R v Smail

[2008] NZCA 6

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE DATABASE UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION OF TRIAL. PUBLICATION IN LAW REPORT OR LAW DIGEST PERMITTED.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA538/07 [2008] NZCA 6

THE QUEEN

v

ERIC NEIL SMAIL

Hearing:         18 February 2008

Court:            Hammond, John Hansen and Priestley JJ

Counsel:         J M Ablett-Kerr QC and M J Phelps for Appellant

P K Feltham for Crown Judgment:      18 February 2008 at 4 pm Reasons:          29 February 2008

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        An extension of time for the appeal is granted.

B        The conviction for murder is quashed and the sentence imposed in the

High Court is set aside.

C        The case is remitted to the High Court at Christchurch for a trial.

R V SMAIL CA CA538/07 [18 February 2008]

EOrder prohibiting publication in news media or on Internet or other publicly accessible database until final disposition of trial.  Publication in Law Report or Law Digest permitted.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Hammond J)

Introduction

[1]      Mr  Keith  McCormick  was  a  tetraplegic.    His  regular  caregiver  was  the appellant, Mr Eric Smail.   On 28 July 2005, Mr Smail killed Mr McCormick by cutting his throat whilst he sat in his wheelchair.

[2]      On 12 May 2006, following a pre-trial guilty plea to a charge of murder in the  High  Court  at  Christchurch,  Fogarty J  sentenced  Mr Smail  to  12  years imprisonment  with  a  minimum  non-parole  period  of  seven  years  imprisonment: HC CHCH CRI 2005-009-009464.

[3]      Mr Smail’s rationale for his guilty plea was that he had been given a pre-trial indication as to sentence.  As he said in his affidavit:

I had understood that the worst case scenario following my guilty plea was life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years; however, I had very clearly understood that a sentence of between 6 and 8 years was far more likely given the Trial Judge’s indication to [trial counsel]. I anticipated being eligible for parole after serving one-third of my sentence. I would not otherwise have pleaded guilty.

[4]     The Solicitor-General sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the circumstances of the case did not permit the imposition of a sentence other than life imprisonment and that the minimum term of imprisonment should have been substantially in excess of seven years.

[5] This Court granted leave to appeal, increasing Mr Smail’s sentence to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 13 years: [2007] 1 NZLR 411. Unfortunately, this Court was not advised of the circumstances in which Mr Smail had come to plead guilty, notably the alleged reliance on a sentencing indication from Fogarty J.

[6] Mr Smail then applied to the Supreme Court of New Zealand for leave to appeal against his sentence. On 20 September 2007, that Court dismissed the application for leave: [2007] NZSC 77. However, in doing so, the Supreme Court held (at [8]-[9]):

It would be unusual for this Court to permit a second appeal on a ground not raised in the Court of Appeal, particularly when it is based on disputed facts and it is still open to the applicant to raise the question in an appeal to the Court of Appeal against conviction by seeking leave to appeal out of time.

Nevertheless, the circumstances may well warrant further appellate consideration. If an application for leave to appeal against conviction out of time is made to the Court of Appeal, it will be for that Court to decide whether, on all the material that is placed before it, leave to appeal should be given having regard, so far as is relevant, to the approach we set out in R v Edwards [more completely reported as Sipa v R (2006) 22 CRNZ 978].

[7]      In October 2007, Mr Smail applied under s 383(1) and 388(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 for an extension of time to appeal to this Court against his conviction and sentence.

[8]      His grounds of appeal are still essentially as summarised by the Supreme

Court in the earlier proceedings (at [5]):

The first ground of the applicant’s proposed appeal to this Court is that he had pleaded guilty to murder because of “misguided advice” from his former counsel  concerning  the  sentence  he  would  receive  and  when  he  would become eligible for parole under that sentence. The second ground is that the Court of Appeal should have offered the applicant the opportunity to vacate his plea of guilty before it increased the sentence imposed in the High Court.

[9]      We delivered a result judgment on 18 February 2008, granting the extension of time, quashing the  appellant’s  conviction and setting aside his sentence,  and remitting the case to the High Court for trial.  We now give our reasons for those determinations.

