R v Haerewa

Case

[2019] NZHC 2663

18 October 2019

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2017-090-6299

[2019] NZHC 2663

THE QUEEN

v

BENNY HAEREWA

Hearing: 18 October 2019

Appearances:

S Teppett and F Culliney for the Crown J Verry for the Defendant

Judgment:

18 October 2019


SENTENCING NOTES OF POWELL J


R v HAEREWA [2019] NZHC 2663 [18 October 2019]

[1]                   Benny Haerewa you appear for sentence today having pleaded guilty to a number of charges specifically:

(a)one charge of threatening to kill;1

(b)five charges of assault with intent to injure;2

(c)three charges of assault with a weapon;3

(d)one charge of intentional damage;4

(e)one charge of sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection;5

(f)two charges of male assaults female;6

(g)one charge of common assault;7 and

(h)one charge of assault on a child.8

Strike warning

[2]                   I note that as the unlawful sexual connection charge is a qualifying offence under the three-strikes regime, you have received a first strike warning upon entry of conviction on that offence.

Factual background

[3]                   The offending for which you are being sentenced took place while you were in a relationship with the primary victim. You were in this relationship for approximately five years. The offending occurred during the last two years of that relationship, while


1      Crimes Act 1961, s 306: maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment.

2      Section 193: maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment.

3      Section 202C: maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.

4      Section 269(2)(a): maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment.

5      Section 128(1)(b): maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment.

6      Section 194(b): maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.

7      Section 196: maximum penalty of one years’ imprisonment.

8      Section 194(a): maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.

you were living together with your young daughter and the primary victim’s other children.

[4]                   The offending which took place over a lengthy period included you physically and ultimately sexually assaulting the primary victim, and physically abusing her children as well as causing significant damage to the home. I will set out more details of that offending when assessing the aggravating factors later in these notes.

Purposes and principles of sentencing

[5]                   The Sentencing Act 2002 sets out the purposes and principles of sentencing. The primary purposes of sentencing in this case are to hold you accountable for the harm that you have done to all of the victims;9 to promote in you a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of, that harm;10 to denounce your conduct;11 and to deter you and others from committing similar types of offences12 and of particular importance in this case, to protect the community from you.13

[6]                   The principles of sentencing that are of particular relevance in this case are the need to take into account the gravity of your offending, including your degree of culpability14 and to take into account the seriousness of the type of offence in comparison with other types of offences.15 It is also necessary to take into account the general desirability of consistency with appropriate sentencing levels16 and to take into account any information provided to the Court concerning the effect of the offending on the victims.17 The Court is also required to impose the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances.18


9      Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(a).

10     Section 7(1)(b).

11     Section 7(1)(e).

12     Section 7(1)(f).

13     Section 7(1)(g).

14     Section 8(a).

15     Section 8(b).

16     Section 8(e).

17     Section 8(f).

18     Section 8(g).

Approach to sentencing

[7]                   As you have heard today, and as both counsel submitted, the central question before the Court is whether you should be sentenced to imprisonment for a fixed or finite term, or whether you should be sentenced to preventive detention. Preventive detention means that you would be imprisoned indefinitely and released only when the Parole Board determines that you no longer pose a threat to community safety.

[8]                   The Court is required to make a decision about what type of sentence is appropriate by first determining what an appropriate finite sentence would be. Determining this involves undertaking three steps. First, I must determine what is called the starting point. The starting point is a term of imprisonment that reflects the seriousness of the offending to which you have pleaded guilty. The second calculation I must do involves adjusting that starting point to take into account your relevant personal circumstances. Finally, I must consider whether a discount is appropriate for your guilty plea and if so, how much.

Submissions from counsel

[9]                   It is accepted by both counsel that the lead offence is that of unlawful sexual connection and that the appropriate starting point for that offending is in the vicinity of six years’ and six months’ imprisonment. It is submitted that the Court should then uplift for the physical assaults on the primary victim and for the charge of intentional damage resulting in a global starting point of between nine and a half and 10 years.

