R v Duffy HC Christchurch CRI 2009-042-2801
[2010] NZHC 482
•15 April 2010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CRI 2009-042-002801
REGINA
v
TRINITY ELIJAH DUFFY JAMES ARTHUR BROWN
Hearing: 15 April 2010
Counsel: K B Bell for Crown
D C Ruth for Prisoners
Judgment: 15 April 2010
SENTENCING REMARKS OF FOGARTY J
Mr Brown
[1] James Arthur Brown you have pleaded guilty on arraignment on charges of kidnapping, blackmail and injuring with intent. The victim in this case was a drug user who had a substantial debt of about $5,500 owed to some drug dealers. Arrangements were put in place by these persons to use you to persuade this customer, by force if necessary, to pay the money owed or to obtain property from him to repay the debt.
[2] You, Mr Brown, have a history of violence and I am in no doubt that you were selected by the drug dealers because of that history knowing that you had the
R V DUFFY AND ANOR HC CHCH CRI 2009-042-002801 15 April 2010
capability and the willingness to do this task. You and your co-defendant, Mr Duffy, confronted the victim outside a house in the early hours of one morning. You got out of your car walked up to him and punched him in the head three times. You then grabbed him and marched him into the house that he was outside and assaulted him again. In the house, as I understand it, there was the discussion about repaying the debt and approximately an hour later the victim was forced by you back into a vehicle and driven away. While in the car you punched him again to the head no fewer than 15 times causing much bruising and subsequent swelling to his head and face.
[3] On arrival at an address the victim was taken to a garage where you used a large piece of 4 x 2 timber to assault him, firstly across the back of his left leg and then to his head, the final blow causing the length of wood to break. Several more assaults followed with the victim being threatened both verbally and physically by you in an attempt to obtain either money or property. The victim was then placed back in the vehicle. You sat beside him. The vehicle was driven off and shortly thereafter the victim contacted his girlfriend via a mobile phone and arranged for delivery of his vehicle to you.
[4] Ms Bell has explained the charging to me in this way, that the kidnapping commenced when you were taken into the house and the blackmailing, being the threat to use force, began inside the house and the charge of injuring with intent to injure was made in respect of the assault on the victim with the piece of 4 x 2 timber. Ms Bell submits that I should take as the lead charge the blackmail charge. But both she, and, quite correctly, your counsel, Mr Ruth, agree that in assessing the culpability of this conduct it is appropriate to treat all the facts, that I have just laid out, as covering the criminality of this evening’s events.
[5] The Crown has sought a starting point of four years for this offending. Mr Ruth has argued for a starting point of three and a half years, relying on a decision: Tozer v R [2010] NZCA 7. Tozer had a context of being a domestic assault of a couple after the breakup of a relationship. It was a serious assault and it also involved use of timber. Here the man who had been abandoned in the relationship tracked down his former partner and her new partner, a man who was
known to Mr Tozer. He tracked them down, burst into the front door of the cottage, picked up a wooden baton and began striking the man about the head. He continued
to beat him. The woman escaped and called the police. The sentencing Judge, Judge Crosbie, took a starting point of three and a half years which was not disturbed on appeal. This is a recent decision of the Court of Appeal on 11 February of this year.
[6] I view your set of facts as more serious than Tozer because yours was a cold- blooded infliction of violence. You were called in as an enforcer to collect a drug debt. Tozer was obviously reacting to the abandonment of a relationship which he did not want to end and was in that sense affected by the emotions which can boil over, particularly in young men, when relationships end.
[7] For these reasons I accept the Crown’s starting point of four years. In terms
of the uplift I think everybody agrees there should be an uplift because of your criminal history which, Mr Brown, is deplorable. You have been involved in assaults for quite a long period of time. For example, you were sentenced in 2006 on a number of charges, one of which included assault with intent to injure. You were convicted in 2003 of injuring with intent to injure. You were convicted away back in 1994 with assault with intent to injure. I think it is appropriate to uplift that starting point to five years. Then Mr Ruth has argued that, by way of mitigation, I should take into account your needs assessment and motivation to change. You are now 43 years old. Mr Ruth has submitted that the probation officer who wrote this report is very experienced and not likely to be fooled by you if you were simply making up the notion that you wanted to try to make a change in your life. I do read the report by the probation officer as taking seriously your readiness to try to change your lifestyle. This is set out in some detail in your past attendances on programs. Admittedly these were programs which you were required to attend. But the probation officer does say in his summary that the Court, when imposing sentence, may wish to take into account your unqualified acceptance of full responsibility and your stated intentions to change your ways.
[8] I have to be careful not to impose a greater discount than is possible for the guilty plea as required by R v Hessell [2009] NZCA 450 and that guilty plea includes the acceptance of full responsibility.
