R v Campbell HC Napier CRI 2009-069-2003

[2010] NZHC 2264

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NAPIER REGISTRY

CRI-2009-069-2003

THE QUEEN

v

EARL STRATHERN CAMPBELL

Hearing:         15 December 2010

Counsel:         C R Walker and J D Lucas for Crown

A Malik for Prisoner

Judgment:      15 December 2010

SENTENCING NOTES OF DOBSON J

Introduction

[1]      I have to sentence you this morning following the entry of a guilty plea for the aggravated robbery of an Armourguard van as its officers delivered money to the ANZ Bank in Hastings, and two related charges of arson and theft of a vehicle.  You also appear for sentence on one charge of escaping from custody, and three for resisting prison officers and a Court security officer.  As the charge for aggravated robbery is the most serious, I will take that as the lead offence.

Facts

[2]      Dealing with the facts briefly, on Monday 29 June last year, you and your associate, Mr Garnham, took a Subaru vehicle which had been previously stolen in

R V CAMPBELL HC NAP CRI-2009-069-2003 15 December 2010

preparation for the next day’s plan.  On Tuesday 30 June 2009, you and Mr Garnham drove to where that vehicle was, dressed in black, wearing black beanies with holes cut out for your eyes, and carrying a large sports bag and an unloaded pistol. Meanwhile your sister, Ms Hema, had positioned herself in a position to observe the movements of the Armourguard van.  She telephoned you when the van was nearing your position.

[3]      You then drove the stolen car to meet the Armourguard van.  As its officers got out of the van, Mr Garnham parked behind it and you got out of the car, with the pistol in your hand.  You ordered the Armourguard officers to put their hands above their heads and struck one of the officers on the forehead with the butt of your pistol. You then picked up the case containing cash canisters and ran back to the waiting vehicle.   Mr Garnham drove the two of you at speed while you placed the cash canisters into the sports bag. You then drove back to the vehicle you had used earlier that morning and you were at least a party to setting the stolen Subaru alight, and you both then left the scene.

[4]      You and Mr Garnham then drove to a property to which your father, Ricky Campbell, had access.   Ricky and you left that property and disposed of the cash canisters.  You then, later that day, met up with Mr Garnham at a motel room and, with a third man, counted the cash. You had taken some $156,000.

[5]      You have disputed elements of the Police summary of facts, intending to downplay your role because the Police summary treats you as being the principal offender.  First, your version reflected in the pre-sentence report and in Mr Malik’s submissions is that Mr Garnham was the first to suggest committing the robbery.  I have read all of the intercepted text messages and whilst that could literally be true, I do consider it unlikely.   I am satisfied, as I am required to be under s 24 of the Sentencing Act, that you took at least an equal, and probably a leading, role in the totality of the planning.

[6]      Next, you say that yours was a lesser role in the theft of the Subaru to be used in the robbery.   Again, you were at the very least a party to all aspects of that criminal conduct.

[7]      Further, you told the Probation Officer that you only hit the Armourguard employee holding the money after he tried to activate an alarm, or a variation on that Mr Malik has suggested this morning is that when he was resisting your demand that he hand over the money.  In contrast, the victim impact statement from that person suggests that you hit him very hard and entirely out of the blue.  He has no reason to omit reference to any initiative he had taken and it is to be expected that in the company debriefing of that incident, his employer would be vitally interested in how effective any attempt to raise the alarm had or had not been.  Even if you thought the employee was going to attempt to raise the alarm, the attack on him without any warning remains an extremely serious aggravating feature of your conduct.

[8]      After a period of Police surveillance, on 17 August 2009 your father, Ricky’s, vehicle was stopped and searched by the Police.  The sum of $15,000 was recovered from that vehicle and that is the only money which has been recovered that the Police treat as proceeds of the robbery.

[9]      I have read the three victim impact statements from the two guards and the previous owner of the stolen Subaru.   If you have not yet read them, I commend them to you.   The guard you attacked has been emotionally unstable since your attack on him in the course of the robbery.  Although born and bred in Hawke’s Bay, the impact  of  your  offending has  caused him  to  move from  the district.   That involved sale of a house at a disadvantage when his life was in disarray, and the whole of his life has been seriously disrupted.

[Mr Campbell interjects. Wants to know his sentence.]

