R v Bell
[2024] NZHC 370
•28 February 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE
CRI-2023-012-410
[2024] NZHC 370
THE KING v
KALEB WILLIAM BELL
Hearing: 28 February 2024 Appearances:
C E R Power for Crown
J A Westgate for Defendant
Judgment:
28 February 2024
SENTENCING REMARKS OF EATON J
This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
R v BELL [2024] NZHC 370 [28 February 2024]
Introduction
[1] Kaleb William Bell, you appear for sentencing having pleaded guilty to a charge of discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.1
[2] You pleaded guilty to that charge on 19 December 2023 after I gave you a sentence indication on 12 December 2023.
Background facts
[3] I have set out in full detail the facts underpinning the charges in my sentence indication notes.2 I do not propose repeating them in full today. The sentence indication notes will be attached to, and form part of, these remarks.
[4] To summarize, you arranged to sell cannabis to another person and his associates. Either that person, who I see from the pre-sentence report you describe as a friend, or one of his associates, was armed with a sawn-off shotgun. You were threatened, stood over and robbed of your cannabis and, you say, of money. You told the author of the pre-sentence report you suffered a $20,000 loss. It is not clear whether you claim that was what was taken from you, or you are describing how that robbery impacted generally on your cannabis dealing. Before the persons who robbed you made off in their Mazda vehicle you managed to get hold of the sawn-off shotgun. Quite how you achieved that remains unexplained. You got into your car, your mother’s BMW and you pursued the Mazda. You eventually pulled up beside the Mazda on a busy Dunedin road just after 4.30 pm. There were significant numbers of members of the public in the immediate vicinity.
[5] From the driver’s seat, you aimed the firearm at the victim, who was sitting in the rear of the Mazda, and you fired a shot. That shot was fired at very close range. The shot hit the top of the doorframe of Mazda leaving a large hole. A single pellet hit the victim in the forehead but did not cause him any serious harm.
1 Crimes Act 1961, s 198; maximum penalty 14 years’ imprisonment.
2 New Zealand Police v Bell [2023] NZHC 3655 at [3] – [8].
[6] You then travelled north in the BMW, you did a U-turn and you waited for the Mazda to arrive. When it passed you, you fired a second shot. Some pellets hit the vehicle, smashing a rear window of the Mazda.
[7] It is now clear, although not referenced within the summary of facts, that another car, a vehicle belonging to a member of the public was struck with pellets incurring damage for which reparation is sought today.
[8] I think you now understand Mr Bell, you could so easily have been facing a charge of murder. This was a truly shocking act of vigilante justice that not only put those inside the Mazda, but other innocent members of the public at real risk. That you were willing to engage in such a grave risk of killing another person or persons, not, on my assessment, as a spontaneous reaction to the circumstances that confronted you but rather, driven by anger and an overriding desire to exact retribution, is alarming. And I think Mr Westgate is right, that it must reflect your state of mind at the time, which I acknowledge reflected in turn at least in part, your background.
[9] I hope you understand why it is that in sentencing you today the sentencing purposes of denunciation, that is, sending clear messages to other young men who might be minded to arm themselves with firearms and to discharge a firearm in a public places, deterrence, not necessarily for you, because I accept you have been deterred from the consequences of your actions, and personal accountability assume importance.
The sentence indication
[10] At the sentence indication and having reviewed the cases I had been referred to by both the Crown and your counsel, I adopted a starting point for your offending of four years’ imprisonment3 and that is the starting point I adopt today. I indicated I would apply a discount of 20 per cent to reflect your guilty plea4 and a further five per cent to reflect your age.5 Finally I indicated I would allow a discrete discount
3 At [13] – [29].
4 At [32].
5 At [34].
of about three months to reflect the time you spent complying with the restrictive terms of electronically monitored bail.6
[11] The indicated sentence was one of two years, nine months’ imprisonment. I acknowledged there might be other discounts available for factors personal to you, but I made it clear in giving you the sentence indication that I regarded your offending as being too serious to permit any sentence other than a full-time custodial sentence to be imposed. That remains the view I have.
[12] I have now received a pre-sentence report and a s 27 cultural report prepared by Ms Oakley. On your behalf, Mr Westgate asks the Court to consider allowing a further discrete allowance to reflect those matters.
