R v Coade
[2024] NZHC 380
•29 February 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE
CRI-2023-012-808
[2024] NZHC 380
THE KING v
CAROLE ANN COADE
Hearing: 22 February 2024 Appearances:
R D Smith for Crown
S A Saunderson-Warner for Defendant
Judgment:
29 February 2024
SENTENCING REMARKS OF PRESTON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 29 February 2024 at pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
R v COADE [2024] NZHC 380 [29 February 2024]
Introduction
[1] Carole Ann Coade, you appear today for sentence having pleaded guilty to the murder of your partner, Mark Willis.
[2] Before I move to my sentencing remarks, I begin by acknowledging all who are present in Court today or remotely attending.
[3] To the family and friends of Mark Willis, who was tragically taken from you, there is nothing I am able to say, or do, and no sentence which this Court can impose that can ever meet your loss. I acknowledge this. The sympathy of this Court is with you all. I acknowledge, also, those who support Carole Coade.
Sentencing Remarks
[4]I now address you Ms Coade.
[5] You may remain seated until I ask you to stand when I formally impose sentence.
[6] As I am sure you can understand, on the charge of murder, the law requires me to sentence you to life imprisonment unless your offending and your personal circumstances mean that it would be manifestly unjust to do so.1 Your lawyer contends that in the special circumstances of this case a sentence of life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust. The Crown argues otherwise.
[7] If I determine that the sentence of life imprisonment would not, in the circumstances, be manifestly unjust, I must then decide what minimum period of imprisonment (or “MPI” as you will hear me refer to it) you should serve.2 By law that can be no less than 10 years and in your case I must also consider whether a greater minimum period is required because of the special circumstances of the offending, or whether that would be manifestly unjust.3
1 Sentencing Act 2002, s 102.
2 Sections 103 and 104.
3 Section104.
[8] Central to my decision is the issue of your mental state at the time you offended. In short, your counsel submits it is unthinkable that you would have committed murder if not for your “severely unwell” mental state.
[9] Counsel for the Crown accepts that your mental health is relevant, but only to the extent it suggests a presumptive minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years is manifestly unjust, and the Crown seeks as you have heard a lesser minimum term.
[10] In determining those issues, I must take into account your personal circumstances, including the fact of your guilty plea and your previous impeccable good character. I will also refer to the purposes and principles of sentencing as they are set in the Sentencing Act 2002 (Act) and cases which are relevant to the issues I must decide.
Facts
[11] I begin by outlining what you did on 18 May 2023 when you murdered your partner, Mark.4
[12] I am conscious this will be distressing for all and particularly for the family and friends of Mr Willis, but sentencing is a public process and it is important that the wider public is able to understand the basis on which I am sentencing you today.
[13] You met Mr Willis in 2017 on-line, having amicably separated from your ex- husband in Auckland. You had a history of intermittent but recurrent depressive episodes. Mr Willis lived in Wellington and had never been married. For the first two years or so you both commuted between the cities to see each other and in December 2019, you moved to Wellington to live with Mr Willis. You worked as a teacher at a local school, where you say you felt happy and emotionally supported.
[14] In December 2021 you and Mr Willis moved to Dunedin, his hometown. Property was more affordable here and you were appointed head of department at a
4 The outline of facts is based on the Summary of Facts, information set out in counsel’s submissions, the report of Dr Maxwell Panckhurst, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 30 January 2024 and the PAC report.
local high school. You found the job very challenging. Mr Willis, for his part, worked long hours in a full-time role and the two of you had differing schedules. You say that despite the relationship with Mr Willis going well, you started to feel more and more isolated and slowly things started to change.
[15] At the beginning of 2023 your mental health began to deteriorate, and at the beginning of the second term in late April, you requested immediate sick leave. You remained on sick leave in early May.
[16] You began to have negative thoughts about your finances, your relationship with Mr Willis and work and retirement prospects. You spiralled into depression and say that you felt disconnected from Mr Willis and unable to talk to him about your concerns.
[17] You sought medical assistance and were prescribed an anti-depressant, but you did not initially take this, although shortly later you did so.
[18] You would later tell psychiatrist Dr Panckhurst that you first had thoughts of harming Mr Willis, which you initially rejected as “crazy”, in the days leading up to the weekend of 13-14 May 2023.
