R v O

[2025] NZHC 2619

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS,

OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF DEFENDANT

PURSUANT TO S 200 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE PARAGRAPH [33(a)].

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF VICTIMS OR CONNECTED PERSONS A, C, D AND E PURSUANT TO S 202 OF THE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE PARAGRAPH [33(b)]

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S RELATIONSHIP TO A, B, C, D AND E PURSUANT TO SS 200 AND 202 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE PARAGRAPH 33(c)].

NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF ANY PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS WHO IS A COMPLAINANT IS PROHIBITED BY S 204 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CRI 2025-019-13

[2025] NZHC 2619

THE KING

v

O

Hearing:	6 August 2025
Appearances:	J Hamilton for the Crown R Barnsdale for O
Judgment:	9 September 2025

JUDGMENT OF HARVEY J

R v O [2025] NZHC 2619 [9 September 2025]

This judgment is delivered by me on 9 September 2025 at 2.15 pm.

……………………………… Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:
Hamilton Legal, Office of the Crown Solicitor, Hamilton

Counsel:
Richard Barnsdale, Barrister, Hamilton

Introduction

[1]    On 10 June 2025, O pleaded guilty to one charge of murder and two charges of attempted murder. On 3 September 2025, Powell J imposed life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of 23 years. I rely on the facts as set out in those sentencing notes.1 O has applied for permanent name suppression. Ms Hamilton for the Crown opposes name suppression for O but submits that permanent name suppression should be granted to the adult victim (A), the surviving child victim (B) and the deceased (C), and that their relationship with O should be suppressed.

[2]    B is entitled to automatic statutory suppression under s 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (CPA). As the Crown consents to permanent name suppression of A and C, those orders are now issued. This is appropriate under s 202(2)(d) of the CPA to prevent the identification of B given their close familial connections (A is B’s mother and C is B’s sibling) and the fact that B and C share a surname. The interest in preserving B’s statutory suppression and anonymity outweighs the limited public interest in disclosure of A and C’s identities.

[3]    The same considerations also apply to B’s two surviving siblings (D and E) identification of whom I consider would not be in the public interest and would likely lead to identification of B as they are her siblings and share her surname. So, I also order permanent name suppression over D and E under s 202(2)(d). The remainder of this judgment concerns whether O’s identity should also be suppressed.

O’s submissions

[4]    O’s application is made on the basis that he and his family have been threatened and he is concerned that, if his name or photograph is published, these threats will increase. On 15 July 2025, O affirmed an affidavit in support of his application for permanent name suppression where he stated:

…

2.I am the applicant for an order granting myself and my family permanent name suppression.

1      R v O [2025] NZHC 2545.

3.I am concerned my family of origin, including my siblings and my own nuclear family, including the other complainants, will be harassed.

4.Since I have been remanded in custody, I have received threats from gang members that I or my extended family will be harmed.

5.I was placed on Designated protective custody initially, but wrongly thought it was safe to leave this. I am now a segregated prisoner.

6.I have observed people examining my face to try [to] find identifying tattoos to help other people identify me.

7.I am scared that, if my name is published, I will be attacked everywhere I am placed. Further if the gangs can not get me, they will be motivated to attack my extended family.

[5]    Mr Barnsdale for O submitted that publication of O’s name is likely to cause extreme hardship,2 and highlighted O’s fear of being harassed. While noting this could be seen as a natural consequence of serving a prison sentence, counsel referred to the psychiatric reports of Drs Rush and Dean which identified important parts of O’s background. First, O told the report writers that as a child he suffered from physical, emotional and sexual abuse — that his father was extremely abusive, violent and had tried to kill him. O also claimed to have been kidnapped or held hostage twice when he was only eight and nine years old. Mr Barnsdale contended these personal difficulties constitute extreme hardship.

[6]    Second, O has a history of substance abuse, suicidal tendencies and psychiatric issues. Dr Dean diagnosed emotional dysregulation with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and alcohol use disorder. This included dysfunctional personality traits of schizotypal borderline and narcissistic types. While there had been a provisional diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, O did not demonstrate psychosis at his assessment. O’s emotional dysregulation and suicidal ideation also predates the offending, so his application must be assessed in the context of long-standing interpersonal, social and occupational difficulties alongside chronic suicidal ideation. The risks of suicidal ideation were manifest, according to Mr Barnsdale, following the events of 1 January 2025. After his offending, O may have stabbed himself in the throat and upper body areas at least 10 times. So, if ever there was evidence of a risk

2      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 200(2)(a).

of suicide, counsel submitted this is it. In which case, if O’s name is allowed to be published his fragile mental state would be threatened.

