R v Huirua

[2022] NZHC 1262

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGANUI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGANUI ROHE

CRI-2019-083-1508

[2022] NZHC 1262

THE QUEEN

v

TE WHITINGA MARK HUIRUA

Hearing:	27 May 2022
Appearances:	M M Wilkinson-Smith and N Turner for Crown J Waugh for Defendant
Judgment:	27 May 2022

ORAL SENTENCING REMARKS OF GENDALL J

Introduction

[1]                 Mr Te Whitinga Mark Huirua, you appear for sentencing today following your guilty pleas on six charges of using a forged document and one charge of carrying on a business fraudulently. The charge of using a forged document relates to s 257(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 and has a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. The charge of carrying on a business fraudulently relates to ss 380(1) and 373(4) of the Companies Act 1993 and has a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.

R v HUIRUA [2022] NZHC 1262 [27 May 2022]

The offending

[2]                 The facts of your offending, Mr Huirua, are said to be broadly unique and generally are as follows.

[3]                 On 27 November 2003, Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi, as one of eight generally recognised iwi of Taranaki, entered into a Deed of Settlement of their Treaty of Waitangi grievances with the Crown. As part of that settlement, the iwi received

$32 million in redress.

[4]                 Te Kaahui o Rauru (Te Kaahui) is a charitable trust established as a governance entity for Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi. Mr Huirua is a  director of Te  Pataka o  Rauru Ltd  (Te Pataka), which was the company heading the investment arm for the iwi. Its directors, (Pookai Aronui), are responsible to ensure that the funds of the iwi are appropriately invested and managed for the benefit of members of the iwi.

[5]                 Mr Huirua invested funds that belonged to his iwi, Te Kaahui in his role as a director of the investment arm Te Pataka. The fraudulent business charge generally arose in part from an attempt to  keep the nature of of the direct  investments  that  Mr Huirua was making hidden from certain staff members of Te Kaahui who would have disagreed with his investment methods, despite the fact he may have been authorised to make direct investments of this type.

[6]                 Mr Huirua’s forgeries arose broadly it appears out of an attempt to hide the losses and means by which the funds had been lost. As to the Te Pataka investments, on Mr Huirua’s advice that the company diversified more into “direct investment” of funds. For the purposes of these investments, Mr Huirua created two companies, “Society One New Zealand Ltd” and “Imdabradaz Capital Ltd” to receive the funds he would invest. The first of these was so-called to mirror the name of a large Australian financial institution to avoid detection of his method and strategy of investing from members of Te Kaahui. In fact, Mr Huirua was a director and sole shareholder of both companies.

[7]Between 4 May 2018 and 29 May 2019 Mr Huirua caused a total of

$3.1 million to be transferred from Te Kaahui to these companies, which Mr Huirua

then invested through brokers. Of this, $2.6 million was lost in trading and Mr Huirua used a further $500,000 for personal expenditure.

[8]                 Mr Huirua did not advise Te Kaahui of the losses. In fact, Mr Huirua then attempted to hide the losses and the way in which the funds had been lost from the auditors and from Te Kaahui through forged documents, including letters and emails from fictionalised people.

[9]                 The losses were eventually discovered because of auditing difficulties and a hui was held on 2 November 2019 between Mr Huirua and members of Te Kaahui. When Mr Huirua was asked about the offending, he stated that he acted alone and was investing on behalf of the iwi. He said he believed Te Pataka had invested the money on the basis of its reliance on him and his knowledge and he had operated and implemented “trading strategies” with which he believed he had a run of bad luck.

[10]              It is important to note here that Mr Huirua is not for sentence for theft of any money from the victims or for the direct loss of these funds. It is not a crime to make a poor investment decision. He is primarily for sentence for the panicked and dishonest actions he took following his realisation that the money entrusted to him by the iwi had gone. There is, as I understand it, no guideline judgment for this type of offending.

Submissions

Crown submissions

[11]              Turning now to the submissions advanced before me, I address first the Crown submissions.

[12]              The Crown submits here that what is really bordering on a form of misappropriation of Treaty of Waitangi settlement funds effectively has added injustice to what was previous injustice the iwi in this case had suffered. The Crown submits Mr Huirua’s forgery and fraudulent business offending is deceitful and manipulative and points to this offending as an absolute breach of trust of Mr Huirua’s

iwi, and an abuse of his position. The Crown contends that Mr Huirua’s offending has brought shame to his iwi and will continue to cause harm to the iwi for generations.

