R v Jetson
[2025] NZHC 1022
•30 April 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2017-009-002687
[2025] NZHC 1022
THE KING v
CYLE ROBERT JETSON
Hearing: 30 April 2025 Appearances:
D Elsmore for Crown
K J Gray and J M Grainger for Defendant
Sentencing notes:
30 April 2025
REDACTED SENTENCING NOTES OF EATON J
R v JETSON [2025] NZHC 1022 [30 April 2025]
Introduction
[1] Cyle Jetson, you appear for sentence today having pleaded guilty to the murder of Pierclaudio Raviola.1
Factual background
[2] The facts of your offending have been captured in a prosecution summary of facts that you admit and accept as providing the essential foundation for assessing your culpability. I know the facts will be very familiar now to you, but sentencing is a public process, and it is important that I refer to those facts in open court.
[3] It is also important, particularly for those members of the media present, that I make it clear that any reference to the role of M in the offending is suppressed from publication in order to preserve her fair trial right.
[4] At the time of the offending back in March 2017, you were 20 years old and in a relationship with M who was then aged 15. Moses Hurrell was aged 16 in March 2017 and is Debra Tihema’s nephew.
[5] In the months leading up to the offending, Debra Tihema formed a relationship with Mr Raviola.
[6] Debra Tihema owed a debt and created a plan to rob Mr Raviola of his car in order to pay that debt. In the afternoon of 23 March 2017, Debra Tihema gathered you, M and Moses at her house to discuss the plan and ask the three of you to assist her in robbing the victim of his car.
[7] That evening, Debra Tihema invited Mr Raviola to visit her at her home address in Bromley, Christchurch. He arrived at her address as planned, and after an initial discussion he followed Debra to her bedroom. You and the other offenders, that is M and Moses, were hiding in the bedrooms at the property.
1 Crimes Act 1961, ss 66, 167, 168 and 172; maximum penalty life imprisonment.
[8] Once in Debra’s bedroom, there was an altercation between Mr Raviola and Debra Tihema. Angry shouting could be heard coming from her room. Moses entered the bedroom and punched the victim twice in the head. He then kicked him in the stomach. M had entered the bedroom, and she too began kicking Mr Raviola.
[9] You heard shouting coming from the bedroom and, believing that your co-offenders could not knock Mr Raviola out, you entered the room to assist. When you entered that room, Mr Raviola was on the floor. You punched him to the side of the head. You kicked him. He tried to get up and you punched him again, to the side of the head at least twice. Your blows knocked him out.
[10] You and Moses left the room. It is the Crown case that M stayed in the bedroom and began bashing Mr Raviola in the head with a shotgun stock. The shotgun stock had been introduced by Debra earlier in the assault when she had struck Mr Raviola in the head. It is accepted that you were not present when the weapon was used. It was the blows to Mr Raviola’s head with the shotgun stock that were the cause of his death. He did not die at the scene.
[11] You and your co-offenders taped his hands and feet with masking tape and carried his unconscious body from the address and placed him in the rear of his Toyota vehicle. You and Moses then drove Mr Raviola to a carpark in Sumner where he was dumped.
[12] It is accepted that enroute to Sumner, you told Moses that you should take Mr Raviola to hospital but that did not occur.
[13] While you and Moses were dumping Mr Raviola in Sumner, M and Debra remained at the scene address and set about cleaning up. You and Moses returned to the scene. And then together with Moses and M, you drove to Mr Raviola’s home address in Phillipstown. Using a key that had been taken from him, the three of you entered his home address and stole items of value including jewellery and electronic devices, none of which you personally kept.
[14] Mr Raviola was found and admitted to Christchurch Public Hospital on 23 March in a critical condition. He remained in a coma with significant head injuries that included several fractures to his skull and a swollen brain. He underwent several surgical procedures, and he remained in a coma until he died three days later.
[15] When spoken to by the police, you initially admitted your part in the assault but later denied any part, admitting only to assisting in removing Mr Raviola from the property and dumping him in Sumner.
Victim impact statements
[16] You faced trial in relation to the charge of murder in this Court in 2020. Following a guilty plea on your burglary charge and being found guilty on a charge of murder by jury trial, you were sentenced, and victim impact statements were then prepared. I have read those statements again for the purpose of today’s sentencing. They were provided by Mr Raviola’s former partner and two of her children. It is important to reflect on the consequences for those people of your actions.