[10]     The second guard is also left with a long-term unsettled attitude from the trauma of the robbery.  The owner of the car has been dealt a cruel blow by your offending.  She was not in a position to have the car insured and the loss of it has been felt heavily by her and her family.

[11]     You should appreciate, Mr Campbell, that this offending has not just lost a significant amount of money to a bank you might think could afford to lose it.  It has also  scarred  in  the  emotional  sense  those  subjected  to  your  attack  and  has

substantially disrupted the life of the family whose vehicle you stole for use in the robbery.

Pre-sentence report

[12]     I have read the pre-sentence report on you.   It highlights your propensity towards violence, and a high risk of re-offending in light of the fact that you have received a sentence of imprisonment every year between 2002 and 2008.  The report writer perceived a lack of genuine remorse for the victims of your offending.  Rather, you have expressed concerns for yourself and your family.

Approach on sentence

[13]     In imposing your sentence I am guided first by the Sentencing Act 2002, and second by the guideline judgment in respect of aggravated robbery offending of R v Mako.[1]   The Court is directed by the purposes and principles of sentencing contained in ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act, which require provision of a sentence that will deter you and others from committing similar offences in the future and to hold you accountable for your actions.  The Sentencing Act also requires the Court to impose

the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances and to assist with your rehabilitation.

[1] R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA).

[14]     The Court of Appeal in R v Mako has provided guidelines as to sentencing for aggravated robbery.   The Court of Appeal outlined 15 features of offending that would be relevant to an assessment of relative seriousness:[2]

[2] At [36]-[51].

(a)       the degree of planning and preparation;

(b)      the number of participants and their deployment; (c)   disguises;

(d)the number and types of weapons and how they are brandished, and whether any firearms are unloaded;

(e)       the target premises or persons, relevant to the potential gain, and the number of members of the public who are affected;

(f)       the specific provisions of the Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment

Act 1999 (now in s 9(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act); (g)           the vulnerability of the victims;

(h)the need for deterrence of certain types of activity in view of their frequency or prevalence in a particular area;

(i)       the use of violence;

(j)       the presence of threats and intimidation;

(k)      the property stolen and the extent of any recovery;

(l)associated   offending   such   as   vehicle   conversion,   detention   or abduction of victims and hostage-taking;

(m)     the impact on victims;

(n)      evidence of there being gang activity; and

(o)      multiple offending.

[15]     Where an aggravated robbery has been committed against a security van transporting large amounts of money in public or to or from a bank, the following

observation from Mako is helpful:[3]

[3] R v Mako at [54]. See also R v Robinson HC Auckland CRI-2007-090-8534, 23 November

2007; R v Kite [2007] NZCA 385.

The robbery of commercial premises where members of the public can be expected to be present, targeting substantial sums in tills or a safe by a group, with a lethal weapon, disguises and other indications of preparation, should attract for adult perpetrators after a defended trial a starting point of six or perhaps more years.  Where firearms are loaded or the danger of harm is increased in other ways, or if actual violence is used, the starting point would be eight years or more.

Comparable decisions

[16]     I next look at comparable decisions.  In R v McMaster, the offender, along with an associate, robbed at gunpoint two security guards who were restocking two ATM machines.[4]   A sum of $140,000 was taken.  Upon approaching the guards, the offender demanded that the guards drop the bags containing the money canisters or he would be shot.  His associate picked up the bags and the two left the scene in a stolen vehicle which was driven by a third person.   The sentence of eight years’ imprisonment was upheld on appeal.   That is comparable offending, except the actual use of violence makes yours somewhat more serious.

[4] R v McMaster [2009] NZCA 393.

[17]     In R v Minhinnick, the offender targeted a supermarket at a time to coincide with the weekend’s takings being removed from the premises.[5]   Two security guards left the supermarket to return to their van, carrying over $200,000.   Prior to the guards reaching the van, the offender, disguised in a beanie and scarf and holding a sawn-off shotgun, approached the guards.   He demanded that they drop the bags. The guards did so, the offender picked up the bags and fled to an awaiting getaway

car.  A starting point of eight or nine years was adopted.  In light of the offender’s extensive  history  of  previous  offending  of  the  same  type,  a  final  sentence  of

11 years’ imprisonment was imposed, along with a minimum period of imprisonment of six and a half years.