[19] You say you approached Mr Willis from behind with a knife on 13 May, but changed your mind as you realised he might overpower you. On 14 May you again approached him with a knife but did not go through with it.
[20] By 18 May you are said to have to been experiencing escalating anxiety about a meeting scheduled with the school principal the following day. You knew you had no sick leave remaining.
[21] That day, Thursday 18 May, Mr Willis returned home from work just after 4.30 in the afternoon. You encouraged him to have a relaxing bath. You made him a coffee which you laced with sleeping tablets. However Mr Willis noticed an unpleasant taste and discarded the coffee.
[22] At around 5.00 pm that evening Mr Willis went to have a bath. You went in to check he was in the bath before returning to the kitchen to get a knife. The knife had a 10 cm blade, you re-entered the bathroom with it and attacked Mr Willis, stabbing him a total of 22 times, and slashing him causing a further six superficial wounds. You continued stabbing him despite Mr Willis fighting back and although he pleaded with you, telling you “no, Carole I love you”. You carried on stabbing him until he went under the water, you have said.
[23] At 5.15 pm that evening, you sent a Facebook message to your children saying: “Hi guys I love you, I am sorry for what I have done”.
[24] At 5.17 pm you transferred $45,000 to the bank account of one of your children.
[25] A minute later you phoned 111. You told the police call-taker that you had stabbed your partner to death. You said the weapon was a knife which you had left in the bathroom.
[26] Police arrived within a few minutes. You met them at the front door, wearing a blood stained top and with several superficial cuts on your hands and fingers.
[27] Mr Willis was found deceased in the bath. He had died from loss of blood from stab wounds.
[28] One of the stab wounds severed an artery in Mr Willis’ upper torso, shoulder area. This was the most life-threatening injury, four others nicked his lungs and another nicked his liver. The depths of the stab wounds ranged from just over one cm to just over 10 cm deep.
[29] You did not make any comment upon your arrest. But you were later assessed by Dr Panckhurst, a psychiatrist. He concluded that you were not insane at the time of the offending but that you were experiencing a severe depressive episode with a severely distorted view of yourself and the world. I will return to the evidence in that regard a little later in my remarks.
Victim Impact Statements
[30] Victim impact statements are before the Court, two of which you have heard read out. There can be no doubt of the emotional devastation wreaked upon Mark Willis’ family and friends as a result of his brutal murder.
[31] As two of Mr Willis’ siblings attest, they carry with them every day the pain and anguish of his loss and the manner in which he was killed.
[32] His brother, Eion asked himself how this could happen to such a placid, caring and compassionate person, whose life you had made complete and who trusted you. The family have been devastated, and Eion grieves for the loss of Mr Willis’ potential and the treasured bond between the brothers, which has been stopped in its tracks.
[33] His sister Deborah cannot bear to think about how her brother died. She says he was a man with so much love and intelligence. His loss in these circumstances will also haunt her, she says words cannot explain the pain and anguish the family has endured since Mark’s murder. It is unending.
[34] Your actions have also had a devasting impact on Mr Willis’ many friends. They feel the loss of a talented and beloved man, a wonderful creative powerhouse, who was funny, gentle, kind and thoughtful.
[35] I have received victim impact statements of two of those friends. Mr Mawkes, the co-director of an unfinished feature film with Mr Willis, mourns his dear friend’s loss. He has not yet had the chance to grieve as he is still reeling from the trauma of learning of Mark’s violent death. He says, in many ways, those close to Mr Willis have received life sentences, as they live with his senseless loss everyday.
[36] Mr Hassall grieves for the many future experiences that will not come to pass with his long-standing friend. He describes Mark as one of the kindest and gentlest people he has ever known. He, too, notes the loss of Mr Willis’ potential in the sphere of the arts and film making. Your actions have devastated Mr Hassall and his family, and he expresses the sadness, distrust and emptiness inside and the sense of almost survivor guilt he continues to experience.
Background to the offending
Personal background
[37]I now address matters personal to you and to the background to your offending.
[38]You are 61 years old today and have no previous convictions.
[39] Your counsel has set out, at length in written submissions, information about your personal circumstances. The information is in support of what Ms Saunderson- Warner describes as the “gaping chasm” between the person who is variously described as an empathetic, gentle and loving mother, partner, friend and teacher and the woman who could murder her partner by stabbing him multiple times when he was taking a bath.
