R v O'Brien
[2004] NZCA 58
•11 May 2004
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA348/03
THE QUEEN
v
JAY DEAN O'BRIEN
Hearing:23 March 2004
Coram:Chambers J
Laurenson J
Randerson JAppearances: Appellant in person
E M Thomas for Crown
Judgment:11 May 2004
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY RANDERSON J
Introduction
[1] Mr O’Brien appeals against his conviction and sentence in the District Court on a number of charges of theft, burglary and receiving stolen property.
[2] At the outset of his trial, Mr O’Brien pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary. Following trial he was found guilty of a further thirteen counts, the most serious of which related to the theft of two late model luxury motor cars. In all, Mr O’Brien was convicted on eight counts of burglary, one of attempted burglary, three of theft, one of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and two of receiving. All the offending was alleged to have occurred over the period November 2001 until 27 March 2002, which was the date of Mr O’Brien’s arrest following the execution of a search warrant at an address in Browns Road, Manurewa.
[3] During the search of the Browns Road address, the police located an M5 series BMW which had been taken from a motor vehicle dealer in Auckland on 15 March 2002. Thereafter, Mr O’Brien made a series of admissions to the police, including his involvement in the theft of the BMW and much of the other offending alleged against him.
[4] Mr O’Brien challenges the lawfulness of the search conducted at the Browns Road address and the admissibility of the evidence which flowed from that search including the admissions in his police statement.
[5] Judge Kerr heard evidence on an application under s 344A of the Crimes Act 1961 on 18 June 2003. He ruled that the search was lawful and the evidence admissible.
[6] Mr O’Brien’s trial took place in the week of 23 June 2003 before a jury with Judge Perkins presiding.
[7] On 7 August 2003 Mr O’Brien was sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment and was ordered to pay reparation of $80,000. He was also disqualified from driving for a period of two years.
The issues on appeal
[8] Mr O’Brien identified the following issues to be determined:
a)Whether Judge Kerr was correct to rule that the search conducted of the Browns Road address was lawful and the relevant evidence admissible;
b)Whether the officer in charge of the case (a Detective Isherwood) gave false evidence about the identity of an informant relied upon in the application for the search warrant;
c)Whether Detective Isherwood gave false evidence about the availability of a Constable Sean Boyd to give evidence at the s 344A hearing and the subsequent trial;
d)Whether Detective Isherwood gave false evidence in relation to a notebook which went missing during the court hearing;
e)Whether a Constable Scott Jones fabricated evidence to the effect that he was part of a surveillance team and was also present at the execution of the search of the Browns Road address;
f)Whether a miscarriage of justice resulted from the non-availability of a co‑accused (Mr Jared Frear) and his older brother Karl to give evidence;
g)Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, having regard to alleged disparity with the sentence imposed on Jared Frear.
Application to call further evidence
[9] In his notice of appeal, Mr O’Brien indicated that he wished to call further evidence on appeal from six police officers and four members of the Frear family. He did not pursue that application at the hearing, but we record that we would not have acceded to his request in any event. Four of the six police witnesses Mr O’Brien sought to call had already given evidence at Mr O’Brien’s trial, at which he was represented by experienced defence counsel. The other two officers were Detective Jones, who gave evidence at the s 344A application, and another detective, Jason Hewitt, whose name was mentioned during the s 344A application as one of the officers involved in the police operation. Mr O’Brien could have instructed his counsel to request the Crown to call those witnesses if he had wished to do so, or they could have been summoned to attend court to give evidence for the defence. No material was put forward to suggest that the evidence of these witnesses would be “fresh” in the sense that it would not have been available at the time of the hearing. Nor is there anything to suggest that their evidence would have been relevant or would have assisted Mr O’Brien’s case.
[10] As to the four members of the Frear family, the Crown accepts that it would not have been feasible to call Mr O’Brien’s co-accused Jared Frear because, while he had pleaded guilty, he had not been sentenced at the date of Mr O’Brien’s trial. In accordance with usual practice, the Crown does not call the evidence of a co‑accused until after sentence. Of course, if Mr O’Brien had considered that the evidence of Jared Frear would have been helpful to his case, he could have instructed his counsel to seek an adjournment of the trial so that Jared Frear could be called after his sentencing was complete. That course was not followed and there was evidence before the court that Jared Frear may not have been a willing witness in any event.
