R v Sandhu

[2025] NZHC 565

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2021-092-000619

[2025] NZHC 565

THE KING

v

HARDEEP SINGH SANDHU

Hearing:

19 March 2025

Counsel:

NE Walker for Crown

GNE Bradford for Defendant

Judgment:

19 March 2025

SENTENCING REMARKS OF DOWNS J

Solicitors/Counsel:

Crown Solicitor, Manukau. GNE Bradford, Auckland.

R v SANDHU [2025] NZHC 565 [19 March 2025]

Introduction

[1]    Hardeep Sandhu, you are for sentence on one charge of injuring with intent to injure.1 You are the last defendant to be sentenced in relation to an attack upon Harnek Singh. Your circumstances differ from your co-defendants in relation to the attack, but as I shall explain, you played an important role in facilitating that attack.

Facts

[2]    The facts are these. You were a devotee of Gurinderpal Brar, who ran Sikh temples in Auckland and elsewhere. Mr Brar’s views about Sikhism differed from Mr Singh’s. Mr Brar resolved to kill Mr Singh. You were part of that plot save you believed Mr Singh was to be beaten rather than killed. But, you understood Mr Singh would be followed, rammed off the road, then attacked.

[3]    On 21 December 2020, you  exchanged  messages  with  a  co-defendant.  You discussed planting a tracking device on Mr Singh’s car. The next day you researched the  location  of  his  home  using  Google  Maps  and  Streetview.  On  23 December 2020, you received instructions from Mr Brar in relation to the attack. Your role was to follow Mr Singh and ram his car so the attack could begin.

[4]    That evening, Mr Singh went to the Sikh temple in Papatoetoe. When he left for his home, three co-defendants followed him in a black car. You also followed him in a white van. You maintained contact with your co-defendants in the other vehicle. When Mr Singh pulled into the driveway of his home, you forcefully rammed the van into his car. This caused Mr Singh’s car to stop at the beginning of his driveway. Your co-defendants in the other car got out and began their attack. They had weapons. You fled the scene and did not further participate.

[5]    Mr Singh suffered a dreadful attack. He was severely injured and very nearly died. But, as I explained at the beginning, you did not appreciate the attack was intended to kill him. Nor were you aware your co-defendants had weapons. It is, however, important to repeat the obvious: you knew Mr Singh was to be attacked by

1      Crimes Act 1961, ss 189(2) and 66; maximum penalty, five years’ imprisonment.

your co-defendants for his contrary religious views. You facilitated that attack in the way I have explained. It follows you committed the crime of injuring with intent to injure by being a party to that crime.

Aggravating factors

[6]    It is common ground your offending is made more serious because it was premeditated; motivated by religious fanaticism; and because it involved multiple assailants. Relatedly, you knew appreciable violence would be administered. The seriousness of this combination speaks for itself. However, I do not accept the severity of the injuries that Mr Singh suffered — which were profound — aggravate your offending as you did not anticipate life-threatening harm. You anticipated a beating, by which I mean a real beating, not more.

[7]    The Crown suggests a starting point of three and a half years’ imprisonment by reference to cases I shall capture in a footnote to my remarks.2 Through your lawyer, Mr Bradford, you accept that starting point as appropriate. So do I having regard to the combination I have mentioned and your role in facilitating the attack. You are guilty of serious violence by being a party to that violence.

[8]    For completeness, I note your co-defendants received much more severe starting points and sentences. But that is because their offending was for attempted murder. I give an admittedly obvious example. Mr Brar, the mastermind behind the attack, but who was not present when it was carried out, received a sentence of 13 and a half years’ imprisonment. The Judge who dealt with Mr Brar began at the maximum penalty (for attempted murder) of 14 years’ imprisonment.3

Personal factors and mitigating factors

[9]    I turn now to your background and some things that may make your offending less serious. I begin with some basics. You are now 31, albeit you were then 27. You are married. I gather your wife is pregnant. You have not committed any crime beyond

2      Nuku v R [2012] NZCA 584, [2013] 2 NZLR 39; R v Sim [2019] NZHC 2361; and R v Teraki

CA293/02, 3 March 2003.