[5] R v Minhinnick HC Christchurch CRI-2005-009-13228, 6 October 2006.

[18]     In R v Robinson the offender, together with an associate travelled in a stolen car to a mall where they robbed a Chubb security van.[6]   The offender confronted two security guards with a sawn-off shotgun and demanded that they open the door to the

van.  When the guards did not comply, the offender fired two rounds in the air, after

which the guards did open the door.  The offender took a bag containing $100,000 in cash and his associate drove him away from the scene.  The car was abandoned and set alight some distance from the scene and a second vehicle was stolen, that vehicle also being set alight.   (That case involved additional charges of being part of an organised criminal group, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and two counts of burglary).  A starting point of 10 years was adopted for the aggravated robbery charge.  The discharge of the firearm is comparable to the use of violence, so that is similar offending.

[6] R v Robinson HC Auckland CRI-2007-090-8534, 23 November 2007.

[19]     Last I compare R v Tipene where the offender, along with three co-accused, entered a bank and shouted at everyone to get down.   One of the offenders was carrying a screwdriver.[7]   They gained access to the staff area and demanded the keys to the drawers from the tellers.  $11,000 in cash was taken.  The offender was 23 and had, since the age of 17, amassed 111 convictions, 25 being burglary-related.  The Judge found the screwdriver was intended to be used as a weapon.  A starting point of six years’ imprisonment was adopted.  A sentence of seven years’ imprisonment was imposed, notwithstanding the guilty plea of the offender before trial.  That was

reduced on appeal to six years’ imprisonment.   The use of a real weapon and the violence makes this case more serious than that.

Starting point

[7] R v Tipene CA269/01, 27 May 2002.

[20]     Now, coming to your case.   The Crown seeks a starting point of “at least eight years” on the aggravated robbery conviction.  In light of the guidance in R v Mako, it is apparent that the appropriate starting point in the present case is eight years or more.   There is the use of a firearm, and while it was not loaded and therefore did not in itself increase the danger of harm, actual violence was used against one of the guards.  Further, the following aggravating features are present:

(a)       First, there was a degree of planning and preparation.

(b)Secondly, the number of participants.  While this did not lead to any increased threat or danger, it does demonstrate a higher degree of planning and organisation (see Mako at [37]).

(c)       You used disguises.

(d)      There was the use of an unloaded firearm. (e)  The potential gain was high.

(f)       There was the use of violence.

(g)      There was the use of threats and intimidation.

(h)      The extent of recovery of property has been low.

(i)There is associated offending (by this I mean converting of a Subaru and its arson).

(j)       The impact on the victims was significant.

[21]     Mr Malik argues for a starting point for all of the June 2009 offending in the range of eight years.  As to the less serious convictions, if I can deal with them for a moment, it is appropriate to consider concurrent sentences, that is ones served at the same time as the longest sentence for the aggravated robbery, in respect of your convictions for theft of a vehicle and arson.  Although they would warrant longer sentences if they stood on their own, I intend treating the convictions for theft of the vehicle and arson as warranting an additional six months when they are added to the sentence I must give you for the aggravated robbery.  Bearing that in mind, I treat the closest analogy for the aggravated robbery offending to be that in Robinson, and although that comparison would justify a starting point of 10 years on its own, I am inclined to suggest a starting point for the aggravated robbery of nine and a half years, increasing that to 10 years on the basis that there will be concurrent sentences ordered on the arson and theft of vehicle convictions.

[22]     I  note  in  this  regard  that  the  starting  point  adopted  by  Judge  Rea  in sentencing Mr Garnham was nine years.  Mr Malik has argued this morning that that is too high because he suggests that Judge Rea misapplied the paragraph of Mako that we are focused on. I accept there that there was no prospective risk that when you committed the burglary the street would be crowded at 7.30 in the morning. But having said that, it was in a main commercial thoroughfare in Hastings, there was always the risk that other members of the public would be encountered and I am not persuaded that Judge Rea’s starting point for your co-offender was wrong.

[23]     In light of the fact that you were the perpetrator of the violence, I consider that an uplift and the disparity of a year between you to be justified.