[10]               It is also accepted by both counsel that this Court should impose cumulative sentences for the physical violence against the children. The reason for a cumulative sentence, being a sentence that follows after the completion of another sentence, the sexual offending and the violence against the primary victim is that, it is submitted, it is important not to lose sight of the fact of the specific offending against the children. It is also submitted that the starting point for that offending must be uplifted for your previous convictions for assaulting one of your former partner’s children in 1996 and 1999, and, in particular, the circumstances of the manslaughter of that child. As a result, both counsel submit that the end sentence for the assaults on the children after considering uplifts ought to be in the vicinity of two years’ imprisonment.

Setting the starting point

Sexual offending

[11]               Considering counsel’s submissions, I begin by turning to the aggravating features of your sexual offending. The guideline judgment for offending involving sexual violation is a case called R v AM.19 In that case the Court of Appeal set out various culpability assessment factors which I have to apply in assessing the seriousness of your offending today.

[12]In your case, of particular relevance, are:

(a)Scale of the offending/particular cruelty:20 prior to the sexual violation, you commenced a degrading and cruel assault of the primary victim. You forced her to sit outside your home on a deck chair while you offered her for twenty dollars to anyone who walked past. You then brought her a pot of water and some old bread, placed them on the ground and told her that she should be treated like a dog.

(b)The second relevant factor is the threats and actual violence that then followed:21

(i)you told the primary victim that she was going to die and wrapped a cord around her neck, pulling it tight. She begged you to stop and told you that she would do anything if he did not kill her;

(ii)not surprisingly this behaviour made the primary victim feel powerless and threatened, and provided context to her then performing oral sex on you. You laid back on the couch, pulled your pants down and exposed your penis. You told the primary victim “you know what to do” and told her that that was all her


19     R v AM [2010] NZCA 114, [2010] 2 NZLR 750.

20     At [47]-[49] and Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(e).

21     At [38]-[41] and s 9(1)(a) and (b).

mouth was good for. The primary victim, fearing for her life, performed oral sex on you.

(c)The third factor is the vulnerability of the primary victim:22 you and the primary victim were in a domestic relationship and living together. The Court of Appeal has recently held that there is an inherent element of vulnerability in offending such as this which takes place in the family home where an occupant is entitled to feel and be safe. The Court held:23

… The family home is a place where an occupant is entitled to feel, and be, safe…. Violence occurring in the complainant’s home will normally be an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. That may be because of home invasion, but it does not depend on external intrusion of that kind. … Co-occupation as a family unit involves a contract of mutual care and nurture. Necessarily it also involves inherent vulnerability to opportunistic breach of that social contract when physical violence is employed. One cannot realistically or effectively lock the door against a co-occupant. Where the victim is a family member, dependent on the offender for emotional and physical support, the alternative aggravating factor of vulnerability almost inevitably will be triggered. It would be a rare case of family violence where that was not so.

(d)Finally there is harm to the primary victim:24 that obviously includes psychological harm which is clearly inherent in offending of this kind.

[13]It is agreed, and I accept, that there are no mitigating features for that offending.

[14]               In their written submissions both counsel identified a number of broadly comparable cases to assist in determining the starting point for the sexual violence offending against the primary victim.25

[15]               Having looked at those cases, I conclude the present offending is not as serious as the cases noted and I am satisfied it clearly falls within band one of R v AM. Band


22     At [42]-[43] and s 9(1)(g).

23     Solicitor-General v Hutchinson [2018] NZCA 162, approved in Everett v R [2019] NZCA 68 at [27].

24     R v AM [2010] NZCA 114, [2010] 2 NZLR 750 at [44] and Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(d).

25     The Queen v Jason Warren [2017] NZHC 1465; and Tamati v R [2018] NZCA 463.

one is offending that attracts 6 to 8 years and is appropriate for offending where the aggravating features are present to a limited extent.26 Taking into consideration the aggravating features I have noted, I consider a starting point of 6 1/2 years’ imprisonment is appropriate for the lead offence of unlawful sexual connection. I will now turn to whether this should be uplifted to account for the physical violence against the primary victim.