Defence submissions

[13]              For Mr Huirua, Mr Waugh, his counsel suggests that, due to Mr Huirua’s poor investment decisions and mismanagement of the funds, this did result in a total of

$3.1 million effectively being lost. Mr Huirua however was authorised to make direct investments of the type he did and making poor investment decisions in itself, as I note, is not a crime. Rather, he points out, Mr Huirua appears for sentence primarily for what he describes as panicked and dishonest actions Mr Huirua took when he realised that the money entrusted to him by the iwi had gone. Although Mr Huirua invested funds that belonged to his iwi it seems legitimately, in his role as director of the investment arm of the iwi, the fraudulent charges arose out of his attempts to keep hidden the losses that were made as well as the nature of the direct investments he was making, with which he knew members of his iwi would have disagreed.

[14]              Mr Waugh also submits that this Court must determine an appropriate sentence that will adequately hold Mr Huirua accountable and promote in him a sense of responsibility and acknowledgement of the harm he has caused. He submits however that an appropriate punishment for this offending can be achieved without a sentence of imprisonment and suggests home detention should be imposed. Mr Waugh goes on to submit here that a sentence of imprisonment, if the Court was considering imposing one, would be disproportionately severe when considering Mr Huirua’s circumstances, including in particular the impact the offending has had on him personally as well as his position within his own community. Mr Waugh says the least restrictive sentence that would meet the principles and purposes of sentencing here is a combination sentence he suggests of nine months’ home detention and 250 hours’ community work.

[15]I will come to my sentence calculation shortly.

Pre-sentence reports

[16]              The Court has received a number  of  reports  to  assist  me  in  sentencing  Mr Huirua.

[17]              From the Department of Corrections a Provision of Advice to this Court has been provided. In this Mr Huirua’s risk of offending is assessed as being low, but his risk of further harm to others is assessed as medium. The report says Mr Huirua has accepted his offending and expressed remorse. However the report writer notes that Mr Huirua also showed features of manipulation, and what is described as a high sense of entitlement. The writer says Mr Huirua went on to exhibit what are described as poor problem-solving skills and impulsiveness. Ultimately, the report recommended as the appropriate sentence here a sentence of imprisonment.

[18]              There is also before me a 29 April 2022 restorative justice memorandum. The memorandum details that Mr Huirua was willing to engage in a restorative justice process but a conference was not convened as Te Kaahui declined to engage in the process.

[19]              Finally, the Court has also received  a  detailed  apology  letter  written  by Mr Huirua. In the letter, Mr Huirua has expressed the guilt, shame and humiliation he indicates he has felt as a result of his actions. He expresses regret at misleading members of his iwi in not being transparent and in losing their money. He says it is crushing that he is no longer part of his iwi and cut off from his whakapapa. Mr Huirua in the letter does accept that his actions could have a negative impact on many generations to come and that there is likely to have been significant loss of mana and trust in his iwi as a result of his actions.

Victim impact statements

[20]              Also before me are two rather chilling victim impact statements. I have read them both carefully and thank the writers for providing them.

[21]              The first victim impact statement is written on behalf of the 4,400 registered iwi members of Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi, the 24 designated paepae members and the

employees both past and present of Te Kaahui. The victim impact statement describes the heavy burden that is felt by all the iwi, and the anger and disappointment felt by them as a result of Mr Huirua’s  actions here.   It says too that the credibility of      Te Kaahui, as an organisation, has been tarnished by Mr Huirua’s actions and the iwi have been left carrying the whakamā.

[22]              The  second  victim  impact  statement  was  written  by  the  previous  Pookai Aronui of Te Pataka.  This  was  the  financial  management  group  which the defendant chaired up until 2019. The members of the Pookai Aronui stated that they were shocked at the level of Mr Huirua’s deceit and manipulation and that he will never be able to restore the trust they had in him or the millions of dollars they contend he has taken from future generations.

