R v G - [2014] NZHC 2801

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF A VICTIM AND CONNECTED PERSONS PURSUANT TO S 202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO S 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS CONTAINED IN THIS JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO S 205
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND [AUCKLAND] REGISTRY

CRI-2014-044-2100 [2014] NZHC 2801

THE QUEEN

v

G

Hearing: 11 November 2014

Counsel:

J Murdoch for the Crown
M Ryan for the Offender

Sentence:

11 November 2014

SENTENCING NOTES OF BROWN J

Solicitors: Crown Solicitor, Auckland
Counsel: M Ryan, Auckland

R v G [2014] NZHC 2801 [11 November 2014]

First strike warning

[1] The offender received a first strike warning on 17 September 2014 when he entered guilty pleas before Lang J. It transpires that there is uncertainty as to precisely when the offences occurred and the possibility that they occurred before the commencement of the Parole Reform Act. In those circumstances the Crown accepts that the first strike warning ought not to have been given on 17 September
2014 and in those circumstances I direct that the first strike warning given at that time is cancelled.

Introduction

[2] You appear today for sentencing having pleaded guilty to eight counts of stupefying, five counts of indecent assault on a child, one count of indecent assault of a girl under 12, one count of indecent assault of a girl under 16, three counts of indecent assault of a boy under 16 and two counts of assault with intent to commit sexual violation. In respect of charges CRN14004503851 and 14004503852 the Crown offers no evidence and those charges are dismissed under s 147.

Factual background

[3] After moving to New Zealand in 1999 you worked as a night shift supervisor. As a result you had trouble sleeping and your doctor prescribed you Triazolam, a sleeping pill with hypnotic and sedative properties. You committed the following offending over a period of eight and a half years between March 2003 and September 2011.

Offending against A

[4] On 28 December 2005 you cared for your niece, A, while her parents went out for dinner. You made a milkshake for A and crushed a sleeping tablet into it. You did this with the intention of stupefying her and then looking at her genitalia. A began to hallucinate and you monitored her breathing. When her parents came home they took her to hospital. A urine test confirmed she had swallowed a sleeping pill and you told her parents that A had accidentally drunk a coke with a sleeping pill in it that you had made for yourself.

Offending against B

[5] The complainant B was seven when you befriended him. You would help him with his homework and if he answered a question incorrectly you would give him a “bare bottom smack”. This continued until B was ten years old and you admit this…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v G

Details

AGLC: R v G [2014] NZHC 2801
Case: [2014] NZHC 2801
Decision Date: 11 November 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Brown J delivered a sentencing judgment in the case of R v G, where the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple charges of sexual offending against children. The charges included stupefying, indecent assault on a child, indecent assault of a girl under 12, indecent assault of a girl under 16, indecent assault of a boy under 16, and assault with intent to commit sexual violation. The court assessed the appropriate starting point for sentencing, taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors. The court considered the age and vulnerability of the victims, the degree of abuse of trust, the intrusiveness and intensity of the acts, the duration of the offending, and the harm caused. The court set a starting point of eight years and six months imprisonment, acknowledging the defendant's guilty plea and remorse but denying a discount for remorse or good character. The court imposed a minimum term of imprisonment of three years and six months, to denounce the defendant's conduct and sufficiently protect the community. The court also made suppression orders to protect the identities of the victims and the defendant's wife. The final sentence was six years and four months imprisonment, to be served concurrently, with the defendant not becoming eligible for parole until serving three years and six months of the sentence.

The court identified the key legal issues as determining the appropriate starting point for sentencing, adjusting the starting point for personal factors and the guilty plea, and imposing a minimum term of imprisonment. The court reasoned that the defendant's offending was of high culpability, involving multiple vulnerable victims, premeditation, and intentional stupefaction. Although the defendant expressed remorse and turned himself in to the police, the court found that this did not constitute "exceptional remorse" warranting a discount. The prolonged nature of the defendant's offending also meant he was ineligible for a good character discount. The court imposed suppression orders to protect the identities of the victims and the defendant's wife, finding that publication of the defendant's identity would likely lead to their identification and cause undue hardship.

Orders