[17] It is clear that Mr Raviola’s death had a significant impact on his former partner and children. She ended up taking a year off work because of the stress she suffered as a result of the murder. The reports I have read describe Mr Raviola as a man who was always interested in what his partner’s children were up to, and in the words of the children, he is described as “a warm and inviting kind of guy, one of the nicest guys I have ever met. Someone who is badly missed”. It is clear that he was a good-natured man and certainly not anybody who deserved to be treated as he was treated by you and your co-defendants.
Procedural history leading to guilty plea
[18] As I say, you faced trial in this Court in 2020. You were found guilty and you were sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years. You were sentenced to a concurrent term of six months’ imprisonment for the burglary.
[19] On 17 November 2023, the Supreme Court quashed your conviction for murder. You were later released on electronically monitored (EM) bail. Your retrial was scheduled to proceed in this Court on 3 March 2025. You were to face a retrial with M, whose conviction had also been independently quashed by the Supreme Court. M’s trial was adjourned following a fitness to plead determination and I directed that your trial should proceed regardless.
[20] The week before your trial was to commence, Ms Elsmore, for the Crown, and Ms Gray, on your behalf, sought an informal indication from the Court as to whether, if you were to plead guilty to the charge of murder on the basis of an agreed summary of facts and in reliance on caselaw that has arisen since you were first sentenced, that you would not be sentenced to life imprisonment on your plea of guilty.
[21] The agreed legal basis for the charge of murder was under s 168(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 (felony murder). Your personal culpability was agreed to be as a party under s 66(2) of that Act.
[22] The most significant shift in the agreed facts, that differs from the situation when you faced trial and were previously sentenced, was that it is no longer alleged that you had knowledge of the presence of the weapon and no longer alleged that you were in the bedroom when the weapon was used.
[23] In light of that agreed position, as regards the charge, your personal culpability and the facts, and having particular regard to your age at the time, both Crown counsel and your counsel were unified in their submission to the Court that it would be manifestly unjust for you to be sentenced to life imprisonment. I agreed with that position, and I indicated to you that if you were to plead guilty to the charge of murder, I would not sentence you to life imprisonment. You entered a guilty plea later that same day.
Personal circumstances
[24] Mr Jetson, you are now aged 28. You are the father to three children. You enjoy the support, in particular, of your mother, and you have a partner. You have spent most of your twenties in prison as a result of your original conviction. You
realistically acknowledge that you will remain in prison until the Parole Board determines that you should be released.
[25] I have considered a number of reports that are personal to you that are relevant in determining the appropriate sentence. That includes:
(a)a report of clinical psychologist Simon Adamson dated 19 August 2019;
(b)a clinical psychologist report by Jon Nuth dated 25 October 2019;
(c)a cultural report dated 1 August 2020;
(d)a pre-sentence report dated 7 April 2025; and
(e)an AOD report dated April 2025.
[26] The reports refer to the lack of positive role models in your upbringing and the trauma of having your father die suddenly when you were seven years old. They explain you have Māori whakapapa, and you have been disconnected from that part of your heritage. You refer particularly to your maternal grandfather whom you describe as a “racist” or an “an old school skinhead”. The reports tell me you experimented with alcohol and drugs from the age of eight, moving to harder drugs including methamphetamine as you got older. Inevitably, you dropped out of school early. It seems likely that your drug and alcohol abuse contributed to the cognitive impairment which has been identified by Dr Nuth. You are assessed as having borderline to below average intellectual ability, and a particular weakness in the area of verbal comprehension. As Ms Gray, on your behalf, has submitted it is that combination of factors which may have triggered your limited coping strategies, leading you to engage in poor decision-making, including getting involved in this offending.
[27] The reports tell me you had a negative peer association from around age 11, and worryingly, as I have discussed with your counsel, the pre-sentence report tells me that you became a patched member of a gang last year. You expressed that you are
now looking to leave the gang, but, and I understand the reasons why, you say the process of departure is a deterrent to leaving the gang.