[10]     The Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed out of time by more than a year. An extension of time can be granted under s 388(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, where it is in the “interests of justice” to allow the appeal to advance.  See generally R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42, particularly at [73], and R v Scurrah CA159/06 12 September

2006.

[11]     This is an appropriate case for an extension of time.  The critical relevance of a sentencing indication and its effect did not become apparent until there had been two appeals.  The appellant then had to engage alternative counsel.  A prospective appeal was lodged as soon as alternative counsel had been engaged.   There is no prejudice to the Crown.  On any view of matters, there is at least an arguable case that there was a sentence indication in the High Court.

Jurisdiction

[12]     There is a dispute between counsel as to the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction, at least as to sentence.

[13]     Ms Ablett-Kerr  QC’s  argument  is  that  Mr Smail  has  never  exercised  his absolute rights to appeal against sentence or conviction under the Crimes Act 1961, maintaining that those rights are still on foot.

[14]     Crown Counsel submit that there has been  a sentence appeal, albeit one initiated by the Solicitor-General under s 383(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, and a resulting application for leave to appeal that sentence to the Supreme Court.

[15]     However, the Crown concedes that there is no barrier to Mr Smail seeking an extension of time to appeal against his conviction.  The Crown’s recognition that the central issue on appeal solely relates to conviction is sufficient to dispose of this jurisdictional issue for present purposes.

[16]     The homicide of Keith McCormick was an awful and traumatic occurrence for the friends and families of the individuals involved.   During the High Court proceedings, the case attracted distinct public notoriety.  Therefore, given the course we have directed, it is important to explain in  simple terms  the principal  legal difficulty that has arisen in this case.

[17]     When somebody pleads guilty to a crime, it is only in the most constrained circumstances that that person may be permitted by a court to change their plea. Difficulties can arise if a person pleads guilty in reliance on a sentence indication, and there is then a Crown appeal.   In this case, the Crown exercised its right of appeal against the sentence imposed by the High Court. The approach endorsed by the Supreme Court of New Zealand to Crown appeals against sentence is that, where a Court increases a sentence on a Crown appeal (as it did in this case), the person who pleaded guilty must be given the opportunity to reconsider their plea: Sipa v R (2006) 22 CRNZ 978.   The Supreme Court in Sipa also made it plain that the accused must swear an affidavit attesting to reliance on the sentencing indication in entering a guilty plea and confirming that they will elect to re-plead if the Court increases sentence.  Mr Smail has deposed that he wishes to vacate his guilty plea, enter a plea of not guilty, and stand trial.  Of course, he is taking a chance because he could ultimately face a heavier sentence than that already imposed upon him.

[18]     The rationale behind this approach, followed in other parts of the British Commonwealth (see, in New South Wales, R v Glass (1994) 73 A Crim R 299), is that the accused has pleaded guilty on the basis of a particular “expectation” which has not been met. As a matter of common justice, he or she should therefore be permitted to reconsider his or her position. That is the state of the law which is binding upon this Court.

Introduction

[19]     The critical  issue  in  this  case  is  whether  the  High  Court  Judge  made  a sentencing indication.  There are two aspects to this question. Firstly, what in fact occurred  in  this  case?    Secondly,  did  whatever  occurred  amount  in  law  to  a sentencing indication?

The facts

[20]     On  15 February  2006,  Fogarty  J,  the  scheduled  High  Court  trial  judge, convened  a  conference  in  chambers.    Mr  Shamy  and  Mr  McCrae,  the  Crown Solicitor and his junior respectively, and Mr Fournier, the then defence counsel, were present.  The accused Mr Smail was not.  Mr McCrae subsequently made a file note, which was produced before us.  No formal record was kept of the conference.

[21]     It is common ground that, at that conference, Fogarty J raised a concern with Mr Fournier  as  to  whether  there  was  any  evidence  to  support  a  defence  of provocation.   Counsel are agreed that the Judge expressed a clear view that provocation was not available on the basis of the current evidence.   However, he indicated that he viewed the case as one involving certain mitigating factors which might impact on sentence, namely the stresses imposed by caregiving.