[40] I also have before me a pre-sentence report and psychiatric report from Dr Maxwell Panckhurst prepared on your behalf. I have multiple character references from your children, your sister and several friends.
[41] I have read all the information before me and I take it into account. In these sentencing remarks I focus on information relating to the signposts of your mental health history, which is necessarily abbreviated, however I acknowledge the further detail reported of your background, particularly as to two distressing experiences in your childhood, in which that information sits.
[42] You were born in England and raised in a loving home environment. From a young age you displayed an anxious temperament, lack of confidence and dependence on others for emotional support. Your mother was diagnosed with bi-polar effective disorder in her 50’s, and you recall her experiencing episodes of mood elevation and periods of depression.
[43] You were the first person in your family to go on to higher education, obtaining a university degree in your native country. In 1988 you met your husband, a New Zealand citizen in England on his “OE”, marrying and subsequently moving to New Zealand in 1991, buying a home in Auckland.
First depressive episode
[44] Together you had three children. You devoted yourself to raising the children as a full-time mother and experienced your first episode of depression in 2006 after your youngest child started school. You are reported to have found yourself at that time lacking in purpose and feeling “worthless”.
[45] You sought and received GP treatment with anti-depressants and talk therapy but did not fully recover until late 2008. You continued on a weaning dose of anti- depressants until February 2010.
[46] In 2009 you commenced part-time secretarial work and returned to university. You completed a post-graduate teaching diploma the following year and began secondary school teaching, although this is said to have been a struggle for you due to lack of confidence.
Second depressive episode
[47] In late 2012 you experienced a second depressive episode, which continued the following year, culminating in an attempted suicide by overdose of sleeping tablets. Your second child recalls you spending weeks in bed during that period.
[48] The first and second depressive episodes were largely managed by your then GP, with only brief contacts with community based mental health services.
[49] Your marriage deteriorated and despite counselling your former husband and you separated in early 2014. You retained full-time care of the children in the family home. You continued being prescribed anti-depressants for some further five years and it was during this time, in 2017 you met Mark Willis online.
[50] You acknowledge that to all, including to you, Mr Willis was a gentle, kind-hearted and talented man. He was a loving and supportive partner; he was never abusive towards you. Indeed those who knew you as a couple say you were well suited, supportive and loving towards each other.
[51] Mr Willis lived in Wellington and the two of you began a relationship, sharing the commuting between Auckland and Wellington. Two years later, having sold the family home and leaving your teaching job you moved to Wellington to be with Mr Willis.
[52] Shortly afterwards, sadly your former husband died suddenly. While this was devasting for you and the children, your children described your significant support to them through this time. For the next two years you and Mr Willis lived in Wellington and you taught at a local school. And in December 2021 as a couple you moved to Dunedin. You were employed as head of a department at a Dunedin secondary school.
[53] Your counsel has submitted that the move to Dunedin likely precipitated a deterioration in your mental health. You found the new job very challenging and began to feel increasingly isolated; Mr Willis was working long hours in his employment.
[54] You had never previously lived in Dunedin and you felt far from your three young adult children in Auckland. When in late 2022 Mr Willis changed work roles to a more physically demanding role with less availability you are said to have experienced a significant drop in your mood.
[55] However, there was some improvement at the beginning of the 2023 school year.
Early 2023
[56] On 21 February last year you sought GP assistance as you were feeling stressed at work and experiencing higher than usual anxiety levels, with more time alone over summer although the doctor noted you were in a “good supportive relationship”.
[57] On a visit to Auckland in mid-April to see your children you met a retired couple happy in their retirement. The psychiatrist reports your mood had been “OK” before this but seeing that couple for some reason led you to begin to have ruminative negative thoughts about your finances, your relationship with Mr Willis and your joint retirement prospects. Dr Panckhurst reports you describe spiralling into depression
with prominent anxious pre-occupation about your difficulties at work, the financial situation and what might happen if you needed to stop work due to your depression.
[58] You reported you felt increasingly disconnected with Mr Willis, but “unable” to talk to him about it. Further, you were thinking the relationship wasn’t the same, wasn’t the fun it had been before that it was “just work”. You didn’t feel close to him, you felt like everyone else’s life was better than yours.
[59] On 24 April you again visited your GP reporting increased anxiety and depressive symptoms. The GP diagnosed a depressive episode and prescribed an anti-depressant however you initially didn’t take it, although you did shortly afterwards. The same day you called in sick for work and after briefly returning to work two days later you saw the principal and arranged a period of sick leave. You say you were feeling overwhelmed with negative thoughts.
