R v Hughes

[2025] NZHC 995

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CRI-2023-009-0002013

[2025] NZHC 995

THE KING

v

KATHERINE MARY HUGHES

Hearing:	29 April 2025
Appearances:	P N M Brown and L Fiennes for Crown O K Jarvis for Defendant
Sentencing Notes:	29 April 2025

SENTENCING NOTES OF EATON J

R v HUGHES [2025] NZHC 995 [29 April 2025]

Introduction

[1]        Katherine Mary Hughes, you appear for sentence today having pleaded guilty to a charge of attempting to wound your elderly husband, Christopher Robin Hughes, with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm.1

[2]        In sentencing you I will first outline the factual background of your offending, then turn to setting a starting point for the sentence I am going to impose. I will make adjustments to that starting point to reflect your personal circumstances. But I recognise from the outset, as has been acknowledged by both counsel, that this is a difficult sentencing exercise because your offending has a number of novel features that counsel have been unable to find present in any other cases that I have been referred to.

Factual background

[3]        The facts of your offending have been captured in a prosecution summary of facts. It is a summary that you admit, and it is the proper basis for today’s sentencing. You will be fully familiar with the facts, but sentencing is a public process. It is important that I refer to those facts.

[4]        You are 69 years old. You and Mr Hughes have been married for over 50 years now. Mr Hughes has advanced Parkinson’s Disease (Parkinson’s), and you were his sole caregiver. You and Mr Hughes slept in separate rooms in your Christchurch home.

[5]        On 1 February 2023, you were both at home. At about 6.20 pm, Mr Hughes was asleep in his bed. He woke to find you sitting on the edge of his bed. You were shaking and you told him “I’m going to end it for both of us”. You were armed with a large blue handled carving knife.

[6]        You produced the knife, and you raised it above your head. Mr Hughes immediately understood both from your words and actions that you were going to stab him and then take your own life. He managed to grab you by the wrists and you both

1      Crimes Act 1961, ss 188(1), 72 and 311; maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.

wrestled to gain control of the knife. Due to his health issues, he found it difficult to disarm you. The struggle that had commenced in Mr Hughes’ bedroom continued in the living room. It was only then he was able to knock the knife from your hand. He then briefly left you so he could trigger his St John Ambulance monitored alarm in order to summon help.

[7]        While he was doing that, you picked up the knife and whilst holding it in one hand, you started swinging a stick vacuum cleaner at Mr Hughes to prevent him from trying to disarm you again. It was then that you plunged the knife into your own chest. As you did that, Mr Hughes was leaning on your shoulders in an attempt to balance himself and trying to retrieve the knife from you. You received a very significant injury to your chest, the blade of the knife narrowly missing your heart.

[8]        Police and an ambulance attended. You were transported to Christchurch Public Hospital in a critical condition. It was due to the intervention of medical staff that you made a full recovery. You could easily have died. Fortunately, Mr Hughes’ only injury was scratches to his hands.

[9]        In explanation to the police, you denied Mr Hughes’ account, an account which accords with the summary I have just been through. You told the police that his account was largely mistaken, likely due to his Parkinson’s.

Victim impact statement

[10]      This morning I have listened to the victim impact statement read on behalf of your daughter, Angela, who is joining us remotely from Perth. As you have heard, your offending still causes her regular nightmares. As a consequence of your offending, she has had to take a lot of time off work, so much so that with recent restructuring, she was made redundant leading to a loss of self-confidence. She finds that even today she is moody, suffering emotional swings reflecting on what her father went through and continues to go through. She is fearful you would continue to inflict harm on her father on your release from prison.

[11]      I had the advantage of listening to Mr Hughes give evidence over the course of five mornings last November. It is difficult to discern exactly how your offending

has impacted on him, but it is plain to see that it was so serious that it could only have left enduring pain for him and for your family.

Procedural process

[12]      You were initially charged with attempted murder. That charge reflected both the words that you uttered to Mr Hughes before you attacked him and it reflected notes that were found within your house. One note read:

“50 years we have been together but not really. We have never been lovingly. You did as you pleased and left me alone to get on with it and now you don’t even love me. I gave you all of me and now you don’t love me at all. I can finish us both, there’s nothing to live for. Something I should’ve done a year ago but I kept on thinking you loved me.”