3      R v Brar [2023] NZHC 3405.

this one. You were born in India. In 2015 you came to New Zealand at the age of 22. You have studied and worked here, otherwise without incident.

[10]   I have a very considerable amount of material about you and your background. Much of that material is helpful. Some is less so. For example, you told the probation officer who prepared your pre-sentence report that you did not appreciate violence was to be used against Mr Singh. That observation is inconsistent with the charge to which you have pleaded guilty, and the agreed summary of facts in relation to the charge. Similarly, you told the author of your extensive cultural report you never felt resentment or hatred towards the victim, and you would never harm him even if you disagreed with him. These observations are difficult to reconcile with your participation in a plot to attack Mr Singh and your role in that attack in ramming his car. You say in your primary affidavit that you drove into the victim’s car because you saw another car approaching yours at speed from behind. Let me just repeat what paragraph 11 of the agreed summary of facts provides: “The defendant’s role was to ram his car into the complainant’s vehicle in order to immobilise it for the attack to take place.” All of which is to say that while much of the material about you is helpful, some of it requires particular care.

[11]   You argue your offending is mitigated by your background and more particularly, because of your indoctrination by Mr Brar. This chapter is largely governed by your cultural report, which you swore as true by an affidavit filed yesterday.

[12]   You say this aspect should attract a discount of 15 percent, which is the same as that given to one of your co-defendants.4 You say you were particularly amenable to the influence of authority figures given your background. The Crown’s position on this discount has softened recently. It no longer contests this figure with any real vigour.

[13]   I am satisfied your offending reflects Mr Brar’s influence as a spiritual leader, a conclusion supported by your pre-sentence report. But I make clear that whether everything you say about Mr Brar is true, is not necessary for me to determine.

4      R v Singh [2024] NZHC 491 at [50].

I, therefore, adopt 15 percent. For completeness, I record that a higher level of discount could be inapt. There is a tension between treating offending as more serious because it reflects religious fanaticism and significant discounts being given to someone amenable to this type of influence.

[14]   As I said earlier, you have not committed any  other offence.  You  seek a  five percent discount for previous good character, including the community works identified in the material you have provided to the Court. The Crown does not contest this discount. I am satisfied it is appropriate primarily for the service you have shown others.

[15]   This brings me to credit for your guilty plea. You seek full credit of 25 percent. The Crown argues 15 percent is the appropriate level. The highest Court in the country has said I must assess all of the circumstances in relation to your plea including, but not limited to, timing.5

[16]   As you will recall you were initially charged with attempted murder. You first appeared in court on that charge in January 2021. The pandemic and other difficulties affected the progress of the charge. That is also true of the charges faced by your co-defendants. On 30 August 2023, you pleaded guilty to attempted murder. You were later given permission by this Court to vacate that plea.6 That happened 9 April last year. Then, through your lawyer, you proposed a guilty plea to the charge now before me. The Crown accepted that proposal. You pleaded guilty to the charge of injuring with intent to injure on 17 July 2024. By then, all remaining defendants had been tried or sentenced. On behalf of the Crown, Ms Walker describes its stance as “pragmatic”.

[17]   The sequence is unusual, indeed a little messy. Your plea meant no further trial was required, but it is difficult to consider it prompt given the overall narrative. I allow 20 percent for these reasons.

5      Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607.

6      R v Sandhu [2024] NZHC 735.

[18]   The remaining mitigating feature is time on electronically monitored bail. You have spent a long time on that bail. More particularly, 1,109 days. Of these, 621 have been on a 24-hour curfew. The remaining 489 days involved a 7 pm to 7 am curfew. Your time on bail has been without incident. The law requires I adopt an evaluative rather than mathematical approach to this issue. The competing contentions are not far apart. The Crown suggests a discount of 14 months; whereas you suggest 17 months. I adopt 14 because of the amount of time in which the curfew was overnight only.

