R v Gordon-Smith (No 2) (on appeal from R v King)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 32/2008
[2009] NZSC 20

DEBORAH GORDON-SMITH

v

THE QUEEN

Hearing:3 December 2008

Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Wilson JJ

Counsel:G J X McCoy and K H Cook for Appellant


D B Collins QC and C Brown for Crown
D J Boldt as Amicus Curiae

Judgment:23 March 2009 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The appeal is dismissed.

BThe formal answer given by the Court of Appeal to question (iii) is amended to read:

The Crown should disclose to the defence any previous convictions of a potential juror known to it, if the previous conviction gives rise to a real risk that the juror might be prejudiced against the accused or in favour of the Crown.  Disclosure should not otherwise be made.  

REASONS

Para No

Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping and Wilson JJ  [1]
McGrath J  [25]

ELIAS CJ, BLANCHARD, TIPPING AND WILSON JJ

(Given by Tipping J)

Introduction

[1]       This appeal concerns the practice colloquially known as jury vetting.[1]  Both the Crown and the defence have statutory rights on the empanelling of a jury to challenge prospective jurors on a peremptory basis (as well as for cause).  They are supplied in advance by the Court with a list of prospective jurors.  Both Crown and defence are able to make such inquiries as they think fit, and as are consistent with law, to obtain information upon which challenges may be exercised.  In some parts of the country, in preparation for trial, the police examine the jury panel list to see whether any potential juror has a criminal conviction.[2]  This case is concerned with that process.  The police may also obtain other information about individual jurors but we are not concerned with the lawfulness of that kind of inquiry. Where jury vetting is undertaken by the police, they supply an annotated jury list to the Crown setting out the result of their inquiries.  The Crown prosecutor uses the information supplied to assist in exercising the Crown’s rights of peremptory challenge. 

[1]The expression “jury vetting” is somewhat loaded but, while recognising that fact, it is convenient to use it as shorthand for the process whereby the police ascertain whether potential jurors have previous non‑disqualifying convictions. 

[2]At present this is not a universal practice throughout the country, largely on account of resourcing issues. 

[2]       The appeal raises two questions.  The first is whether jury vetting by the police is lawful.  It has two parts – whether the police may obtain information about the criminal history of prospective jurors from law enforcement information held by government agencies, and whether they may then pass it on to the Crown.  The second question is whether and to what extent the Crown, on receiving such information, should supply it to the defence. 

[3]       In the High Court[3] Fogarty J ruled that the process of jury vetting by the police was unlawful because there was no sufficient statutory basis for it.…

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Details
Case
[2009] NZSC 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Gordon-Smith (No 2), the Supreme Court of New Zealand addressed the legality of jury vetting practices and the extent to which information obtained during such vetting should be disclosed to the defence. The Court ruled that the practice of jury vetting by the police, where they ascertain whether prospective jurors have previous convictions and provide this information to the Crown, is lawful. The Court found that the police are entitled to access such information under the Privacy Act 1993, as it pertains to their law enforcement duties, which include assisting the Crown in the prosecution of indictable crimes. The Court also held that the Crown should disclose to the defence any previous convictions of a potential juror if such a conviction gives rise to a real risk that the juror might be prejudiced against the accused or in favour of the Crown. This approach balances the accused's right to a fair trial with the privacy interests of jurors. The Court further concluded that the system for selection of the jury should be regulated to ensure it is not perceived as favouring the Crown, which could compromise the impartiality of the jury. The Court's decision mandated the Solicitor-General to prepare guidelines for prosecutors to assist in implementing these principles.

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