Physical violence offending

[16]               The physical violence against the primary victim included threats to kill her while she was pregnant with your child and frequent punching of her in the head and face, causing black eyes and bruising. These assaults appear to have been driven by your jealously of her talking to other males. This included, on one occasion, punching her in the face in the car as you were driving to one of the children’s basketball games. You did this because the primary victim had been communicating with the coach. As a result, the primary victim withdrew her child from that basketball game.

[17]               Aggravating features in respect of your physical violence included threatening the primary victim with weapons (including a wooden broom and a tomahawk) and you using weapons to attack the primary victim including attacks to her head, causing harm and injury and also included an abuse of trust over a prolonged period. I agree with the Crown that the aggravating features of your violent offending, and its prolonged nature, means that this offending in isolation would invariably attract a starting point of up to 5 years imprisonment.27 When considering the totality principle, however, I consider an uplift of three years’ imprisonment for the violent offending is appropriate. This is accepted by Mrs Verry. This takes the starting point for the combined sexual and violent offending to one of 9 1/2 years’ imprisonment.

Intentional damage of home

[18]               I turn now to the intentional damage of your home. Police noted when they visited the property that there was significant damage to most walls including holes,


26     At [90] and [93].

27     Tiplady-Koroheke v R [2012] NZCA 477, Goodman v R [2016] NZCA 64, Latu v Police [2017] NZHC 363.

carvings and writing on those walls. While you were living at this home with the primary victim, you would carve into the walls and doors messages about being a child killer. You would also damage the walls and doors by hitting them with a tomahawk and other objects. This caused extensive damage to the property. The Crown submits that this was a mechanism by which you asserted power and control over the occupants of the house. The infliction of this damage could only have induced fear into the primary victim and her children.

[19]               There is no tariff decision for intentional damage. However, both counsel agree that an uplift of 6 months’ imprisonment is appropriate to reflect this offending. This takes the starting point for the sexual, violent and damage to property offending to one of 10 years’ imprisonment.

Physical violence against the children

[20]               With regard to the issue of physical violence against the children. For the reasons I have already set out, the offending against the children needs to be considered separately from your other offending against the primary victim and a cumulative sentence needs to be imposed.

[21]               The information before the Court indicates that you frequently punched and kicked the primary victim’s 14 year-old son. On one occasion you kicked him while he was under the coffee table. On another you punched him one morning because he was not getting up to go to school. You also frequently slapped her second son, when he was between the age of seven and nine years old. You threw a can of fizzy drink at the nine-year-old’s head. On another occasion, you slapped him in the head while you were visiting your sick mother. As a result of these various assaults, the children suffered pain and bruising.

[22]               The aggravating features of the physical offending against the children include the use of a weapon (namely the fizzy drink can); breaching the trust inherent in the nature of the relationship; and the vulnerability of the victims because of their age, living situation, and physical disparity.

[23]               Furthermore, pursuant to s 9A of the Sentencing Act, it is necessary for this Court to have regard to the fact that the offending involved violence to a child under

14. Considering the circumstances of this offending and the aggravating features present, a starting point of two years is appropriate for this offending.28

[24]               As a result, the combined starting point for all of the offences is therefore 12 years.

Personal circumstances of Mr Haerewa

Aggravating factors

[25]               I now turn to your personal circumstances. I begin with the aggravating factors. There is no dispute that you have a number of relevant previous convictions including, as I have noted, injuring with intent to injure and a very serious conviction for manslaughter. The injuring with intent to injure conviction was when you assaulted the child, then two-years old for which you were sentenced to imprisonment and supervision. During that sentence you completed a course in anger management and self-development.29 Following your release from prison, you proceeded to violently assault the same child over a four-month period. As a result of those injuries, the child died and you were sentenced for a charge of manslaughter for which you received 12 years imprisonment.30

[26]               In light of these previous convictions, I agree with counsel that an uplift of six months to the starting point on the two years’ imprisonment for the assault on the child victims is appropriate.

Mitigating factors

[27]               With regard to the mitigating factors on your behalf, Mrs Verry has noted that these include your whānau, community and cultural background. Much of that background is outlined in Ms Isaacson’s Psychological Assesment Report. You are


28     M v R [2010] NZCA 94; Ranfurly v Police [2017] NZHC 2077; Anderson v R [2016] NZHC 2386’; and SM v Police [2016] NZHC 960.