Aggravating and mitigating factors personal to the offender

[24]     Now aggravating and mitigating factors personal to you.  First, aggravating features.  The Crown notes that I would be justified in imposing an increase for your previous convictions.  On my count you have some 47.  The pre-sentence report has broken those previous convictions down, analysing that you have three convictions for alcohol and drug-related offending, nine involving violence and weapons and

11 for dishonesty.

[Mr Campbell  interjects  further.    Challenges  nature  of  convictions.    Judge invites  Mr Malik  to  speak  to  his  client.    Mr Campbell  remonstrates  with Mr Malik.  Mr Campbell removed from Court.]

[25]     In addition, there are 13 driving convictions and 10 for offending against authority.  I accept that none of those convictions are, on their own, nearly as serious as  the  aggravated  robbery  conviction  for  which  Mr Campbell  is  now  being sentenced.   Perhaps the most troubling aspect of his previous convictions is how quickly he has re-offended after release from prison.   He received a sentence of imprisonment every year between 2002 and 2008, with this current offending in June

2009 following release in early March 2009 for a burglary committed in May 2008 after release in February 2008.   Mr Malik has argued that the current convictions represent an escalation and that there should only be an uplift where there has been a

repetition of the same character of offending.   Of course, each case and the circumstances of each offender have to be treated on their own circumstances and that could not be an absolute rule.   In this case I cannot dismiss Mr Campbell’s previous convictions entirely and consider they do justify a small uplift of five per cent.

[26]     As   I   have   noted,   the   pre-sentence   report   writer   has   recorded   that Mr Campbell shows no remorse for his offending.  Mr Malik has informed me that Mr Campbell  has  offered  to  have  a  restorative  justice  conference  with  the  two Armourguard security guards, and with the owner of the Subaru.  None of those has occurred.  The Sentencing Act obliges me to have regard to an apology, but I have also to reflect on whether it is genuine.[8]

[8] Sentencing Act 2002, s 10.

[27]     Mr Campbell cannot be given a lot of credit for indicating that he would be prepared  to  undergo  a  restorative  justice  process,  when  that  does  not  ensue. Similarly,  I am  guided  by  the  Probation  Officer’s  view  that  his  expressions  of remorse are less than completely genuine, and probably focus more on himself than on the substantial harm he has caused to others.   Nonetheless, and as a part of rehabilitative processes, he should be encouraged to reflect on his offending in ways that these initiatives suggest he is starting to do, and I would accordingly grant a five per cent discount for these features as a mitigating factor.

Guilty plea

[28]     Mr Campbell pleaded guilty only days before trial, but he is entitled to some discount for that guilty plea.  Under the Court of Appeal’s guidance in R v Hessell a small reduction would be appropriate:[9]

[9] R v Hessell [2009] NZCA 450, [2010] 2 NZLR 298 at [17]-[18].

…a guilty plea entered between a status hearing or first callover and the date three weeks before trial or hearing warrants a reduction of between 10% and

20%. The extent of the reduction depends on the stage at which the plea was

entered and the degree to which the plea prevented further trauma, stress, and inconvenience for victims and witnesses and saved resources.

[18]   A small reduction of less than 10% may be warranted if a guilty plea is entered after the commencement of the trial or hearing.  This depends on the stage at which the plea is entered and the extent to which it relieves victims and witnesses of the need to give evidence.   A guilty plea at the conclusion of the prosecution case does not warrant any reduction.

[29]     On 16 November 2010, shortly after his plea, the Court of Appeal decision in

Hessell was overturned by the Supreme Court.[10]

[10] R v Hessell [2010] NZSC 135, (2010) 24 CRNZ 966.

[30]     As a matter of fairness, if Mr Campbell had entered a guilty plea on an expectation of the extent of discount that the Court of Appeal authority suggested was  appropriate,  he  should  now  be  sentenced  on  that,  even  if  the  law  has subsequently changed.   In Mr Campbell’s circumstances as I have discussed with counsel, I do not treat the different approach to discounts for guilty pleas as now set by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hessell to make any material difference.  Indeed, if the Supreme Court’s approach were more generous to him, it may be appropriate to give him benefit of any greater advantage as the Crown has acknowledged.