[60] That same day you travelled impulsively to Auckland to see your children, who noted you as acting out of character. One of your children reports you said you were finding your new life away from them hard, your job very challenging and that you were having concerns financially.
[61] On your return to Dunedin you remained off work and continued to have difficulty sleeping. You attended an initial counselling session and your GP noted on 3 May that you were really struggling with sleep and depression, that the medication commenced had not had much effect on you and you were not really sleeping at all.
[62] The final GP visit before the murder was on 8 May. In this appointment similar symptoms were noted, as was the fact that you had a “supportive partner who was loving and caring but considering ending this relationship (due to current mental)”.
[63] The GP formed the view you were experiencing a major depressive episode, with a plan to refer you to the family mental health service. However, you failed to attend a subsequent urgent appointment.
[64] Around this time Mr Willis spoke to his work supervisor about the fact he was having issues at home with you having depression which had been quite severe lately and that you were struggling to even get out of bed. Your children also noticed a withdrawal in your usual contact with them by text and phone at this time.
[65] In relation to your mental health at the time of the murder on 18 May Dr Panckhurst ultimately concluded (as I record in brief and I set out the full passage in my sentencing remarks):
In my opinion there is strong clinical evidence to indicate that Ms Coade, in the context of a recurrent depressive disorder, has experienced a Major
Depressive Episode, of high severity, with Psychotic Features, as defined in the DSM-V. Ms Coade presented with a pervasive low mood (markedly detached emotional state), anhedonia (loss of enjoyment in life), anorexia (loss of appetite), marked insomnia, psychomotor retardation, fatigue, amotivation, poor concentration, suicidal ideation, and depressive cognitions including a prominently distorted and negative lens in relation to her experience and view of self, other and her future. While the conscious thoughts focussed on fears about her job and finances, underlying these were her deepest vulnerabilities including fear about her dependency on Mr Willis, that he may not love her in a depressed state, and the ultimate fear of being abandoned, alone and uncared for.
Further, he said:
In relation to the psychotic element to Ms Coade’s depressive episode, this is evident, in my opinion, through Ms Coade’s striking loss of touch with reality, manifest in the delusional belief that the only solution to her situation was to murder her partner in the full knowledge that this would lead to her arrest and long term management in prison, where she would be “fed” and “cared for”. While there is a degree of logic to this thinking, in my opinion, this thought is delusional in the context of the unwavering conviction with which it is held, and its near complete exclusion of the associated realities and broader consequences of taking Mr Willis’ life. It is apparent that immediately following the offence, and progressively since, these realities have burst forth and Ms Coade has been shocked by the far reaching and tragic implications of her extremely out of character actions.
(emphasis added)
[66] And your counsel has addressed in her written submissions and again in the Court this morning, further matters relating to the way in which you were acting at this time.
Approach on sentencing
[67]I now address the approach I adopt on sentencing.
[68] As I have noted, your counsel says that this is one of the rare cases where the presumption of life imprisonment should be displaced. She submits a finite sentence in the region of 10 years’ imprisonment is appropriate, with express regard to the impact of your mental health upon your offending.
The principles and purposes of sentencing
[69] In determining the appropriate sentence, I must take into account the purpose and principles outlined in the Act. There is a need to denounce your offending and to hold you accountable for the harm that you have done. The sentence I will impose is intended to promote a sense of responsibility in you for that harm. There must be deterrence, both against future offending by you and against others who might act similarly. And I have to consider the protection of the public.
[70] The sentence I impose on you must be consistent in kind and length with those that are imposed on others who have offended in a similar way. And I must consider the gravity of your offending and your own culpability. I must take into account any circumstances that might make an otherwise appropriate sentence disproportionately severe and I must take into account the effects that the offending has had upon you.
[71] As will be evident, the key issue for me to decide is the degree to which your mental impairment moderated your culpability for this episode of wholly out of character and catastrophic violence.
