R v Lyttelton - [2016] NZHC 1042

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI-2008-044-009465 [2016] NZHC 1042

THE QUEEN

v

MARTIN VICTOR LYTTELTON

Hearing: 18 May 2016

Appearances:

S McColgan for the Crown
Defendant in person
M Gibson as amicus curiae

Judgment:

18 May 2016

JUDGMENT OF ASHER J
(on request for disputed facts hearing,

and on application of s 79 of the Parole Act 2002)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Auckland.
M Gibson, Auckland.

Copy to: Defendant

R v LYTTELTON [2016] NZHC 1042 [18 May 2016]

Introduction

[1] Mr Lyttelton appears before me today for sentence. In this ruling I need to deal with two preliminary matters that will not form part of the essential sentencing reasoning. For this reason I am issuing a separate ruling on the two points, although aspects of what I say may appear in the sentencing.

Adjournment

[2] Since the conclusion of the trial I have received well in excess of 10 submissions on various points relating to the sentencing. Mr Lyttelton’s submissions have included a document headed “Defendant’s submissions for a proof of facts hearing under s 24 of the Sentencing Act 2002”.

[3] In conferences discussing the pending sentencing hearing Mr Lyttelton has at times appeared to disavow a wish for such a s 24 hearing.1 But today, the day I am to impose sentence, he has towards the end of his oral submissions made it clear that he does seek a form of disputed facts hearing and wishes this sentencing to be adjourned so that this may take place.

[4] In his very detailed submissions he takes issue with a large number of factual matters. Some of these reflect the defence that he put forward at the trial, and some of them are matters of detail. I do not propose setting out all of the disputed factual matters that he raises. In general terms it can be said that he now invites me to conclude that at least in part Mr Ord perjured himself when he gave evidence at the trial on how the facts unfolded once he had entered the home. He also submits that the original Police summary of facts was misleading, that the Crown has misled the Court in its sentencing submissions, and that relevant facts have been suppressed by
the Police. He has relied on past Law Commission reports,2 and an article by

Professor Hall.3

1      R v Lyttelton HC Auckland CRI-2008-044-009465, 3 May 2016 [Minute (No 22)].
2      Law Commission Proof of Disputed Facts on Sentence (R76, 2001).
3      Geoff Hall “Proof of Facts: a New Zealand Perspective” (unpublished paper).

[5] The Crown opposes any adjournment and submits that I am in a position to determine all relevant facts having heard the evidence at the trial, and having the benefit of the jury verdicts.

[6] Mr Gibson, amicus curiae, has made no submission on this point.

[7] Section 24(1) provides:

24 Proof of facts

(1) In determining a sentence or other disposition of the case, a court—

(a) may accept as proved…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Lyttelton

Details

AGLC: R v Lyttelton [2016] NZHC 1042
Case: [2016] NZHC 1042
Decision Date: 18 May 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Lyttelton, the defendant, Martin Victor Lyttelton, was convicted of multiple charges, including murder and attempted murder. The case came before the High Court of New Zealand for sentencing. The primary issues in this case were whether there should be an adjournment for a disputed facts hearing under section 24 of the Sentencing Act 2002 and whether section 79 of the Parole Act 2002 should apply to the sentencing process.

The court examined whether a disputed facts hearing was necessary. The defendant argued for such a hearing, contending that several factual matters, including the credibility of witnesses and the accuracy of police reports, were disputed. The Crown opposed this, arguing that the court had sufficient evidence from the trial to make factual determinations. The court concluded that the facts of the case were clear and that the defendant's disputes were either resolved by the jury verdicts or could be assessed based on the evidence presented at trial. The court found that it was not necessary to adjourn for a disputed facts hearing as the evidence was sufficient for the court to reach a conclusion on the facts.

The second issue was whether section 79 of the Parole Act should be applied to the sentencing process. The defendant and his amicus curiae argued that if the new sentence exceeded the previous sentence, the defendant should not return to prison as the start date of the new sentence should be the start date of the original sentence, which had already been served. The Crown argued that this interpretation of section 79 was incorrect and that the calculation of time served was a matter for the Parole Board, not the court. The court agreed with the Crown, determining that section 79 was intended to set a start date for the calculation of time served and did not apply to the scenario where the new sentence exceeds the original sentence. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not bound to direct that the defendant should not return to prison if the new sentence exceeded the original sentence.

In conclusion, the court denied the request for an adjournment for a disputed facts hearing and ruled that section 79 of the Parole Act did not apply to the sentencing process in this case.

Orders