[7]    As to Ms Hamilton’s submission that permanent name suppression should only be granted for A, B and C, counsel contended this makes no sense. If O’s name is published, it would not be difficult to connect him to the victims, particularly in his local community. In addition, Mr Barnsdale made the point that protection of the public will be achieved by O’s prison sentence. Following that, the issue then falls within the purview of the Parole Board and their assessment of whether O will be fit to release and on what conditions.

Crown submissions

[8]    Ms Hamilton submitted that O’s evidence is insufficient to establish a nexus between publication and the risk of extreme hardship.3 His mental health conditions and diagnoses existed prior to the offending and during the prosecution. The evidence does not identify how publication would result in extreme hardship, nor does it provide information on how any risks would be ameliorated by name suppression or other alternatives. Counsel contended that no link has been drawn between O’s mental state and the effect of publication. Ms Hamilton also argued there are protective factors mitigating a risk of harm to the defendant within the prison environment and arrangements which could be made to support him with the disclosure of his identity.4 Counsel submitted that none of the consequences identified by O were extraordinary. Rather, for O’s application to succeed, Ms Hamilton contended, there must be something beyond the ordinary consequences associated with criminal proceedings.5

[9]    As to hardship to O’s family members, counsel contended that, apart from O’s bare assertions, there is no evidence of danger or harm to his family members and therefore the threshold under s 200(2)(c) or (e) is not met.6 The victims do not share O’s surname and this weighs against granting O suppression. Rather, the victims’ interests can best be achieved by suppressing their names and their relationship with

3      See Hawea-Edwards v R [2020] NZHC 3093; and R v Hart [2021] NZHC 1890.

4      See Hawea-Edwards v R, above n 3, at [37].

5      Robertson v New Zealand Police [2015] NZCA 7 at [49].

6      Compare with the evidence provided in Purutanga v R [2022] NZHC 2616 at [13].

O. Counsel also referred to the views of the victims. A supports O’s application for suppression as she is concerned about the impact on B and her siblings if name suppression is lifted. However, A acknowledged that many friends, family and associates already know about the events. Ms Hamilton also submitted that while victims’ views are important, they are not controlling and may be outweighed by the principle of open justice and the public interest.

[10]   Ms Hamilton argued the Court should exercise its discretion to decline O’s application. The seriousness and nature of the charges give rise to a strong public interest in the identification of O, which will be relevant to how people in future may deal with him — for example, within a personal relationship or regarding access to children in a domestic situation.7

Legal principles

[11]   The starting point is the principle of open justice. Counter-balancing factors identified in s 200(2) must be weighed against that principle and the underlying interests it serves.8 Section 200 requires a two-stage enquiry. First, the Court must determine whether one of the requirements in s 200(2) has been established: this is a jurisdictional test. The Court must be satisfied that publication of O’s details is likely:

(a)to cause O “extreme hardship”;9

(b)to cause any of the victims “undue hardship”;10

(c)to endanger the safety of any person;11 or

(d)to lead to the identification of another person whose name is suppressed by order or by law.12

7      Dean v R [2021] NZCA 293 at [12].

8      M (SC13/23) v R [2024] NZSC 29, [2024] 1 NZLR 83 at [44]; and see Erceg v Erceg

[2016] NZSC 135, [2017] 1 NZLR 310 at [2].

9      Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 200(2)(a).

10     Section 200(2)(c).

11     Section 200(2)(e).

12     Section 200(2)(f).

[12]   When conducting the first stage of the test, “likely” means there is a real and appreciable possibility of the specified consequence occurring.13 “Hardship” means “severe suffering or privation”, the qualifier “undue” indicates “something more” and the “extreme” is another degree further.14 “Extreme hardship” is a very high threshold which requires a contextual assessment and something beyond the ordinary consequences of publication.15

[13]   At the second stage, the Court exercises its discretion to determine whether permanent name suppression should be ordered. This involves weighing the competing interests of the defendant and victims against those of the public, taking into account such relevant matters as: the seriousness of the offending, whether the applicant has been convicted, the views of the victim16 and the public interest in knowing the character of the offender.17 The onus is on the applicant to displace the principle of open justice and satisfy the judge that suppression should be ordered.18

Stage one — The jurisdictional threshold

[14]   It is acknowledged that O has suffered and continues to suffer from a range of mental health conditions, including chronic suicidal ideation. It appears this has been exacerbated over time by various factors including alcohol abuse. However, I am not satisfied the evidence on this issue to date is sufficient to meet the test for extreme hardship under s 200(2)(a). Furthermore, although O may have suffered extreme hardship throughout his life (as raised by Mr Barnsdale above at [5]), this does not mean publication of his offending is, itself, an extreme hardship or likely to cause one.