[9] Counsel have agreed that the appropriate level of discount is 20%. But I consider in this case I am entitled separately to take into account your past performance at programs and your stated intention to participate in future programs to try to break this violent history. I do that to the extent of four months off the five months and then bring the sentence down to four years eight months and then, following the Court of Appeal, you are entitled to a 20% discount for your guilty plea.
[10] Accordingly, you are sentenced to three years four months imprisonment.
[Mr Brown stood down and leaves Courtroom]
Mr Duffy
[11] Mr Duffy you have heard the sentence that I have just passed on your
co-offender, Mr Brown. You were present with Mr Brown in this respect. You were with Mr Brown when the victim was first confronted outside the house. You were a party with Mr Brown to marching the victim back into the house. Mr Duffy you then remained during this assault in the house and in the removal of the victim in the car to these other addresses with Mr Brown. So you were in the car when Mr Brown was punching the victim to the head. You remained in the vehicle, however, when Mr Brown took him out to a garage where Mr Brown assaulted him and you were not present when the car was handed over.
[12] Nonetheless, Mr Duffy, you were part and parcel of this plan to obtain the drug debt from the victim by violence and by threats of violence. You have accordingly also been charged with kidnapping and blackmail and again I take the lead charge here as being blackmail. Because you have significantly less responsibility for the violence, but also taking into account you were obviously considered necessary or desirable in the plan, I am of the view that the appropriate starting point for the offending in your case is three years.
[13] You have a very different criminal history from Mr Brown. But you do have two previous convictions for violence: one in 2008 of male assaults female, and, one
in 2001 of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. That warrants an uplift of six months to three years six months. You are entitled to a discount of 20%.
[14] I sentence you to two years ten months imprisonment on the blackmail charge.
[15] In respect of the kidnapping charge the decision of the Crown to indict you
on the kidnapping charge as well as blackmail is plainly justified by the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Clarke [1982] 1 NZLR 654. There that Court upheld multiple charges in a case where the accused had driven a car recklessly and with excess alcohol. He was tried by a jury on two separate charges, firstly manslaughter by an unlawful act, namely, reckless driving, and, secondly, driving with excess blood alcohol.
[16] In a carefully considered decision the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that that was in breach of s 10(2) of the Crimes Act 1961 which provides:
10 Offence under more than one enactment
…
(2) Where an Act or omission constitutes an offence under 2 or more Acts other than this Act, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under any one of those Acts.
And also that it was not an abuse of process.
[17] The sentencing Judge following the convictions imposed concurrent sentences. The Court of Appeal did not consider s 10(4) which provides:
(4) No one shall be liable, whether on conviction on indictment or on summary conviction, to be punished twice in respect of the same offence.
[18] The Court of Appeal did expressly leave open the question of whether such a restrictive reading of s 10 was correct. The Court of Appeal in Clarke were confronted by the fact that there had been a jury trial and two verdicts and I am sure were affected by the very natural reluctance of all Judges to disturb jury verdicts.
[19] More pertinently, the Court of Appeal decision in Clarke was in 1982, before the passing of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Therefore, there is a significant argument that that decision is now out of date because we do not know how s 10 would be construed were it subjected, as s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act now requires, to s 26(2) of the Act which provides:
26 Retroactive penalties and double jeopardy
…
(2) No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again.
[20] I have gone into this in some detail because I have been developing a practice, without full explanation, of taking into account all the criminality in the lead offence, then rather than imposing concurrent sentences in respect of the contemporaneous offence which criminality has already been taken into account, convicting and discharging under s 108 of the Sentencing Act 2002. As the commentary to s 109 of the Sentencing Act says in Adams on Criminal Law:
SA109.01 Criterion for conviction and discharge
… is often used in the disposition of lesser charges, where the sentences imposed for greater charges are considered sufficient to meet the overall criminality of the offending.
…
[21] I regard this as a somewhat unsatisfactory result. But, it is better, in my view, than imposing another sentence in respect of the same criminality but comforting oneself that the person is not being punished twice because it is being imposed concurrently. I have considerable doubt as to whether that was the intention of Parliament when enacting s 10(4). That is the reason why I am not doing it any more.
[22] Accordingly, in respect of the kidnapping charge you are convicted and discharged. That completes your sentencing.
Mr Brown
[23] I go on to complete the sentencing of Mr Brown, with the consent of Mr Ruth who has advised that this aspect can be completed in Mr Brown’s absence.
[24] Likewise in respect of the kidnapping and injuring with intent charges in the case of Mr Brown, he is convicted and discharged.
Solicitors:
Raymond Donnelly & Co, Christchurch, for Crown
D C Ruth, Christchurch, for Prisoners
0