[31]     The  Supreme  Court’s  approach  in  Hessell  requires  sentencing  Judges  to consider all relevant circumstances in giving a discount (which is subject to an upper limit of 25 per cent). The Court noted that the following circumstances are relevant:

(a)      whether the plea saved considerable resources;

(b)whether it saved witnesses and victims from the trauma of giving evidence;

(c)      the strength of the prosecution’s case;

(d)      whether facts were disputed;

(e)       when a plea was entered (which is not to be the result of a formalistic quantification); and

(f)      whether the plea was the result of a reduced charge.

[32]     Here,  the  guilty  plea  was  entered  after  the  Crown  case  was  materially prepared.   The Crown argues that it had a very strong case with evidence to be adduced by Mr Garnham, the co-accused, and multiple intercepted communications. I do accept that Mr Campbell has saved witnesses and victims the time and trauma of giving evidence, and therefore I allow a discount of five per cent.

Sentence

[33]     Taking the starting point of ten years for all of the June 2009 convictions, I have  identified  an  aggravating  factor  warranting  a  five  per cent  increase,  and combined mitigating factors warranting a 10 per cent decrease.   That means a net reduction  of  five  per cent  so  he  is  sentenced  to  nine  years  and  six  months’ imprisonment.   On the lesser conviction of arson, I sentence him to 12 months’ imprisonment, and for theft of the vehicle I sentence him to six months’ imprisonment, but each is to be served concurrently with the longer sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction.

[34]     Now  the  Crown  has  sought,  pursuant  to  s 86  of  the  Sentencing Act,  a minimum period of imprisonment to be imposed.  Mr Walker has cited each of the criterion in s 86(2) of the Sentencing Act, and emphasises in particular the need to protect the community.  He refers to the other evidence that I have heard in unrelated and   different   proceedings   and   suggests   that   that   reveals   a   tendency   on Mr Campbell’s part to violence.  He also argues that the seriousness of the offending is  such  that  a  minimum  period  of  imprisonment  is  necessary  to  emphasise denouncing conduct of this type.

[35]     Mr Malik  has  opposed  any  such  period.    He  cites  the  authority  of  R  v Gordon[11] in his written submissions and urges that consistency of treatment does not warrant the additional imposition of a minimum period.  He emphasises that there was no extreme violence here, that the firearm was unloaded, that there was no particular cruelty, that the victims were not particularly vulnerable and this was not part of multiple offending or a criminal spree.  He urges that a nominal sentence is to

be preferred because that leaves the future of Mr Campbell’s term in prison in the hands of the Parole Board where he urges for a man of his characteristics and previous record it should be.

[11] R v Gordon [2009] NZCA 145 at [15]-[17].

[36]     By a very narrow margin, I have decided not to impose a minimum term.  I do so in the hope that the longer period Mr Campbell will in any event have to serve in prison will set him on a road to some form of rehabilitation.  As Mr Malik points out, his shorter periods of imprisonment have not enabled the focus of the Parole Board in a way that would give him access to rehabilitation programmes that it is to be hoped will be available to him.  I emphasise that in any repetition of offending of this seriousness, he could not expect to be treated so leniently.

Escape from custody

[37]     Dealing with the escape from custody, on the conviction for escaping from lawful custody, the Crown seeks a starting point of six months’ imprisonment.  The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.  There are also three convictions for resisting prison officers and a Court security officer.  The Crown also argues that a minimum discount for his guilty pleas is appropriate as they were entered on the day scheduled for the defended hearing, and when a conviction was inevitable.

[38]     Mr Campbell has three previous convictions for escaping from custody (in

2008, 2005 and 2004) and two for resisting the Police (in 2007 and 2005).   It is evident that these previous convictions have had little effect on him.  The offending occurred at the end of a callover in this Court.  Mr Campbell resisted being taken to the cells and aided by a brother was able to avoid being detained and get some way out of the Court.  Mr Campbell’s brother was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault  and  was  sentenced  to  14  months’ imprisonment.    The  charges  against Mr Campbell have been downgraded and are less serious than those his brother was convicted of.

[39]     I  have  considered  Quilter  v  Police,[12]   which  appended  a  list  of  some

[12] Quilter v Police HC Christchurch AP90/87, 2 July 1987. 

