R v Manuel

[2023] NZHC 1304

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE

CRI 2023-088-840

[2023] NZHC 1304

THE KING

v

BRONSON MANUEL

Hearing:

29 May 2023

Appearances:

M Smith for the Crown

C Taylor for the defendant

Judgment:

29 May 2023

Reasons:

29 May 2023

REASONS JUDGMENT OF CAMPBELL J

[Name Suppression]

These reasons for judgment were delivered by me on 29 May 2023 at 3.30 pm

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

R v B MANUEL [2023] NZHC 1304 [29 May 2023]

[1]    Mr Bronson Manuel is charged, together with his brother Mr Samson Manuel, with murdering Shayden Perkinson in Whangarei on 15 April 2023. Mr Bronson Manuel has interim suppression of name, though his brother does not. Mr Bronson Manuel applied for suppression to continue through to trial.

[2]    Mr Bronson Manuel’s application was opposed by the Crown, by Mr Dinsdale (of the Northern Advocate) and by Mr Perkinson’s whānau. At the end of the hearing, I dismissed the application, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

Governing principles

[3]    Suppression of a defendant’s name or identifying particulars is governed by   s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Relevantly, this provides:

200     Court may suppress identity of defendant

(1)A court may make an order forbidding publication of the name, address, or occupation of a person who is charged with, or convicted or acquitted of, an offence.

(2)The court may make an order under subsection (1) only if the court is satisfied that publication would be likely to—

(a)cause extreme hardship to the person charged with, or convicted of, or acquitted of the offence, or any person connected with that person; or

(b)cast suspicion on another person that may cause undue hardship to that person; or

(c)cause undue hardship to any victim of the offence; or

(d)create a real risk of prejudice to a fair trial; or

(e)endanger the safety of any person; or

(f)lead to the identification of another person whose name is suppressed by order or by law; or

(g)prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences; or

(h)prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand.

(3)The fact that a defendant is well known does not, of itself, mean that publication of his or her name will result in extreme hardship for the purposes of subsection (2)(a).

…

[4]    Section 200 requires a two-step inquiry. The first step is whether one of the threshold grounds in s 200(2) has been met. If one is met, the second step is whether, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, a suppression order ought to be made.1

[5]    As to the first step, one of the threshold grounds must be “likely”. “Likely” means, in this context, that there is at least an “appreciable risk”, one that “must not be fanciful and cannot be discounted”, that publication will lead to one of the outcomes specified in s 200(2).2

[6]    The second step of the s 200 inquiry requires a balancing of relevant considerations in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Before a suppression order can be made, the balance must “clearly favour” suppression.3

The grounds of Mr Bronson Manuel’s application

[7]    Mr Manuel relied on the grounds set out in s 200(2)(a) and (e): that publication would be likely to cause extreme hardship to Mr Manuel or persons connected with him or would endanger the safety of any person.

[8]    Mr Manuel filed an affidavit in support from his partner, Ms Dereney Scott. Ms Scott deposed that since Mr Manuel was charged, she and her tamariki have been extremely fearful for their safety. She explained the basis for this fear. The door to her house in Whangarei had been kicked in. This occurred after she and her whānau had relocated from Whangarei. In her new location, her car window was smashed while she was at a supermarket. She believes these acts were in retribution for what her partner and his brother allegedly did.

[9]    Ms Scott has also received threats over social media. She annexed screenshots of some of these threats.

1      D v Police [2015] NZCA 541 at [10].

2      R v W [1998] 1 NZLR 35 (CA) at 39–40 (interpreting ss 139 and 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985), referred to with implicit approval in Huang v Serious Fraud Office [2017] NZCA 187 at [9]; D v Police [2015] NZCA 541 at [30](a).

3      D v Police [2015] NZCA 541 at [12].

[10]   Ms Scott said that she was aware that Mr Manuel’s name was already known because of what was being said on social media. She said her concern was that the threats of retribution would increase if Mr Manuel’s name was published.

[11]   Mr Taylor, counsel for Mr Manuel, candidly acknowledged that in some respects the horse had already bolted, given that the social media posts showed that in the Whangarei community the identity of Mr Manuel is already known. He also acknowledged that the threats to Ms Scott had been occurring while Mr Manuel enjoyed interim name suppression. He submitted that, nonetheless, if name suppression did not continue there would be increased public knowledge and thereby an increase in the risk to the safety of Mr Manuel and his whānau.

Would publication be likely to cause extreme hardship or endanger the safety of any person?

[12]   The phrase “extreme hardship” connotes a very high level of hardship. The Court of Appeal explained why in Robertson v Police:4

The word “hardship” on its own means “severe suffering or privation”. The addition of the qualifier “undue” in s 200(2)(c) indicates that something more than hardship simple is required, while the word “extreme” in s 200(2)(d) indicates something more again.

[13]   Assessing whether publication of Mr Manuel’s name would be likely to cause “extreme hardship” requires a comparison between the contended hardship and the typical consequences associated with a defendant’s name being published.5

[14]   I am not satisfied that publication of Mr Manuel’s name would be likely      to cause extreme hardship either to Mr Manuel or members of his whānau. It is unfortunate that some members of the community are threatening retribution. But that is occurring with name suppression currently in place. The information vacuum created by a suppression order is sometimes filled by ill-informed and one-sided speculation, whether on social media or otherwise. The threats made in this case may reflect that. In any event, there is no reason to think that these threats would increase if suppression were lifted. I consider that, if anything, responsible and balanced

4      Robertson v Police [2015] NZCA 7 at [48].

5      Robertson v Police [2015] NZCA 7 at [49]; X v R [2020] NZCA 387 at [42].

reporting of this case by  media organisations is more likely to lead to a reduction    in such threats.

[15]   For the same reasons, I am not satisfied that publication of Mr Manuel’s name would be likely to endanger his safety or the safety of members of his whānau.

[16]   Mr Manuel has not established one of the threshold grounds in s 200(2), so it is not necessary for me to consider the balancing exercise in s 200.

Result

[17]   For these reasons, I declined Mr Manuel’s application for continued name suppression. Mr Taylor gave no indication that an appeal would be filed. Mr Manuel’s interim name suppression accordingly lapsed.

Campbell J