[13]The second note read:

“We can’t do this anymore. I’m not looking after Chris properly. I don’t want to stay here anymore but I don’t want to leave.”

[14]      A trial was scheduled for 18 November 2024. Shortly before that trial the Crown applied for an order that Mr Hughes’ out of court statements be admitted as hearsay evidence at trial on the grounds of his then diagnosis of dementia. The Crown case was that he was unavailable to give evidence at trial. I declined the Crown application, but I adjourned your trial and made an order that Mr Hughes’ evidence be given in advance of trial, in that week that had been set down for the trial. Mr Hughes gave evidence, as I say, over the course of five mornings that week, from the residence where he was then residing and with a communication assistant. He was cross-examined by Ms Jarvis on your behalf.

[15]      It was the evidence that Mr Hughes gave last November and a looming trial date of April this year that led to discussions between your counsel, Ms Jarvis, and Crown counsel and ultimately led to the charge being reduced from attempted murder to one of attempted wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. A charge to which you promptly entered a guilty plea. The maximum sentence you now face is one of seven years’ imprisonment.

Personal circumstances

[16]You are 69 years old. You have no previous convictions.

[17]      You met Mr Hughes when you were 18 years old. Together you have three children, a daughter and two sons. You have four grandchildren. You describe the role you played within the  family  as  bringing  up  the  children  and  supporting  Mr Hughes in his building business.

[18]      The pre-sentence report records your belief that you enjoyed little emotional support throughout your marriage. You told the report writer that you became isolated and lonely over the years with little outlet for personal expression. You felt that you existed to make sure your family were looked after. It was against that background that you say you became the sole caregiver for your husband when he was diagnosed with Parkinson’s in late 2020. From there, there is no dispute that, you spent most of your days looking after him and received little respite from that role.

[19]      The report tells me that you are now estranged from your family, that is not just your husband, but your children and grandchildren. You have not spoken to your children since 1 February 2023. And not surprisingly, you describe yourself as feeling very isolated and ostracised.

[20]      When asked about the offending you told the report writer you could not remember what triggered you to get the knife and decide to kill your husband. You said you probably had just had enough that day. You refer to a state of desperation and to the demands of looking after Mr Hughes over a sustained period. You told the report writer you were “worn down” and that you lost perspective of your life outside of your home.

[21]      While I accept you acknowledge some remorse and you do say you wish to apologise to Mr Hughes, it is clear that you continue to feel resentful of your husband for placing you in what you describe as a position of shame. The report tells me you do not take full responsibility for the consequences of your offending, instead laying the blame on your husband for turning your family against you. That response inevitably clouds your remorse.

[22]      The pre-sentence report writer assesses you as a low likelihood of re-offending and a low risk of harm to others. Your identified risk factors are poor emotional coping, a lack of communication and support in your familial relationships and attitudes which excused your offending behaviour.

[23]      You told the report writer that you were prepared for a sentence of imprisonment. You agreed it would be useful for you to engage with a departmental psychologist during your sentence. And it is not surprising that a sentence of imprisonment is the recommended sentence.

Principles and purposes of sentencing

[24]      Mrs Hughes, the essential purpose of imposing sentence today is to hold you accountable for the harm you have caused both to Mr Hughes and to the wider community. The sentence that I impose is intended to promote in you a sense of acknowledgement of the harm of your offending, it is to denounce your conduct and to deter both you and any other person from committing the same or a similar offence.

[25]      But I agree with Ms Jarvis that another relevant purpose of sentencing is to assist you in your rehabilitation and reintegration following what has been a lengthy custodial remand of around two years.

Starting point

[26]      In sentencing you, I must set a starting point based on the seriousness of your offending, having particular regard to the aggravating factors of your offending, and by reference to any analogous cases. I must then adjust the starting point—in your case that is by applying deductions to reflect personal mitigating factors—to then reach an end sentence.

[27]      Both the Crown and your defence counsel accept that given the seriousness of the offence you have pleaded guilty to, a sentence of imprisonment strikes as the only appropriate sentence. As regards the length of that sentence, they are not far apart.

[28]      Having said that Ms Jarvis, in her oral submissions this morning, has raised the possibility that a sentence of intensive supervision could be a viable alternative to a full-time custodial sentence.