[11] The other members of the Frear family whom Mr O’Brien wished to call on appeal were Katrina, Shirley, and Karl Frear. These witnesses could have been called by Mr O’Brien if they had been summoned to do so. It follows that the evidence was available to be called at the time of the trial and it is now too late to call it on appeal. Mr O’Brien provided no material to indicate how the evidence of these witnesses might have assisted his case.
[12] Mr O’Brien also sought to introduce on appeal a transcript of radio conversations between certain officers involved in the surveillance of the Browns Road address prior to the execution of the search warrant. It will be convenient to deal with that material when addressing the lawfulness of the search.
First issue – the lawfulness of the search at the Browns Road address and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in consequence
[13] The material relevant to this issue includes the application for the search warrant sworn by Constable Boyd as well as evidence given before Judge Kerr at the hearing of the application under s 344A by Detectives Jones and Isherwood. Both were cross‑examined by Mr O’Brien’s counsel. No evidence was called at the s 344A hearing from or on behalf of Mr O’Brien.
[14] The evidence relied upon by Constable Boyd in the application for the warrant related to four stolen motor vehicles. The first was a Porsche taken on 24 January 2002. This vehicle was linked to Mr O’Brien because a police officer observed him driving the vehicle on 25 March 2002 and was able to identify Mr O’Brien as the driver. The second was the M5 series BMW taken on 15 March 2002. The third vehicle mentioned in the application for the search warrant was a maroon 3 series BMW taken on or about 16 March 2002. This vehicle was located on 23 March 2002 at an address in South Auckland as a direct result of information supplied by an informant whom Constable Boyd called “Snail”. The fourth vehicle was a 7 series BMW taken from a motor vehicle dealer’s showroom on 20 March 2002. It was located the following day at Auckland airport. Fingerprints taken from the vehicle were found to belong to Mr O’Brien’s co‑accused Mr Jared Frear.
[15] The application for the search warrant also included a substantial body of information which Constable Boyd swore was supplied to him by Snail. The information was very detailed. Snail named Mr O’Brien as the person responsible for multiple thefts of late model luxury cars, including the Porsche, the BMW M5 series and the BMW 3 series. Snail gave the South Auckland address at which the BMW 3 series was located. He was also aware that the BMW 7 series had been located and said the police would find the fingerprints belonging to Jared Frear. Importantly, Snail advised Constable Boyd that Mr O’Brien was living at 20B Browns Road, Manurewa and that the BMW M5 series was parked in the garage at that address. Constable Boyd swore that he had also spoken to Jared Frear who confirmed that Mr O’Brien was living at the stated address and that the BMW was in the garage.
[16] Constable Boyd disclosed in the warrant application that Snail was known to the police and gave details of his previous convictions. None of them involved offences of dishonesty. Other material, which is not relevant for present purposes, was included in the affidavit.
[17] At the time of the hearing before Judge Kerr, the police understood that Constable Boyd was not available to give evidence. He had left the police force for personal reasons some time after the events in question and was understood to be travelling overseas. Detective Constable Jones gave evidence in his place and confirmed that he was aware of the information that had been included in the application for the search warrant as he was a member of the police Car Squad which was investigating the matter. He explained to Judge Kerr that, to his knowledge, Constable Boyd was no longer in New Zealand and was somewhere in Europe. He said he did not know his precise location.
[18] In evidence, Detective Jones described the events which led to the execution of the search warrant on 27 March 2002. He confirmed that as a result of information received from Constable Boyd’s informant, the two of them went to the address in South Auckland where they located the BMW 3 series as advised. It is common ground that the address at which this BMW was located was at or near the family home of Jared Frear.
[19] The police then conducted enquiries to investigate the address at 20B Browns Road which had been given to them by the informant. An aerial photograph was obtained, as well as two maps ‑ one from the Manukau City Council and the other from police sources. These materials showed there were three adjoining properties: 20A, 20B and 20C. Armed with this information, Detective Jones said he and Constable Boyd carried out brief observations at the address on 26 March, the day before the warrant was executed. They viewed the property first from the road but could not see beyond the front house on the property. They noted that the driveway led to the left of the front house and appeared to lead towards the rear of the property. They also inspected the property on the same occasion from an adjoining park, but were only able to see the roofs of the houses. An inspection of the letter boxes did not help in identifying precisely which of the dwellings on the property was which.