The pre-sentence report
[13] The pre-sentence report observes your current offending represents an escalation in criminality and assesses your risk of re-offending as medium and your risk of harm to others as high. It tells me the remorse that you demonstrate is genuine. It speaks to your regret at having been separated from your daughter, and I understand that. It tells me in the event of a full-time custodial sentence you will, and these are your words “train hard getting the right mindset” and you will prepare yourself for a second chance outside. The report writer refers to your history of drug use, to your addictions and to your desire to work on the issues you have with substance abuse. Realistically, the report says the only recommended sentence is one of imprisonment.
[14] As Mr Power has highlighted, the report writer says you told her you had offended as you did to uphold your “street cred”, that is, to maintain your status. Mr Bell, that you were willing to engage in such serious violence to maintain the respect of others serves to highlight your distorted thinking and indicates an astonishing disregard not only the lives of the members of the public, but the victim, who you were shooting at, your so-called friend and also for yourself.
6 At [35].
The s 27 report
[15] The s 27 report tells me you are now 26 years old and, identifying as Māori you have whakapapa to Ngāti Tūwharetoa through your maternal grandmother, Te Whānau a Apanui and Ngāpuhi through your maternal grandfather’s whakapapa and Ngāti Porou through your paternal lineage. However, you and your maternal grandmother are disconnected from te ao Māori.
[16] The report describes you as being raised in a highly dysfunctional, neglectful, and abusive home, an environment that is said to have not only moulded your behaviours, but normalised crime and antisocial behaviours. You were exposed to violence, substance abuse and crime. Both your parents are described as alcoholics, your father has struggled with a methamphetamine addiction. You were exposed to cannabis from an early age and have developed longstanding substance abuse issues.
[17] The report writer considers you to have been both genetically and environmentally predisposed to abusing substances.
[18] Notwithstanding those obvious disadvantages you did have much success at school. You were described as an exceptional student, “an honour roll student”. However, when your family relocated to Dunedin, your academic success was curtailed and you left school with NCEA levels one and two, described by the report writer as well below what you were capable of. You clearly have ability Mr Bell.
[19] After school you worked for a period in your paternal grandfather’s demolition business in Auckland before returning to Dunedin to work with your father learning the stonemasonry trade. You met your ex-partner, and you have a child together. You worked with your father for about five years, during which time you began using methamphetamine. From there, you developed an addiction and report that at the time of this offending you had not slept for two nights and were under the influence of a number of narcotics including methamphetamine. The report writer suggests that your substance addiction issues are at the heart of your offending and, what is called, the “drug-crime” nexus is a highly relevant consideration.
[20] With reference to those matters, Mr Westgate, asks the Court to consider allowing a further discrete five to 10 per cent deduction.
[21] Mr Power, on behalf of the Crown, observes the contents of the s 27 report insofar as they relate to the circumstances around the commission of the crime are entirely self-reported. He refers particularly to your assertion that you had not slept for two days and were under the influence of drugs. He invites the Court to exercise caution in relying on your self-report and stresses that self-induced intoxication either by alcohol or drugs is not, as a matter of law, a mitigating factor.
[22] Mr Power questions the nexus, or the link, between your drug addiction and this offending, highlighting the absence in your criminal history of any convictions for drug offending. With reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in Berkland7 Mr Power submits that the causative contribution of background factors may be displaced in whole or in part in a case like yours, where the offending is particularly serious. That leads him to submit that any credit to reflect the matters set out in the s 27 report should be nominal.
[23] Just on that last submission, in my view, the Supreme Court in Berkland in referring to displacement of background factors, were referring to more complex and orchestrated offending where an offender is likely to have engaged in a careful assessment of the risks of detection and therefore increased agency. I am not persuaded this case falls neatly within that category.
[24] Overall, I am satisfied your personal background is relevant in assessing your culpability and worthy of recognition by a further discrete deduction.
[25] Yes, much of the report is based on what you have told the report authors, but I do not think see that as a basis to discard those matters as irrelevant. A mystery of this case, and is what is not explained in the report is how you came to overcome the three persons, including one armed with a sawn-off shotgun and why, given you were armed with a shotgun, and they had stolen from you, that rather than try and recover
7 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143 at [111].
what they had stolen, you instead fired shots, and one in particular, at close range and did not make any effort to recover what you say was taken from you.