29     R v Haerewa S5/99, HC Napier, 18 August 1999 at 5-6.

30     At 9.

the fifth of six children growing up in a family environment characterised by domestic violence, financial strain, parental alcohol abuse and a harsh physical punishment environment. Ms Isaacson also suggests that maternal alcohol was present during your mother’s pregnancy with you. Ms Isaacson also notes that your father was predominantly absent from home due to imprisonment and you were frequently separated from your parents.

[28]               Gang affiliation was also reinforced through your family connections. Although you were never a patched gang member you prospected for the Mongrel Mob from about 15 years old. There seems little dispute that as a result of that gang culture, anti-social and violent acts were somewhat normalised.

[29]               Having considered the matters that have been raised it is clear that none of this in any way excuses the offending that you have committed. However, the Court recognises that discounts can be given for the combined effects of the difficulties in upbringing, which has clearly effected your neurodevelopmental connections and ability to control your behaviour, particularly in a family environment. Although  Mrs Verry sought a discount of 10 per cent, I agree with the Crown that a discount of 5 per cent is more appropriate in this situation.

Guilty plea

[30]               The third part of the analysis is to assess the discount that should be given for a guilty plea. You were originally charged on 4 December 2017. Your guilty plea was entered in May 2019, three weeks before your trial was due to commence. But this followed lengthy resolution discussions and also a propensity application which determined that your manslaughter conviction could be entered into evidence.

[31]               Taking account of these various circumstances, I am satisfied that a 20 per cent discount for the guilty plea is appropriate, as suggested by counsel.

Summary of finite sentence

[32]This, by my calculation, results in a total finite sentence of 9 years being:

(a)7 years and 7 months’ in relation to the sexual offending; the violent offending; and the damage to property; and

(b)1 year and 5 months’ in respect of the offences against the children.

Minimum period of imprisonment

[33]               Given this position, where an offender receives a fixed sentence of imprisonment of more than two years, the Court may order that an offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment, which is a minimum period longer than the one- third of the length of the sentence that is the default period under the Parole Act 2000.31 The Court may impose a minimum period of imprisonment if it is satisfied that the one-third default minimum is insufficient either to hold an offender accountable for the harm done, to denounce conduct, to deter the offender or others, or to protect the community.32

[34]               It is clear that your offending is serious. You have previous serious convictions and given the nature of the victims I am satisfied there is a special need to protect the community and I do not consider that a non-parole period of one-third of the sentence would be sufficient to meet the sentencing objectives that I have mentioned.

[35]               In this, I agree with counsel that a minimum period of imprisonment of two thirds of the sentence is appropriate in order to hold you accountable for the harm done to the victims of the offending, to denounce your offending and to operate as a deterrent to others. I therefore fix a minimum period of imprisonment at six years.

Preventive detention

[36]               As I noted at the outset, and as you heard in my discussions with counsel today, the primary issue between the Crown and your defence counsel was whether preventive detention should be imposed.


31     Sentencing Act 2002, s 86(1).

32     Section 86(2).

[37]               Both counsel focussed their respective submissions on whether preventive detention was appropriate in your case. But as you heard me discuss with them, there was a preliminary question to be determined. This arises because of the wording of s 87 of the Sentencing Act which provides:

(1)The purpose of preventive detention is to protect the community from those who pose a significant and ongoing risk to the safety of its members.

(2)This section applies if—

(a)a person is convicted of a qualifying sexual or violent offence (as that term is defined in subsection (5)); and

(b)the person was 18 years of age or over at the time of committing the offence; and

(c)the court is satisfied that the person is likely to commit another qualifying sexual or violent offence if the person is released at the sentence expiry date (as specified in subpart 3 of Part 1 of the Parole Act 2002) of any sentence, other than a sentence under this section, that the court is able to impose.

(3)The High Court may, on the application of the prosecutor or on its own motion, impose a sentence of preventive detention on the offender.

