IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA77/05
THE QUEEN
v
MARK ALBERT CRAVEN
Hearing: 20 September 2005
Court: Hammond, Chambers and Robertson JJ Counsel: S J Mitchell for Applicant
A M Powell for Crown
Judgment: 22 September 2005
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for special leave to appeal is dismissed.
REASONS
(Given by Chambers J)
An application for special leave to appeal
[1] The police charged Mark Craven, the applicant, with driving a motor vehicle while the proportion of alcohol in his breath exceeded 400 micrograms of alcohol
R V CRAVEN CA CA77/05 22 September 2005
per litre of breath. The prosecution was dismissed in the District Court, Judge Hole correctly considering himself bound by a High Court decision, Hunt v New Zealand Police HC AK A182/02 10 December 2002. The effect of that decision was to render the result of Mr Craven’s allegedly positive evidential breath test inadmissible.
[2] The police appealed to the High Court under s 107 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. By the time that appeal was heard, this Court had reversed the High Court decision in Hunt: Police v Tolich & Hunt (2003) 20 CRNZ 150. The ground on which Mr Craven had succeeded in the District Court was accordingly swept from under his feet. Notwithstanding that, Mr Mitchell, for Mr Craven, advanced various arguments as to why the police’s appeal should not succeed and, further, as to why the case should not be remitted to the District Court for rehearing. Keane J, who heard the appeal, ruled that the appeal be allowed and he ordered that the case be remitted to the District Court for determination in light of this Court’s decision in Tolich & Hunt: NZ Police v Craven HC AK CRI2003-404-270
28 October 2003.
[3] Mr Craven sought leave to appeal to this Court under s 144(1) of the
Summary Proceedings Act. Keane J declined that application on 16 February 2005.
[4] Mr Craven has now sought special leave to appeal under s 144(3) of the same
Act.
Determination of the application for special leave
[5] Special leave may be granted only if, in the opinion of this Court, the question of law involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to this Court for decision: see s 144(3) and the leading case of R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211.
[6] Mr Mitchell, who appeared for Mr Craven in this Court as in the two lower
Courts, said that the case gave rise to three important questions of law.
A jurisdictional bar?
[7] The first was as to the correct interpretation of s 108 of the Summary
Proceedings Act, which reads as follows:
No determination shall be appealed against by reason only of the improper admission or rejection of evidence.
[8] Mr Mitchell submitted that the police’s appeal in this case was barred by s 108, as the police…
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- AGLC
- R v Craven CA77/05 [2005] NZCA 371
- Case
- [2005] NZCA 371
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the police's appeal was barred by section 108 of the Summary Proceedings Act, whether the High Court had jurisdiction to answer the case stated despite its infelicities, and whether the High Court has a discretion not to remit a case when the case stated is answered in the prosecution's favour. Additionally, the Court considered the delay in applying for special leave.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for special leave, finding that none of the questions met the criteria under section 144(3) of the Summary Proceedings Act. The Court held that the appeal was not barred by section 108, as the appeal went directly to a matter of substantive law. Regarding the infelicities in the case stated, the Court found that the question was clear and that the High Court had jurisdiction to answer it. Lastly, the Court found that the High Court had the discretion not to remit the case, but that the reasons provided by Craven's counsel were not persuasive. The Court also considered the significant delay in applying for special leave as a factor in dismissing the application.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding that the questions of law raised did not meet the criteria for special leave and that the delay in applying for leave was extraordinary.
Orders
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