[15]    There is insufficient expert evidence about how publication of O’s particulars will  impact  his  mental  health  to  the  necessary  degree.    I  have  considered     Mr Barnsdale’s submissions about O’s risk of suicide, including what may have been

13     Farish v R [2024] NZSC 65, [2024] 1 NZLR 223 at [27].

14     M (SC13/23) v R, above n 8, at [69].

15     Robertson v New Zealand Police, above n 5, at [49].

16     This is a mandatory consideration under s 200(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.

17     Robertson v New Zealand Police, above n 5, at [41], endorsed by M (SC13/23) v R, above n 8, at [35]–[39].

18     Robertson v New Zealand Police, above n 5, at [44].

an attempted suicide following the offending on 1 January 2025.19 However, there is an absence of expert evidence confirming a real or appreciable risk of suicidal behaviour while O is in the Department of Corrections’ custody as a consequence of publication rather than as a consequence of his underlying mental health conditions or of his offending.20 In addition, no evidence has been provided about why such risks would not be sufficiently monitored and addressed by Corrections.21

[16]   I have also taken account of O’s claim that there are risks of violence to himself and his family. As he confirmed in his affidavit filed in support of this application, O is now a segregated prisoner. While not eliminating risk to himself completely, it does reduce it. More importantly, there is no evidence, beyond O’s bare assertions, that there is any real or appreciable danger to himself or his family. In which case, he has not established a sufficient evidential basis for his belief that his or his family’s safety will be endangered by publication.22 The only aspect of this matter which raises a real concern is that publication of O’s identity could lead to the identification of the victims and, in particular, B. In which case, as in R v X, permanent name suppression for O could be warranted under ss 200(2)(f).23

[17]   There is uncertainty as to whether publication of O’s name will identify A, B, C, D or E because O has a different surname. However, O was a close family member and seemingly actively involved in their lives (O was living with all five). In which case, there is a real and appreciable risk that publication of his name will lead to their identification — especially in their local community — notwithstanding his differing last name.24 For similar reasons, there is a real and appreciable risk that any identification of A, C, D or E would also have the knock-on effect of leading to identification of B in breach of her automatic statutory suppression under s 204 — notably, B, C, D and E are siblings and share a last name. In this context, I consider the risk of undermining B’s name suppression is sufficient to meet the jurisdictional threshold under s 200(2)(f).

19     I note Powell J did not determine whether or not O’s injuries were self-inflicted or defensive: see

R v O, above n 1, at [13].

20     See King v Police [2020] NZHC 1213 at [24].

21     See O’Reilly v R [2019] NZCA 254 at [4], citing MS (CA405/16) v R [2016] NZCA 544 at [11].

22     Bitossi v R [2014] NZCA 595 at [8].

23     R v X [2016] NZHC 840 at [42]–[47].

24     Stuff Ltd v R [2021] NZCA 86 at [20], citing W (CA639/16) v R [2017] NZCA 580.

[18]   While  not  strictly  necessary  to   determine,  given  my   finding  regarding s 200(2)(f), I also consider that the risk of identifying B would cause her undue hardship under s 200(2)(c) — this is relevant to the Court’ discretionary exercise under stage two.25 I note that courts have adopted different positions on this issue. In Purutanga v R, despite a psychologist’s report which, among other topics, discussed the negative impacts of publication on the victim’s children, Lang J considered the relevant hardships were due to their family environment and the offending itself rather than publication.26 In contrast, the Court of Appeal in Stuff Ltd v R held that:27

… L's surviving child victim is still young, in a couple of years she will be starting school and if L's name is publicised there is a real prospect that her link to L (and the details of his offending) could become widely known in her school community. This would be a very significant burden for a young child to bear. This also, in our view, constitutes undue hardship.

