[1] In 2013 Mr Hallett stood trial for the murder of Rodney Tahu in August 1979. The Crown’s evidence against Mr Hallett included a statement he made to his former wife (now Mrs Sharpe) in 1979, shortly after Mr Tahu was murdered. This statement was tantamount to a confession that he had committed the murder.

[2] In 1979 the common law and the Evidence Act 1908 (the 1908 Act) prevented Mrs Sharpe from giving evidence against Mr Hallett on the charge of murder. Without her evidence, the prosecution case against Mr Hallett was weak. A charge was laid against him, but at a committal hearing in the Magistrate’s Court in October 1979 the charge was dismissed for want of proof.

[3] The Evidence Act 2006 (the 2006 Act) removed the barrier prohibiting one spouse from testifying against his or her spouse. After the enactment of this legislation, the Police laid a fresh charge of murder against Mr Hallett. At his trial the Crown proposed to call Mrs Sharpe to give evidence of the confession Mr Hallett had made to her. Mr Hallett’s counsel took the view that her evidence was admissible under s 71 of the 2006 Act, so no pre-trial steps were taken to have the Court determine if this evidence was indeed admissible. During the course of the trial, however, Mr Hallett changed his stance. He objected to the admissibility of Mrs Sharpe’s evidence on the grounds that the 2006 Act did not apply; and therefore the legal impediment that had prevented her from testifying earlier was still in place. Time was made available to hear and determine this objection.

[4] The question I had to determine was whether s 71 of the 2006 Act enables a willing witness to testify in a criminal trial against a former spouse about matters that she learned from that spouse at a time when the law precluded her from giving this testimony. This entailed an analysis of the protection that the law in 1979 gave to spousal communications. If the protection were characterised as an evidential or procedural rule, there would be little or no difficulty in finding that the 2006 Act would apply: see R v…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Hallett

Details

AGLC: R v Hallett [2013] NZHC 1076
Case: [2013] NZHC 1076
Decision Date: 14 May 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved a criminal trial for the murder of Rodney Tahu, committed in August 1979. The key evidence against the accused, Menzies Reginald John Hallett, was a confession he made to his former wife, Mrs Sharpe, shortly after the murder. Initially, Mrs Sharpe was precluded from testifying against Hallett due to the Evidence Act 1908, which prevented spouses from testifying against each other. However, after the Evidence Act 2006 came into force, the Crown laid a fresh charge against Hallett, seeking to have Mrs Sharpe testify against him. Hallett objected to this, arguing that the 2006 Act should not apply to the events that occurred before its enactment. The court had to determine whether the 2006 Act allowed the admission of Mrs Sharpe's evidence and whether it should be excluded as a confidential communication under the 2006 Act. The court found that the 2006 Act was a procedural change that applied to all criminal proceedings, regardless of when the events occurred. It also determined that spousal immunity was not a substantive right or entitlement but rather a procedural rule, which meant that the 2006 Act could apply retrospectively. The court further ruled that Mrs Sharpe's evidence should not be excluded as confidential information under the 2006 Act, as the public interest in disclosing the communication outweighed the interest in protecting the relationship between the former spouses.

Orders