[29]      A sentence of intensive supervision was mentioned in passing by the author of the pre-sentence report, but it was not one that was formally considered or recommended.

[30]      Ms Brown, for the Crown, acknowledges the difficulties in setting a starting point. She has referred to a number of cases involving what are said to engage broadly similar facts but involving the charge of attempted murder. She submits that the court can otherwise take guidance from R v Taueki.2 Ms Brown submits that having regard to the aggravating factors of your offending, a starting point of two and a half years’ imprisonment is appropriate. Ms Jarvis, on your behalf, generally supports the submission that has been advanced by Ms Brown, but with emphasis on the lower maximum penalty for your offending, compared to the offence of attempted murder, she contends for a starting point of around two years’ imprisonment.

[31]      I have read carefully the attempted murder cases relied on by both counsel but I  am  not  satisfied  that  they  are  analogous.   Those  three  cases,  R  v  Morton,3   R v Faithfull4 and R v Bell,5 each involved the attempted murder of a loved one. They were cases where the offending was motivated by love and compassion and either described as or fall under the umbrella of an attempted mercy killing. I am not satisfied that is a fitting description of your offending.

[32]      I will refer particularly to the facts of R v Morton. Mr Morton was 82 years old when he attempted to kill his 81-year-old wife and to then take his own life in a murder/suicide via carbon monoxide poisoning. They had been married for 57 years. Mrs Morton then suffered significant physical, mental and cognitive disabilities following a stroke. She was unable to move unassisted. Her ability to communicate had been significantly affected. Mr Morton was unhappy with the level of care his

2      R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA).

3      R v Morton [2021] NZHC 1096.

4      R v Faithfull HC Auckland CRI 2007-004-7451, 14 March 2008.

5      R v Bell HC Whanganui S011886, 8 March 2002.

wife was receiving at an aged care facility. He contemplated a murder/suicide via carbon monoxide poisoning. He was described as preoccupied in his concerns for his wife’s situation. He was described as being deeply distressed.

[33]      He was permitted to take Mrs Morton for a walk in her wheelchair from the facility where she was residing. He took her away. He put her in his car, where he had ventilation tubing, rolls of duct tape and a knife. He had written an email to close friends and a family member expressing his frustration with the situation as a result of Mrs Morton’s medical condition and recording his intention to take both their lives. He drove to an unidentified location where he parked the car and took steps to pump exhaust gases into the car. A passing motorist intervened and ultimately Mr Morton was arrested. Immediately on interview, he admitted the facts, telling the police that Mrs Morton had agreed to a joint suicide pact.

[34]      Particularly significant, when I contrast that case with your offending, Davison J referred to Mr Morton’s deep emotional connection to his wife and accepted that following her stroke, Mr Morton’s life had fallen to pieces. The Judge described Mr Morton as suffering immense distress and becoming sleep deprived as a consequence of his wife’s illness. It was accepted that Mr Morton’s remorse was genuine, that he had demonstrated a close and enduring emotional connection with his wife, notwithstanding her condition and her inability to communicate. The gravity of his offending was informed by what was described as his clear motivation of genuine compassion for his wife and his wish to bring an end to her profoundly diminished quality of life. The Judge described the fact that Mr Morton had intended to take his own life as speaking to the depth of the love he had for his wife of nearly 60 years. In that case the Judge took a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment. The Judge also referred to a number of cases that I have reviewed.6

[35]      So to my mind, Morton is a compelling example of an attempted mercy killing, that is a killing motivated by love and compassion for a loved one who is suffering.

6      R v Martin CA199/04, 14 February 2005; R v Crutchley HC Hamilton CRI-2007-069-83, 9 July 2008, R v Faithfull, above n 4; R v Law HC Hamilton T021094, 29 August 2002; R v Davison [2011] NZHC 1677; and R v Karnon HC Auckland S14/99, 29 April 1999.

The suicide factor in that case reflected the depth of the bond between the offender and the victim.

[36]      I need only refer briefly to the other two cases advanced by the Crown. Both fall generally under that same umbrella.

[37]      In R v Faithfull the defendant’s wife had undergone chemotherapy for pancreatic cancer.  She had a poor prognosis and was suffering considerable pain.  Mr Faithfull attempted to kill his wife by placing a pillow over her face as she slept. A starting point of two years and three months’ imprisonment was adopted.