Approach to sentence assessment
[72] As you have heard, your counsel and counsel for the Crown contend for different approaches to the way in which I should assess the just sentence here, based on interpretation of a recent Supreme Court authority, Van Hemert v R.5
[73] Counsel diverge over the sequence in which I should consider the application of two sections of the Act relating to murder. Section 102 requires a presumptive sentence for murder of life imprisonment unless, given the circumstances of the
5 Van Hemert v R [2023] NZSC 116.
offence and the offender, that would be manifestly unjust. Section 104, if it is engaged due to the brutality of your offending or Mr Willis’ particular vulnerability, requires a minimum period of imprisonment of at least 17 years, unless that would be manifestly unjust. Here the Crown concedes your mental health would require a lower MPI and submits in the range of 12-13 years.
[74] Counsel also disagree on whether the Supreme Court in Van Hemert adopted, or endorsed, the approach in R v Smith6, a Court of Appeal decision. The Court observed in that case, where s 104 is potentially engaged, it is appropriate first to reach a provisional conclusion under the section before contemplating s 102. And that approach was preferred as the decision on the implications of s 104 will usually influence, but not determine, the assessment whether the presumption of life imprisonment is displaced.
[75] Ms Saunderson-Warner acknowledges that s 104 may be considered in your case, on the face of the pre-meditation and brutality of the murder, or Mr Willis’ vulnerability. However, she submits that none of those factors are present at a sufficient level in comparison to other cases to engage an elevated MPI.
[76] It is common ground that the Court’s assessment of how your mental impairment influenced the apparent pre-meditation and brutality of your offending and your appreciation of Mr Willis’ particular vulnerability is centrally relevant to moderate your culpability.
[77] After careful consideration, I have reached the view that in the circumstances of your case there is no material difference, under either approach, to the issues I must decide. As the Supreme Court noted in Van Hemert, s 102 must be read in conjunction with ss 103 and 104. In Van Hemert the discussion of s 102 proceeded on the basis that s 104 was triggered, which did not appear to be in issue given the degree of the brutality of the murder committed by Mr Van Hemert.7
6 R v Smith [2021] NZCA 318.
7 Engaging the presumptive 17-year MPI, subject to the Court’s assessment of the degree to which Mr Van Hemert’s uncontrollable psychotic episode moderated his culpability; finding that indicated a 10-year MPI was appropriate.
[78] However, as I noted and unlike in Van Hermert, Ms Saunderson-Warner disputes whether s 104 applies on the facts before me. I must therefore consider the relative culpability that is indicated by the aggravating factors, viewed through the lens of your mental impairment. And I accept that assessment inevitably informs, without determining, the Court’s assessment whether the presumption of life imprisonment is displaced.
Section 104 assessment
[79]I now address the aggravating factors of the offending, in context of s 104.
[80] The Crown contends that s 104 is engaged but accepts that your mental impairment means that a 17-year MPI would be manifestly unjust. The Crown seeks an MPI in the region of 12 to 13 years, based on comparator cases.
[81] Mr Smith argues that you committed the murder with a high level of brutality, cruelty or callousness and/or that Mr Willis was particularly vulnerable.
[82] The submission here is that, while the Court must avoid conflating aggravating features of the offending, those aggravating features are relevant to my assessment in two other ways. Mr Smith submits your planning or pre-meditation, while it does not itself trigger the section, was inextricably linked to the brutality of the murder, as you rendered Mr Willis particularly vulnerable and, he submits, given your appreciation that he was so vulnerable.
Comparator cases
[83] For reasons I am about to explain, I consider that s 104 is engaged in this case. I have considered, as comparator cases, cases including R v Gottermeyer, R v Marinovich, R v Beazley and, principally, Van Hemert v R. I do not refer to these cases in my oral remarks today, but they will appear in my written sentencing remarks.8 They have assisted me in determining what I consider to be an appropriate minimum period of imprisonment reflecting the culpability of your offending, although I have to say it is a particularly difficult assessment in your case given the
8 Paragraphs [84]-[87] were not read in oral sentencing remarks.
apparently loving, supportive and mutually happy relationship with Mr Willis prior to your offending.
[84] R v Gottermeyer involved a successful appeal by the Crown against a minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years, imposed on Mr Gottermeyer for the murder of his wife.9 Mr Gottermeyer and his wife separated following his diagnosis with psychotic symptoms and depression. He was admitted and subsequently discharged from a psychiatric hospital yet remained subject to intensive supervision. On the morning of the murder, Mr Gottermeyer drove to the victim’s home to discuss financial matters. The victim refused to sign papers pertaining to the sale of their house and in retaliation, Mr Gottermeyer stabbed her 12 times with a knife. The Crown initially sought a minimum period of imprisonment of 15 years due to the level of brutality involved. One aspect of the defence was that although there were no grounds for the insanity defence, Mr Gottermeyer was suffering from serious depression at the time of the murder. The High Court held that s 104 did not apply however life imprisonment per s 102 was appropriate, with minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years. On appeal, it was held that s 104 was applicable. A significant adjustment was required to recognise Mr Gottermeyer’s reduced moral culpability and 20 per cent was considered appropriate by the Court of Appeal.
