R v Brackenridge - [2019] NZHC 1004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2016-004-11508

[2019] NZHC 1004

THE QUEEN

v

KIRI PAUL PATIRA BRACKENRIDGE

Hearing: 6 May 2019

Appearances:

S L McColgan and S S McMullan for the Crown

M J Dyhrberg QC and N P Chisnall for Mr Brackenridge

Judgment:

6 May 2019

Reasons:

9 May 2019

JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

[Reasons for Ruling No 1]

This judgment was delivered by me on 9 May 2019 at 2.00 pm, pursuant to
r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

Solicitors: Crown Solicitor, Auckland Counsel: M Dyhrberg QC, Auckland

R v BRACKENRIDGE [2019] NZHC 1004 [6 May 2019]

[1] On 6 May 2019 I ruled “drug-induced schizophrenia is a ‘disease of the mind’ for the purpose of s 23(2)” of the Crimes Act 1961, such being my subsequent direction to the jury. These are my brief reasons for that ruling.

[2] The expert psychiatric evidence in this case was schizophrenia syndrome is characterised (untreated) by persisting and profound delusions, hallucinations, and disordered thought in people so affected. While scientific research into its precise and complete aetiology is incomplete and indeterminate, genetic predisposition to schizophrenia is a necessary (but insufficient) condition for its occurrence.

[3] Significant use of high potency cannabis derivatives and/or methamphetamine can produce permanent changes in a person’s brain which lead to schizophrenia. New Zealand Ministry of Health data suggest such use probably increases the rate of schizophrenia in those genetically predisposed to its onset. The rate of schizophrenia among such users of either cannabis or methamphetamine is five or six times the rate among non-users. The rate doubles again for significant users of both drugs. As such, schizophrenia can be drug-induced in the genetically predisposed.

[4]Section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides:

23 Insanity

(1) Every one shall be presumed to be sane at the time of doing or omitting any act until the contrary is proved.

(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted by him or her when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him or her incapable—

(a)of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or

(b)of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong.

(3) Insanity before or after the time when he or she did or omitted the act, and insane delusions, though only partial, may be evidence that the offender was, at the time when he or she did or omitted the act, in such a condition of mind as to render him or her irresponsible for the act or omission.

(4) The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person who is alleged to be…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Brackenridge

Details

AGLC: R v Brackenridge [2019] NZHC 1004
Case: [2019] NZHC 1004
Decision Date: 6 May 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Brackenridge, the defendant, Kiri Paul Patira Brackenridge, was charged with criminal offences and claimed to be exempt from conviction due to a 'disease of the mind' under Section 23(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. The High Court of New Zealand was required to determine whether drug-induced schizophrenia qualified as a 'disease of the mind' under the statute. The court examined the expert psychiatric evidence that outlined the characteristics of schizophrenia syndrome and the potential for drug use to induce the condition in genetically predisposed individuals. The court considered the policy concerns underlying the insanity defence, the distinction between excuse and justification, and the relevance of self-induced drug effects in determining the defendant's capacity to be held responsible for the crime.

The court held that drug-induced schizophrenia should be considered a 'disease of the mind' for the purpose of Section 23(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. The court rejected the Canadian approach of an individualised contextual analysis, as it was deemed inapplicable to the specific circumstances of the case. The court emphasised the importance of the offender's capacity to be held responsible for their crime and found that the 'deserving' nature of the offender for the exercise of the insanity defence was not a relevant consideration. The court concluded that the operative state of mind was schizophrenic, regardless of its origin, and thus qualified as a 'disease of the mind' under the statute.

Based on the court's reasoning, drug-induced schizophrenia was determined to be a 'disease of the mind' for the purpose of Section 23(2) of the Crimes Act 1961. The court's decision allowed the defendant to be assessed for the insanity defence by a jury, even if disclaimed by the offender. The court's ruling in this case provides guidance for future cases involving drug-induced mental illnesses and the applicability of the insanity defence under New Zealand law.

Orders