37 sentences involving escaping from custody in the Christchurch region during the previous two years, plus Yee v Police,[13]  and Ragg v Police.[14]    The general tenor of the  cases  is  that  a  term  of  more  than  12  months’ imprisonment  is  uncommon. Indeed, in Quilter, in reliance on an appendix referred to, Williamson J noted that commonly the term imposed is between three and six months’ imprisonment, cumulative on any other term.   Of course, longer sentences have been imposed. Those are relatively old cases, and there is, if anything, a trend to longer sentences in more recent cases.

[13] Yee v Police HC Auckland AP46/93, 6 April 1993.

[14] Ragg v Police HC Hamilton AP41/01, 18 July 2001.

[40]     In R v Baleitavuki,[15] the appellant and six other prisoners were being escorted to Court for a depositions hearing.  When the vehicle was stopped at traffic lights, the appellant and three others escaped through an air vent in the vehicle’s roof while the appellant was handcuffed to another.  The appellant (and the person to whom he was handcuffed) stopped a vehicle and attempted to take it.  The driver refused and a scuffle ensued.  The driver received moderate bruising, but did not require medical attention.   The Judge considered that a cumulative sentence was required and a

[15] R v Baleitavuki HC Auckland CRI-2005-004-22544, 15 September 2006.

12 month starting point was adopted, and reduced by four months on account of the

prisoner’s guilty plea.

[41]     What is worrying about this offending is that it was in Court and caused significant disruption to a High Court hearing.  All Court users are entitled to expect that  everyone  else  will  behave  themselves  so  that  the  Court’s  business  is  not disrupted by such behaviour.  Whether Mr Campbell likes it or not, the Court as an institution expects civil behaviour and will, where appropriate, separately punish those who commit offences in Court.

[42]     Accordingly, in light of the comparable cases and the aggravating factor that it was conduct in Court, I set a starting point of six months’ imprisonment.   That should be uplifted by five per cent to reflect his previous convictions for escaping

from custody.  In light of his guilty plea, I again provide him with a five per cent

discount, providing an end sentence of six months’ imprisonment.  The offending is different  in  character  and  timing  from  the  other  convictions.    In  following  the previous authorities on this, and as accepted by Mr Malik, it is appropriate to impose this sentence cumulatively, that is, it is to be served after that for aggravated robbery.

[43]     Having imposed that sentence on a cumulative basis, s 85 of the Sentencing Act requires me to stand back and reflect on whether the cumulative length of separate prison sentences is not disproportionately long, so that it is wholly out of proportion with the gravity of his overall offending.  I am satisfied that it is not.  On the more serious of the offending, I have already addressed the relativity between him and Mr Garnham and there is ample justification for the addition to the total period to be served, on account of his more recent offending in this Court.

Reparation

[44]     As to reparation, the Crown has sought a reparation order under s 12 of the

Sentencing Act.

[45]     To the extent that I consider it is appropriate, reparation is not opposed and that is on the basis that it is confined to the proceeds of sale of the two vehicles.

[46]     I accordingly make a reparation order, notionally for the amount of $20,000, but on terms that the order is not to be enforced except in relation to the proceeds of the sale of the two motor vehicles identified as having been purchased with the proceeds of the robbery.

[47]     The Crown also sought under the head of reparation an order in respect of the balance of the sum seized from Mr Ricky Campbell.  Mr Malik’s instructions are that Mr Earl Campbell treats that as money for which Mr Ricky Campbell is responsible and he disavows both any claim to it and any interest in whether a reparation order is made in respect of it.  In those circumstances, that is a matter to be addressed in the course of dealing with Mr Ricky Campbell.

[48]     Now I would like to have Mr Campbell back to convey to him the outcome of

the sentencing. Tell him I won’t delay him very long.

[Mr Campbell returns to Court.]

[49]     Mr Campbell, the effect of the sentencing I have concluded in your absence is that you are sentenced to nine years and six months on the aggravated robbery conviction.  You will serve concurrent, that is at the same time, terms of 12 months for the arson conviction and six months for the theft.   You will then serve cumulatively at the end of that sentence six months for the conviction on escaping from custody and you are convicted and discharged on the convictions for resisting arrest.  I have accepted Mr Malik’s submissions and I am not imposing a minimum period in relation to the longest of those sentences.  I will order reparation, but it will be limited to the proceeds of sale of the two vehicles.

[50]     You may now stand down.

Dobson J

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Napier