[26] But otherwise, I have found the report helpful in understanding more about your background and what might have led you to engage in such serious offending. I accept those background features help explain your addiction, an addiction that did play a role in your decision making on the day. I am referring particularly to what was described as the “drug-crime nexus”. I consider that to be relevant.
[27] In support of the submission that the Court should allow a further deduction, Mr Westgate highlights the shift in attitude that you have demonstrated since your arrest and detention, which I infer is highlighting how you might operate in the community when you are not under the influence of drugs or in the grip of addiction. He highlights you have re-engaged with family, and you are enjoying strong familial support. He has read to me this morning a letter he has received from your grandfather. Your grandfather has seen a marked change in your attitude since your release on EM bail. Mr Westgate highlights that although the decision I made to grant your release on EM bail was finely balanced, there is no suggestion of any breaches and you have engaged positively both with family and employment whilst on EM bail.
[28] I allow a deduction at the higher end of the range advanced by your counsel, of 10 per cent to reflect the personal factors outlined in the s 27 report.
[29] Beyond that further deduction, I am conscious you have spent another two months on EM bail since the sentence indication, and I increase the allowance to reflect time on EM bail from three months to four months.
Reparation
[30] Mr Power, for the Crown seeks a reparation order in the sum of $1,908.70. That is said to cover the costs to Vero Insurance Limited for repairs to a vehicle belonging to a member of the public that was damaged by the shotgun pellets. Given you will have the opportunity to engage in employment through your grandfather’s business upon your release, I am satisfied it is appropriate to make that reparation order. I make that order accordingly in favour of Vero Insurance Limited.
Other orders
[31] The Crown also seek an order pursuant to s 39A of the Arms Act 1983. That is, a firearms protection order. That order prohibits an offender from accessing, possessing, or using any firearm or related items. Any unlicensed person in possession of a firearm commits an offence. I am sure you are aware of that. But a s 39A order takes matters a step further. It will prevent you having any association with somebody who is in possession of firearms. It is an order that will strongly encourage you to steer clear of firearms upon your release from prison. Mr Westgate takes no issue with the making of an order, and I make that order accordingly.
[32] The Crown also seek an order for destruction of the sawn-off shotgun. I make an order accordingly.
[33] Finally, the Crown seek an order for confiscation of the vehicle you used, the BMW, registration GCE188, your mother’s vehicle. That vehicle was used by you in the commission of the offence. You take no issue with the making of that confiscation order, and I make an order accordingly.
Result
[34] From a starting point of four years’ imprisonment, I made total allowances of 35 per cent made up of 20 per cent for your guilty plea, five per cent to reflect your relative youth and ten per cent for recognise the range of causative factors outlined in the s 27 report. I also allow a deduction of four months in recognition of the extended compliant period you have spent on electronically monitored bail. That leads to an end sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment.
[35] I repeat Mr Bell what I said at the sentence indication, and I consider I have been generous with the discounts I have allowed you. Even if I had been persuaded that a short-term sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment or less was available, I would not have considered that sentence to be appropriate having regard to the serious nature of the offending.
[36] I commend you for the positive attitude you have displayed since this offence was committed, particularly of late. I strongly encourage you to stay strong and remain focussed during the term of your imprisonment. You are most fortunate to have the support of a loving family and an employment opportunity upon your release. I am confident that you will take that up.
[37] Mr Bell please stand. Kaleb Bell, on the charge of discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm you are sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment. I confirm the ancillary orders I have made during these remarks.
[38]You may stand down.
...................................................