[20] Detective Jones deposed that on the following evening, 27 March 2002, he and Constable Boyd went to the property again prior to the time the warrant was executed at 10 pm. They were in the back yard of the property and were observing the rear unit, which they believed to be number 20B. They were interested to see whether there was any activity at the property and whether they could see the BMW M5 series. Detective Jones deposed that while they were observing the property, they saw a vehicle arrive at the property and saw two people unloading items from the vehicle and placing them in the garage of the unit they were observing. They were not able to identify Mr O’Brien as one of the two persons.
[21] About five minutes later, they executed the search warrant. Mr O’Brien was found in the property which was formally occupied by a friend of his, a Mr Gunn, who was also present when the warrant was executed. The BMW M5 series was located in the garage of that address.
[22] It transpired that the address the officers had been observing and the unit at which the search warrant was executed was one of two units known as 20C Browns Road. Detective Scott confirmed in cross-examination that he believed the address they were observing was 20B Browns Road, as indicated in the application for the search warrant and in the warrant itself. He also confirmed that he had made inquiries with Mercury Energy but there was no electricity account holder for the address at number 20B.
[23] Detective Jones also confirmed that earlier on 26 March 2002 he was positioned with another officer further up Browns Road and late in the evening observed the BMW M5 leaving the subject address and accelerating away at high speed. They were not able to identify precisely which dwellinghouse the vehicle had come from, but they noted it had come from the driveway serving the units at 20B and 20C Browns Road.
[24] In relation to the informant Snail, Detective Jones said he understood he was an associate of Jared Frear. He added that Mr Gunn had confirmed to him after the warrant was executed that he was a close friend of Mr O’Brien’s who stayed with him on occasions.
[25] Detective Isherwood’s evidence related mainly to the execution of a search warrant at another address in Auckland city. The search of that address is not challenged on appeal. There was little in Detective Isherwood’s evidence which is relevant for present purposes.
[26] In his decision on the application under s 344A, Judge Kerr considered first the reliability of the informant Snail. He concluded that there was nothing to suggest that Snail was a co-offender with Mr O’Brien and that his reliability was supported by the accuracy of the information which led to the recovery of the BMW series 3 shortly before the execution of the warrant. On that basis, the Judge considered that Snail was not so unreliable that his evidence should be disregarded. On that basis, there was direct evidence from the informant, confirmed by the co‑accused Jared Frear, that Mr O’Brien was residing at the Browns Road address and that the BMW M5 series would be located there. The informant’s account of the matter was further crucially confirmed by two sightings of that BMW at or near the Browns Road address in the period immediately prior to the execution of the warrant.
[27] As to the confusion over the correct address, the Judge concluded:
In looking at that particular question, it seems clear enough that the dwelling house that was actually searched was the dwelling house which the police had in mind to search, although it was mis-described because it was described as B rather than C. So the dwelling house was located where the police expected to locate the dwelling house and the search was carried out accordingly.
[28] The Judge recorded that Mr O’Brien’s counsel had submitted that the evidence should be excluded on the grounds of unfairness and that no reliance was placed on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
[29] The Judge concluded that the mis-description of the property did not give rise to any unfairness and that even if it were an unlawful search in terms of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, he would not have ruled the evidence inadmissible on that account.
[30] We are satisfied that Judge Kerr was correct. We do not see any unlawfulness or unreasonableness in the search undertaken pursuant to the warrant and there is no basis upon which the evidence obtained should be excluded. We include in that respect not only the real evidence found at the address but also the admissions made subsequently by Mr O’Brien when he was interviewed by the police.
[31] There have been a number of previous cases where search warrants have been executed at addresses other than the premises described in the warrant. This court considered several examples in R v Kappely [2001] 1 NZLR 7, 12‑13. Much will depend on the circumstances in determining whether a search in such circumstances is nevertheless lawful and reasonable. We consider the present case was a simple mis‑description of the property which was readily understandable, given the multi‑unit development at the address. The police could not reasonably have obtained more accurate information than they had without alerting the occupiers to their enquiries. The evidence supported the conclusion reached by the Judge that the police believed they were executing the warrant at 20B Browns Road, as stated in the warrant. That was the property they had under investigation and the property at which they observed the BMW in the garage. They acted in good faith and did not realise the error until after the warrant was executed. There was sufficient material in the application for the search warrant both to support the reliability of the informant and to link Mr O’Brien to the identified address.
