R v Ruddelle - [2020] NZHC 272

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2019-092-1067

[2020] NZHC 272

THE QUEEN

v

KAREN ANNE RUDDELLE

Hearing: 10-21 February 2020

Appearances:

Y V Yelavich and C P Howard for the Crown S D Cassidy and P I Pati for K A Ruddelle

Date:

26 February 2020

JUDGMENT OF PALMER J

(Bail – redacted for publication)

The judgment was delivered by me on Wednesday 26 February 2020 at 11.30am.

……………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Counsel/Solicitors:
S D Cassidy and P I Pati, Barristers, Auckland Kayes Fletcher Walker, Crown Solicitor, Manukau

R v RUDDELLE [2020] NZHC 272 [26 February 2020]

Summary

[1] On Friday 21 February 2020, a jury found Ms Karen Ruddelle not guilty of the murder of Mr Joseph Ngapera but, by a majority, guilty of his manslaughter. I was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that it would be in the interests of justice to grant Ms Ruddelle bail to her home, pending sentence, on conditions including a 24- hour curfew. This was because:

(a)The jury appears to have considered Ms Ruddelle acted to defend her son or herself but did so with more force than was reasonable.

(b)I cannot rule out a sentence of home detention which remains a distinct possibility though I go no further than that.

(c)Sentencing may be delayed for a restorative justice process, in which both Ms Ruddelle and Mr Ngapera’s whānau have expressed interest.

(d)There is a possibility of some discount in sentence for the factors said at trial to have resulted in Ms Ruddelle’s social entrapment in an ongoing pattern of harm from Mr Ngapera’s violence, reinforced by aspects of Mr Ngapera’s coercive control over her.

(e)I accept that Ms Ruddelle’s remorse for the offending is genuine.

(f)Ms Ruddelle does not pose a risk to the safety of others and she is caring for her 15-year-old son. There were no breaches of the bail she was on leading up to the trial or during the trial.

(g)If a report by the Department of Corrections indicates electronically monitored bail is feasible, that could help to demonstrate suitability for home detention.

What happened?

[2] Ms Ruddelle was charged with murdering her partner, Mr Ngapera, on 14 November 2018. Her defence was that she acted in defence of her 14-year old son and

herself and that she did not intend to kill, and was not reckless about killing, Mr Ngapera. She gave evidence of sustained family violence against her by Mr Ngapera for three years beforehand. This included undisputed evidence of:

(a)Mr Ngapera’s history of family violence:

(i)Mr Ngapera’s convictions for violence against a previous partner while drinking at home in 2012 and for threatening to kill another partner, in 2014;

(ii)16 Police callouts by Ms Ruddelle from 2015 to 2018, including three in 2015 and 2016 when she said he threatened to kill her, two in 2016 and 2017 when she said he…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Ruddelle

Details

AGLC: R v Ruddelle [2020] NZHC 272
Case: [2020] NZHC 272
Decision Date: 26 February 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand heard the case of The Queen versus Karen Anne Ruddelle, wherein the appellant was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter by a majority of the jury. The court was required to decide whether to grant bail to the appellant pending sentencing, taking into account the various factors relevant to the interests of justice. The court considered the evidence of the appellant's social entrapment in an ongoing pattern of harm from her deceased partner's violence, her remorse for the offending, and the possibility of a restorative justice process which could delay sentencing. The court also weighed the likelihood of a sentence of imprisonment and the risk the appellant posed to the safety of others.

The court found that the interests of justice favoured granting bail to the appellant on certain conditions. It noted that the jury appeared to have considered the appellant's actions to be in defence of herself or her son but with more force than was reasonable. The court could not rule out a sentence of home detention, but it remained a distinct possibility. The sentencing may also be delayed for a restorative justice process, in which both parties had expressed interest. The court accepted that the appellant's remorse for the offending was genuine and that she did not pose a risk to the safety of others. The court also took into account the fact that the appellant was caring for her 15-year-old son and there had been no breaches of the bail she was on leading up to or during the trial.

Accordingly, the court granted bail to the appellant on the conditions that she live at her home address, remain there on a 24-hour curfew, not consume alcohol or non-prescription drugs, report to probation, not associate with the deceased's whānau except as part of a restorative justice process, and appear in court for sentence. The court granted leave to either party to apply to vary these conditions.

The final orders of the court were that the appellant be granted bail on the aforementioned conditions, that restorative justice be considered, and that sentencing be deferred if necessary to allow for such a process. The court directed the Department of Corrections to report on any information relevant to a possible sentence of home detention and indicated it might hear a person called by the appellant under s 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002.

Orders