[28] You have managed to hold down jobs and complete courses in the past. You successfully acquired qualifications in traffic control which led to you working in traffic management and it was only a diagnosis of epilepsy that prevented you from continuing that. You have told the report writers that you have an interest in learning about your whakapapa and your culture.
[29] The pre-sentence report writer records you did not initially feel remorse and were more focussed on self-preservation, but says your remorse became prevalent 10 months after the offending, including anger at yourself for being involved in taking someone else’s life. The report writer recommends custodial rehabilitative treatment for both violence and alcohol and drug use and tells me that you are motivated to embark on that course of rehabilitation.
Sentencing purposes and principles
[30] In sentencing you today, Mr Jetson, a number of purposes of sentencing are engaged. That includes holding you accountable for the harm you have done not only to Mr Raviola and his family but to the broader community. The purpose is to promote in you a sense of responsibility for and acknowledgment of that harm, to denounce your conduct and to deter you from committing the same or similar offences but also to assist you in your rehabilitation and reintegration.
[31] No one sentence can serve all those purposes and I will endeavour to explain why the sentence that I have decided should be imposed is one that I consider balances those sentencing purposes.
[32] The law requires a Judge to impose a sentence of life imprisonment on an offender who is convicted of murder unless that sentence would be manifestly unjust.2 And having imposed a life sentence, the court must also impose a minimum period of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.3 Those provisions recognise the sanctity of
2 Sentencing Act 2002, s 102(1).
3 Section 103.
life. However, more recently the Court of Appeal has held that where there is a combination of youth and other mitigating factors, a sentencing judge may be able to step back from a life sentence, that is find that a life sentence would be manifestly unjust and impose a finite sentence.4 That will be particularly so where an offender can point to both mitigating circumstances as regards the offending and their role in it, and to a combination of substantial mitigating factors that are personal to the offender.5
[33] So, the first question I must answer is whether it would be manifestly unjust to sentence you to life imprisonment. As I have previously indicated to you, the answer to that question is yes, I am satisfied it would be. Although both counsel agree that is the appropriate answer, it is nevertheless necessary that I briefly explain my reasoning for that.
Why would a life sentence be manifestly unjust?
[34] The primary factors that, in my view, would make it manifestly unjust to impose a life sentence on you relate to the role that I find you played in the offending, your age as at the date of the offending and other personal mitigating factors which are captured in the various reports that I have read.
[35] As regards your role, the legal basis upon which you have pleaded guilty to murder is as a joint enterprise party to a felony murder. If you break that down, what that means is you were one of those involved in a plan to rob Mr Raviola of his car. In the course of carrying out that serious offence, Mr Raviola was killed by a co-defendant. By your guilty plea you acknowledge you knew it was a probable consequence of carrying out the robbery that one or more of the group would intentionally inflict grievous bodily harm on Mr Raviola. It is not alleged that you foresaw the possibility of Mr Raviola’s death.
[36] I acknowledge that you were far from the ringleader of the group who agreed to commit the robbery. Rather you and the two other young persons were, in effect,
4 Dickey v R [2023] NZCA 2, (2023) 34 FRNZ 555.
5 At [177].
used by Debra Tihema to achieve her objective. She was the one to benefit from the robbery. She was the one who had a pressing debt. I accept you were drawn into this offending as a consequence of your relationship with M. On my assessment, your role was to act as “muscle” and to become involved as necessary to render Mr Raviola defenceless to the robbery. Ultimately, that is the very role you played. You acknowledged that you entered the bedroom where Mr Raviola was being assaulted in order to knock him out because the others had been unsuccessful in rendering him defenceless. I have acknowledged that it is accepted you did not know Debra Tihema was in possession of the weapon. You were not present when it was used. I do not think there is any doubt that what transpired, and I am referring to the tragic and meaningless death of Mr Raviola, went well beyond what you had ever contemplated.
[37] When I summarise your role, it is important not to overlook the aggravating factors of this murder. Mr Raviola was a vulnerable man. He was much older than the group who set upon him. He was heavily outnumbered. It was a robbery that was premediated. There had been a plan hatched by Debra Tihema to lure Mr Raviola to her address and, albeit loosely, roles were allocated to each of the offenders.