[38]      In R v Bell, Mrs Bell visited her friend in hospital and found that friend unable to speak, unable to recognise people, unable to feed herself and wearing nappies. She attempted to kill her close friend by placing a pillow over her face. The Judge did not specify a starting point but imposed an end sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.

[39]      The common feature of those cases is not present in your offending. The starting points that were adopted (or that can be inferred) reflect the reduced culpability of an offender in an attempted mercy killing. But I do not think you were motivated by love or compassion Mrs Hughes. You were not motivated by a desire to put an end to Mr Hughes’ suffering. Yes, he was suffering advanced Parkinson’s. His dementia, at that stage, had not been diagnosed, and there is no suggestion it was manifesting itself. There is no suggestion he was in pain or discomfort or suffering mental anguish, such that he had given up the will to live.

[40]      Your motivation for attacking Mr Hughes and then attempting to take your own life was, I think, to end your own suffering. You blamed Mr Hughes, at least in part, for that suffering. You felt highly stressed, unsupported by both your family and State agencies. I have no doubt you were stressed, exhausted, and desperate. I have no doubt you had lost any sense of self-worth, but you were not acting out of mercy for Mr Hughes.

[41]      The only other comment I make in relation to the cases I have discussed is that in each of them, the offenders made prompt full and frank admissions consistent with

the love and compassion they felt for their victim. It is notable you did not. In effect you told the police Mr Hughes had got it all wrong, blaming his illness.

[42]      That is why I have not found those cases that have been referred to me as being particularly helpful. But what they do highlight is that regardless of mitigating circumstances, the sanctity of life will invariably, if not inevitably, require the court to adopt a starting point of imprisonment when there is an attempt made to kill another person. I remind myself that the charge for which you are to be sentenced does not allege an intent to kill but in my view that must have been what you had in mind, and it would be contrived to find otherwise. Notwithstanding the lower maximum penalty for the charge to which you have pleaded guilty, in my view your criminal culpability is higher than that of the offenders in the cases I have discussed. A higher starting point must be adopted.

[43]      To test that view I adopt the orthodox considerations in assessing violent offending, by identifying the aggravating factors of your offending and considering the tariff cases.

[44]      The first aggravating factor of your offending is premeditation. This was not spontaneous offending. As Ms Brown has highlighted, you had previously made threats to use that very same knife on Mr Hughes. When the police attended, they found the written notes that I have read. The inference from those notes is that you and Mr Hughes would be dead. I do not think it coincidence that your wills had been left on a cabinet, not in a drawer where they might ordinarily have been stored. I am not suggesting that this was a carefully premeditated or planned murder/suicide, planned to be affected on the evening of 1 February. But I am satisfied that, having reached a point of what you considered to be a point of no return, you put in motion a plan you had previously contemplated. I think it most likely that you decided to act as you did in the hours prior to the attack. So, premeditation and planning are present albeit at a modest level.

[45]      The second aggravating factor is Mr Hughes’ vulnerability. He was an elderly man, in his own bed and asleep when you entered his room with intent to use the knife on him. He had advanced Parkinson’s. You must have believed he was defenceless.

As it transpired, he was not and there was fight. But it is difficult to discern of a more vulnerable victim. This is a significant aggravating factor.

[46]      Closely related to his vulnerability is the third factor, the breach of trust. Surely a patient must be entitled to have the utmost trust in their caregiver. A spouse of some 50 years must be entitled to have the utmost trust in their life partner. So, your breach of trust was present to a high level.

[47]      The final factor is the use of a knife. A knife is a lethal weapon. The fact that you used a knife immediately contrasts your offending with the other cases I have discussed where, for example, a pillow was used to smother a loved one. The use of a knife, in my view, reflects enhanced criminal culpability.