[19]   I recapitulate, meaning restate. From the starting point of three and a half years’ imprisonment, I deduct 15 percent for your background and Mr Brar’s influence; five percent for good character and community works; 20 percent for your guilty plea; and 14 months for your time on electronically monitored bail. This produces a sentence of just over 11 months’ imprisonment, which I round down to  11 months.

[20]   The Crown argues this should be your sentence. You argue for a sentence other than imprisonment.7  Indeed, you say you should be discharged without conviction.   I address this now, then return to the ultimate penalty.

[21]   In very short, a defendant may be discharged without conviction if the direct and indirect consequences of a conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offending.8 You argue a conviction would have very serious consequences, including the ability to find meaningful employment and deportation. You say if you were deported back to India, you would be at risk of violence as well as being separated from your wife. You refer to other consequences as well, including to your mental health and reputation.

[22]   I have received expert evidence in relation to your immigration situation and the consequences of a conviction. I thank all of the lawyers for that evidence and for

7      But not home detention.

8      Sentencing Act 2002, ss 106 and 107. The law in this area is increasingly complex, as to which see, for example, Bolea v R [2024] NZSC 46.

their assistance in relation to your case. It is apparent they have taken great care in making sure I need to know what I need to know.

[23]   I return to the experts. There is a difference of opinion between them about what a conviction would mean. Those differences are helpfully summarised in a joint memorandum. The Crown expert considers a conviction would not affect your liability for deportation as you are already unlawfully in New Zealand. Your expert considers a discharge without conviction would strengthen the possibility of you remaining here.

[24]   This morning Mr Bradford tells me that your appeal before the Immigration and Protection Tribunal has been paused pending what I do today. Before moving on, I make clear that nothing in my remarks or my decision is intended to express a view on what should happen to you. That issue is for others, not me.

[25]   It is not necessary for me to determine which expert is correct. Rather, I proceed on the assumption a conviction would significantly heighten the risk of your deportation. I return to the other alleged consequences.

[26]   If you were deported, I do not accept you would be at risk of harm. I see that risk as speculative. Likewise, risk of harm to meaningful employment opportunities whether you are deported or not. I say that because you have a work history and good qualifications. Your wife would be able to accompany you to India. Whether she would want that is another matter. I see no particular risk to reputation or mental health from the fact of a conviction.

[27]   The question then becomes: does the likely, serious consequence of deportation and related risk of separation from your pregnant wife, constitute a grossly disproportionate outcome?

[28]   Your offending is serious even when mitigating features are appropriately weighed as part of the mix. I repeat the combination identified earlier: the offending was premeditated; motivated by religious fanaticism; and involved multiple assailants. You knew appreciable violence would be administered. You played an important role

in ramming Mr Singh’s car so your co-defendants could attack him. As I have explained, your background and Mr Brar’s influence contributed to the offending. Other mitigating factors exist too, including your otherwise good character. The point, however, is that while the consequences of a conviction may be serious, that remains true of your offending. You were a willing party to serious, premeditated violence. No gross disproportionality exists between consequence and offence gravity.

[29]   I return to ultimate penalty. I am not persuaded to impose a sentence other than imprisonment given the seriousness of your offending. It is important it be marked by such a sentence. But that is not quite the end of the story. You were remanded in custody for more than 13 months. That time will be applied against your prison sentence. A term of 11 months would mean you face no further penalty today beyond perhaps the potential consequences of conviction.

[30]Mr Sandhu please stand.

[31]   On the charge of injuring with intent to injure, I sentence you to a term of    11 months’ imprisonment. I do so on the understanding you have already served that time. Your application for a discharge without conviction is dismissed.

……………………………..

Downs J