[19]Then, the Court of Appeal in Dean v R held the effect of Stuff Ltd v R:28

… is plainly not that in every case of domestic violence causing death, permanent name suppression must be given to the defendant to protect other family members, in particular siblings of the deceased, from the usual consequences of publication of the name of the defendant.

[20]   The Court of Appeal went on to distinguish cases falling under s 203 as involving direct victimisation of the complainant in deeply distressing circumstances, noting that Parliament made a judgment in s 203 that in cases involving sexual offending, suppression ought to be standard practice. Whereas the Court noted in other cases there is a very strong public interest in naming violent offenders, primarily as a public safety consideration.29

[21]   After careful reflection, I find that the present case falls within the ambit of Stuff Ltd v R. B will be starting school in a few years and, as discussed above at [17], publication of O’s name risks B’s identity, her link to O and the details of the offending becoming widely known in B’s local and school communities. As in Stuff Ltd v R, I find this constitutes undue hardship on the facts of this case. Importantly, much like the Court of Appeal in Dean v R held with regards to s 203, I also consider that

25     Stuff Ltd v R, above n 24, at [22].

26     Purutanga v R, above n 6, at [16].

27     Stuff Ltd v R, above n 24, at [25].

28     Dean v R, above n 7, at [12].

29 At [12].

Parliament has decided in s 204 of the CPA that in cases involving child complainants, suppression ought to be standard practice. In the present case, the age and consequent vulnerability of B as a complainant, as recognised by Parliament in s 204, is a consideration that signals B’s identification is an undue hardship greater than that which inevitably follows publication in criminal proceedings involving adult complainants.30

Stage two — Judicial discretion

[22]   Stage two requires consideration of whether an order for name suppression should be made, balancing the principle of open justice against any applicable counterbalancing factors in s 200(2).31 I note the commonly expressed interests underlying the principle of open justice.32 I also accept that O has been convicted for extremely serious offending. I agree with the Crown that there is a very strong public interest in naming violent offenders like O so that those dealing them in future years have access to information as to their character.33 Given my findings under stage one, I must weigh the above considerations against the interest in protecting B’s automatic statutory suppression under s 204 and the undue hardship that would arise to her if her identity and her connection to O and the offending became known.

[23]   As noted in R v CD, when considering name suppression in criminal cases involving children, the child’s best interests shall be a primary consideration.34 Young persons are likely to suffer a greater degree of hardship from publication than adults because of their lesser maturity.35 This approach seeks to uphold art 3.1 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, which New Zealand ratified on       14 March 1993.36

30     See R v L [2017] NZHC 2256 at [41].

31     M (SC13/23) v R, above n 8, at [44].

32     See Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Criminal Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CPA200.01].

33     Dean v R, above n 7, at [12].

34     R v CD [2024] NZHC 52 at [5]–[6], citing DP (CA418/15) v R [2015] NZCA 476, [2016] 2 NZLR

306 at [10] and [23], and R v M [2018] NZHC 2212 at [21].

35     DP (CA418/15) v R, above n 34, at [23].

36     Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990).

[24]   The present case is finely balanced. On the one hand, alongside the factors discussed above, A has acknowledged that many friends, family and associates already know about the incident. O and B also do not share a surname. These factors reduce the risk that publication would undermine B’s suppression under s 204.

[25]   On the other hand, A supports suppression of O’s name for the benefit of B and her other children. While not determinative, this is an important mandatory consideration under s 200(6).37 It also distinguishes several other key cases. In Purutanga v R, the deceased’s family were “strongly opposed” to suppression for  Mr Purutanga.38 Likewise, in Dean v R, Mr Dean and his partner remained in a relationship despite his offending and this raised an inference that suppression was sought on his behalf rather than for his family.39 No evidence has been provided in the present case to support such an inference and A’s statement to Police was clear that she supported suppression for the benefit of her children, including B.