[85] In R v Beazley the victim was the estranged wife of the defendant.10 Mr Beazley began to develop resentment towards the victim as he was required to pay child support. He began to feel like everything in his life was spiralling downwards and contemplated suicide. He then however, began to contemplate killing the victim. He located her address, knocked at her door and when she opened, stabbed her. The victim attempted to fend Mr Beazley off however was unsuccessful. He stabbed her 18 times. Subsequently, he called a friend and then the Police to confess. Four of the s 104 factors were held to be present. It was held not to be manifestly unjust to impose an MPI of 17 years. When considering Mr Beazley’s mental state, it was held that he was suffering from depression of moderate severity with some psychotic features at the time of the killing however this was not sufficient to justify reducing the MPI.
9 R v Gottermeyer [2014] NZCA 205.
10 R v Beazley [2019] NZHC 672.
[86] R v Marinovich involved the defendant murdering his mother.11 Mr Marinovich lived with his mother and the two had a very close relationship. In the months leading up to the offending, the defendant had been prescribed an anti-depressant medication however there was no further follow-up by his doctor. The victim was also unwell, both mentally and physically and a week before the murder, was admitted to hospital. At the time of her discharge, her needs were very high. On the night of the murder, the two had an argument during which Mr Marinovich strangled the victim and struck her 10 times on the head with a hammer. He then showered, drove to the train station, called 111 and confessed. Section 104 was engaged however a 17-year minimum period of imprisonment was considered unjust. One of the reasons for this was his mental disorder. Whilst there was not enough evidence to establish that the defendants’ autism spectrum disorder caused the offending, the Judge recognised that the particular characteristics of this disorder played a significant role. The minimum period of imprisonment in this case was 14 years.
[87] Finally, in R v Van Hemert, upon discovering his former partner had entered into a new relationship, Mr Van Hemert suffered a severe psychotic episode and sought “revenge sex” with a sex worker, Ms Te Pania.12 A disagreement broke out between them which resulted in Mr Van Hemert attacking the victim with a knife and killing her. He stabbed her multiple times and she also suffered from blunt force injuries to her head. The Supreme Court traversed Mr Van Hemert’s mental state and held that the fact that his offending would not have occurred but for the onset of an uncontrollable psychotic episode pointed in favour of a finding that life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust, despite the defence of insanity being inapplicable. Mr Van Hemert was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal it was determined that “having regard to the clear causal nexus between Mr Van Hemert’s mental impairment and the offending, and the greater community protection associated with the imposition of an indeterminate (life) sentence, we are satisfied that the minimum period of imprisonment necessary in this case is no greater than 10 years”.13
11 R v Marinovich [2020] NZHC 1160.
12 Van Hemert v R [2023] NZSC 116.
13 At [97].
Aggravating factors Brutality, Cruelty
[88] In my view this was a brutal, frenzied attack involving at least 28 stabs or strikes with the knife, some plunged to the hilt.
[89] I accept that this represents a terrifying concentration of blows, particularly to Mr Willis’ upper body. You continued to strike him despite him pleading with you to stop. You elected this method having failed to succeed in drugging him so that he would drown while asleep in the bath.
[90] In my view and acknowledging the invidious distinction between different categories of murders, or cases of murder, the attack does reach the degree of savage violence which the Courts have recognised engages s 104.
Premeditation
[91] The Crown does not press the premeditation in the steps you took in the days leading up to killing Mr Willis as independently triggering s 104. But it does submit they are relevant to the Court’s assessment of your mental state and the s 104 factor of brutality.
[92] Your counsel acknowledges there was clear pre-meditation but says this must be viewed against the lens of your severe depressive episode. However, I consider this is a distinguishing feature between your case and Mr Van Hemert’s. Yours was not a florid descent into an uncontrollable psychosis. During the week or so before you killed Mr Willis you acknowledge some insight into your thinking. You challenged your thoughts as “crazy”. Further, around the same time, you withdrew from the medical support for your increasing symptoms, having previously sought that out and received appropriate medical assistance.