Case Law

[23]              I turn now to the case law relating to this matter. On this there is no general guideline judgment for dishonesty offending of this type, and I refer to the Court of Appeal 2015 decision in McGregor.1 Indeed, before me both counsel agreed this offending is generally unique.  They appear also to agree however, that the case of   R v Varjan is a comparable one,2 although Mr Huirua your counsel, Mr Waugh, argues that your offending can be distinguished in two ways, namely that first:

(a)you, Mr Huirua had no intent to deprive the victims here of any funds, but rather intended to increase the investment fund for the benefit of your iwi; and secondly

(b)the loss of the funds itself cannot be directly attributable to any criminal offending on your part, as the funds were lost by you, Mr Huirua, in the course of what he says was authorised direct investment.

[24]              Counsel also suggest here that your culpability, Mr Huirua, is significantly diminished as a result.

1      McGregor v R [2015] NZCA 565 at [13].

2      R v Varjan CA97/03, 27 May 2003.

[25]              A number of other cases have been cited to me here but none are identical. The cases mainly deal with offences which have a seven-year maximum sentence, whereas the present offending involves charges which carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

[26]              However, the Court of Appeal in R v Varjan did outline the manner in which culpability for offending involving dishonesty of a type like this is to be assessed and described this in the following way:

[22]Culpability is to be assessed by reference to the circumstances and  such factors as the nature of the offending, its magnitude and sophistication; the type, circumstances and number of the victims; the motivation for the offending; the amounts involved; the losses; the period over which the offending occurred; the seriousness of breaches of trust involved; and the impact on victims.

[27]And the Court in that case went on to state:

[25] The authorities clearly indicate that in cases of major defalcations, misappropriations, schemes dishonestly to obtain money or property or where recidivism indicates the need to protect the community, imprisonment is appropriate.

Start point

[28]              With these matters in mind I now turn to the starting point for the sentencing exercise here. In this case Mr Waugh, counsel for Mr Huirua submitted before me that a start point of three years’ imprisonment would adequately reflect the significant breach of trust and actual harm done to the victims.

[29]              The Crown however disagrees and as I will note below maintains a starting point of between four and five years’ imprisonment is appropriate here. With these conflicting positions in mind I turn now to consider your culpability here Mr Huirua, through the lens of the factors described in the Varjan case.

Nature of the offending

[30]              First, I turn to the nature of the offending in question. Here, you Mr Huirua created two companies with names that were purposefully designed to mirror the names of successful investment companies and thereby to mislead members of your

iwi and to avoid suspicion. Although the establishment of the companies and investment of funds may have been broadly authorised, and your actions to conceal this trading to an extent involved perhaps what is said to be panic on your part      Mr Huirua, the fact is that you deliberately mislead those who were entitled to the funds and purposely delayed investigation and discovery of the losses.

Magnitude and sophistication of the offending

[31]              Turning now to the second matter which relates to the magnitude and sophistication of that offending, the deliberately misleading naming of the companies here as I see it reflects the fact Mr Huirua that your offending was somewhat sophisticated in that it was an attempt that proved to be successful for some time to avoid suspicion and to facilitate the fraudulent activity. In addition, Mr Huirua, you created fictitious entities and associated email addresses for these fictitious persons in an attempt to evade responsibility for your actions. The attempts to cover up the activities must also be seen against the backdrop of your considerable banking and investment experience. Mr Huirua, as I see it, you knew perfectly well what you were doing.

The type, circumstances and numbers of victims

[32]              I turn now to the next enquiry  which  relates  to  the  type,  circumstances and numbers of  victims  here.  There  are  over  4,400  registered  members  of  Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi, and it is accepted by all parties the impacts of the present offending will be felt for generations. Sadly, it is also relevant that the offending in question is further harm against an iwi directly resultant from an attempt also to make restitution for historic harms against that iwi.

Motivation for the offending

[33]              I turn next to the issue of the motivation for the present offending. On this  Mr Huirua contends that his motivations were to benefit his iwi and he claims he was not self-interested to achieve personal monetary gain. He claims he invested the money on behalf of his iwi and that his offending, while cowardly, foolish and naïve, was not malicious.

[34]              I accept it is possible this may well be the case. However, it must be borne in mind at the same time that notwithstanding these explanations by you Mr Huirua, you also transferred $500,000 from the funds in question into your own personal bank accounts. The writers of the victim impact  statements  on  behalf  of the iwi  said  Mr Huirua, and I quote, “you saw opportunities to misappropriate funds and rather than contributing to our development, you in your egotistical style only considered your own personal gain.” I conclude that it may well be somewhat difficult here to reconcile your claimed motivation Mr Huirua for the actions you took with your later persuasive and convincing deceit relating to all these matters.