(4)When considering whether to impose a sentence of preventive detention, the court must take into account—

(a)      any pattern of serious offending disclosed by the offender's history; and

(b)      the seriousness of the harm to the community caused by the offending; and

(c)      information indicating a tendency to commit serious offences in future; and

(d)      the absence of, or failure of, efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offending; and

(e)      the principle that a lengthy determinate sentence is preferable if this provides adequate protection for society.

(5)In this section and in sections 88 and 90, qualifying sexual or violent offence means—

(a)      a sexual crime under Part 7 of the Crimes Act 1961 punishable by 7 or more years' imprisonment; and includes a crime under section 144A or section 144C of that Act; or

(b)      an offence against any of sections 171, 173 to 176, 188, 189(1), 191, 198 to 199, 208 to 210, 234, 235, or [236] of the Crimes Act 1961.

[38]                With reference to that section, it is clear that before a court can consider whether preventive detention is appropriate for any particular offender (which is the power granted under s 87(3) of the Sentencing Act), whereupon the Court would then take into account the five matters set out in s 87(4), the Court must first be satisfied in terms of s 87(2). In particular the Court must be satisfied that an offender has been convicted of a qualifying sexual or violent offence, that the offender is over 18, and, most importantly in terms of this case, the Court must be “satisfied that [the offender] is likely to commit another qualifying sexual or violent offence if the person is released at the sentence expiry date”.

[39]               Looking at these three matters, which effectively establish a threshold that must be met before preventive detention can be imposed, there is no dispute that the first two requirements are met. On the third matter Mr Teppett submits that there is sufficient material before the Court for me to be satisfied in terms of s 87(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act, that you will commit another qualifying sexual or violent offence if you are released at your sentence expiry date. As you have heard Mr Teppett does not suggest that you will commit another qualifying sexual offence, but he does say it is likely you will commit a qualifying violent offence.

[40]               What is a qualifying violent offence is set out at s 87(5)(b) of the Sentencing Act and you have heard us discuss those today. Within that list Mr Teppett has suggested that the particular offences that you are likely to commit are manslaughter,33 attempt to murder,34 wounding with intent,35 injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm36 or aggravated wounding or injury.37 In Mr Teppett’s submission the section 87(2)(c) threshold is actually a low threshold for the Court to be satisfied.


33     Crimes Act 1961, s 171.

34     Section 173.

35     Section 188.

36     Section 189(1).

37     Section 191.

[41]               In submitting that the threshold has been satisfied the Crown relies in particular on your previous criminal history establishing a pattern, and Mr Teppett relies particularly on what occurred between 1996 and 1999, and again between 2014 and 2017, and goes on to suggest that the offending for which I am sentencing you today would have been much worse if it had not been brought to a stop at the time that it was.

[42]               The second source of material relied on by the Crown are the reports of the three specialists who have assessed you in recent times. There are Dr Krishna Pillai, a consultant psychiatrist, Dr John Jacques, a consultant forensic psychiatrist and    Ms Anja Isaacson, a clinical psychologist. As Mr Teppett has noted there is really no dispute among the specialists that you are at a high risk of violent offending and despite a large amount of rehabilitative effort and treatment to date, this has not been successful in alleviating that risk. The Crown also relies upon the report from the Probation Service when you were released at the end of your manslaughter sentence in 2011 which confirmed the opinion of the Probation Service that, at that time, you were still at a very high-risk of re-offending.

[43]               Likewise, the Provision of Advice to the Courts Report (PAC report) that was undertaken prior to this sentence also indicates that you are at a risk of further offending.

[44]               Having considered those matters and the detailed submissions provided by Mr Teppett, I am however not satisfied that the threshold in s 87(2)(c) has been met. First, while there is no dispute that the consensus of medical opinion is that you are at high risk of violent offending that, with respect, is not the issue. I am required to be satisfied that it is likely that you will not just offend, or violently offend, or even commit serious violence offences, but that you will commit one of the qualifying violent offences as I have set out earlier. It is on that point that there is really no information given by the specialists. Their overall focus was on whether preventive detention should be imposed, not on the qualifying threshold, and while Dr Jacques did refer to qualifying violent offences he was not in any way specific about that and therefore his comments are of limited assistance to the Court.