[93] You told Dr Panckhurst your initial thoughts of killing Mr Willis in the week before the murder arose as a solution to the issues you were facing in your work and your financial affairs. You denied feeling any anger towards him but you said you didn’t feel like you loved him anymore.
[94] You were, I accept, also able to rationalise your behaviour to some extent. On 13 May 2023 when you approached Mr Willis from behind with a knife tucked in your trousers while he was on all fours cleaning the carpet, you had thoughts to stab him, but you changed your mind as you feared he would be too strong and overpower you.
[95] Similarly, the next day, on 14 May you stood behind Mr Willis holding a knife as he sat at his computer but returned to the kitchen and put it away, thinking to yourself “this is crazy”. You called your children telling them you were not coping but did not reveal your homicidal thoughts.
[96] On 18 May there was further planning when you attempted to surreptitiously drug Mr Willis so he would fall asleep in the bath and die. When that did not succeed as Mr Willis noticed an unpleasant taste due to the sleeping tablets, you checked that he was in the bath before returning to the kitchen to get the knife you used in the attack.
[97]And when Mr Willis fought back, you kept going until he went under the water.
Vulnerability
[98] I also consider that Mr Willis was particularly vulnerable, as you had encouraged him to have a bath before attacking him and I accept you had gone to some lengths to ensure this, having elected not to act sooner in circumstances when he may be better able to meet the attack.
[99] Even if his vulnerability was not such as to trigger s 104, I agree that this aspect may be considered, together with your pre-meditation, as relevant to the brutality, cruelty or callousness of the killing.
Callousness
[100] However, I do not consider your apparent determination to carry out the murder before your meeting with the principal, which the Crown characterises as callous, as further aggravating. This aspect supports, as your counsel says, your distorted thinking by 18 May.
Other aggravating factors
Breach of trust & family violence14
[101] Your offending I accept is further aggravated by the breach of trust. Mr Willis was your partner in his home where he should have felt safe. He was entirely blameless. Indeed, as his family and friends have eloquently told the Court, and as your comments to your GP recorded, he was a loving and supportive sibling, partner, and friend.
[102] There was no forewarning of your attack, no conflict or other words or conduct which pre-empted it and I accept that would have added to Mr Willis’ vulnerability.
[103] In these circumstances, as in Van Hemert, I consider s 104 is triggered, and that a 17-year MPI is therefore engaged.
Would it be manifestly unjust to impose an MPI of 17 years?
[104] However, I also accept as does the Crown, that over-arching all of these aggravating features of your offending is the extent of your mental health impairment at the time. I must consider whether, in light of this and the mitigating factors of your early guilty plea, your prior impeccable good character and your evident remorse, it would be manifestly unjust to impose an MPI of that term. The Crown responsibly acknowledges it would be.
[105] I am satisfied your offending likely would not have happened if you were not very mentally unwell, however, as I have noted, I also accept there are features of the offending and the period leading up to it which suggest you retained some appreciation of your actions and acted in circumstances in which you acknowledge you did not love Mr Willis.
14 Sentencing Act, s 9(1)(a) and (f).
[106] Standing back and considered in light of the comparator cases, while none is on all fours, I consider the culpability of your offending viewed through the lens of your severe depressive episode is appropriately marked by a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years.
Section 102: would the sentence of life imprisonment by manifestly unjust?
[107] I move now to consider s 102 and whether a sentence of life imprisonment with that indicative minimum term would be manifestly unjust.
[108] I have concluded that s 104 is engaged. I now must determine whether, in the circumstances of your offence and your personal circumstances, a sentence of life imprisonment would be clearly unjust.
[109] Ultimately, I have found it appropriate to assess your offending in context of s 102 in light of Van Hemert, as your counsel urges me to do.
Personal circumstances
[110] As Dr Panckhurst’s evidence indicates, you were very mentally unwell, but not insane, when you murdered your partner. There can be no doubt that moderates your culpability.
[111] However, as the psychiatrist identified, the offending also appears to have resulted in context of your underlying psychological dynamics and life stressors, particularly in relation to your work, your heightened dependency needs and relationship stresses, including the loss of your maternal role as your children grew up.