[48]      Those are the aggravating factors. There are however other factors I think relevant in setting a starting point. It is not a mitigating factor, but Mr Hughes did not suffer any real injury. His hands were scratched as he tried to get the knife from you. I also think it telling that when you entered Mr Hughes’ bedroom, he was asleep and you then sat on the end of the bed armed with the knife and you spoke with him. It was then you told him you were going to end it for both of you. Effectively you were forewarning him that you were intending to kill him. You could, if you had been absolutely committed to a murder/suicide scenario, have simply attacked him as he lay in his own bed asleep. But you did not. That leaves some doubt in my mind as to your true intent, or at least the true level of your determination. In a similar vein, I observe that following Mr Hughes’ successful resistance, you did not persist in any attempt to seriously injure him. Whilst the two of you continued to tussle after you left the bedroom, Mr Hughes, in his evidence, did not suggest that you were again trying to stab him with the knife. I think it significant that as soon as you were able, you turned the knife on yourself, knowing he was uninjured, rather than taking any further steps to harm him. I have regard to those factors in setting a starting point.

[49]      The combination of aggravating factors I have discussed would place this offending in band two of Taueki and suggest a starting point range of between five- and 10-years’ imprisonment, albeit adjusted down to reflect you have pleaded guilty

to an attempt7 and not the full offence. Ms Jarvis, in her written submissions, invites the Court to treat this offending  as more appropriately considered as band two of     R v Nuku, which is a tariff case dealing with lesser offending involving intent to injure but including an offence under s 188(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, an offence carrying the same maximum penalty you face of seven years’ imprisonment.8

[50]      I am not sure it is appropriate to consider this offending under Nuku, simply because of the common maximum penalty. In my view, the intent of an offender will often be the best indicator of true culpability. Your admitted intent was not merely to injure but to inflict grievous bodily harm. The use of a large knife, the words you uttered and the notes that were found point to a heinous intent. I prefer the approach that was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Tai v R.9 In that case the defendant attempted to cause grievous bodily harm by driving a car at two victims. Due to his alcohol intake and his subsequently impaired judgment, he missed them and hit a police car instead meaning the two intended victims were physically unharmed. A starting point was adopted by reference to Taueki,10 but reduced by around a third to reflect Mr Tai was charged with an attempt.11

[51]      It is difficult as I say because there are no analogous cases, but in my view your offending falls to the lower end on band two of Taueki. I consider a starting point in the region of five years to be appropriate but reduced to three years and two months to reflect your offence was an attempt and not a complete offence.

[52]      I am satisfied that the starting point I have settled on sits comfortably with the attempted murder cases that I have discussed but distinguished.

7      R v Taueki, above n 2, at [34].

8      Nuku v R [2012] NZCA 584, [2013] 2 NZLR 39.

9      R v Tai [2021] NZHC 2769.

10     R v Taueki, above n 2.

11     R v Tai, above n 9, at [16] and [19].

Personal mitigating factors

Guilty plea

[53]      It is agreed that you are entitled to a deduction to reflect your guilty plea. The Crown say 10 per cent. Ms Jarvis contends for a 15 per cent deduction.

[54]      Your plea was entered only after Mr Hughes gave evidence over five mornings last year. I have no doubt that caused distress to him. It was plainly exhausting for him and it must be reflected in the level of deduction for your guilty plea. But on the other hand, I accept you pleaded promptly once a lesser charge was on offer. In the circumstances I agree with Ms Jarvis that a 15 per cent deduction is appropriate.

Remorse

[55]      You say you are remorseful. Tangible remorse can be recognised by a sentence deduction. But I am not persuaded that you are genuinely remorseful or have truly confronted the seriousness of this offending. If Mr Hughes’ had not reacted as he did, he might well be dead, and you left facing a murder charge. The pre-sentence report records that you consider yourself to be the victim and continue to blame Mr Hughes for the situation you were in and for the decisions you made. You also blame him for the estrangement from your family. Ms Jarvis submits you are not resentful towards Mr Hughes. I sincerely hope that is true. Ms Jarvis says the comments that you made reflect your distress at your overall situation, that is at your age and stage facing a serious criminal charge, being brought before the court and for having spent the last two years in custody. I am not so sure that is a submission that captures where you are at. I am not persuaded a discrete deduction for remorse is available.

Previous good character

[56]      As a 69-year-old defendant appearing in court for the first time you are entitled to a deduction to recognise you have lived a long and law-abiding life. But this is not case where you claim to have done many good deeds in your community. Rather, and I accept, for many, many years you were a supportive wife and caring mother and you devoted many, many years of your life, leading  up to this offending looking after  Mr Hughes. I allow a deduction of 10 per cent to reflect your previous good character.