Amounts involved and the losses

[35]              I turn now to  the  amounts involved and the losses in  question.   In total,   Mr Huirua caused, it seems, $3.1 million to be transferred to various bank accounts ultimately lost from the iwi through trading and alleged misappropriation of some of those funds.

[36]              As noted, those losses in total were $3.1 million, although as the parties also say, the impacts of the offending are far greater and will be felt for generations by descendants of the iwi. It adds insult to injury, they say, that the source of the funds in question was indeed redress from the iwi settling their Treaty of Waitangi grievances in 2005. This $3.1 million as I understand it represents approximately 10 per cent of the monetary redress the iwi received. If this is seen as mismanagement relating to funds it will continue to affect the iwi considerably, especially when considering the beneficial outcomes the moneys could have achieved otherwise. This however must be placed into perspective here, given the nature of the offences which Mr Huirua is facing.

Period over which the offending occurred

[37]                I turn next to the period over which the offending occurred. On this the parties dispute the period in question. The Crown says the offending spanned between 2 May 2018 and 15 October 2019, a period of around 17 months. Mr Huirua however says that apart from the admittedly misleading naming of the companies, the bulk of the offending occurred only between 5 August 2019 and 15 October 2019. He

maintains the relevant period to be assessed should be limited to the period during which the letters in question from him were dishonestly drafted and sent.

[38]              I do not accept however Mr Huirua’s submission on this point. The incorporation of a company with a name specifically designed to mislead members of his iwi is plainly relevant to the fact of his dishonest offending. It demonstrates an intention to be dishonest and to hide Mr Huirua’s dealings as he knew they would be at the expense of members of his own iwi. I consider this demonstrates an ongoing attempt to be dishonest.

Seriousness of the breaches of trust involved

[39]              I turn next to the seriousness of the breaches of trust involved. The Crown described the present offending here as a “gross and flagrant breach of trust”. I accept this. Mr Huirua was trusted in his role on the Board and the iwi diversified into the loss-making trading in question purely on his advice. The Court has heard there is significant anger and disappointment at the trust given to Mr Huirua and the way in which he “hood winked”, in their words, the members of his iwi.

[40]              In the victim impact statement of the previous Pookai Aronui of Te Pataka, it is stated that Mr Huirua was appointed one of their Pookai Aronui and ultimately appointed to assume the position of Chair, on  the  basis  of  his  whakapapa  to  Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi as well as a banking career which they understood to be highly regarded.

[41]              In the first victim impact statement as I note, written  on  behalf  of  the  4,400 members of the iwi, the writer states that Mr Huirua was “placed in a position of trust and influence and to have this offending occur by one of our own, with no sense of remorse is beyond comprehension for the iwi.”

[42]              Mr Huirua does accept here he is guilty of a breach of the absolute trust of   Te Kaahui and Te Pataka. This is to his credit.

Impact on the victims

[43]              Turning now to the impact on the victims, that has been described in this  case as profound. The financial loss caused by Mr Huirua, although not directly relevant perhaps to the offences for which he is to be sentenced, does represent some 10 per cent of the original Crown settlement. There are over 4,400 registered members of the iwi as I note and, more than this, the impacts of his offending they describe will be something that  will  be  felt  for  generations.  Furthermore,  and  significantly, Mr Huirua was held out as a trustworthy representative of the iwi, an iwi which appears now to have suffered reputational damage and whakamā, which they now have to carry as a result of his actions.

Overall start point

[44]              With all these matters in mind, I turn now to the overall sentencing starting point to be adopted here. On this the Crown submits the present offending is most similar to the offending which took place in the Henare decision before this Court. There a starting point of five and a half years’ imprisonment was adopted for offending that occurred over a period 12 months and involved around $1.5 million, of which the defendant personally benefitted to the extent of $800,000.3 I have accepted in this case the offending occurred over a longer period of time, and the losses to the iwi broadly speaking were something in the region of twice that amount. However, to some extent it does seem Mr Huirua’s intentions in investing the money were not wholly self-focused, and in fact he benefitted at most only to the extent of $500,000 which he claims in any event was authorised. At the same time, however, Mr Huirua’s attempts to conceal his dishonesty were persistent and sophisticated. When all these factors are taken into account, and having regard to many of the authorities cited before me, including the Love case4 which has been mentioned by counsel in submissions, the Crown submits an appropriate starting point here would be between four and five years’ imprisonment.