[38] I observe that in sentencing, you and the other defendants, following your trial, Dunningham J at paragraph [12] of the sentencing notes referred to role. The Judge said Mr Hurrell’s role was to get the car; M’s role was to back them up in taking the car keys. And the Judge said you were clearly part of the plan as well.
[39] As I have said, I consider your role was “muscle”, a role that you agreed to and that you effectively undertook. You achieved your objective, which was to render Mr Raviola defenceless in order that the robbery could be affected.
[40] The murder itself is aggravated by the use of the weapon. I am also satisfied that there must have been gratuitous violence that was inflicted, albeit by others. I also think it significant in describing the aggravating factors of your offending that you and Mr Hurrell in what could only be described as callous conduct in removing Mr Raviola’s body from the scene, dumping it rather than seeking medical assistance and then going to his house and committing burglary.
[41] Overall, I consider that your role as a lesser party to a felony murder in circumstances where you had no knowledge and were not involved in the ultimate fatal assault to be factors that significantly impact the level of your culpability, albeit of themselves not sufficient to rebut the presumption of life imprisonment. Rather, it is factors personal to you when considered alongside the role as I have assessed it to be that lead me to the view that to impose a life sentence would be manifestly unjust.
[42] First and foremost is your age. You were only 20 years old at the time. I will shortly discuss the principles that are engaged with youth offending, but I acknowledge for now that your offending had a number of the characteristics of youth offending. It was committed under the influence of an adult. I have no doubt that you were susceptible to the influence of Debra Tihema and acting out of a sense of loyalty both to her and M. With reference to the reports, I accept that although you were 20 years old, you [redacted] had a much lower level of maturity than your chronological age. There is a degree, albeit not a strong degree, of impulsiveness in your decision to enter the bedroom when you did and to act as you did.
[43] The psychological reports indicate that your cognitive functioning was of a person of significantly lesser years than your numerical age. It is not necessary that I detail all the findings of the psychologists beyond recognising that both were of the opinion that at the age of almost 15, your functioning was “perhaps about two years behind [your] peers”. You had an IQ in 2019 of 79, which is low, and at the time you were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and a range of developmental, medical and behavioural problems.
[44] In addition to your age and the associated issues I have discussed, I am also conscious of the matters set out in the s 27 report and the alcohol and drug report. They indicate to me a traumatic childhood that did, in part, set you on a path that inevitably led to early exposure to drugs and ultimately to gangs.
[45] I do agree with Ms Gray that it is significant that notwithstanding your original conviction for murder being quashed by the Supreme Court, you have since elected to plead guilty to murder. That was a big call on your behalf. You have also made
expressions of remorse and I accept that those factors indicate accountability and are positive in assessing your rehabilitative prospects.
[46] So, when I look at the combination of those factors—the totality of circumstances, which is your role, youth, your background, your mental health, and your rehabilitative potential, and I consider those factors against the potential harm that would be inflicted on you if sentenced to life in prison, I do find that a life sentence would be manifestly unjust.
What is the appropriate finite sentence?
[47] Whilst there is agreement between counsel that you should receive a finite sentence, there is significant disagreement as to the appropriate starting point.
[48] As I have discussed with counsel, it is challenging for a Judge to settle on an appropriate starting point due to the paucity of relevant cases and because the appropriate approach in fixing a finite sentence following a conviction for murder is not settled.
[49] In Dickey v R, the Court of Appeal determined it would be manifestly unjust to impose life sentences on three youthful offenders convicted of murder.6 The Court arrived at an end sentence applying what is described as the orthodox Moses approach, having first nominated a notional starting point before making deductions for personal mitigating factors.7 For all three appellants the Court considered it necessary to then make a significant upward adjustment to arrive at a sentence that the Court considered reflected the gravity of such serious offending.
[50] The difficulty with that approach, as was recognised by Johnstone J in R v D and P, is that working from an end sentence and adding back in percentage deductions that were allowed, the effective starting points applied in Dickey were very significantly higher than the notional starting point articulated by the Court.8
6 Dickey v R, above n 4.
7 Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296, [2020] 3 NZLR 583.
8 R v D and P [2024] NZHC 2118.
Johnstone J referred to the recalculated starting points as the “implied” starting point. I would describe it as the effective starting point.