[32] We conclude that this ground of appeal must be rejected.
Second issue : Detective Isherwood’s evidence about the identity of Snail
[33] Mr O’Brien contended that the informant known as Snail was Karl Frear. Mr O’Brien’s point was that if Snail was Karl Frear then the reliability of Snail was put in question. Of course, this matter is only relevant to the application for the search warrant. It had no bearing on the trial itself.
[34] The issue was raised several times in the District Court, but it was never suggested to any of the police witnesses that Snail was Karl Frear. The matter came up first when Detective Jones was cross-examined at the s 344A hearing. It was then put to him that Snail was Jared Frear. Detective Jones said he was able to say it was not Jared Frear because the two were referred to quite separately by Constable Boyd. Then, during the trial itself, Constable Boyd was questioned by defence counsel before the jury. Constable Boyd confirmed that Snail had criminal convictions, which he detailed. He denied a suggestion put to him that Snail was a police officer.
[35] The matter did not go further before the jury but, in a voir dire on the fourth day of the trial (26 June 2003) both Constable Boyd and Detective Isherwood were questioned about a statement in Detective Isherwood’s notebook which referred to a discussion which he had with Karl Frear on 19 November 2002. It was recorded that Karl Frear had called a police 025 cellphone number which he had obtained from “one of my brother’s mates”. The notebook then went on to record what appeared to be a reference to Karl Frear having spoken to a “Detective Snail” at the Papakura Police Station. It was put to Constable Boyd that this suggested Snail was a detective at the Papakura Police Station. Constable Boyd explained that he had difficulty in getting across to the informant that the name Snail was simply a code name for the two of them to use. Constable Boyd’s evidence was that the informant remained under the false impression that he (Constable Boyd) was a Detective Snail. Constable Boyd went on to state that he was aware that Jared Frear knew the informant because he had spoken to both Jared Frear and the informant at the same time on the same cellphone.
[36] Detective Isherwood was then questioned on the same subject. He confirmed he had spoken to Jared Frear at the date indicated in his notebook. Jared Frear had told him that he had been making efforts to speak to the police. Jared told him that he had mentioned this to a friend who had been in contact with the police and spoken to a “Detective Snail”. Detective Isherwood said he found this very unusual and, upon checking, was satisfied that there was no “Detective Snail”.
[37] The evidence falls well short of identifying the informant Snail. There is nothing in the evidence before the court to suggest that Snail was Karl Frear or that any police officer gave false evidence about his identity. All that the evidence shows is that Jared Frear knew who the informant Snail was and that he was someone with whom Jared Frear was associated.
[38] We are not persuaded that this matter has any substance. It does not affect our conclusion about the reliability of the information included in the application for the search warrant, nor could it have affected a fair trial for the appellant.
Third issue : Alleged dishonesty by Detective Isherwood over the availability of Constable Boyd to give evidence
[39] This issue was also canvassed on several occasions in the District Court. We have already mentioned Detective Jones’ evidence before Judge Kerr on 18 June 2003 when he informed the Judge of Constable Boyd’s unavailability as he was understood to be somewhere in Europe.
[40] On the Thursday prior to the commencement of his trial, Crown counsel applied for Constable Boyd’s evidence to be admitted under the Evidence Amendment Act 1980 on the grounds that he was unavailable to give evidence. The court was informed that Constable Boyd had left the police and was understood to be in Europe, whereabouts unknown. The court was advised that Detective Isherwood had been unable to contact him, despite numerous attempts to do so.