[45]              Turning to Mr Huirua’S position, his counsel Mr Waugh, as I note, suggests a start point of something less than this, being three years’ imprisonment. In particular

3      R v Henare [2019] NZHC 2126.

4      Love v R [2017] NZCA 265.

Mr Waugh relies on what he says was Mr Huirua’s lack of any intention to deprive the iwi victims of their funds and to cause them any loss. He maintains the offending was not sophisticated or premeditated in any significant way and that it is better characterised as simply panicked actions of someone desperately trying to salvage what they might from a disaster. Mr Huirua does accept the key aggravating feature of his offending here is the significant breach of trust resulting in loss of mana for his iwi, with an intergenerational effect on the financial situation of the iwi. On this basis, Mr Waugh submits that Mr Huirua is less criminally culpable than the offenders in a number of cases he has cited to me, and he submits that the three year start point he notes is accordingly appropriate.

[46]              On these aspects I have carefully considered all the cases which have been cited to me here. Having done this and having regard to Mr Huirua’s sophisticated and persistent deceitful and fraudulent actions in this case, the inappropriate use of his position, and the complete abuse of the utmost trust placed in him by his iwi, I am satisfied that an appropriate start point for the offending for which he is charged is four and a half years’ imprisonment.

Aggravating factors

[47]              As to aggravating factors, it is accepted there are no personal aggravating factors of the present offending. The extent of loss and harm resulting from the offending, the abuse of trust and premeditation has been factored into the starting point I have noted above. Accordingly, there is no uplift for aggravating factors to the starting point.

Mitigating factors

[48]              As to mitigating factors, there are several mitigating factors to be taken into account here, as all parties before me have accepted.

Guilty plea

[49]              First I turn to Mr Huirua’s guilty plea. He has as I have noted pleaded guilty to the charges he faces and his counsel suggests a full 25 per cent discount for this

guilty plea should result. The Crown however points out that Mr Huirua’s first appearance in this case was on 5 November 2019 and his trial was scheduled at that time for 23 May 2020. Resolution discussions then commenced in February 2021, but it was not until February 2022 that resolution was ultimately reached and he pleaded guilty. This was only three months before the trial of the remaining charges he was facing was due to begin. In these circumstances, I am satisfied a 20 per cent discount for Mr Huirua’s guilty plea is appropriate.

Remorse

[50]              Next I consider a discount for remorse. Here there is no doubt if genuine remorse is shown, then a discount separate from any guilty plea is available, and I refer to the Supreme Court decision in Hessell.5 Remorse is always a question of fact and judgment and I refer to the Court of Appeal decision in Moses,6 and any discount is earned by demonstrating an understanding of the wrongfulness of the conduct, a tangible acceptance of responsibility for that conduct and its effect on any victims. On this aspect I refer to the decision in Whitcombe.7 Discounts for remorse of between five and eight per cent are available for genuine remorse where for example a defendant shows a willingness to pay reparation, or on the basis of engagement in restorative justice or written and genuine apology letters, and I refer to decisions on this aspect such as Rowles, Watene, Poi and Kauvai.8

[51]              The evidence before the Court here, including the pre-sentence report and letter of remorse written and filed by Mr Huirua, tend to indicate that he feels considerable shame, embarrassment and guilt for what he has done. I am prepared to accept here that Mr Huirua is conscious of the harm he has caused to his iwi, not only on a monetary basis, but also in terms of the loss of mana he has caused and the potential damage of his actions on the iwi generally. I note also that Mr Huirua offered to participate in restorative justice. This was ultimately declined by the iwi on the basis

5      Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [64].

6      Moses v R [2020] NZCA 296 at [24].

7      Whitcombe v Police [2018] NZHC 1409 at [27].

8      Rowles v R [2016] NZCA 208; Watene v R [2014] NZCA 381; Poi v R [2015] NZCA 300; and

Kauvai v R [2017] NZCA 241.

it was effectively too little too late and would not be  of  assistance  to  their  tamariki, mokopuna or uri whakaheke.

[52]              Mr Waugh also points out that Mr Huirua offered to continue to work for the iwi at a reduced rate to pay off the debt. However, when he attended a hui to discuss his offending, Mr Huirua it appears said he was authorised to conduct the investing in question and he declined to do the work he was told he would need to do to make a meaningful attempt to repay the debt.