[26]   I also note that although many family, friends and associates know about the incident, the wider bell of publicity has not yet been rung. This distinguishes it from Dean v R where the name of the defendant had already been reported by the media.40 Whereas, in the present case, suppression of O’s particulars may have a significantly more than marginal effect and benefit for B. Most importantly, the application of s 204 in this case distinguishes it from Purutanga v R, Dean v R and even Stuff Ltd v R. As discussed above and in R v L, s 204 raises a presumption of vulnerability.41 This makes the case analogous to R v X in which the Court granted suppression under ss 200(2)(f) in similar circumstances. Heath J held that a suppression order “will generally be made if the Court is satisfied that publication would be likely to lead to the identification of someone whose name is suppressed by law.”42

[27]   However, in R v X the defendant did not pose a risk to society (provided she was properly treated).43 Here there is an obvious argument that publication of O’s

37     R v Kealey (2001) 18 CRNZ 602 (CA) at [13].

38     Purutanga v R, above n 6, at [14].

39     Dean v R, above n 7, at [16].

40     Dean v R, above n 7, at [3] and [14].

41     R v L, above n 30, at [41].

42     R v X, above n 23, at [43].

43 At [23].

identity is needed to promote public safety as O may well pose a real risk to the public. Ms Hamilton emphasised that members of the public who might deal with O in future should be fully informed about his true character.44 Even so, this argument must be considered in light of Powell J’s sentence. O is to serve an MPI of 23 years. During this time, the public are largely protected from dealing with O and any consequent risks from doing so. The need for them to be fully informed about his character for their own protection is much diminished. Like R v X, I consider O will not pose a significant risk to the public at large while serving his MPI. As in R v X and in light of all the factors discussed, I consider little public interest will be served by publication of O’s name during such a period when weighed against B’s interests in suppression

— her interests being the primary consideration (see above at [23]).

[28]   On the other hand, once O completes his MPI then the issue of public safety will dramatically increase in importance. O will become eligible for parole and, upon release, may have future dealings with members of the public giving rise to potential public safety risks. In addition, by this time B will have grown into an adult and will be better able to cope with the implications of publication. Once she passes the age of 18, her interests will no longer be a primary consideration.45

[29]   In summary, I exercise my discretion under stage two to grant O interim name suppression per s 200(2)(f) of the CPA until 1 September 2041. By this date, B will be 18 years old.46 O will also be nearing the completion of his MPI. The lapse of suppression at this date will permit the public to be informed of O’s true character well in advance of any possibility of release, thereby promoting public safety. Moreover, it will provide a window for any publicity to subside before O’s MPI expires. This may assist with O’s potential rehabilitation into society if granted parole. It also separates the event of publication from the event of O’s MPI expiring, which gives B and her family time to process the former before dealing with the latter. Lastly, this order is consistent with the approach taken in R v L in which interim name suppression was granted for the defendant until after the complainant turned 18 years of age.47 The complainant in that case also had automatic statutory suppression under s 204.

44     Dean v R, above n 7, at [12].

45     Although, I note her automatic statutory suppression under s 204 would continue.

46     To preserve B’s anonymity, I have not selected her actual birthday.

47     R v L, above n 30, at [49]–[52].

[30]   I acknowledge that the interim name suppression granted to O is much longer (being approximately 16 years) than that granted in R v L. However, the principles remain the same: while B remains a vulnerable child complainant entitled to automatic suppression under s 204, the risk of her being inadvertently identified through publication of the defendant’s name should be minimised. Once B turns 18, O’s suppression should prima facie lapse as the need to prioritise and secure B’s anonymisation under s 204 diminishes48 and the importance of public safety considerations substantially increases so as to outweigh the counterbalancing factors under s 200(2)(f) and (a).

[31]   The suppression granted to O is solely for the benefit of the victims. Should B (or the victims more generally) no longer support suppression for O, this would amount to a change of circumstance warranting a review of the suppression orders in this judgment.49 This may not be determinative depending on B’s age at the time, but it may well be persuasive given the finely balanced nature of this case.50

Decision

[32]O’s application for permanent name suppression is declined.

[33]The following ancillary orders are now issued:

(a)O is granted interim name suppression until 1 September 2041. This includes a prohibition on the publication of any photograph of X.51

(b)A, C, D and E are granted permanent name suppression.52

(c)The relationship between O and A, B, C, D and E is permanently suppressed.

Harvey J

48     Although, again, I note B’s own name suppression would continue under s 204.

49     Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 208(3); R v Hendriks [2018] NZCA 447 at [4]; and

R v Rivers-Awarau [2019] NZCA 505.

50     See R v L, above n 30.

51     See Lee v R [2024] NZHC 2073 at [51]; and Downs (ed), above n 32, at [CPA200.16].

52     An order is not necessary in relation to B as she has automatic statutory suppression under s 204.