[22]     It  is  also  common  ground  between  counsel  that  the  discussion  then progressed, in a general way, to the issue of sentence in the event that a guilty plea was entered.

[23]     The  Crown  was  firmly of the  view  that  Mr  McCormick’s  homicide  fell within the ambit of s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002, and said so.  Accordingly, the Crown advised that it would be seeking a sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 17 years.

[24]     Counsel have deposed that the Judge was of the view that s 104 should not be applied to this case.   Mr Fournier’s recollection is that the Judge suggested that a finite sentence could be considered, meaning a sentence of imprisonment short of life imprisonment.  He has deposed that neither sentence length nor a minimum non- parole period was mentioned.

[25]     On the information before us Fogarty J twice expressed the view that he did not think it mattered whether Mr Smail pleaded guilty to murder or manslaughter. Manslaughter does not attract a minimum term of imprisonment.  This would have reinforced Mr Fournier’s view that the Judge was, broadly, leaning against a life term for murder.

[26]     Crown counsel deposed that the focus of the meeting in chambers was on the overall outcome of the case.  The Judge advised Mr Fournier of the need to obtain additional material prior to sentencing, detailing the stresses on Mr Smail at the time that he killed Mr McCormick.

[27]     Importantly,  after  this  conference,  Crown  counsel  made  it  known  to Mr Fournier that the Crown disagreed with the course the Judge was contemplating in suggesting a finite sentence rather than a life sentence with a minimum non-parole period of 17 years.

[28]     Subsequent  to  this  conference,  there  were  further  discussions  between Mr Smail and Mr Fournier.  Mr Smail was advised that the Judge was disinclined to leave provocation to a jury, leaving him with no defence.  However, Mr Smail was told by his counsel of the sympathetic light in which the Judge viewed his actions. In particular, he was advised that the Judge had indicated that a finite sentence, as opposed  to  life  imprisonment,  would  be  considered  if  Mr Smail  pleaded  guilty. Mr Fournier mentioned a likely sentence length of six to 10 years to Mr Smail, based not on what the Judge had indicated as a possible term, but on Mr Fournier’s own rather hopeful interpretation of the materials subsequently circulated to counsel by the Judge under cover of a minute dated 6 March 2006.

[29]     On  1  March  2006,  Mr Smail  signed  written  instructions,  drafted  by Mr Fournier, which included this statement: “my counsel has advised me that I could receive a  finite sentence  rather than  a  life  sentence with  a  minimum  period  of imprisonment.”

[30]     At  this  point,  certain  observations  can  be  made  as  to  the  facts.    It  is abundantly plain that the Crown never wavered in its view that this was a murder attracting the full consequences of s 104, namely life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole  period  of  17  years.    That  was  communicated  to  the  Judge  and  the defence.

[31]     The  practical  difficulty  is  that  the  Judge  indicated  some  sympathy  with Mr Smail’s position and said that a finite sentence of a distinctly lesser character might be considered.  To the Crown, there was a clear indication that the Judge was not minded to impose the s 104 sentencing level.

[32]     It  is  appropriate  to  mention  that  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  sentencing indication,  amendments  to  the  Sentencing  Act  had  recently  been  implemented. Judges were struggling with what the appropriate sentence for murder should be in the new regime.  The material provided to counsel included material which had been provided  to  judges  generally  at  seminars  under  the  auspices  of  the  Institute  of Judicial Studies.  Although the Judge did not specify a finite figure in advance, on any view of the matter he was clearly actively contemplating the possibilities of a finite sentence.

[33]     This was of great practical significance.   A sentence of life imprisonment means exactly that. Even when on parole from a sentence of life imprisonment, a person can be recalled to prison at any time during their life.  A finite sentence on the other hand is served during a defined period, taking into account the relevant parole provisions.   Thus, even the form of a sentence is of the greatest import for an accused.

[34]     It is also quite plain that Mr Smail was never advised that the Crown would have a right of appeal against a finite sentence if imposed, nor was he advised that the Crown might well exercise that right in his case.

[35]     Finally, the advice as to the non-parole period (see [3] above) was incorrect, if given.

The law

[36]   Sentencing indications have given rise to some real difficulties in the administration of criminal justice in New Zealand.