[41] The following day (the Friday before trial) Constable Boyd unexpectedly contacted Detective Isherwood. It turned out he was in Samoa and would be returning to New Zealand early on Thursday 26 June during the week of the trial. When this became known, Detective Isherwood was questioned in a voir dire before Judge Perkins at the outset of the trial on Monday 23 June 2003. He confirmed that Constable Boyd had left the police and gone to Europe. He had been able to send a brief of evidence to Constable Boyd in Europe by Email and the brief was signed and posted back to him before depositions. He had kept sending him Emails, but without success, until he heard back from him on the Friday prior to trial. Prior to that he had been unable to obtain any response to Emails or, he believed, to telephone calls which he had made to a number given to him. He had not been aware that Constable Boyd was in Samoa, or that he was coming to New Zealand, until the Friday immediately before the trial.
[42] When Constable Boyd arrived in New Zealand, he gave evidence before the jury on 26 June 2003. In cross‑examination he confirmed he had left the police force on 2 August 2002 and had travelled to London. He confirmed Detective Isherwood’s evidence about the manner in which his brief of evidence was prepared and signed for depositions. Although he had an Email address, he said Detective Isherwood’s statement that he also given him a telephone number was not correct. He said he had not checked his Emails for some time because his laptop computer had been stolen at the same time as his British passport was stolen. It was only when he was in Samoa that he went into an Email cafe where he obtained access to an Email from Detective Isherwood informing him of the hearing date.
[43] Mr O’Brien expressed deep suspicions about this evidence, but there is no material before us to suggest that any of it was wrong or that any of the police officers involved gave false or misleading evidence. It may be that Detective Isherwood was mistaken about having a telephone number to contact Constable Boyd, but we do not regard that as material. Certainly, Constable Boyd was not available for the s 344A hearing, but he was questioned about the informant Snail when he came to New Zealand for the trial and nothing that was said on that occasion affects our conclusions about the validity of the search warrant. We observe that the police clearly wanted Constable Boyd to give evidence and, as soon as they discovered he was available, he was called to give evidence.
[44] In summary, we are not persuaded that there was any dishonesty over this issue, nor that there was any prejudice or unfairness from Mr O’Brien’s point of view.
Fourth issue : The missing notebook
[45] Detective Isherwood gave evidence in a voir dire during the course of the hearing on 26 June 2003. He stated he had become aware that morning that one of his two police notebooks had gone missing the day before. One of them was the notebook which had the note in it about his discussion with Karl Frear about “Detective Snail”. Detective Isherwood was plainly suspicious that the notebook had been taken by Mr O’Brien from the witness box during an adjournment. However, that was never substantiated.
[46] Mr O’Brien contended that his cell had been searched the day before (25 June), which suggested that Detective Isherwood had become aware that the notebook had gone missing the previous day and not on 26 June as he stated. There is no evidence to support Mr O’Brien’s contention in that respect. In any event, the issue is completely irrelevant. The jury was unaware of what had transpired and Detective Isherwood was questioned about the contents of the notebook. There could be no disadvantage to Mr O’Brien on that account.
Fifth issue : Was Constable Jones part of the surveillance team and was he present during the execution of the warrant at Browns Road?
[47] Mr O’Brien’s contention was that Constable Jones had fabricated his evidence on this subject, as already elaborated. He relied on a handwritten record prepared by a Constable Gollan of radio communications in the period leading up to and during the execution of the warrant. Mr O’Brien contended that because the transcript did not refer to Constable Jones, he could not have been present.
[48] We reject Mr O’Brien’s contention. The court had the detailed evidence of Constable Jones on this issue during the s 344A hearing. As well, Detective Isherwood’s evidence during trial was that those present, (apart from himself) were officers Jones, Boyd, Gollan and six others. Detective Isherwood’s evidence on that subject was not questioned, even though, by that stage, Mr O’Brien’s counsel had the relevant transcript (which, it should be recalled, was not disclosed to the defence at the time of the s 344A hearing). Constable Gollan also gave evidence at the trial and confirmed that Constable Jones was present when the warrant was executed. He was not cross‑examined on that point either.
[49] As well, the mere fact that Detective Scott’s name is not mentioned in the brief transcript of communications does not show he was not present. All it demonstrates is that there was no record of any radio communication by him during the course of the operation that evening.
[50] This ground for appeal is rejected accordingly.
