R v S HC Timaru CRI 2009-045-631

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TIMARU REGISTRY

CRI 2009-045-000631

REGINA

v

S

Hearing:         (On Papers)

Counsel:         T M Gresson for Crown

J Westgate for Accused

Judgment:      16 December 2009

JUDGMENT OF FOGARTY J

Introduction

[1]      At the close of the Crown case, Mr Westgate for the accused, made a s 347 application for dismissal of Counts 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10 against his client.   These counts all allege that she was a party under s 66 with her co-accused, Mr Shaw, in his conduct of pointing a rifle against a member of the police.  The application was successful.

[2]      It is also important to  appreciate that the offending was directed to two different points in time.   Count 1, and arguably Count 3, was while Ms S 

was driving the Landrover car, being pursued by the police, with Mr Shaw in the

R V S HC TIM CRI 2009-045-000631  16 December 2009

passenger seat beside her.  Counts 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10 were directed to her conduct after the vehicle had crashed into a tree and she and Mr Shaw, each carrying a child, had left the vehicle, walking away from the police for some kilometres.

[3]      Section 66 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides:

66       Parties to offences

(1)Every one is a party to and guilty of an offence who— (a)  Actually commits the offence; or

(b)Does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to commit the offence; or

(c)      Abets any person in the commission of the offence; or

(d)Incites,  counsels,  or  procures  any  person  to  commit  the offence.

(2)       Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence  committed by any one  of them in the  prosecution  of the common purpose if the commission of that offence was known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common purpose.

[4]      The indictments against Ms S   did not contain any particulars as to the basis on which she was being prosecuted as a party.   Rather, they were drawn in exactly the same way as if she had been the person who did use the rifle.   In the margin there was a general reference to s 66.

[5]      In the course of the s 347 application the prosecutor relied on s 66(1)(b) and (c), and s 66(2).  When arguing s 66(1) he did not particularly distinguish between sub-paragraph (b) and sub-paragraph (c).

[6]      I found that there was insufficient evidence in law for a jury to convict Ms S    of  being  a  party  to  these  offences.    The  Crown  have  made  an application under s 381A of the Crimes Act 1961 to me to refer for the opinion of the Court of Appeal questions of law arising out of that direction.

[7]      That application posed four questions as follows:

(a)Whether I was right in law…

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Details
Case
[2009] NZHC 2315
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Regina v S, the High Court of New Zealand at Timaru addressed an application by the Crown to appeal the dismissal of certain charges against the accused, Ms S. Ms S was charged with multiple counts related to her alleged participation with Mr Shaw in pointing a rifle at police officers. The Crown argued that Ms S was a party to the offenses under s 66 of the Crimes Act 1961. The court, however, dismissed the charges against Ms S, finding insufficient evidence to prove her participation as a party to the offenses. The Crown subsequently applied for leave to appeal the dismissal, raising questions regarding the interpretation of s 66(1) and s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961.

The central legal issues the court had to decide involved the interpretation and application of s 66(1) and s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, specifically whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Ms S's role as a party to the offenses. The Crown argued that the trial judge had misapplied the legal test for determining secondary participation in a crime. They contended that mere knowledge of the likelihood of encouraging criminal conduct should suffice for a conviction. The court analyzed the Crown's arguments and compared them with the established legal principles, particularly focusing on the case of Pene v R, which emphasized the need for an actual intention to encourage the commission of a crime.

The court found that the Crown's arguments were not supported by the evidence presented. It held that the Crown had not identified a significant point of law warranting an appeal. The court concluded that the trial judge's application of the legal criteria for secondary participation was correct and that there was insufficient evidence to prove Ms S's participation as a party to the offenses. The Crown's application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

In conclusion, the court upheld the dismissal of the charges against Ms S, finding no basis for a legal appeal. The court emphasized the necessity for the prosecution to prove an actual intention to encourage criminal conduct, as opposed to mere knowledge, for a conviction under s 66 of the Crimes Act 1961.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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