Quin v Muir - [2024] NZHC 2475

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CIV-2023-419-351 [2024] NZHC 2475

BETWEEN
KARL THOMAS QUIN

Appellant

AND

BEVIN JOHN MUIR

Respondent

Hearing: 30 July 2024

Appearances:

N S Tabb for Appellant

R M J Hakaria for Respondent

Judgment:

30 August 2024

JUDGMENT OF O’GORMAN J

This judgment was delivered by me on 30 August 2024 at 1 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

…………………………………

Solicitors/Counsel:
Natalie Tabb, Barrister, Auckland Sharp Tudhope, Tauranga

QUIN v MUIR [2024] NZHC 2475 [30 August 2024]

[1] This is an appeal against the decision of Judge P R Spiller on 12 December 20231 which set aside a default judgment entered by Judge R G Marshall on 30 November 2022.2 Judge Marshall granted judgment for $99,402.31 in favour of Mr Quin against Mr Muir.

[2] Judge Spiller set aside the default judgment on the grounds that it constituted a miscarriage of justice because of an error on the part of Mr Muir’s solicitor in failing to file a statement of defence. Mr Quin appeals on the grounds that no miscarriage of justice occurred because there is no defence to the plaintiff’s claims and therefore the judgment should not have been set aside.

Factual background

[3] In early June 2021, the respondent listed a 1956 Chevrolet Belair for sale on Trade Me. The listing described the car as “exceptionally tidy”, “ready to hop in and go cruising in comfort” and “just been through full certification…”.

[4] Mr Quin first made contact with the seller through the “Ask A Question” facility on the Trade Me website, to which the seller replied with his telephone number.

[5] A telephone conversation took place between Mr Quin and Mr Muir a day or two later. Mr Quin was told that the vehicle had a current warrant of fitness and had been certified by the low volume vehicle technical association. There was a discussion about the condition of the vehicle. Mr Quin alleges that he was told the vehicle was in “good condition”, whereas Mr Muir says that the answer was that everyone’s opinion on condition is different. Nothing in the advertisement or the conversation indicated that the vehicle had any defects or material issues of concern.

[6] Mr Quin was the highest bidder and purchased the vehicle for $80,600. He paid the purchase price and took possession in person in Thames (he declined the opportunity of a test drive). He transported the vehicle to Kerikeri on a vehicle trailer.

1 Quin v Muir [2023] NZDC 27547.
2 Quin v Muir DC Thames CIV-2022-075-63, 30 November 2022.

[7] Within the first few days Mr Quin and Mr Muir exchanged texts in which Mr Quin said, “love the car, awesome”, and “Been taking it to work every day removed plates on exhaust sounds good … just love it led bulbs in it now”.

[8] However, by 29 June 2021, the appellant experienced problems with the vehicle…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2024] NZHC 2475
Decision Date: 30 August 2024

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Karl Quin appeals against the decision of the District Court to set aside a default judgment in his favour. The default judgment was entered by Judge Marshall and subsequently set aside by Judge Spiller on the basis of a miscarriage of justice due to an error by the respondent's solicitor in not filing a statement of defence. Quin argues that the default judgment should not have been set aside as there is no defence to his claims. The court must determine whether setting aside the default judgment constitutes a miscarriage of justice, considering whether there is a substantial ground of defence and whether the delay in presenting the defence is excusable.

The court considers the three causes of action pleaded by Quin: breach of contract, misrepresentation, and mistake. The court finds that the issues of express or implied terms, as well as misrepresentation and the right of cancellation, involve disputed facts that cannot be determined in the context of the appeal. The court notes that the respondent's reliance on affirmation or acceptance under the sale of goods provisions was not properly considered in the District Court. The court also finds that the cause of action for mistake is not established on the undisputed evidence, as it requires actual knowledge of the mistake by the other party. Furthermore, the court dismisses the new cause of action for total failure of consideration as it was not pleaded.

The court concludes that there are arguable grounds of defence that turn on disputed factual issues, the delay in presenting the defence is reasonably explained, and Quin will not suffer irreparable injury if the default judgment is set aside. The court therefore dismisses the appeal, upholding the decision to set aside the default judgment.

Orders