R v Greer - [2013] NZHC 3025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CRI 2013-009-5283 [2013] NZHC 3025

REGINA

v

KEVAN BERIA GREER

Hearing: 14 November 2013

Appearances: M Elliott for Crown
K J Gray and A Trinder for Accused

Judgment: 14 November 2013

SENTENCING OF FOGARTY J

[1] Mr Greer, you face charges of:

Possession of Class C cannabis for supply;

Supplying Class C controlled drug (cannabis) to persons under the age of 18, as a representative charge;

Dealing to people under 18 for sexual exploitation, another representative charge;

Possession of Class B drug (Ritalin) for supply;

Possession of Class B drug (morphine) for supply.

[2] These charges relate to the possession and supply of drugs to school students from your Toyota van. The vehicle was fitted with curtains, which meant the interior
could not be viewed from the outside.

R v GREER [2013] NZHC 3025 [14 November 2013]

[3] The police observed you parked outside Burnside High School, during school hours, in May of this year. The police approached the vehicle and executed a search warrant. Two 16 year old school girls were inside the vehicle. Both were there to get cannabis. The police searched the vehicle and found: 155 grams of cannabis, with an estimated street value of between $1,300 and $3,100; 53 x 60 milligram morphine sulphate tablets; 53 x 20 milligram Ritalin tablets; a large amount of money in cash, which is the subject to a dispute as to whether that was from drug dealing or legitimate business activities; a digital camera and various other items. The digital camera contained 17 photographs, showing six different females in various states of undress, exposing either breasts or genitals.

[4] The text data from your phone indicates you had supplied cannabis to more than 20 school aged students between January 2013 and May 2013. None of the victims of the offending wanted to provide victim impact statements.

[5] Mr Greer, the sentencing in this Court is in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act, passed by Parliament in 2002. I agree with Mr Elliott for the Crown that the principle sentencing purpose for drug offences is denunciation and deterrence, personal factors being secondary to that.

[6] This offending has had an enormous impact on your family, and on your children. It is regrettable that some persons in the community have sought to take out their anger at this offending against your children. Unfortunately, I can do nothing about that. It is to your credit that your family is supporting you. I have read those letters in support. But, for the purposes of sentencing, the law is clear that it is denunciation and deterrence, with personal factors being secondary to that.

[7] As Ms Gray acknowledged, and I think Mr Elliott did too, this is actually a difficult sentencing exercise. I am very pleased that both Mr Elliott and Ms Gray and her team have met prior to this hearing and worked through the issues. As a result, there is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Greer

Details

AGLC: R v Greer [2013] NZHC 3025
Case: [2013] NZHC 3025
Decision Date: 14 November 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kevan Berla Greer was convicted of drug possession and supply, and of dealing to people under the age of 18 for sexual exploitation. The matter came before Fogarty J in the High Court of New Zealand, Christchurch Registry. The main legal issues before the court were the appropriate starting point for sentencing, and the appropriate uplift for the offending by reason of supply to persons under the age of 18. The court was also required to determine whether there should be an uplift for the sexual exploitation charge.

The court considered the quantity of drugs involved to be the dominant principle of drug offending. The court accepted the Crown's submissions that the proven offending was a relatively small scale exercise, and adopted a starting point of 2 years. The court also agreed with counsel that there should be an uplift by reason of supplying to students, and accepted a figure of 1 year. The court was satisfied that there should be an 18 month uplift for the charges in respect of Ritalin and morphine, and a 1½ year uplift for the sexual exploitation charge. The court then applied the totality principle, and considered whether the indicative sentence should be reduced. The court was satisfied that the sentence should not be reduced. The court accepted the Crown's submission that there ought to be a 25% discount for the defendant's guilty pleas, which brought the end sentence down to 4½ years.

The court sentenced the defendant to 3 years for the lead charge of supplying cannabis to persons under the age of 18, 1½ years for the charge of dealing to people under the age of 18 for sexual exploitation, 2 years for the charge of possession of Class C (cannabis) for supply, 1 year for the charge of possession of Class B drug (Ritalin) for supply, and 1 year for the possession of Class B (morphine) for supply. The sentences for the latter three charges were concurrent. The court ordered the defendant's van to be forfeited, and ordered the destruction of the drugs and paraphernalia. The question of the forfeiture of the large sum of cash found in the defendant's possession was to be heard at a later date.

Orders