Health/addiction

[57]      Ms Jarvis submits that a further deduction might be allowed to reflect your health and your past history of alcohol addiction. I have very limited information about either matter. The pre-sentence report refers to you confirming you had drunk alcohol throughout your life but that you do not consider it to be problematic or that you have an addiction. You have confirmed you were not drinking at the time you offended. The probation report does tell me you would benefit from a better understanding of the impact of alcohol on your behaviour, mood and health. I accept, based on the evidence Mr Hughes gave last November, that you had not been drinking for many years until shortly before this offending. Effectively, you fell off the wagon.

[58]      I do not have any information regarding your physical health that might justify a sentence deduction. Similarly, I have no reports that have assessed your mental health. But even without reports, I accept that as the full-time caregiver to Mr Hughes you were heavily burdened by that role and by his illness. I accept without question they were factors in play when you made a very serious attempt to take your own life on 1 February 2023. That you were, throughout this period, mentally unwell is further evidenced by the subsequent attempt you made to end your life while briefly on electronically monitored (EM) bail. I am satisfied you were in a distressed mental state at the time and to recognise your then and ongoing fragile mental health, I allow a further deduction of five per cent.

Time on EM bail

[59]      Ms Jarvis submits a small deduction should be allowed to reflect the five weeks you spent on EM bail in mid-2023. She highlights that during that period you did not breach conditions but, as I have said, you did make a further attempt on your own life and the records tell me you behaved aggressively towards a nurse while in hospital. Given the length of the time you were on EM bail and those matters, I am not prepared to make an allowance to recognise time on EM bail.

Imminent release and the need for special conditions

[60]      Mrs Hughes, from a starting point of three years and two months’ imprisonment, I have allowed total deductions of 30 per cent. That leads me to a sentence, rounded down, of 26 months’ imprisonment.

[61]      Because of the time you have served on remand that would mean you would go almost immediately to the Parole Board, and you would be released with your sentence to expire in less than two months. I have expressed to counsel during the course of this sentencing my concerns about how you will cope when released into the community. I agree with counsel and the report writer that successful reintegration is going to require support and structure. As matters stand, absent support and oversight from Corrections, you are isolated. In my view, to release you into the community without support structures in place is not in your interests. It is not in your family’s interest. It is not in the community’s interests.

[62]      Ms Jarvis has made a submission this morning that in those circumstances, a viable alternative is a sentence of intensive supervision. I accept that might be seen as an appropriate sentence to provide the necessary support for you in the community. But in my view, your offending is simply too serious to permit that sentence. Intensive supervision is not a sentence that would adequately denounce your offending.

[63]      I consider the support and oversight that is required to assist you in reintegration and rehabilitation can only be achieved in a manner that is consistent with the principles and purposes of sentencing through the imposition of post-release conditions. I can only impose those conditions if I impose a short-term sentence, that is, one that is 24 months or shorter.  Given the  end sentence that  I have  settled of  26 months is so close to a short-term sentence, I have resolved to allow a further two-month deduction. In my view, the least restrictive and appropriate sentence for you is one of 24 months’ imprisonment.

Result

[64]Mrs Hughes, can you please stand.

[65]      Katherine Hughes, on the charge of attempting to wound Mr Hughes with intent to cause him grievous bodily harm you are sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. I impose the following special conditions of your release, conditions to expire six months after your sentence expiry date:

(a)you are to attend and complete an assessment with a departmental psychologist and to complete any treatment recommended by that assessment to the satisfaction of a probation officer and treatment provider;

(b)you are to attend and complete any programme/treatment or counselling to address your use of alcohol to the satisfaction of a probation officer;

(c)you are not to possess or consume alcohol or to use drugs not prescribed to you by a medical practitioner; and

(d)you are not to contact the victim of your offending directly or indirectly.

[66]      Finally, Mrs Hughes, the Crown apply for a protection order under s 123B of the Sentencing Act 2002.   That is an order that would prohibit any contact with     Mr Hughes. Ms Jarvis, on your behalf, confirms you do not oppose the making of that order. I accept  that  it  is  both  appropriate  and  necessary  for  the  protection  of Mr Hughes. I make an order accordingly.

[67]You may stand down.

...................................................

Eaton J

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors, Christchurch

Counsel:
O K Jarvis, Barrister, Christchurch