[51] More recently, Dunningham J in R v Messervy reviewed sentencing decisions post Dickey and attached to her sentencing notes a schedule recording the effective starting points applied in cases that have adopted the Dickey approach.9 Those effective starting points have ranged between 21- and 43-years’ imprisonment.
[52] As I have indicated to counsel and like Dunningham J, I prefer the approach adopted in R v D and P. In my view that provides greater transparency and promotes consistency in sentencing. What I must then do is assess where your offending falls having regard to the starting point range that is emerging from the cases.
Crown submissions
[53] Ms Elsmore, for the Crown, submits a starting point in the region of 30 years is appropriate. While you did not inflict the fatal blows, she highlights that you did physically confront Mr Raviola with enough force to knock him unconscious. She reminds me this was a co-ordinated and planned assault on a vulnerable victim and that you striking Mr Raviola was part of the plan to rob him. She reminds me that following the assaults, you took Mr Raviola in a vehicle and left him to die in a car park. She reminds me that rather than offer assistance, you, Mr Hurrell and M then burgled his house.
[54] With reference to recent cases that I have reviewed, Ms Elsmore submits your offending is significantly more serious than Lo v R which had an effective starting point of around 20 years, but she says appreciably less serious than R v Yu which had an effective starting point of around 34 years.10
9 R v Messervy [2024] NZHC 3770.
10 Lo v R [2024] NZCA 359; and R v Yu [2023] NZHC 1391.
Defence submissions
[55] Ms Gray, on your behalf, invites the Court to focus on the three post Dickey cases that involve party liability.11 She submits that Lo v R is most analogous to your offending. Ms Gray further submits that the principle of parity requires the Court to at least have regard to the starting point that was adopted when Mr Hurrell was sentenced for manslaughter. She submits that the appropriate starting point for your offending is between 20- and 22-years’ imprisonment.
Analysis
[56] I have reviewed the cases referred to me by counsel.12 Broadly speaking your offending has similarity to that of Mr Brown in Dickey. In that case the implied or effective starting point was around 29 years.13 Mr Brown was aged 19 years. It was his belief that the victim had sexually molested his young relative that set in train rumours that ultimately led to the victim’s death. Mr Brown had posted on Facebook messages indicating he wanted to find the victim. That messaging was the catalyst for others to become involved and to resolve to commit violence against the victim. Mr Brown was centre stage in a meeting with Ms Dickey and other offenders to discuss effecting an assault on the victim. He also played a central role in arranging for the victim to be lured to a place where he could be attacked. Mr Brown was aware that a principal offender was in possession of a large hunting knife and had said he was going to kill the victim. He was with Ms Dickey and the principal offender when the victim was confronted, and the hunting knife produced and utilised. As the victim sought to escape, Mr Brown kicked the victim. His role in the attack was described by the Court of Appeal as peripheral.
[57] I consider Mr Brown’s role to be more culpable than yours given he was instrumental in setting the victim up for the purpose of a serious assault. He knew it was going to involve a potentially lethal weapon.
11 Dickey v R, above n 4; Lo v R, above n 10; and R v Yu, above n 10.
12 Dickey v R, above n 4; R v D and P, above n 8; M (CA434/22) v R [2023] NZCA 319; R v TH [2023] NZHC 630; R v Fiers [2023] NZHC 3368; R v Huntley [2024] NZHC 182; R v Ronaki [2024] NZHC 3019; and R v Messervy, above n 9.
13 The implied starting point will vary dependent on whether deductions are applied as a percentage or as a fixed term.
[58] The effective starting point adopted in Lo v R was 20 years.14 Mr Lo was 17 years old when he joined in a random attack initiated by the primary offender that led to the death of the victim. The victim in that case had been seriously assaulted by a co-offender. Mr Lo then joined in, hitting the victim hard in the mouth causing him to fall to the ground. From there both he and the principal offender punched, kicked and stomped on the victim’s head and body. The Court of Appeal accepted that Mr Lo had played a limited role in what was otherwise a prolonged assault leading to the victim’s death and acknowledged that it was possible the victim was in the process of dying by the time Mr Lo joined the attack.
[59] I assess your culpability as being higher than that of Mr Lo, having regard to the extent of planning, the robbery motive and the callousness of your actions after the serious assault. In my view, your starting point must fall between that adopted in the two cases I have discussed.