Eaton J
Solicitors:
PRB Law, Dunedin
Counsel:
J A Westgate, Barrister, Dunedin
NOTE: PUBLICATION OF THE JUDGMENT AND OF THE REQUEST FOR A SENTENCING INDICATION IN ANY NEWS MEDIA OR ON THE INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE DATABASE IS
PROHIBITED BY SECTION 63 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011 UNTIL THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SENTENCED OR THE CHARGE DISMISSED. SEE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE
CRI-2023-012-410
[2023] NZHC 3655
NEW ZEALAND POLICE v
KALEB BELL
Hearing: 12 December 2023 Appearances:
R D Smith for Crown
J A Westgate for Defendant
Judgment:
12 December 2023
SENTENCING INDICATION OF EATON J
This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
NEW ZEALAND POLICE v BELL [2023] NZHC 3655 [12 December 2023]
Introduction
[39] Kaleb Bell seeks a sentence indication on a charge of discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.8
[40] In giving a sentence indication, I will focus on what I consider to be the relevant matters, if you were to plead guilty to that charge, I will set a starting point and then assess what discounts are available from that starting point based on the information I have before me.
Facts
[41] First, I must deal with the facts. I have in front of me a summary of facts that has been agreed between Crown counsel and your counsel for the purposes of this hearing. The indication I will give is based on those facts.
[42] On 10 March 2023, you had arranged to sell cannabis to a person I will refer to as “the victim” and that person’s associates. You all met at around 4:30 pm at St Kilda Beach. The sale did not go as planned. The victim and his associates “stood over” you. The victim was armed with a sawn-off shotgun. He threatened you with it. The group then took the cannabis without paying. As the victim and his associates were leaving, you managed to get hold of the sawn-off shotgun. The summary does not tell me how you managed to do so.
[43] Minutes later, the Mazda car in which the victim was travelling in the back seat was stopped at the traffic lights in the northbound lane on Thomas Burns Street in Dunedin.
[44] There were a number of members of the public in the vicinity, both on foot and in vehicles. As the Mazda was waiting for the lights to change, you have driven at speed on the inside lane and, upon reaching the Mazda, stopped at an angle with the front of your vehicle facing inwards towards the Mazda. Your vehicle was stopped about one metre from the Mazda. You remained in the driver’s seat of your car. You
8 Crimes Act 1961, s 198(1)9a); maximum penalty 14 years’ imprisonment.
were armed with the sawn-off shotgun. You aimed the firearm at the victim in the backseat of the Mazda and fired a shot. The shotgun kicked up, meaning most of the spread of pellets hit the top of the door frame of the Mazda leaving a large hole, some 7 centimetres in circumference. One pellet hit the victim in the forehead, lodging under the skin but not fracturing or damaging the skull.
[45] Having fired that first shot, you then travelled north and onto the St Andrew Street extension. On reaching the railway line, you did a U-turn and drove back towards the Mazda which was then approaching the roundabout on Thomas Burns Street. You stopped at the roundabout. From that position, you steadied the shotgun by resting it on the wound down window pillar of the front passenger side of your vehicle. You waited for the Mazda to arrive and as it negotiated the roundabout, you fired a second shot. Some pellets hit the Mazda, smashing the driver’s side rear quarter window. The Mazda then drove down Ward Street and you sped away in a southerly direction.
[46] You hid your car and the shotgun with an associate. That person has since been identified and has pleaded guilty to attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Victim impact statements
[47] The victim or victims, that is the occupants of the Mazda have been uncooperative with the police. There are no victim impact statements.
Approach to sentencing
[48] In determining the sentence that would be imposed if you were to plead guilty, I will have regard to the purposes and principles set out in the Sentencing Act 2002. That includes having regard to the gravity of the offending of your case. I must ensure the sentence indication I give is consistent with sentences that is imposed on persons who offend in a similar manner, and generally in similar circumstances.
[49] The first step in fixing a sentence is to establish a starting point. It requires the Court to identify the aggravating and any mitigating features of your offending and to consider any similar cases.
[50] Having fixed an appropriate starting point, I will then take into account any relevant personal circumstances including your guilty plea.
Starting point
[51] There is no dispute as to the aggravating factors that apply. They are first, that you fired two shots, separated in time by you having left the scene where you fired the first shot and driven further up the road where you assessed you had the best opportunity to fire a second shot. Second, and in particular in relation to the first shot, you were in very close proximity to the victim. That significantly enhanced the likelihood of fatal consequences. Third, both shots were fired on a public road at a busy time of the day, putting members of the public at risk.
[52] There is not a guideline judgment for the offence of discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Both counsel have referred to cases said to be of assistance in fixing a starting point. Mr Smith on behalf of the Crown has referred particularly to two cases.
