R v Silverwood

[2016] NZHC 1496

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CRI-2015-085-12415 [2016] NZHC 1496

THE QUEEN

v

CARL JAMES SILVERWOOD

Hearing:	1 July 2016
Counsel:	G J Burston for Crown N J Sainsbury for Defendant
Judgment:	1 July 2016

JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J

[1]      Carl Silverwood is charged with the murder of his mother, Helen Silverwood and the attempted murder of his father, Lee Silverwood.  The defence has advised that he intends to raise the defence of insanity and the Crown, relying on several experts’ psychiatric reports, agrees that the only reasonable verdict is not guilty by reason of insanity.  Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure (Mental Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (CPMIP Act) is therefore activated.

[2]      At a hearing today I found that the defendant had caused the acts forming the basis of the offences with which he is charged.  I found further that the defendant was insane within the meaning of s 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 at the time of the commission of the offence and that the appropriate verdict is therefore not guilty by

reason of insanity.  I found further that the defendant should be detained in a hospital

R v SILVERWOOD [2016] NZHC 1496 [1 July 2016]

as  a  special  patient  under  the  Mental  Health  (Compulsory  Assessment  and

Treatment) Act 1992.

[3]      Finally, I declined to make a general order for suppression of the identity of the defendant,  and/or  his victims, but  I directed  that  there should  be no  image published of the defendant.

[4]      I now give my reasons.

Facts

[5]      At the time of the incident the defendant (who is now 28 years old) was living with his parents.  He was at the address with them on 6 December 2015.  He and his mother, Helen, were in the lounge and his father, Lee, was in the garage. The defendant and Helen had an argument about the defendant not taking his medication and about the money he had been spending.  He left the lounge and got a large knife from the kitchen.  He came back into the lounge where Helen saw him carrying the knife.   She retreated to the farthest corner and called out to Lee for help.   The defendant pursued her and Helen tried to protect herself with her hands.  The defendant grabbed her hand to prevent her escape.  He stabbed her once in the side of her torso, then four times in the chest and upper abdomen.  Helen then fell to the ground and the defendant stabbed her three times in the arms and upper back, and two more times, once in the abdomen and another to the right arm.

[6]      The defendant then left Helen, went to the bathroom and washed his hands. He left  the knife in  the laundry and  went  to  the garage where  Lee  was.   The defendant picked up a hammer and swung it at Lee’s head, but Lee raised his arm to protect himself.  The hammer struck Lee on his left forearm, bounced off and hit his head just behind the left ear.   The pair struggled, Lee took the hammer from the defendant and told him to leave.  The defendant was located nearby by the police a short while thereafter.   Helen was pronounced dead when the ambulance arrived. Lee required stitches to his head wound and had superficial injuries to his forearm.

[7]      The defendant admitted the attack on Helen.  He said he was not getting on with her and had had enough, so he decided to kill her.  He said he had intended to

kill her and that he had been thinking about doing this since the previous Friday. The defendant admitted attacking Lee in the way I have outlined and the defendant said he had the same thoughts about killing his father.  He said he intended to kill him and hoped he would die when he struck Lee with the hammer.

Actus Reus

[8]      The Act implicitly requires that I must be satisfied of the defendant’s involvement in the offences with which he is charged.1    There is considerable evidence to support such a conclusion.  The defendant admitted his involvement to Police as I have recorded above.  He also admitted his involvement to various of the psychiatric clinicians who interviewed him for assessment purposes.   The defence accepts that the defendant committed the actus reus.  I am satisfied on these bases that the defendant was involved in the commission of the offences with which he is

charged.

Insanity – s 20

[9]      The Crown called Dr Tracey Heads a consultant forensic psychiatrist with extensive experience.  She provided written reports to this Court on the questions of fitness to plead and insanity on 30 December 2015, 25 May 2016 and 13 June 2016. The thrust of her evidence on the question of insanity has been consistent.  She is of the view that the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the offending and had  been  unwell for a  long period prior to then with significant deterioration following his choice to cease medication in around September 2015. Her view was that the defendant did understand that his actions involved inflicting serious and lethal harm but he was unable rationally to consider what he was doing or appreciate the moral quality of his actions.  Her opinion was that the criteria for a defence of insanity were therefore met.