[45]               I have considered the Crown’s request as to whether I should grant leave for the various report writers to adjourn this hearing and allow the various report writers to provide further evidence. I decline that application. It is a principle of sentencing that the Crown must be ready to proceed on the day of sentencing, but more fundamentally this is a question for me as the Judge, rather than a question for the specialists.

[46]               The other aspect of the medical evidence that presents difficulties is that the assessment that I am required to undertake in terms of s 87(2)(c) is not whether you will re-offend or even re-offend in terms of a qualifying offence now, but whether you will do so at the end of the sentence, which as I have indicated will be somewhere between six and nine years away. As Dr Pillai noted in his report:

In completing a risk assessment for the purpose of this report the assessor is in a technically and ethically difficult position. The assessment of risk is required at the point of release to the community which may be at the end of lengthy finite sentence many years in the future. It is possible that risk of violence could have exacerbated or ameliorated at that point depending on Mr Haerewa’s condition at that time and the supports available to him and other circumstances in the community at that time. …

[47]               In undertaking my own assessment as to that future risk I do not accept      Mr Teppett’s submission that there is a definable pattern in your offending upon which I can conclude it is likely you will commit a qualifying violent offence when you are released from prison. Your offending does not establish a steady escalation, nor indeed some sort of pattern which shows you alternating between lower level offending and then building up to serious offending, such that I could be satisfied that the likely next step for you would be a qualifying violent offence.

[48]               The reality is, in terms of the information that I have before me today, is that notwithstanding the seriousness of your current offending, and by any standards it is very serious, it is nonetheless less serious, and in particular with regard to the offending against the children, than the absolutely horrific offending that took place between 1996 and 1999 where there was clearly an escalation in your offending behaviour. It appears clear that the treatment that you have participated in, while it has not entirely prevented your re-offending, has at least provided some control and

some ability for you to limit the severity of the offending – notwithstanding it was prolonged, the severity was significantly reduced.

[49]               In circumstances where, as Ms Isaacson has noted, there remains scope for future treatment particularly as regards to family violence type offending, as well as the possibility of extended supervision orders at the time of your release if the risks at that time are still perceived to be high, I am unable to be satisfied that you are likely to commit a qualifying violent offence. Given this conclusion with regard to the threshold test in s 87(2)(c), I conclude s 87 does not therefore apply to you and the sentence of preventive detention is therefore not available.

Sentence

[50]Mr Haerewa please stand.

[51]For the reasons that I have outlined today you are sentenced to:

(a)7 years and 7 months’ imprisonment for the sexual and violent offending against the primary victim, and the intentional damage offending;38

(b)you are then sentenced to a further 1 year and 5 months’ imprisonment for the violent offending against the child victims. This will be served cumulatively on the sentence for the sexual and violent offending against the primary victim and the intentional damage offending39

(c)This means you are sentenced to a total of 9 years’ imprisonment.

(d)A minimum period of imprisonment is imposed and fixed at 6 years.


38     See Charges 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 as set out in Appendix A.

39     See Charges 13, 14 and 15 as set out in Appendix A.

[52]Mr Haerewa you may stand down.


Powell J

Charge 1 1 years’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 2 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 3 1 year 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 4 1 years’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 5 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 6 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 7 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 8 7 years’ 7 months imprisonment

(Cumulative with Charge 13, 14

and 15))

Charge 9 1 years’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 10 1 years’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 11 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 12 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 8)
Charge 13 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 15)
Charge 14 6 months’ imprisonment (Concurrent with Charge 15)
Charge 15 1 year 5 months’ imprisonment

(Cumulative with Charge 1, 2, 3,

4, 5, 6, 7, 8)

Total

(Sum of cumulative sentences)

= 9 years’ imprisonment

6 years’ to be served without parole
 
Appendix A: Benny Haerewa – Details of Sentence
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Cases Citing This Decision

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Cases Cited

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Statutory Material Cited

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Everett v R [2019] NZCA 68
R v Warren [2017] NZHC 1465