[37]     The first point to note is that there is presently no formal definition of a sentencing indication in our law.  In broad terms, a sentencing indication is typically given prior to the commencement of a trial where a judge is given at least a summary of the facts agreed to by the prosecution and the defence and any other relevant material.  The judge may then be in a position to give a broad indication of the type of sentence that the offender is likely to face were he or she to plead guilty, and possibly a sentence range as to term.

[38]   There has been much concern in the British Commonwealth as to the appropriateness of such an exercise, and the parameters and conditions to attach to it.

[39]     Sentence indications can amount to a form of “plea bargaining” which may be regarded as objectionable in and of itself.  Plea bargaining can involve the negotiation of which pleas are to be advanced or, as is the case here, discussions between counsel and the trial Judge as to the sentence likely to be imposed if a guilty plea is accepted.    Those  who  have  concerns  about  sentence  indications  include opponents of the very notion of “bargained justice”, and victims groups who are often concerned that such arrangements pay insufficient attention to the distinct needs and concerns of victims.   See generally New Zealand Law Commission Criminal  Pre-trial  Processes:  Justice  Through  Efficiency  (NZLC  R89  2005)  at [304]-[342] and McConville and Mirksy, Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True History (2005).

[40]     The  advantages  of  sentence  indications  include  the  so-called  “speedy resolution” of charges, which may reduce the trauma to victims of having to appear in court, the alleviation of anxiety of the accused by reducing the time between charge and disposition, and economic savings to the state in reducing the number of trials.

[41]     Considerable concern has been voiced about judges involving themselves with sentence indications, particularly in chambers conferences where the accused is not present.  Perhaps the leading Australian case is the decision of the Full Court of the Victoria Supreme Court in R v Marshall [1981] VR 725. In that case, the accused had pleaded guilty after receiving a sentence indication in open court from the trial Judge. The discussion between defence counsel and the trial Judge was recorded and later transcribed. There was then an appeal against the sentence to the Full Court. That Court adjourned the matter to enable a fuller discussion of the issues, particularly those relating to what the trial Judge had done in giving a sentence indication. Indeed, the Full Court requested an appearance from the Solicitor-General of Victoria at the adjourned appeal date. Before handing down its judgment, the Full Court consulted other members of the Court and decided to express its view about sentence indications for the guidance of trial Judges, although that matter had not been raised by counsel for the appellant.

[42]   The major concern of the Full Court in Marshall was directed to any arrangement in private between Judge and counsel about plea and sentence. The Full Court considered that such an arrangement is (at 732):

… objectionable because it does not take place in public, it excludes the person most vitally concerned, namely the accused, it is embarrassing to the Crown and it puts the judge in a false position which can only serve to weaken public confidence in the administration of justice.

[43]     Despite concerns raised in that Court, mirroring the kind of discussion that has taken  place  in  academic literature,  there  has  latterly been  support  for  what amounts to sentence indication schemes in both Australia and New Zealand.   In New Zealand,  the  District  Court  Bench  Book  provides  guidelines  for  sentence indications.  The Bench Book guidelines were set out by this Court in R v Edwards [2006] 3 NZLR 180 at [41].

[44]     The  position  with  respect  to  the  indictable  jurisdiction  was  correctly summarised by the Law Commission in Criminal Pre-trial Processes (at [307]):

There are no equivalent written guidelines in the indictable jurisdiction, but sentence indications generally conform to the same approach.   However, there  are  three  major  differences.    First,  in  the  indictable  jurisdiction sentence indications at callover are provided following committal, so that the judge has the full briefs of evidence; in contrast, sentence indications at status hearings are frequently based on only brief statements of fact provided orally by prosecution and defence.   Secondly, sentence indications in the indictable jurisdiction are often provided on the basis of detailed written submissions from both prosecution and defence and are likely to be based on a full victim impact statement and information as to required reparation; in contrast, status hearings rarely involve submissions by either party as to the appropriate sentence, and where such submissions are given they are oral and off the cuff. Thirdly, because in the indictable jurisdiction imprisonment is often inevitable, indications are more likely than in the summary jurisdiction to address quantum as well as type; in particular,  they may indicate whether the offender will receive not more than 2 years’ imprisonment, thus making them potentially eligible to apply to serve the sentence by way of home detention.