[10]     The defence called Dr Justin Barry-Walsh, whose view was in substance the same as that of Dr Heads.   Dr Barry-Walsh pointed to various of the defendant’s psychotic delusions that were likely to have led him genuinely to believe that killing his parents was morally appropriate.  For example the defendant said that the Police,

gangs and the Governor-General have all given him permission to kill his parents; the defendant considered that his parents were imposters and that his real parents were various celebrities including Freddie Mercury. And so forth.

[11]     I find that at the time of the offending Mr Silverwood suffered from a disease of the mind in terms of s 23(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, and that, on the balance of the probabilities, in his delusional state, he did not know that the killing of his mother and the attempted killing of his father, were morally wrong (in terms of subs (2)(6)).

Section 23 – disposition

[12]     Section 23 of CPMIP Act requires that, on acquittal under the Act, I make inquiries as to the most suitable method of dealing with the defendant in terms of ss 24 or 25.  The terms of s 24(1) and s 24(2)(a) provide that, where appropriate, I may order that, hereafter, the defendant be detained in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.

[13]     Dr Heads  addressed  this  issue  in  her  most  recent  updating  report  of

13 June 2016.  She advised that in her opinion an order in the terms referred to is necessary in the interests of the public.  She referred to the nature of the defendant’s chronic mental condition, his ability to mask symptoms, his history of non- compliance with medication regimes and the extreme violence of the charges against him as reasons for choosing such a course.

[14]     I am satisfied that an order as recommended by Dr Heads should be made.

Suppression

[15]     The parties are in agreement that s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 is the controlling provision with respect to the interests of the defendant and that the standard to be met is “extreme hardship”.2   The standard with respect to suppressing the identities of victims and connected persons is set out in s 202(1) and (2).  “Undue hardship” must be shown.  In this case the focus is on the defendant.  There are no

particular issues with respect to the victims and connected persons that demonstrate undue hardship.

[16]     Both  Dr Heads  and  Dr  Barry-Walsh  were of  the view that  there are  no particular clinical reasons for suppression of the defendant’s identity in this case. There appears to be no anxiety on the part of the defendant in respect of publication of his identity.  Dr Heads’ view was that the defendant is likely to be held in secure treatment arrangements for the foreseeable future and any impact of publicity at this point on his eventual reintegration into the community some years hence would be no more than speculation.  Dr Barry-Walsh shared that view.

[17]     The only potential detraction from that consensus is to be found in a letter from the defendant’s treating clinician, Dr Pam Darling, dated 26 May 2016.   She records that the defendant was suffering from ongoing psychosis, distressing flashbacks and, through treatment, is now able to realise what he has done and how this has affected his family.   She expressed concern about the possible negative effects of publication in light of the defendant’s state at the time.  She recommended that name suppression be continued and reassessed after a further three months of treatment.

[18]     I have given careful thought to this question.   I consider that, although the concerns expressed by Dr Darling are significant, they must be mitigated by the fact that the defendant will be in secure care as a result of the orders I have made.  As Dr Heads advised, his release into the community where the effect of publication may be more keenly felt, will be many years into the future.  I do not consider that the defendant’s interests in the context of this particular case outweigh the right of the public to be informed of the events that have led to the process we are engaged in today.  In addition, it would be mere speculation to conclude at this early stage that eventual reintegration into the community some years hence, may be significantly compromised by publication today.

[19]     I decline to order general suppression of the defendant’s identity accordingly. The exception relates to the publication of Mr Silverwood’s image in the press.  If a photograph of him is published in the mainstream media, it is likely to be a particular

focus and will profile both his identity and the events that led to the charges.  Even in secure treatment, Mr Silverwood is likely to be exposed to such coverage to a greater degree  than  simply  print  coverage.    At  that  point,  the  concerns  expressed  by Dr Darling are likely to take on greater significance.

[20]     I direct therefore that no image of the defendant is to be published.

Williams J

Solicitors:         Crown Solicitor, Wellington.

N J Sainsbury, Wellington, for Defendant