[53] The first is R v Byles,9. In that case the defendant pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Mr Byles knew the victim who, along with his associates, was routinely armed in light of rising tensions between elements of the Taranaki criminal underworld and the victim. While out for a drive, Mr Byles spotted the victim and directed his partner and driver to follow him. While they attempted to block the victim’s vehicle from leaving a cul-de-sac, Mr Byles exited his vehicle with his .22 rifle pointed down. He raised his hand, requesting the victim to stop. He was ignored. Fearing he would be shot, Mr Byles raised the firearm and fired several shots before the victim managed to drive off. As he was driving off, Mr Byles fired several more shots, one hitting the driver’s headrest and another striking a residential property.
[54] In that case Gwyn J adopted a starting point of four years, six months’ imprisonment. The Judge observed that the same starting point had been applied in
9 R v Byles [2022] NZHC 2897.
R v Hakeke,10 where a drive-by shooting had occurred within a gang context, with the offenders travelling to a particular area with the intention of engaging in a confrontation before firing two shots but injuring no one. While there was not the same level of premeditation or gang element as assessed by Gwyn J, Mr Byles fired a significantly greater number of shots, one of which had hit the victim’s headrest and another, a residential property.
[55] The next case Mr Smith referred to was R v Reihana,11 That offending arose in the context of rising inter-gang tensions. The offenders had discovered a rival gang member was staying at an Auckland hotel and subsequently booked a stay there themselves. They learnt the victim was in the reception area of the hotel and gang members including Mr Reihana arrived soon after. Mr Reihana was armed with a pistol. He fired two shots. Those bullets were later recovered from the wall behind where the victim and a staff member had been seated. In that case Moore J took a five-year, six month starting point.
[56] Mr Westgate, on your behalf submits those cases involve more serious offending because they engage higher levels of premeditation and potential danger. He referred me to R v Katene.12 There, in the context of an escalating inter-familial dispute, the two co-defendants drove to the other family’s property, one of them having said he was coming around to shoot members of the family. The primary offender fired several shots at members of the family but was himself seriously injured when he was run over by a member of the other family. A five-year starting point was adopted in respect of his offending, the Judge recognising a high degree of planning and an element of home invasion. That was then reduced by six months to a starting point to four years, six months’ imprisonment in recognition of there being provocation and because the defendant had suffered serious injuries.
[57] Mr Bell, what distinguishes your offending from the offending in the cases I have described is that you were stood over in what I describe as an armed robbery and
10 R v Hakeke [2013] NZHC 865.
11 R v Reihana [2023] NZHC 580.
12 R v Katenne HC Rotorua CRI-2008-063-4495, 23 April 2010. That decision was upheld on appeal in Katene v R [2010] NZCA 394.
you only came into possession of the firearm in response to that robbery. You set out that afternoon to sell cannabis, not to engage in a violent confrontation. It is accepted there was no planning or premeditation, and there was an element of provocation in your offending. Planning or premeditation of this offending is a serious aggravating factor, as is gang conflict, and I accept that neither of those factors arise in your offending.
[58] Mr Smith observes that your offending occurred in the context of a drug deal gone wrong but submits that does not reduce your culpability, he suggests it could be seen as aggravating your offending because you engaged in an act of vigilantism. There is some merit in that submission, but I temper the extent to which I place weight on that.
[59] Mr Smith has proposed a starting point of four years’ imprisonment. He had initially proposed a starting point slightly higher than that. I sense he is influenced by a media article he has referred to me this afternoon, which records that on 5 December a man was jailed having conducted an armed robbery when he was supposedly buying cannabis. That person has been identified as the same person who offended against you. Mr Smith accepts that information further supports the Crown’s agreement to the matters set out in the summary of facts as prepared for this sentence indication.
[60] Mr Westgate on your behalf submits the appropriate starting point is less than that. He encourages the Court to adopt a starting point of about three and a half years’ imprisonment.
[61] In my view your offending is less serious than that of Reihana where the offending occurred in the context of intergang tensions. Similarly, in Byles the offending occurred in the context of ongoing criminal underworld tensions. In both of those cases, the offender was deliberately armed with a loaded firearm, highlighting a level of culpable premeditation that is not present in your offending.