[53]              It is fair to say the writer of the victim impact statement on behalf of the members of the iwi does not believe Mr Huirua is genuinely remorseful. After noting that they “d[id] not believe that you will ever be able to understand the harm caused by your actions”, he went on to say that “[a]t no point did you show any remorse for the damage and harm you have caused”. The writer then went on to state, “Your arrogance and selfish individualised attitude that you displayed to us has left us feeling that you would resort to anything in order to save yourself, but you showed us that you are not prepared to get your hands dirty in order to do this.” This last comment it seems is a reference to the fact that, as the writer says, Mr Huirua made it clear that jobs at the marae such as sweeping the floors, doing the dishes and cleaning the toilets were beneath him. “While you consider yourself,” the writer states, “we are left with the trauma now imposed on a whole tribe. We are left with having to mend the harm you have caused.”

[54]              Mr Huirua also it seems attempted to justify his actions at the hui following the discovery of his offending and as I note did decline to do the work suggested, being work that the iwi advised him would help to resolve in time some of the issues he had caused. I do note Mr Huirua’s remorse as evidenced in his letter of apology before the Court. However I also accept the Crown submissions that there does seem to be some undercurrent of self-pity for the situation in which Mr Huirua has found himself. In these circumstances I reach the conclusion that a further discount for remorse of some five per cent is appropriate here.

Previous good character

[55]              I turn now to  a  possible  discount  for  previous  good  character.  This  is  Mr Huirua’s first instance of offending. I accept a discrete discount is available for what is said to be his previous good character, as evidenced by his lack of convictions, and on this I refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2009 in Hockley.9

[56]              Mr Huirua continues to maintain his actions were done with the aim of benefitting his iwi and community.   He points out that in the first 18 months of     his tenure as Chair the value of the investment fund increased from $42 million to

$52 million. It is pertinent to note at this stage, however, that the Court has received evidence from the Chief Executive Officer of Te Kaahui that while it is true the assets grew in this time as stated, this was “not a result of Mr Huirua’s leadership, but the fact that equities did a great job in a buoyant market” and that investments made during his term as Chair later dropped in value.  The Chief Executive  maintains too that  Mr Huirua’s actions (including the fraud the subject of the present offending) have resulted in a total loss of $8 million to the fund and that the $3.1 million in question “would have created direct investment and employment opportunities for our people. We  will feel the effects for some time to come.”   Mr Waugh  does point out that    Mr Huirua was held in a high level of esteem by his iwi at the time and this should be taken into account. I am prepared to accept that Mr Huirua, in his eyes, felt that he was using his position to benefit his people but against this I must balance the fact that, as I have noted, $500,000 of the funds in question amounted to personal expenditure incurred by Mr Huirua and this might at one level be seen as a betrayal of the trust placed in him to an even greater extent.

[57]              Thus, overall I accept that Mr Huirua is entitled to some discount for the evidence of his previous good character reflected by his absence of any earlier convictions. I do not consider however a full 15 per cent discount for this is warranted. Overall, I am satisfied a 10 per cent discount for Mr Huirua’s previous good character is appropriate in this case.

9      See R v Hockley [2009] NZCA 74 at [30].

Conclusion

[58]              By way of conclusion, as I have noted earlier, I have adopted a starting point of four and a half years’ imprisonment, or some 54 months. I have accepted that a total discount of some 35 per cent is appropriate in this case. This is made up by way of 20 per cent for the guilty plea, 5 per cent for genuine remorse, and 10 per cent for previous good character. The final sentence I will impose shortly therefore will be a sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment, or two years and 11 months.

[59]              As this is not a short term of imprisonment, neither a community-based sentence nor a combination sentence of home detention and community work is available. I am satisfied this sentence achieves the purposes and principles of sentencing here as set out in the Sentencing Act, particularly deterrence, denunciation and accountability. It is my hope that such a sentence can begin, as the iwi says, to restore the harm and the hurt Mr Huirua that you have caused by your actions to your iwi and future generations.

[60]              Mr Huirua please stand. You are now sentenced on the charges you face to a total term of two years and 11 months’ imprisonment.

Gendall J

Solicitors:

Wilkinson-Smith Lawyers Limited, Whanganui Crowley Waugh, Barristers and Solicitors, Whanganui