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R v Lucas-Edmonds

R v Lucas-Edmonds

Case [2009] NZCA 193 21 May 2009

Sentencing

Mens Rea & Intention

Unconscionable Conduct

Frustration of Contract

Risk to Community

Criminal Law

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA585/2008
[2009] NZCA 193
THE QUEEN
v
TRISTAN LUCAS-EDMONDS
Hearing:11 May 2009

Court:Ellen France, Priestley and Miller JJ
Counsel:R M Gould for Appellant

T Epati and B Charmley for Crown

Judgment:21 May 2009 at 10.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The appeal is allowed.
BThe sentence of five years four months imprisonment imposed in the Wellington District Court on 22 August 2008, and the imposition of a minimum term of imprisonment, are quashed.
CA sentence of four years eight months imprisonment is substituted.

D        The other concurrent sentences imposed by the Judge remain unaltered.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Priestley J)
The appeal
[1]       This appeal raises difficult and perplexing issues relating to the sentencing of offenders who, although not covered by specific provisions of mental health and treatment statutes, are nonetheless significantly impaired. The interface between culpability and diminished responsibility is perplexing for sentencers.
[2]       Judge Barry sentenced the appellant on three charges of arson and one charge of burglary in the Wellington District Court on 22 August 2008. The lead arson charge attracted an end sentence of five years and four months. Other terms of imprisonment were concurrent. The Judge also imposed a minimum term of imprisonment of one half of the sentence (two years eight months imprisonment). The appeal challenges both the lead sentence and the minimum term.
Background
[3]       At the time of his offending the appellant was aged 22. Over the previous six years he had accumulated 19 convictions for burglary, 14 for wilful damage, and eight for being unlawfully on premises.
[4]       We say more about his mental state later. His life was effectively blighted from birth. His mother abused alcohol and substances during her pregnancy and abandoned the appellant when he was four weeks old. He was undoubtedly the victim of foetal alcohol syndrome. Child Youth and Family files and computer records exceed 1,300 pages. Short terms of imprisonment imposed have not brought about any discernible modification in his behaviour.
[5]       Early on an April evening in central Wellington in 2008 the appellant, who had not previously committed crimes of this seriousness, had been sniffing glue. He used glue as an accelerant for two of the three fires he lit. All three fires were lit within a 45-minute period.
[6]       The first fire involved plywood board which had been erected to block pedestrian access to an overbridge. Having set fire to the board, the appellant extinguished it with his shoe. Nonetheless, the plywood board was burnt and charred. A fire crew was despatched.
[7]       The second fire involved a mattress stored in an open garage underneath a residential apartment in Te Aro. The fire to the mattress quickly took hold. The appellant stood nearby, watching the conflagration. The apartment above the garage was occupied by three people at the time, who fled from the apartment when they noticed heat and smoke coming…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Lucas-Edmonds

Details

AGLC: R v Lucas-Edmonds [2009] NZCA 193
Case: [2009] NZCA 193
Decision Date: 21 May 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, the case of R v Lucas-Edmonds involved the appellant, Tristan Lucas-Edmonds, who was appealing against his sentence imposed by the Wellington District Court. The appellant was convicted on three charges of arson and one charge of burglary. The primary issues the court had to decide were whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and whether the imposition of a minimum term of imprisonment was appropriate.

The court examined the appellant's background, including his history of abuse, neglect, and substance abuse, which significantly impaired his mental state. The court noted that the appellant had pleaded guilty early and expressed remorse, which warranted some discount on the sentence. However, the court was concerned about the appellant's persistent offending and the danger he posed to the community.

The court concluded that the sentence of five years and four months imprisonment was manifestly excessive. The court determined that a more appropriate starting point for the sentence should have been seven years, considering the appellant's culpability and persistent offending. The court also found that the imposition of a minimum term of imprisonment would delay the appellant's access to necessary treatment, and thus, the minimum term was quashed.

The court substituted the sentence of five years and four months with a sentence of four years and eight months on the lead charge of arson to the church. The other concurrent sentences for the burglary and the other two arson charges remained unaltered. The court's decision aimed to balance the need for deterrence and community protection with the appellant's significant mental impairments and the urgent need for treatment.

Orders