[62] On the other hand, I have to balance that against the fact that I cannot conceive of facts that would come closer to an act an attempted murder. I hope you understand how fortunate you are not to be facing a murder charge.
[63] Your offending graphically highlights the dangers that arise when young men are involved in drug dealing and that drug dealing is then linked to the use of firearms. It is shocking to the Court that persons purchasing cannabis in daylight hours would be armed with a loaded sawn-off shotgun. It is even more shocking a young man would become so incensed at having his cannabis stolen and having been the subject of an armed robbery, that in a busy public street in front of other road users and indeed CCTV cameras, he would chase those who have offended against him and fire a lethal weapon at close range on a public road not once, but twice. It seems very little value is placed on human life when drugs are involved.
[64] I accept your initial decision to pursue the victim, having disarmed those who offended against you was impulsive and you were acting under provocation. But, at the point you fired the shots, the victim presented no threat to you. You were not acting in self-defence. You were angry and I assess you were hell-bent on revenge for what had happened. What is alarming is that you did not come to your senses as you drove after the Mazda, and you did not do so having fired the first shot when surely you must have known that you were only a matter of inches from having killed your intended target.
[65] I do not doubt the victim and his associate are properly described as violent thugs involved in serious violent offending themselves. But, as you should by now understand, that cannot and does not justify your response.
[66] Having regard to the authorities, the aggravating factors I have identified but accepting you were acting under a degree of provocation, I have assessed the appropriate starting point for your offending to be one of four years’ imprisonment.
[67] Counsel do not propose there be any uplift to that starting point to reflect aggravating personal factors. I agree with that assessment. I have had a look at your criminal history but it does not include any convictions I would consider to be relevant to this offending.
Mitigating factors
[68] As regards mitigating factors, you are entitled to credit if you were to enter a guilty plea. Mr Westgate has submitted that should be the maximum of 25 per cent. Mr Smith submits it should be no more than 20 per cent.
[69] You were initially charged only with the attempted murder. That charge remains alive pending your response to the sentence indication. The alterative charge on which I give this indication was laid on 1 May 2023, so not long after you were first charged. When I granted you bail in May this year, Mr Smith made it clear that prosecution were content to accept your guilty plea to that charge and to abandon the more serious charge. At the bail hearing I indicated that a delay in your guilty plea would only diminish the credit you would get if a plea was ultimately entered. Your request for a sentence indication was only made recently.
[70] I accept Mr Westgate’s submission that you should still receive a significant credit for a guilty plea if it is entered, but any guilty plea will not be entered at the first reasonable opportunity. I would fix that credit as being at 20 per cent.
[71] Mr Westgate seeks a further deduction of around 10 per cent to reflect your youth and the fact that you have spent time on EM bail. I prefer to deal with each factor separately.
[72] At the time of the offending you were aged 25. Recently the Court of Appeal in Dickey v R13 acknowledged that neurological development may not be completed until the age of 25. The courts have accepted that a credit to reflect youth might be appropriate, recognising young persons behave and react differently from adults due to biological rather than behavioural or personality factors, and are more likely to act impulsively and to therefore have better prospects of rehabilitation than adult offenders. I agree your offending does broadly engage these principles, albeit at a lower level. Your reaction was impulsive and ill-considered. I would allow a discount of five per cent to reflect your age.
13 Dickey v R [2023] NZCA 2.
[73] I would allow a discrete discount to reflect the time you spent on EM bail. I understand you have been compliant with the conditions of your EM bail for the last six months or so since you were released. I would allow a deduction of about three months to reflect the time spent on EM bail.
Indication
[74] The formal indication Mr Bell I give is from a starting point of 48 months’ imprisonment, I would allow a deduction of 20 per cent for guilty plea, five per cent for youth and three months to reflect time spent on EM bail to date. That. I calculate would lead to an end sentence which I would round down to 33 months’ imprisonment. It may be there are other personal credits available at sentencing.
[75] Mr Bell, that sentence indication remains open for five working days. Mr Westgate on your behalf is to file a memorandum confirming your response to the indication.
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Eaton J
Solicitors:
RPB Law, Dunedin
Counsel:
J A Westgate, Barrister, Dunedin
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