Sixth issue : The non-availability of Karl and Jared Frear to give evidence
[51] This issue has already been canvassed when we dealt with the issue of whether Mr O’Brien should be permitted to call further evidence. Suffice to say that no adjournment was sought to enable their evidence to be adduced. Nor is there any evidence that their evidence would have been likely to have been helpful to Mr O’Brien. As well, Karl Frear’s evidence would likely have been limited to a charge of burgling the premises of Noel Leeming, a charge to which Mr O’Brien pleaded guilty. We also note the point made by Mr Thomas for the Crown that defence counsel managed to get evidence before the court of Jared Frear’s previous convictions and that he had pleaded guilty to some of the crimes alleged. That material was helpful to Mr O’Brien because it suggested that someone else had been responsible for the offending.
Seventh issue : Sentence appeal
[52] Mr O’Brien’s contention was that his sentence was manifestly excessive, having regard to the much lighter sentence imposed on his co-accused Jared Frear by the same Judge.
[53] Mr Frear pleaded guilty to thirteen counts of burglary and one of unlawful taking. He was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and granted leave to apply for home detention. In addition, he was ordered to pay reparation of $78,845.
[54] We accept Mr Thomas’ submission for the Crown that there were ample grounds to distinguish Jared Frear’s sentence from that of Mr O’Brien. First, Mr Frear was entitled to a substantial discount for a guilty plea. That benefit was not available to Mr O’Brien, except in respect of the two minor counts to which he pleaded guilty at the outset of his trial.
[55] Secondly, Mr O’Brien was always regarded as the principal offender.
[56] Thirdly, Mr O’Brien’s previous criminal history was far more serious than that of Mr Frear. His past convictions included violent offending, many convictions for dishonesty, a number involving the theft of motor vehicles, and dealing in both class A and B drugs. He had been in prison previously on a number of occasions. His last conviction for unlawful interference with a motor vehicle was in March 1999. Mr Frear, on the other hand, had only a handful of convictions on relatively minor charges over the period 1997 to 1999. He had not previously been imprisoned.
[57] Fourthly, in sentencing Mr O’Brien, the Judge accepted that Mr O’Brien was the prime motivator and that Mr Frear was under his influence. The Judge also noted that Mr Frear suffered from personality, medical, and psychological difficulties which made him an easy target for Mr O’Brien’s criminal influence.
[58] Fifthly, the Judge noted that Mr Frear had taken positive steps towards rehabilitation from addictions. The Judge considered Mr Frear had shown remorse and insight, whereas he did not believe Mr O’Brien had done so.
[59] The Judge considered that, in the circumstances, he was entitled to make what he described as “a radical distinction” between Mr O’Brien and Mr Frear in terms of sentencing.
[60] The Crown had sought a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. However, the Judge accepted the submission made by Mr O’Brien’s counsel that the offending was committed while Mr O’Brien was “on a chronic drug addicted spree”. He also accepted the submission made by Mr Cassidy as counsel that, in the overall context, a sentence in the range of four to five years would be appropriate.
[61] The Judge pointed out that significant damage had been done to premises and vehicles and that a large amount of property had been lost. He regarded the offending as serious and towards the upper end of criminality and culpability. He considered the offending to be premeditated, planned and sophisticated, and observed that it had occurred over a lengthy period. While there was co‑operation upon his arrest, it was not to the same extent as that afforded to the police by Mr Frear.
[62] For the reasons given, we have no hesitation in concluding that Mr O’Brien’s prison sentence was entirely appropriate and that there is ample justification for the disparity between his sentence and that of Jared Frear.
[63] The only aspect of the sentence which has given us cause for concern is the reparation order of $80,000. The Judge made reference to a reparation schedule, about which he said there was some agreement. He noted that, in respect of the balance, there would need to be civil remedies pursued.
[64] Inquiries made by Mr Thomas with counsel representing the Crown at both trial and sentencing, have revealed that the reparation schedule was prepared by the officer in charge. Although there was some agreement about the amount of the loss, there was no agreement about a reparation order and none was sought. The Crown accepts that Mr O’Brien has no means of meeting a reparation order. We also note that there was no reparation report under s 33 of the Sentencing Act. It is probable that the Judge made the order mistakenly believing it was agreed to.
[65] In the circumstances, the Crown consents to the reparation order being quashed and we agree it was inappropriate.
Result
[66] For the reasons given, the appeal against conviction is dismissed. The appeal against sentence is allowed, but only to the extent of quashing the reparation order.
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Tauranga
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