[45]     The issue before us is whether, in the circumstances we have noted, there was a sentencing indication in the High Court such as to attract the application of the rule that an accused must be given an opportunity to re-plead on a successful Crown appeal.

[46]     Sentence  indications  are  not  confined  to  formal  “sentence  indication hearings”.  Less formal indications may also create an expectation on the part of the accused and attract the application of the rule.   Further, the “sentence indication” label applies not only to indications of sentence term but also to indications of sentence type.

[47]     Even on the view of the evidence most favourable to the Crown, the Judge conveyed his view that this case should not attract the application of the full weight of s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002.  In our view, this alone comprises a sentence indication.  If, as Mr Fournier suggested, there was an indication that something less than life imprisonment would be imposed, consistent with the written instruction his client signed, an indication that a finite sentence might be possible also occurred.

[48]     The result is that the accused was put in an intolerable position.  If he pleaded guilty, he could reasonably have expected that there was at least a respectable chance that he would be facing a sentence of less than life imprisonment; if he pleaded not guilty, and went to trial, he could potentially face a sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 17 years.

[49]     We are not minded to encourage any relaxation of the safeguards for an accused which our appellate courts have put in place in New Zealand to avoid sentencing indications prejudicing him or her on a successful Crown appeal.

[50]     In our view, the existence of a sentence indication in this case is sufficient to dispose of the appeal.   It required that Mr Smail’s conviction be set  aside, his sentence quashed and his case remitted to the High Court for trial.  He has already deposed that he will plead not guilty.

Other concerns

The chambers conference

[51]     The course that the High Court trial Judge took in this case was entirely well meaning, but also very high risk.  A judge is perfectly entitled, indeed obliged, to efficiently manage a case.  It may be perfectly legitimate for a judge who, amongst other things, has to anticipate the length of a trial and the nature of defences which may be run, to make inquiries as to how such things may fall.

[52]     Unfortunately,  the  discussion  in  chambers  regarding  possible  defences “spilled over” into sentence in this case.  With the benefit of hindsight, it would have been advisable if counsel had reminded the Judge of the perils of discussing such matters, particularly where the Crown had made it plain that it was going to seek the maximum penalty known to our law.

[53]     It is quite plain that Mr Smail did not know when he entered his plea that the Crown could possibly appeal against a finite sentence, or even life imprisonment and a non-parole period of less than 17 years, regardless of the sentence imposed by the trial Judge.  In entering a plea of guilty, he was always at risk of the very thing that happened in this case.

[54]     Mr Fournier frankly and responsibly told us in cross-examination that he did not appreciate the rule, laid down by the Supreme Court in Sipa, that his client might be entitled to re-plead on a successful Crown appeal against sentence.

Advice on first sentence appeal

[55]     It is difficult to see why counsel involved in the first appeal to this Court did not advise that panel that there was at least room for argument that there had been a sentence indication in this case.

[56]     There  was  a  particular  obligation  on  Mr Fournier  in  this  respect.  As  is normally the case in Solicitor-General appeals, counsel from the Crown Law Office appeared for the Crown.  In fairness, they may have not been aware of the events which had transpired in Fogarty J’s chambers conference.  Mr Fournier was aware, and he should have drawn to this Court’s attention, that there may have been a sentence indication on the first appeal, so that this Court could have determined that issue for itself.

[57]     A failure to take that course resulted in an unnecessary application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the involvement of that Court, and then a further appeal to this Court.

[58]     We are of the view that Mr Smail should have been present at the chambers conference in this case. This issue was pursued from the Bench, as Ms Ablett-Kerr QC did not raise the point on appeal.

[59]     Ms Feltham agreed that Mr Smail should undoubtedly have been present, at least for the discussion pertaining to sentencing.

[60]     As it transpires, it is not necessary for us to determine the case on this point. However, we do draw attention to the distinct statutory and common law authority for the proposition that a sentence indication must be in open court, with the accused present, although the Court will likely have to strictly restrict any publication of what is said.