[60] In fine tuning that starting point, I accept Ms Gray’s submission that the court ought to bear in mind that in sentencing Mr Hurrell, following his guilty plea to a charge of manslaughter and burglary, that the starting point of seven years was adopted (including a six-month uplift for the burglary). The level of violence that Mr Hurrell inflicted was lesser. He did not attempt to and did not in fact render Mr Raviola unconscious. Mr Hurrell was sentenced on the basis that in assaulting Mr Raviola he did not intend to cause him grievous bodily harm. He had not been involved in the earlier attempt to take Mr Raviola’s car. But otherwise, he was involved to the same extent as you in the robbery and in the callous treatment of Mr Raviola’s body after the assault, and the burglary of his premises.
[61] Mr Jetson, when I stand back and have regard to the authorities and my assessment of your culpability, I settle on an appropriate starting point of 24 years’ imprisonment.
14 Lo v R, above n 10.
Mitigating factors
Youth and rehabilitative prospects
[62] You were 20 years old when you committed this offence. I agree with Ms Gray that your numerical age does not reflect your cognitive maturity. Your age and the prospects of rehabilitation are important sentencing considerations.
[63] The Court of Appeal has recently considered the impact of sentences of imprisonment and in particular, a sentence of life imprisonment on young people.15 The Court observed that an offender’s youthful age is a relevant consideration in fixing an appropriate determinate sentence because of the neurological differences between a young person and an adult relevant in assessing personal culpability, and relevant because there are greater prospects of rehabilitation that might apply to a young person.
[64]In Dickey the Court relied on the Crown’s acknowledgement that:16
(a)adolescent behaviour reflects the slow pace of the development of those parts of the brain that control higher-order executive functioning, such as impulse control, risk assessment and planning ability;
(b)neurological development may not be complete until the age of 25;
(c)young persons who commit serious offences frequently exhibit other characteristics which also tend to mitigate culpability, notably intellectual deficits, mental illness and experiences of abuse or other childhood trauma; and
(d)young persons are more receptive to treatment and therefore have better prospects of rehabilitation than adult offenders, who find it more difficult to alter entrenched behaviours.
15 Dickey v R, above n 4.
16 At [86].
[65] And so Ms Gray submits, and I accept, that the factors that render the youth of an offender relevant in determining a finite sentence do apply to your offending. In particular, I am satisfied you have poor impulse control, a limited capacity to undertake appropriate risk assessments. I am satisfied you were liable to the influence of older persons, in particular, Debra Tihema, who as I have said I believe you felt a sense of obligation [redacted]. I am mindful of the struggles you have faced as outlined in the psychological reports, the s 27 report and the alcohol and drug report. You do exhibit characteristics that have been referred to by the Court of Appeal in Dickey that tend to mitigate culpability.
[66] As regards rehabilitative potential, I accept you have demonstrated a genuine desire to engage in rehabilitation and that you have matured over the years since this offending. Hence it is so disappointing for me as Judge to learn that notwithstanding the significant time you have already spent in custody you have not been offered much by way of rehabilitative pathways. And it provides no comfort to the Court that you have recently elected to become a patched member of a gang. I understand the pressures that young men face in prison that can lead to gang associations. But if you are truly serious about rehabilitation and living an offence-free life on your release, then you need to continue, and I say continue rather than start, on a path of thinking long and hard about your future focus and a life which does not have gangs involved because as a young man you have the potential to rehabilitate. You have got three children. They should strongly motivate you to be a better father.
[67] I am satisfied not only that your youth is a significant factor in determining that a life sentence would be manifestly unjust, but I accept it is a factor which justifies a discrete and significant deduction from the length of the otherwise appropriate finite sentence.
[68] In Dickey the Court of Appeal referred to a range of 10–30 per cent as being ‘common’ to recognise youth.17 I have considered the youth discounts that have been allowed in relation to various cases of young people convicted of murder both in and since Dickey. Of course, every case will ultimately be considered on its own merits.
17 Dickey v R, above n 4, at [175].
But I do agree with Ms Gray that a deduction of 20 per cent is both justified to account for your youth and rehabilitative prospects and is consistent with the deductions allowed in comparable cases.