[112] He opines that your psychological response to these stressors manifested in catastrophic anxiety about your own life. And that this in turn resulted in the delusional, single-minded intention to kill, and to do so before the upcoming principal’s meeting, with the aim that if you killed Mark you would end up in a prison and be fed.
[113] On the other hand, it appears from the psychiatrist’s report that you had feelings of anger towards Mr Willis, albeit “largely subconscious”, which feelings emerged in the latter part of Dr Panckhurst’s assessments with you.
Remorse
[114] While I accept you have expressed evident remorse on an increasing basis, and deep regret, as the psychiatrist describes, there is some force in my view in the Crown observation that this appears to remain at least in part focussed on your own situation and that of your family, which your actions have brought about. I also note your acknowledgement of “great difficulty” allowing yourself to truly feel for Mr Willis, even after your incarceration and the stabilisation of your mental state. Those matters are relevant to my determination of the s 102 issue.
Future risk assessment
[115] Finally, as in Van Hemert, the issue of future risk is centrally relevant to the s 102 calculus. I consider this aspect is not as straightforward as the psychiatric assessment of “low future risk” appears in isolation.
[116] Dr Panckhurst addressed several matters in relation to risk management factors relevant to future risk. He noted that:
(a)your long-term engagement with professional services will be an essential part of the risk management plan;
(b)professional services (correctional and health) must be well appraised of the key warning signs and potential risks;
(c)you had a critical withdrawal from supports in the week at least before you committed the murder; and
(d)your living situation and personal support were intricately linked to your distress and catastrophic thinking – and that a stable, informed, future living situation will be essential elements of future risk management.
[117] Further, while you are very likely to engage well with professional supports and services, as I accept, Dr Panckhurst noted that future support services are “likely to be extensive and mandated”. And that monitoring your psychological stress will sit hand and hand with the monitoring of your depressive illness and be tied in with aspects of the plan supporting your living situation and your personal and professional supports.
[118] I have this morning received an addendum report from Dr Panckhurst. This addresses your presentation with elevated mood which led to the delay of your sentencing in September last year. Dr Panckhurst then noted his high index of suspicion that you may be presenting with an emergent manic mood episode, in the context of a family history of bipolar affective disorder.
[119] The addendum report advises Dr Panckhurst’s opinion that episode is likely reflective of an underlying vulnerability to a bipolar spectrum mood disorder.
[120] These findings, viewed as a whole, in my view clearly suggest that the degree of supervision and oversight which the sentence of life imprisonment provides is both necessary and appropriate in the interests of public safety in future.
[121] I acknowledge that s 102 has, on rare occasions, been applied in respect of murders committed under serious mental impairment, as yours was, where a level of risk to public safety remained.15 But in those cases, the offending was intimately connected with the offender’s relationship involving a history of violence and abuse at the hands of the victim.
15 R v Cole [2017] NZHC 517; R v Simeon [2021] NZHC 1371.
[122] By contrast, Mr Willis had been to you a deeply compassionate, supportive partner. In that sense I consider your brutal attack on him poses a heightened risk to the public safety, in particular future partners, which supports the imposition of a life sentence.
[123] Standing back and taking into account your circumstances and the circumstances of your offence, I do not consider the sentence of life imprisonment to be manifestly unjust. Section 104 is engaged but is significantly mitigated by the influence of the severe depressive episode with psychotic features, in my view such that an MPI of 11 years is appropriate in your case.
Firearms prohibition order
[124] As you have heard this morning, I must also consider whether a firearms prohibition order be granted, as the Crown seeks. That application is opposed by your counsel. The application is sought on the basis that, because your offending used a readily accessible weapon to commit a brutal killing, you might pose a risk to public safety if you were able to access firearms in the future.
[125] I have reached the view that I am not satisfied an order is necessary, reasonable and appropriate in your case, primarily as the question of your eligibility for, and conditions of future release, on parole after you have served the minimum period of imprisonment will properly be a matter for the Parole Board at that time.
[126] Ms Coade, would you please stand. Carole Ann Coade I sentence you to life imprisonment, with a minimum period of imprisonment of 11 years.
[127]I decline to impose a firearms prohibition order.
Suppression
[128] There is no application on your behalf for continuation of the interim order suppressing your name and identifying details, and that order lapses, accordingly.
[129]You may stand down.
………………………………………
Preston J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Dunedin
S A Saunderson-Warner, Dunedin
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