[61]     Section 376(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 secures the accused’s presence at the “whole … trial” of his or her case, which extends to pre-trial processes.   For an example, see R v O’Brien [2001] 2 NZLR 145 where this Court held that a judge wrongly heard and determined in chambers an application to declare a Crown witness hostile, in the absence of the accused. We are of the view that the term “trial” in s 376(1) must extend also to sentencing matters.

[62]     The minimum standards of criminal procedure protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 also provide for the right of the accused to be present at the trial (s 25(e)).   Again, an extended definition of   “trial” has been adopted.   For instance, in R v de Montalk CA66/98 25 June 1995, this Court emphasised the importance of the accused being present at the hearing of pre-trial applications that could impact the accused’s right to defend his or her case.  In R v Yzendoorn [2002]

3 NZLR 758, this Court regarded sentencing as part of a trial, holding that the lower court judge had been wrong to continue a trial and proceed to sentence without the accused being present. See generally Rishworth et al (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) at 685.

[63]     In R v Simon CA162/90 4 June 1991, this Court also affirmed the dangers of a judge seeing counsel in chambers in the absence of the accused, where an application was on a material matter such as sentencing.  The Court referred to an oft-cited passage from the judgment of Mustill LJ in R v Harper-Taylor (1988)

138 NLJ 80 at 81, to the effect that the absence of a defendant is a potential source of trouble. He or she only learns what the judge has said second hand; he or she may complain afterwards that an accurate account has not been given; and he or she cannot hear what counsel has said to the judge, and correct any errors.

[64]     In R v Goodyear [2005] 3 All ER 117, a five Judge panel of the English Court of Appeal took a more favourable view of sentencing indications than had previously been the case in that jurisdiction. However, it clearly signalled that the hearing should normally take place in open court with a full record of the proceedings, both parties represented, and in the presence of the defendant: “if the process we envisage is properly followed, there should be very little need for the judge to involve himself in the discussions with the advocates” (at [77]).

[65]     This   question   has   also   been   considered   by   the   New   Zealand   Law Commission in its Criminal Pre-Trial Processes report.  The Commission took the view  that  a  crucial  component  of  any law  reform  in  this  area  is  that  sentence indications should be made by judges in open court.

Miscarriage of justice

[66]     It will be readily apparent that the effect of some of the foregoing factors, regarded separately or cumulatively, might well give rise to the setting aside of this verdict on the grounds set out by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Sungsuwan v R [2006] 1 NZLR 730, namely that the proper course of justice was disadvantaged to the extent of a miscarriage by what counsel had done here. Further, it may be that the breach of Mr Smail’s right to be present should amount to a miscarriage in and of itself. We do not have to determine that point. It would require fuller argument on which the Crown, and possibly even the Solicitor-General, would wish to be heard given the implications of such a holding for Status Hearings and sentence indications in New Zealand courts.

Need for an express regime

[67]     Hampel J of the Victoria Supreme Court has said that “sentence indications, given  responsibly  in  open  court  with  the  rights  of  the  accused  and  the  public carefully observed, would not bring the criminal justice system into disrepute. They would enhance it”: “Plea bargaining – a judge’s involvement” (1985) 59 Law Inst J

1304 at 1307.  See also the comments of Baragwanath J in Deighton v New Zealand Police HC WHA CRI-2005-488-24 20 May 2005, particularly at [9]. Given  the widespread incidence of sentencing indications in our criminal justice system, it is unfortunate that a legislative scheme has not yet been put in place.

Results

[68]     As a matter of caution, we confirm the directions and determinations given in our result judgment:

•    We grant an extension of time for the appeal.

•    We quash Mr Smail’s conviction and set aside the resultant sentence.

•    We remit his case to the High Court at Christchurch for a trial.

•    Any question of bail can be resolved by the High Court at Christchurch. [69]     Counsel did not seek any suppression orders beyond those normally attaching

to a re-trial: that the judgment is not to be published in news media, the Internet or other publicly accessible databases until the final disposition of the trial.  Publication in Law Reports or Law Digests is permitted.  We make those orders.

Solicitors:

Crown Law Office, Wellington