.
For the reasons given above the appeal is allowed in relation to the representative rape charge, the conviction on that charge is quashed and a new trial ordered. Presumably the Crown will now seek leave to present an amended indictment in the light of this judgment.
Mr Smith was sentenced to two years imprisonment on each of the indecent assault charges to be served concurrently. This means we must consider the question of home detention. Although it may now be academic, we grant leave for Mr Smith to apply for home detention.
Solicitors:
Govett, Quilliam New Plymouth for Appellant
Crown Law Office, Wellington
0
0
0