Guilty plea
[69] The Crown say a deduction of up to 15 per cent. Ms Gray supports a deduction at that level.
[70] When your case was awaiting retrial, you sought what I would describe as a form of sentence indication the week prior to trial. That reflected an amended summary of facts and an agreed basis for criminal culpability. It was a less culpable fact pattern. I agree that a 15 per cent deduction for your guilty plea is appropriate.
[71] Ms Gray seeks a further small deduction for remorse and rehabilitative prospects. She suggests five per cent for the combination of those factors. In my view they have been accounted for in the youth deduction that I have allowed. I am not satisfied that a discrete credit for remorse is appropriate.
Personal factors/mental health
[72] As regards personal factors, that includes your past struggles with mental health and your addiction, the Supreme Court in Berkland v R recognised that childhood events may have a causal connection to future offending.18 The relevant risk factors identified include exposure to gang violence, drug use, absence of parental supervision and guidance and exposure to domestic violence. Deductions in the range up to 25 per cent might be allowed.
[73] Ms Gray encourages the Court to allow a generous deduction to reflect your background, featuring social deprivation, mental health challenges and addiction. I have briefly summarised the reports that I have reviewed. They do paint a background that is sadly commonplace to those who appear in this Court on serious charges.
18 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509 at [116].
[74] On the other side as Ms Elsmore has highlighted, you have had the very real advantage of the enduring love and support of your mother throughout. You are very fortunate to have somebody who stands by you.
[75] It is not necessary that I detail the issues that are set out in the various reports, suffice to say that from a young age you were exposed to gangs. That led to an exposure to violence and ultimately led to drug use and almost inevitably, addiction. You have suffered other trauma in your past. You have suffered PTSD and social isolation throughout your childhood. You have struggled with your mental health throughout.
[76] I am satisfied there is a real causal connection between those factors and your offending and it warrants a deduction that I fix at 15 per cent.
Overall
[77] Taking into account those deductions, the starting point of 24 years will be reduced by 50 per cent, which brings me to an end sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment.
Time spent on EM bail
[78] Ms Gray seeks a further deduction to reflect the time you spent on EM bail. In total, you spent almost two and a half years on EM bail. The Court has confirmed that deductions of between 30 and 50 per cent might be afforded for time on EM bail.19 You were compliant throughout your time on EM bail. Although I note there have been issues more recently that led to your surrender into custody and later applications to change your address. But as Ms Elsmore has confirmed, the absences that you were permitted during the prolonged period you were on EM bail were minimal. It is appropriate to allow a deduction and I make a further deduction of 12 months, which equates to around 40 per cent to reflect the time on EM bail.
19 Paora v R [2021] NZCA 559 at [53].
Minimum period of imprisonment
[79] Because you will be subject to a long-term sentence, the law permits me to impose a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI), that is the period of time you must serve before you become eligible for parole. The court may impose an MPI if it is necessary for one or more of the purposes of holding you accountable for the harm you have caused, denouncing your conduct, deterring you and others from committing similar offences or protecting the community from you.20
[80] The Crown contend for an MPI of at least 50 per cent. Ms Gray submits that an MPI of around 40–50 per cent would be appropriate.
[81] If I did not impose an MPI, you would be eligible for parole after one-third of the end sentence.21 In my view, the possibility of release after one-third would not be sufficient to hold you accountable or adequately denounce your conduct. That is simply because you engaged in serious violence to carry out a planned robbery and a life was lost in the implementation of that offending.
[82] I assess the appropriate level of MPI for your offending is one of six years’ imprisonment. That is a little over 50 per cent. That does not mean that you will be released at that date. But it is a date for you to work to in order to present your strongest case to the Parole Board that if released you would not present an undue risk to the safety of the community.
Conclusion
[83]Mr Jetson, can you please stand.
[84] Cyle Jetson, on the charge of murdering Pierclaudio Raviola you are sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, and you must serve a minimum period of imprisonment of six years.
[85]You may stand down.
20 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86.
21 Parole Act 2002, s 84.
[86] I also make a final direction that the alcohol and drug report is not to be accessed absent order of the Court.
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Eaton J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors, Christchurch
Counsel:
K J Gray, Barrister, Christchurch
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